09 February 2019

Mental Models VI

“The intellectual capacity thinks the forms in the phantasmata (mental images) […] And for the following reason, as without having perceptual awareness no one could either learn or understand anything, so when one engages in intellectual activity one must at that time do so by means of a phantasma. For, phantasmata are just as perceptual states (aisthemata) are [in actual external perception] but without matter.” (Aristotle, “De Anima” III, cca. 350 BC)

“Nor is it enough to say that the intelligible notions formed by the active intellect subsist somehow in the phantasmata (mental image), which are certainly intrinsic to us; for as we have already observed in treating the passive intellect, objects only become actually intelligible when abstracted from phantasmata; so that merely by way of the phantasmata, we cannot attribute the work of the active intellect to ourselves” (St. Thomas Aquinas, “De Anima” III, cca. 1268) [On Aristotle's phantasmata]

“From all this I am beginning to have a rather better understanding of what I am. But it still appears - and I cannot stop thinking this - that the corporeal things of which images are formed in my thought, and which the senses investigate, are known with much more distinctness than this puzzling 'I' which cannot be pictured in the imagination.” (René Descartes, “Meditations” II, 1641)

“For after the object is removed, or the eye shut, we still retain an image of the thing seen, though more obscure than when we see it. And this is it the Latins call imagination, from the image made in seeing, and apply the same, though improperly, to all the other senses. But the Greeks call it fancy, which signifies appearance, and is as proper to one sense as to another. IMAGINATION, therefore, is nothing but decaying sense; and is found in men and many other living creatures, as well sleeping as waking.” (Thomas Hobbes, “Leviathan: The Matter, Form and Power of a Commonwealth  Ecclesiastical and Civil”, 1651)

“It is also only by virtue of the continual action of God upon us that we have in our soul the ideas of all things; that is to say, since every effect expresses its cause, the essence of our soul is a certain expression, imitation or image of the divine essence, thought, and will and of all the ideas which are comprised in God.“ (Gottfried W Leibniz, “Discourse on Metaphysics”, 1686)

“As in a block of marble all possible figures are potentially contained in it, and can be drawn out of it by the movement or by the action of the chisel, so in the same way all intelligible figures are potentially in intelligible extension and are discovered in it according to the different ways in which this extension is represented to the mind, as a consequence of the general laws which God has established according to which he continuously acts in us. “ (Nicolas Malebranche , “Dialogues On Metaphysics And Religion”, 1688)

“But to form the idea of an object, and to form an idea simply is the same thing; the reference of the idea to an object being an extraneous denomination, of which in itself it bears no mark or character. Now as it is impossible to form an idea of an object, that is possessed of quantity and quality, and yet is possessed of no precise degree of either; it follows, that there is an equal impossibility of forming an idea, that is not limited and confined in both these particulars. Abstract ideas are therefore in themselves individual, however they may become general in their representation. The image in the mind is only that of a particular object, though the application of it in our reasoning be the same, as if it were universal.” (David Hume, “Treatise of Human Nature”, 1738)

“While all that we have is a relation of phenomena, a mental image, as such, in juxtaposition with or soldered to a sensation, we can not as yet have assertion or denial, a truth or a falsehood. We have mere reality, which is, but does not stand for anything, and which exists, but by no possibility could be true. […] the image is not a symbol or idea. It is itself a fact, or else the facts eject it. The real, as it appears to us in perception, connects the ideal suggestion with itself, or simply expels it from the world of reality. […] you possess explicit symbols all of which are universal and on the other side you have a mind which consists of mere individual impressions and images, grouped by the laws of a mechanical attraction.” (Francis H Bradley, "Principles of Logic", 1883)

“Memory-images, it is true, cannot be directly aroused through external sense impressions, but follow them after a longer or shorter interval. Still, it is obvious that their attributes, and especially their relation to the primary ideas through direct impressions, can be most accurately be learned, not by waiting for their chance arrival, but by using such memory-ideas as may be aroused in a systematic, experimental way, through immediately preceding impressions.” (Wilhelm M Wundt, “Outlines of Psychology”, 1897)

“In perception, a knowledge forms itself slowly; in the [mental] image the knowledge is immediate. We see now that the image is a synthetic act which unites a concrete, nonimagined, knowledge to elements which are more actually representative. The image teaches nothing: it is organized exactly like the objects which do produce knowledge, but it is complete at the very moment of its appearance. […] Thus, the object presents itself in the image as having to be apprehended in a multiplicity of synthetic acts. Due to this fact, and because its content retains a sensible opacity, like a phantom, because it does not involve either essences or generating laws but only an irrational quality, it gives the impression of being an object of observation: from this point of view the image appears to be more like a perception than a concept.” (Jean-Paul Sartre, “The Psychology of Imagination”, 1940)

See also:
Mental Models I, II, III, IVV, VII, VIII

No comments:

Post a Comment

Related Posts Plugin for WordPress, Blogger...

On Data: Longitudinal Data

  "Longitudinal data sets are comprised of repeated observations of an outcome and a set of covariates for each of many subjects. One o...