"All physicists agree that the problem of physics consists in tracing the phenomena of nature back to the simple laws of mechanics.” (Heinrich Hertz, "The Principles of Mechanics Presented in a New Form", 1894)
"Experience is the collecting of what is similar in different particular perceptions." (Heinrich Hertz, "The Principles of Mechanics Presented in a New Form", 1894)
"For our purpose it is not necessary that they [images] should be in conformity with the things in any other respect whatever. As a matter of fact, we do not know, nor have we any means of knowing, whether our conceptions of things are in conformity with them in any other than this one fundamental respect." (Heinrich Hertz, "The Principles of Mechanics Presented in a New Form", 1894)
"In this sense the fundamental ideas of mechanics, together with the principles connecting them, represent the simplest image which physics can produce of things in the sensible world and the processes which occur in it. By varying the choice of the propositions which we take as fundamental, we can give various representations of the principles of mechanics. Hence we can thus obtain various images of things; and these images we can test and compare with each other in respect of permissibility, correctness, and appropriateness." (Heinrich Hertz, "The Principles of Mechanics Presented in a New Form", 1894)
"It is a common and necessary feature of human intelligence that we can neither conceive of things nor define them conceptually without adding attributes to them that simply do not exist. This applies not only to every thought and imagination of ordinary life, even the sciences do not proceed otherwise. Only philosophy seeks and finds the difference between things that exist and things that we perceive, and also sees the necessity of this difference. […] What we add are therefore not incorrect conceptions but the conditions for such conceptions in general. We cannot simply remove them and replace them with better ones; either we must add them, or we must abstain from all conceptions of this kind." (Heinrich Hertz, "The Principles of Mechanics Presented in a New Form", 1894)
"Mature knowledge regards logical clearness as of prime importance: only logically clear images does it test as to correctness; only correct images does it compare as to appropriateness. By pressure of circumstances the process is often reversed. Images are found to be suitable for a certain purpose; are next tested as to their correctness ; and only in the last place purged of implied contradictions." (Heinrich Hertz, "The Principles of Mechanics Presented in a New Form", 1894)
"The images which we may form of things are not determined without ambiguity by the requirement that the consequents of the images must be the images of the consequents. Various images of the same objects are possible, and these images may differ in various respects. We should at once denote as inadmissible all images which implicitly contradict the laws of our thought. Hence we postulate in the first place that all our images shall be logically permissible or, briefly, that they shall be permissible. We shall denote as incorrect any permissible images, if their essential relations contradict the relations of external things, i.e. if they do not satisfy our first fundamental requirement. Hence we postulate in the second place that our images shall be correct. But two permissible and correct images of the same external objects may yet differ in respect of appropriateness. Of two images of the same object that is the more appropriate which pictures more of the essential relations of the object, the one which we may call the more distinct. Of two images of equal distinctness the more appropriate is the one which contains, in addition to the essential characteristics, the smaller number of superfluous or empty relations, the simpler of the two. Empty relations cannot be altogether avoided: they enter into the images because they are simply images, images produced by our mind and necessarily affected by the characteristics of its mode of portrayal." (Heinrich Hertz, "The Principles of Mechanics Presented in a New Form”, 1894)
"The most direct, and in a sense the most important, problem which our conscious knowledge of nature should enable us to solve is the anticipation of future events, so that we may arrange our present affairs in accordance with such anticipation. As a basis for the solution of this problem we always make use of our knowledge of events which have already occurred, obtained by chance observation or by prearranged experiment. In endeavouring thus to draw inferences as to the future from the past, we always adopt the following process. We form for ourselves images or symbols of external objects; and the form which we give them is such that the necessary consequents of the images in thought are always the images of the necessary consequents in nature of the things pictured. In order that this requirement may be satisfied, there must be a certain conformity between nature and our thought." (Heinrich Hertz, "The Principles of Mechanics Presented in a New Form", 1894)
"[…] we cannot a priori demand from nature simplicity, nor can we judge what in her opinion is simple. But with regard to images of our own creation we can lay down requirements. We are justified in deciding that if our images are well adapted to the things, the actual relations of the things must be represented by simple relations between the images. And if the actual relations between the things can only be represented by complicated relations, which are not even intelligible to an unprepared mind, we decide that those images are not sufficiently well adapted to the things. Hence our requirement of simplicity does not apply to nature, but to the images thereof which we fashion ; and our repugnance to a complicated statement as a fundamental law only expresses the conviction that, if the contents of the statement are correct and comprehensive, it can be stated in a simpler form by a more suitable choice of the fundamental conceptions." (Heinrich Hertz, "The Principles of Mechanics Presented in a New Form", 1894)
"One cannot escape the feeling that these mathematical formulas have an independent existence and an intelligence of their own, that they are wiser than we are, wiser even than their discoverers, that we get more out of them than was originally put into them." (Heinrich Hertz)
"The rigor of science requires that we distinguish well the undraped figure of nature itself from the gay-coloured vesture with which we clothe it at our pleasure." (Heinrich Hertz)
"This is often the way it is in physics - our mistake is not that we take our theories too seriously, but that we do not take them seriously enough. It is always hard to realize that these numbers and equations we play with at our desks have something to do with the real world." (Heinrich Hertz)
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