🪷On Mind: On Reasoning (1875-1899)

"The very genius of the common geometry as a method of reasoning - a system of investigation - is, that it is but a series of observations. The figure being before the eye in actual representation, or before the mind in conception, is so closely scrutinized, that all its distinctive features are perceived; auxiliary lines are drawn" (the imagination leading in this), and a new series of inspections is made; and thus, by means of direct, simple observations, the investigation proceeds." (Edward Olney, "Mathematics", The Cyclopedia of Education, 1877

"[…] it must be noticed that these diagrams do not naturally harmonize with the propositions of ordinary life or ordinary logic. […] The great bulk of the propositions which we commonly meet with are founded, and rightly founded, on an imperfect knowledge of the actual mutual relations of the implied classes to one another. […] one very marked characteristic about these circular diagrams is that they forbid the natural expression of such uncertainty, and are therefore only directly applicable to a very small number of such propositions as we commonly meet with." (John Venn, "On the Diagrammatic and Mechanical Representation of Propositions and Reasonings", 1880)

"Symbolical reasoning may be said to have pretty much the same relation to ordinary reasoning that machine-labour has to manual labour. In the case of machine labour we see some ingeniously contrived arrangement of wheels, levers, &c., producing with speed and facility results which the hands of man without such aid could only accomplish slowly and with difficulty, or which they would be utterly powerless to accomplish at all. In the case of symbolical reasoning we find in an analogous manner some regular system of rules and formulae, easy to retain in the memory from their general symmetry and interdependence, economizing or superseding the labour of the brain, and enabling any ordinary mind to obtain by simple mechanical processes results which would be beyond the reach of the strongest intellect if left entirely to its own resources." (Hugh MacColl, Symbolical reasoning. Mind 5" (17), 1880)

"We endeavour to employ only symmetrical figures, such as should not only be an aid to reasoning, through the sense of sight, but should also be to some extent elegant in themselves." (John Venn, "Symbolic Logic", 1881)

"[…] deduction consists in constructing an icon or diagram the relations of whose parts shall present a complete analogy with those of the parts of the object of reasoning, of experimenting upon this image in the imagination, and of observing the result so as to discover unnoticed and hidden relations among the parts." (Charles S Peirce, 1885)

"I call a sign which stands for something merely because it resembles it, an icon. Icons are so completely substituted for their objects as hardly to be distinguished from them. Such are the diagrams of geometry. A diagram, indeed, so far as it has a general signification, is not a pure icon; but in the middle part of our reasonings we forget that abstractness in great measure, and the diagram is for us the very thing. So in contemplating a painting, there is a moment when we lose the consciousness that it is not the thing, the distinction of the real and the copy disappears, and it is for the moment a pure dream, - not any particular existence, and yet not general. At that moment we are contemplating an icon." (Charles S Peirce, "On The Algebra of Logic : A Contribution to the Philosophy of Notation" in The American Journal of Mathematics 7, 1885)

"There is no more remarkable feature in the mathematical theory of probability than the manner in which it has been found to harmonize with, and justify, the conclusions to which mankind have been led, not by reasoning, but by instinct and experience, both of the individual and of the race. At the same time it has corrected, extended, and invested them with a definiteness and precision of which these crude, though sound, appreciations of common sense were till then devoid." (Morgan W Crofton, "Probability", Encyclopaedia Britannica 9th Ed,, 1885)

 "The theory most prevalent among teachers is that mathematics affords the best training for the reasoning powers; […] The modem, and to my mind true, theory is that mathematics is the abstract form of the natural sciences; and that it is valuable as a training of the reasoning powers, not because it is abstract, but because it is a representation of actual things." (Truman H Safford, "Mathematical Teaching and Its Modern Methods", 1886)

"There are three aspects of thinking as more or less complete stages of it. These are, conception, judgment, and reasoning. They are not to be considered three distinct acts; not even three successive stages. No one of them could occur without each of the others." (John Dewey, "Psychology", 1887) 

"There is probably no other science which presents such different appearances to one who cultivates it and one who does not, as mathematics. To [the noncultivator] it is ancient, venerable, and complete; a body of dry, irrefutable, unambiguous reasoning. To the mathematician, on the other hand, his science is yet in the purple bloom of vigorous youth, everywhere stretching out after the 'attainable but unattained', and full of the excitement of nascent thoughts; its logic is beset with ambiguities, and its analytic processes, like Bunyan's road, have a quagmire on one side and a deep ditch on the other, and branch off into innumerable by-paths that end in a wilderness." (Charles H Chapman, Bulletin of the New York Mathematical Society 2, 1892) 

"[…] geometry is the art of reasoning well from badly drawn figures; however, these figures, if they are not to deceive us, must satisfy certain conditions; the proportions may be grossly altered, but the relative positions of the different parts must not be upset." (Henri Poincaré, 1895)

"Deduction is that mode of reasoning which examines the state of things asserted in the premises, forms a diagram of that state of things, perceives in the parts of the diagram relations not explicitly mentioned in the premises, satisfies itself by mental experiments upon the diagram that these relations would always subsist, or at least would do so in a certain proportion of cases, and concludes their necessary, or probable, truth." (Charles S Peirce,"Kinds of Reasoning", cca. 1896)

"A system is a set of objects compromising all that stands to one another in a group of connected relations." (Charles S Peirce, "Cambridge Lectures on Reasoning and the Logic of Things: Detached Ideas on Vitally Important Topics", 1898) 

"The ideal of mathematics should be to erect a calculus to facilitate reasoning in connection with every province of thought, or of external experience, in which the succession of thoughts, or of events can be definitely ascertained and precisely stated. So that all serious thought which is not philosophy, or inductive reasoning, or imaginative literature, shall be mathematics developed by means of a calculus." (Alfred N Whitehead,"Universal Algebra", 1898) 

"The whole of Mathematics consists in the organization of a series of aids to the imagination in the process of reasoning." (Alfred North Whitehead,"A Treatise on Universal Algebra", 1898)

"Many theorems are obvious upon looking at a moderately-sized figure; but the reasoning must be such as to convince the mind of their truth when, from excessive increase or diminution of the scale, the figures themselves have past the boundary even of imagination." (Augustus de Morgan, "On the Study and Difficulties of Mathematics", 1898)

"The ordinary logic has a great deal to say about genera and species, or in our nineteenth century dialect, about classes. Now a class is a set of objects compromising all that stand to one another in a special relation of similarity. But where ordinary logic talks of classes the logic of relatives talks of systems. A system is a set of objects compromising all that stands to one another in a group of connected relations. Induction according to ordinary logic rises from the contemplation of a sample of a class to that of a whole class; but according to the logic of relatives it rises from the contemplation of a fragment of a system to the envisagement of the complete system." (Charles S Peirce, "Cambridge Lectures on Reasoning and the Logic of Things: Detached Ideas on Vitally Important Topics", 1898) 

"Logic sometimes makes monsters. For half a century we have seen a mass of bizarre functions which appear to be forced to resemble as little as possible honest functions which serve some purpose. More of continuity, or less of continuity, more derivatives, and so forth. Indeed, from the point of view of logic, these strange functions are the most general; on the other hand those which one meets without searching for them, and which follow simple laws appear as a particular case which does not amount to more than a small corner. In former times when one invented a new function it was for a practical purpose; today one invents them purposely to show up defects in the reasoning of our fathers and one will deduce from them only that. If logic were the sole guide of the teacher, it would be necessary to begin with the most general functions, that is to say with the most bizarre. It is the beginner that would have to be set grappling with this teratologic museum." (Henri Poincaré, 1899)

🪷On Mind: On Reasoning (1850-1874)

"The reasoning of mathematicians is founded on certain and infallible principles. Every word they use conveys a determinate idea, and by accurate definitions they excite the same ideas in the mind of the reader that were in the mind of the writer. When they have defined the terms they intend to make use of, they premise a few axioms, or self-evident principles, that every one must assent to as soon as proposed. They then take for granted certain postulates, that no one can deny them, such as, that a right line may be drawn from any given point to another, and from these plain, simple principles they have raised most astonishing speculations, and proved the extent of the human mind to be more spacious and capacious than any other science." (John Adams,"Diary", 1850)

"The discovery of truth is prevented more effectively, not by the false appearance things present and which mislead into error, not directly by weakness of the reasoning powers, but by preconceived opinion, by prejudice." (Arthur Schopenhauer, "Parerga and Paralipomena", 1851)

"Reasoning from analogy is often most plausible and most deceptive." (Charles Simmons, "A Laconic Manual and Brief Remarker", 1852)

"To deduce the laws of the symbols of Logic from a consideration of those operations of the mind which are implied in the strict use of language as an instrument of reasoning." (George Boole, "An Investigation of the Laws of Thought", 1854)

 "It has long been a complaint against mathematicians that they are hard to convince: but it is a far greater disqualification both for philosophy, and for the affairs of life, to be too easily convinced; to have too low a standard of proof. The only sound intellects are those which, in the first instance, set their standards of proof high. Practice in concrete affairs soon teaches them to make the necessary abatement: but they retain the consciousness, without which there is no sound practical reasoning, that in accepting inferior evidence because there is no better to be had, they do not by that acceptance raise it to completeness." (John S Mill, "An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy", 1865)

"[...] observation is the mind's support in reasoning [...]" (Claude Bernard, "An Introduction to the Study of Experimental Medicine", 1865)

"An anticipative idea or an hypothesis is, then, the necessary starting point for all experimental reasoning. Without it, we could not make any investigation at all nor learn anything; we could only pile up sterile observations. If we experiment without a preconceived idea, we should move at random […]" (Claude Bernard, "An Introduction to the Study of Experimental Medicine", 1865)

"Considered by itself, the experimental method is nothing but reasoning by whose help we methodically submit our ideas to experience, - the experience of facts." (Claude Bernard, "An Introduction to the Study of Experimental Medicine", 1865)

"Every process of what has been called Universal Geometry - the great creation of Descartes and his successors, in which a single train of reasoning solves whole classes of problems at once, and others common to large groups of them - is a practical lesson in the management of wide generalizations, and abstraction of the points of agreement from those of difference among objects of great and confusing diversity, to which the purely inductive sciences cannot furnish many superior. Even so elementary an operation as that of abstracting from the particular configuration of the triangles or other figures, and the relative situation of the particular lines or points, in the diagram which aids the apprehension of a common geometrical demonstration, is a very useful, and far from being always an easy, exercise of the faculty of generalization so strangely imagined to have no place or part in the processes of mathematics." (John S Mill, "An Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy", 1865)

"If the facts used as a basis of reasoning are ill-established or erroneous, everything will crumble or be falsified; and it is thus that errors in scientific theories most often originate in errors of fact." (Claude Bernard, "An Introduction to the Study of Experimental Medicine", 1865)

"It has long been a complaint against mathematicians that they are hard to convince: but it is a far greater disqualification both for philosophy, and for the affairs of life, to be too easily convinced; to have too low a standard of proof. The only sound intellects are those which, in the first instance, set their standards of proof high. Practice in concrete affairs soon teaches them to make the necessary abatement: but they retain the consciousness, without which there is no sound practical reasoning, that in accepting inferior evidence because there is no better to be had, they do not by that acceptance raise it to completeness." (John S Mill, "An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy", 1865)

"Speaking concretely, when we say ‘making experiments or making observations’, we mean that we devote ourselves to investigation and to research, that we make attempts and trials in order to gain facts from which the mind, through reasoning, may draw knowledge or instruction. Speaking in the abstract, when we say, ‘relying on observation and gaining experience’, we mean that observation is the mind’s support in reasoning, and experience the mind’s support in deciding, or still better, the fruit of exact reasoning applied to the interpretation of facts. Observation, then, is what shows facts; experiment is what teaches about facts and gives experience in relation to anything." (Claude Bernard, "An Introduction to the Study of Experimental Medicine", 1865)"

"The degree in which each mind habitually substitutes signs for images will be, CETERIS PARIBUS [with other conditions remaining the same], the degree in which it is liable to error. This is not contradicted by the fact that mathematical, astronomical, and physical reasonings may, when complex, be carried on more successfully by the employment of signs; because in these cases the signs themselves accurately represent the abstractness of the relations. Such sciences deal only with relations, and not with objects; hence greater simplification ensures greater accuracy. But no sooner do we quit this sphere of abstractions to enter that of concrete things, than the use of symbols becomes a source of weakness. Vigorous and effective minds habitually deal with concrete images." (George H Lewes, "The Principles of Success in Literature", 1865)

"It has long been a complaint against mathematicians that they are hard to convince: but it is a far greater disqualification both for philosophy, and for the affairs of life, to be too easily convinced; to have too low a standard of proof. The only sound intellects are those which, in the first instance, set their standards of proof high. Practice in concrete affairs soon teaches them to make the necessary abatement: but they retain the consciousness, without which there is no sound practical reasoning, that in accepting inferior evidence because there is no better to be had, they do not by that acceptance raise it to completeness." (John S Mill, "An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy", 1865)

"Ideas are substitutions which require a secondary process when what is symbolized by them is translated into the images and experiences it replaces; and this secondary process is frequently not performed at all, generally only performed to a very small extent. Let anyone closely examine what has passed in his mind when he has constructed a chain of reasoning, and he will be surprised at the fewness and faintness of the images which have accompanied the ideas." (George H Lewes "Problems of Life and Mind", 1873)"

“Nor do I know any study which can compete with mathematics in general in furnishing matter for severe and continued thought. Metaphysical problems may be even more difficult; but then they are far less definite, and, as they rarely lead to any precise conclusion, we miss the power of checking our own operations, and of discovering whether we are thinking and reasoning or merely fancying and dreaming." (Isaac Todhunter,"Conflict of Studies and Other Essays", 1873)

"With Algebra we enter a new sphere, that of symbolical quantities; here letters are symbols of any values we please; all we deal with in them is the relations of equality which the letters symbolise. Although the values are changeable, jet, once assigned, they must remain fixed throughout the operation. Illogical reasoning, in philosophic as in ordinary minds, is not due to any irregularity in the normal operation, but to a departure &om the values assigned." (George H Lewes "Problems of Life and Mind", 1873)

"By deductive reasoning and calculation, we must endeavor to anticipate such new phenomena, especially those of a singular and exceptional nature, as would necessarily happen if the hypothesis be true." (William S Jevons, "The Principles of Science: A Treatise on Logic and Scientific Method", 1874) 

"Deduction is certain and infallible, in the sense that each step in deductive reasoning will lead us to some result, as certain as the law itself. But it does not follow that deduction will lead the reasoner to every result of a law or combination of laws." (William S Jevons, "The Principles of Science: A Treatise on Logic and Scientific Method", 1874)

"It must be the ground of all reasoning and inference that what is true of one thing will be true of its equivalent, and that under carefully ascertained conditions Nature repeats herself." (William S Jevons, "The Principles of Science: A Treatise on Logic and Scientific Method", 1874)

"Numerical facts, like other facts, are but the raw materials of knowledge, upon which our reasoning faculties must be exerted in order to draw forth the principles of nature. [...] Numerical precision is the soul of science [...]" (William S Jevons, "The Principles of Science: A Treatise on Logic and Scientific Method", 1874)

🪷On Mind: On Reasoning (1825-1949)

"It is true that of far the greater part of things, we must content ourselves with such knowledge as description may exhibit, or analogy supply; but it is true likewise, that these ideas are always incomplete, and that at least, till we have compared them with realities, we do not know them to be just. As we see more, we become possessed of more certainties, and consequently gain more principles of reasoning, and found a wider base of analogy." (Samuel Johnson, 1825)

"Geometry is a true natural science: - only more simple, and therefore more perfect than any other. We must not suppose that, because it admits the application of mathematical analysis, it is therefore a purely logical science, independent of observation. Everybody studied by geometers presents some primitive phenomena which, not being discoverable by reasoning, must be due to observation alone." (Auguste Comte,"Course of Positive Philosophy", 1830)  "

"The errors which arise from the absence of facts are far more numerous and more durable than those which result from unsound reasoning respecting true data." (Charles Babbage, "On the Economy of Machinery and Manufactures", 1832)

"Every syllogism, then, consists of three propositions; the two first of which are called the premises and the third the conclusion. Now, the advantage of the all these [valid] forms to direct our reasoning is this, that if the premises are both true, the conclusion infallibly is so.This is likewise the only method of discovering unknown truths. Every truth must always be the conclusion of a syllogism, whose premises are indubitably true." (Leonhard Euler, "Letters of Euler on Different Subjects in Natural Philosophy Addressed to a German Princess" Vol. 1, 1833)

"Theories usually result from the precipitate reasoning of an impatient mind which would like to be rid of phenomena and replace them with images, concepts, indeed often with mere words." (Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, "Maxims and Reflections", 1833) 

"Geometry is that of mathematical science which is devoted to consideration of form and size, and may be said to be the best and surest guide to study of all sciences in which ideas of dimension or space are involved. Almost all the knowledge required by navigators, architects, surveyors, engineers, and opticians, in their respective occupations, is deduced from geometry and branches of mathematics. All works of art are constructed according to the rules which geometry involves; and we find the same laws observed in the works of nature. The study of mathematics, generally, is also of great importance in cultivating habits of exact reasoning; and in this respect it forms a useful auxiliary to logic." (William Chambers & Robert Chambers, "Chambers's Information for the People" Vol. 2, 1835)

"Scientific Ideas can often be adequately exhibited for all the purposes of reasoning, by means of Definitions and Axioms; all attempts to reason by means of Definitions from common Notions, lead to empty forms or entire confusion." (William Whewell, "History of the Inductive Sciences from the Earliest to the Present Time", 1837)

"The connected course of reasoning by which any Geometrical truth is established is called a demonstration." (Robert Potts, "Euclid's Elements of Geometry", 1845)

🪷On Mind: On Reasoning (1800-1824)

"[…] although the symbol √-1 be beyond the power of arithmetical computation, the operations in which it is introduced are intelligible, and deserve, if any operations do, the name of reasoning." (Robert Woodhouse," On the necessary Truth of certain Conclusions obtained by Means of imaginary Quantities", 1801)

 "Mathematical science has been at times embarrassed with contradictions and paradoxes; yet they are not to be imputed to imaginary symbols, rather than to any other symbols invented for the purpose of rendering demonstration compendious, and expeditious. It may; however, be justly remarked, that mathematicians, neglecting to exercise mental superintendance, are too prone to trust to mechanical dexterity; and that some, instead of establishing the truth of conclusions on antecedent reasons, have endeavoured to prop it by imperfect analogies or mere algebraic forms. On the other hand, there are mathematicians, whose zeal for just reasoning has been alarmed at a verbal absurdity and, from a name improperly applied, or a definition incautiously given, l have been hurried to the precipitate conclusion, that operations with symbols of which the mind can form no idea, must necessarily be doubtful and unintelligible." (Robert Woodhouse," On the necessary Truth of certain Conclusions obtained by Means of imaginary Quantities", 1801)

 "The introduction of impossible quantities, is assigned as a great and primary cause of the evils under which mathematical science labours. During the operation of these quantities, it is said, all just reasoning is suspended, and the mind is bewildered by exhibitions that resemble the juggling tricks of mechanical dexterity." (Robert Woodhouse," On the necessary Truth of certain Conclusions obtained by Means of imaginary Quantities", 1801)

 "The operations performed with imaginary characters, though destitute of meaning themselves, are yet notes of reference to others which are significant. They, point out indirectly a method of demonstrating a certain property of the hyperbola, and then leave us to conclude from analogy, that the same property belongs also to the circle. All that we are assured of by the imaginary investigation is, that its conclusion may, with all the strictness of mathematical reasoning, be proved of the hyperbola; but if from thence we would transfer that conclusion to the circle, it must be in consequence of the principle just now mentioned. The investigation therefore resolves itself ultimately into an argument from analogy; and, after the strictest examination, will be found without any other claim to the evidence of demonstration." (Robert Woodhouse," On the necessary Truth of certain Conclusions obtained by Means of imaginary Quantities", 1801)

 "The symbol √-1 might arise from translating questions of which the statement involved a contradiction of ideas into algebraic language, and reasoning on them, as if they really admitted a solution." (Robert Woodhouse," On the necessary Truth of certain Conclusions obtained by Means of imaginary Quantities", 1801)

"Mathematical science has been at times embarrassed with contradictions and paradoxes; yet they are not to be imputed to imaginary symbols, rather than to any other symbols invented for the purpose of rendering demonstration compendious, and expeditious. It may; however, be justly remarked, that mathematicians, neglecting to exercise mental superintendance, are too prone to trust to mechanical dexterity; and that some, instead of establishing the truth of conclusions on antecedent reasons, have endeavoured to prop it by imperfect analogies or mere algebraic forms. On the other hand, there are mathematicians, whose zeal for just reasoning has been alarmed at a verbal absurdity and, from a name improperly applied, or a definition incautiously given, l have been hurried to the precipitate conclusion, that operations with symbols of which the mind can form no idea, must necessarily be doubtful and unintelligible." (Robert Woodhouse," On the necessary Truth of certain Conclusions obtained by Means of imaginary Quantities", 1801)

"The introduction of impossible quantities, is assigned as a great and primary cause of the evils under which mathematical science labours. During the operation of these quantities, it is said, all just reasoning is suspended, and the mind is bewildered by exhibitions that resemble the juggling tricks of mechanical dexterity." (Robert Woodhouse," On the necessary Truth of certain Conclusions obtained by Means of imaginary Quantities", 1801)

[…] although the symbol √-1 be beyond the power of arithmetical computation, the operations in which it is introduced are intelligible, and deserve, if any operations do, the name of reasoning." (Robert Woodhouse," On the necessary Truth of certain Conclusions obtained by Means of imaginary Quantities", 1801)

The introduction of impossible quantities, is assigned as a great and primary cause of the evils under which mathematical science labours. During the operation of these quantities, it is said, all just reasoning is suspended, and the mind is bewildered by exhibitions that resemble the juggling tricks of mechanical dexterity." (Robert Woodhouse," On the necessary Truth of certain Conclusions obtained by Means of imaginary Quantities", 1801)

The operations performed with imaginary characters, though destitute of meaning themselves, are yet notes of reference to others which are significant. They, point out indirectly a method of demonstrating a certain property of the hyperbola, and then leave us to conclude from analogy, that the same property belongs also to the circle. All that we are assured of by the imaginary investigation is, that its conclusion may, with all the strictness of mathematical reasoning, be proved of the hyperbola; but if from thence we would transfer that conclusion to the circle, it must be in consequence of the principle just now mentioned. The investigation therefore resolves itself ultimately into an argument from analogy; and, after the strictest examination, will be found without any other claim to the evidence of demonstration." (Robert Woodhouse," On the necessary Truth of certain Conclusions obtained by Means of imaginary Quantities", 1801)

 The Combinatorial Analysis is a branch of mathematics which teaches us to ascertain and exhibit all the possible ways in which a given number of things may be associated and mixed together; so that we may be certain that we have not missed any collection or arrangement of these things, that has not been enumerated. [...] Besides its uses in mathematical investigations, it not only enables us to form our ideas of the elegant compositions of design, but to contemplate the prodigious variety which constitutes the beauties of nature, and which arises from the combinations of objects, by their number, forms, color, and positions. It has a relation to every species of useful knowledge upon which the mind of man can be employed." (Peter Nicholson, "Essays on the Combinatorial Analysis", 1818) 

"Genius and science have burst the limits of space, and few observations, explained by just reasoning, have unveiled the mechanism of the universe. Would it not also be glorious for man to burst the limits of time, and, by a few observations, to ascertain the history of this world, and the series of events which preceded the birth of the human race?" (Georges Cuvier, "Essays on the Theory of the Earth", 1822)"

“Mathematical proofs, like diamonds, are hard and clear, and will be touched with nothing but strict reasoning." (John Locke, 1824)

🪷On Mind: On Reasoning (1750-1799)

"Especially when we investigate the general laws of Nature, induction has very great power; & there is scarcely any other method beside it for the discovery of these laws. By its assistance, even the ancient philosophers attributed to all bodies extension, figurability, mobility, & impenetrability; & to these properties, by the use of the same method of reasoning, most of the later philosophers add inertia & universal gravitation. Now, induction should take account of every single case that can possibly happen, before it can have the force of demonstration; such induction as this has no place in establishing the laws of Nature. But use is made of an induction of a less rigorous type ; in order that this kind of induction may be employed, it must be of such a nature that in all those cases particularly, which can be examined in a manner that is bound to lead to a definite conclusion as to whether or no the law in question is followed, in all of them the same result is arrived at; & that these cases are not merely a few. Moreover, in the other cases, if those which at first sight appeared to be contradictory, on further & more accurate investigation, can all of them be made to agree with the law; although, whether they can be made to agree in this way better than in any Other whatever, it is impossible to know directly anyhow. If such conditions obtain, then it must be considered that the induction is adapted to establishing the law." (Roger J Boscovich, "De Lege Continuitatis" ["On the law of continuity"], 1754)

"We think only through the medium of words. Languages are true analytical methods. Algebra, which is adapted to its purpose in every species of expression, in the most simple, most exact, and best manner possible, is at the same time a language and an analytical method. The art of reasoning is nothing more than a language well arranged." (Abbé de Condillac, "System of Logic", cca. 1781)

 "The mathematician pays not the least regard either to testimony or conjecture, but deduces everything by demonstrative reasoning, from his definitions and axioms. Indeed, whatever is built upon conjecture, is improperly called science; for conjecture may beget opinion, but cannot produce knowledge." (Thomas Reid, "Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man", 1785)

"In every chain of reasoning, the evidence of the last conclusion can be no greater than that of the weakest link of the chain, whatever may be the strength of the rest." (Thomas Reid, "Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man", 1785)

"In mathematics it [sophistry] had no place from the beginning: Mathematicians having had the wisdom to define accurately the terms they use, and to lay down, as axioms, the first principles on which their reasoning is grounded. Accordingly we find no parties among mathematicians, and hardly any disputes." (Thomas Reid, "Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man", 1785)

"In metaphysical reasoning, the process is always short. The conclusion is but a step or two, seldom more, from the first principles or axioms on which it is grounded, and the different conclusions depend not one upon another.

"It is otherwise in mathematical reasoning. Here the field has no limits. One proposition leads on to another, that to a third, and so on without end. If it should be asked, why demonstrative reasoning has so wide a field in mathematics, while, in other abstract subjects, it is confined within very narrow limits, I conceive this is chiefly owing to the nature of quantity, […] mathematical quantities being made up of parts without number, can touch in innumerable points, and be compared in innumerable different ways." (Thomas Reid, "Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man", 1785)

"The mathematician pays not the least regard either to testimony or conjecture, but deduces everything by demonstrative reasoning, from his definitions and axioms. Indeed, whatever is built upon conjecture, is improperly called science; for conjecture may beget opinion, but cannot produce knowledge." (Thomas Reid, "Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man", 1785)

"The reader will find no figures in this work. The methods which I set forth do not require either constructions or geometrical or mechanical reasonings: but only algebraic operations, subject to a regular and uniform rule of procedure." (Joseph-Louis de Lagrange, "Mechanique Analytique", 1788)

 "The only method of preventing such errors from taking place, and of correcting them when formed, is to restrain and simplify our reasoning as much as possible. This depends entirely upon ourselves, and the neglect of it is the only source of our mistakes." " (Antoine-Laurent de Lavoisier, "Elements of Chemistry in a New Systematic Order", 1790)

 "We think only through the medium of words. Languages are true analytical methods. Algebra, which is adapted to its purpose in every species of expression, in the most simple, most exact, and best manner possible, is at the same time a language and an analytical method. The art of reasoning is nothing more than a language well arranged." (Antoine-Laurent Lavoisier,"Elements of Chemistry", 1790)

"We must trust to nothing but facts: These are presented to us by Nature, and cannot deceive. We ought, in every instance, to submit our reasoning to the test of experiment, and never to search for truth but by the natural road of experiment and observation." (Antoin-Laurent de Lavoisiere, "Elements of Chemistry", 1790)

[...] mathematicians obtain the solution of a problem by the mere arrangement of data, and by reducing their reasoning to such simple steps, to conclusions so very obvious, as never to lose sight of the evidence which guides them." (Antoine-Laurent Lavoisier, "Elements of Chemistry In a New Systematic Order", 1790)

We must trust to nothing but facts: These are presented to us by Nature, and cannot deceive. We ought, in every instance, to submit our reasoning to the test of experiment, and never to search for truth but by the natural road of experiment and observation." (Antoine Lavoisier, "Elements of Chemistry", 1790)

We ought, in every instance, to submit our reasoning to the test of experiment, and never to search for truth but by the natural road of experiment and observation." (Antoine-Laurent Lavoisier, "Elements of Chemistry in a New Systematic Order", 1790)

In mathematics, such processes [of reasoning] are much longer than in any other science; and hence the study of it is peculiarly calculated to strengthen the power of steady and concatenated thinking, - a power which, in all the pursuits of life, whether speculative or active, is one of the most valuable endowments we can possess. This command of attention, however, it may be proper to add, is to be acquired, not by the practice of modern methods, but by the study of Greek geometry, more particularly, by accustoming ourselves to pursue long trains of demonstration, without availing ourselves of the aid of any sensible diagrams; the thoughts being directed solely by those ideal delineations which the powers of conception and of memory enable us to form." (Dugald Stewart, "Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind", 1792)

"Whoever limits his exertions to the gratification of others, whether by personal exhibition, as in the case of the actor and of the mimic, or by those kinds of literary composition which are calculated for no end but to please or to entertain, renders himself, in some measure, dependent on their caprices and humours. The diversity among men, in their judgments concerning the objects of taste, is incomparably greater than in their speculative conclusions; and accordingly, a mathematician will publish to the world a geometrical demonstration, or a philosopher, a process of abstract reasoning, with a confidence very different from what a poet would feel, in communicating one of his productions even to a friend." (Dugald Stewart, "Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind", 1792)

🪷On Mind: On Reason (1725-1749)

"For chemistry is no science form’d à priori; ’tis no production of the human mind, framed by reasoning and deduction: it took its rise from a number of experiments casually made, without any expectation of what follow’d; and was only reduced into an art or system, by collecting and comparing the effects of such unpremeditated experiments, and observing the uniform tendency thereof. So far, then, as a number of experimenters agree to establish any undoubted truth; so far they may be consider'd as constituting the theory of chemistry." (Hermann Boerhaave, "A New Method of Chemistry", 1727)

"[…] our reasonings about the wonderful and intricate operations of Nature are so full of uncertainty, that, as the wise-man truly observes, hardly do we guess aright at the things that are upon earth, and with labour do we find the things that are before us." (Stephen Hales, "Vegetable Staticks", 1727)

"It hath been an old remark, that Geometry is an excellent Logic. And it must be owned that when the definitions are clear; when the postulata cannot be refused, nor the axioms denied; when from the distinct contemplation and comparison of figures, their properties are derived, by a perpetual well-connected chain of consequences, the objects being still kept in view, and the attention ever fixed upon them; there is acquired a habit of reasoning, close and exact and methodical; which habit strengthens and sharpens the mind, and being transferred to other subjects is of general use in the inquiry after truth." (George Berkeley, "The Analyst; Or, A Discourse Addressed to an Infidel Mathematician", 1734)

"All the perceptions of the human mind resolve themselves into two distinct kinds, which I shall call impressions and ideas. The difference betwixt these consists in the degrees of force and liveliness, with which they strike upon the mind, and make their way into our thought or consciousness. Those perceptions, which enter with most force and violence, we may name impressions; and under this name I comprehend all our sensations, passions and emotions, as they make their first appearance in the soul. By ideas I mean the faint images of these in thinking and reasoning. I believe it will not be very necessary to employ many words in explaining this distinction." (David Hume, "A Treatise of Human Nature", 1738)

"But to form the idea of an object, and to form an idea simply is the same thing; the reference of the idea to an object being an extraneous denomination, of which in itself it bears no mark or character. Now as it is impossible to form an idea of an object, that is possessed of quantity and quality, and yet is possessed of no precise degree of either; it follows, that there is an equal impossibility of forming an idea, that is not limited and confined in both these particulars. Abstract ideas are therefore in themselves individual, however they may become general in their representation. The image in the mind is only that of a particular object, though the application of it in our reasoning be the same, as if it were universal." (David Hume, "Treatise of Human Nature", 1738)

 "Do not expect to arrive at certainty in every subject which you pursue. There are a hundred things wherein we mortals […] must be content with probability, where our best light and reasoning will reach no farther." (Isaac Watts," The Improvement of the Mind", 1741) 

 "It is not therefore the business of philosophy, in our present situation in the universe, to attempt to take in at once, in one view, the whole scheme of nature; but to extend, with great care and circumspection, our knowledge, by just steps, from sensible things, as far as our observations or reasonings from them will carry us, in our enquiries concerning either the greater motions and operations of nature, or her more subtile and hidden works." (Colin Maclaurin, "An Account of Sir Isaac Newton's Philosophical Discoveries, in Four Books", 1748)

It seems evident, that men are carried, by a natural instinct or prepossession, to repose faith in their senses; and that, without any reasoning, or even almost before the use of reason, we always suppose an external universe, which depends not on our perception, but would exist, though we and every sensible creature were absent or annihilated. […] It seems also evident, that, when men follow this blind and powerful instinct of nature, they always suppose the very images, presented by the senses, to be the external objects." (David Hume, "An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding", 1748)

There is no method of reasoning more common, and yet none more blameable, than, in philosophical disputes, to endeavour the refutation of any hypothesis, by a pretence of its dangerous consequences to religion and morality. When any opinion leads to absurdities, it is certainly false; but it is not certain that an opinion is false, because it is of dangerous consequence. Such topics, therefore, ought entirely to be forborne; as serving nothing to the discovery of truth, but only to make the person of an antagonist odious." (David Hume, "An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding", 1748) 

🪷On Mind: On Reason (1700-1724)

"The mathematics are the friends to religion, inasmuch as they charm the passions, restrain the impetuosity of the imagination, and purge the mind from error and prejudice. Vice is error, confusion and false reasoning; and all truth is more or less opposite to it. Besides, mathematical truth may serve for a pleasant entertainment for those hours which young men are apt to throw away upon their vices; the delightfulness of them being such as to make solitude not only easy but desirable." (John Arbuthnot, "An Essay on the Usefulness of Mathematical Learning", 1701)

"[…] even if someone refuses to admit infinite and infinitesimal lines in a rigorous metaphysical sense and as real things, he can still use them with confidence as ideal concepts" (notions ideales) which shorten his reasoning, similar to what we call imaginary roots in the ordinary algebra, for example, v-2." (Gottfried W Leibniz, [letter to Varignon], 1702)

“It is easy to perceive that the prodigious variety which appears both in the works of nature and in the actions of men, and which constitutes the greatest part of the beauty of the universe, is owing to the multitude of different ways in which its several parts are mixed with, or placed near, each other. But, because the number of causes that concur in producing a given event, or effect, is oftentimes so immensely great, and the causes themselves are so different one from another, that it is extremely difficult to reckon up all the different ways in which they may be arranged, or combined together, it often happens that men, even of the best understandings and the greatest circumspection, ale guilty of that fault in reasoning which the writers on logic call the insufficient, or imperfect enumeration of parts, or cases: insomuch that I will venture to assert, that this is the chief, and almost the only, source of the vast number of erroneous opinions, and those too very often in matters of great importance, which we are apt to form on all the subjects we reflect upon, whether they relate to the knowledge of nature, or the merits and motives of human actions. It must therefore be acknowledged, that that art which affords a cure to this weakness, or defect, of our understandings, and teaches us so to enumerate all the possible ways in which a given number of things may be mixed and combined together, that we may be certain that we have not omitted any one arrangement of them that can lead to the object of our inquiry, deserves to be considered as most eminently useful and worthy of our highest esteem and attention. And this is the business of the art, or doctrine of combinations." (Jakob Bernoulli,"Ars Conjectandi" [“The Art of Conjecturing"], 1713) 

"[...] this subject] has a relation to almost every species of useful knowledge that the mind of man can be employed upon." (Jacob Bernoulli,"Ars Conjectandi"[“The Art of Conjecturing"], 1713)

"There are two kinds of truths: those of reasoning and those of fact. The truths of reasoning are necessary and their opposite is impossible; the truths of fact are contingent and their opposites are possible." (Gottfried W Leibniz, "Monadology", 1714)

“Reasoning will never make a Man correct an ill Opinion, which by Reasoning he never acquired." ( Jonathan Swift,"A Letter to a Young Gentleman, Lately Enter’d Into Holy Orders by a Person of Quality", 1721)

🪷On Mind: On Reasoning (1600-1699)

"The long chains of simple and easy reasonings by means of which geometers are accustomed to reach the conclusions of their most difficult demonstrations, had led me to imagine that all things, to the knowledge of which man is competent, are mutually connected in the same way, and that there is nothing so far removed from us as to be beyond our reach, or so hidden that we cannot discover it, provided only we abstain from accepting the false for the true, and always preserve in our thoughts the order necessary for the deduction of one truth from another." (René Descartes, "Discourse on the Method", 1637)

"So there arise two kinds of variation: complexion [combinations] and situs [permutations]. And viewed in themselves, both complexion and situs belong to metaphysics, or to the science of whole and parts. If we look at their variability, however, that is, at the quantity of variation, we must turn to numbers and to arithmetic. I am inclined to think that the science of complexions pertains more to pure arithmetic, and that of situs to an arithmetic of figure." (Gottfried Leibniz,"Dissertatio de arte combinatoria" [“Dissertation on the Art of Combinations"], Leipzig, 1666)

"It is obvious that if we could find characters or signs suited for expressing all our thoughts as clearly and as exactly as arithmetic expresses numbers or geometry expresses lines, we could do in all matters, insofar as they are subject to reasoning, all that we can do in arithmetic and geometry." (Gottfried W Leibniz, 1677)

" Mathematics in gross, it is plain, are a grievance in natural philosophy, and with reason: for mathematical proofs, like diamonds, are hard as well as clear, and will be touched with nothing but strict reasoning. Mathematical proofs are out of the reach of topical arguments; and are not to be attacked by the equivocal use of words or declaration, that make so great a part of other discourses, - nay, even of controversies." (John Locke, "An Essay Concerning Human Understanding", 1690)

“Even the wisest and most prudent people often suffer from what Logicians call insufficient enumeration of cases." (Jacob Bernoulli , 1692)

"The Reader may here observe the Force of Numbers, which can be successfully applied, even to those things, which one would imagine are subject to no Rules. There are very few things which we know, which are not capable of being reduc’d to a Mathematical Reasoning; and when they cannot it’s a sign our knowledge of them is very small and confus’d; and when a Mathematical Reasoning can be had it’s as great a folly to make use of any other, as to grope for a thing in the dark, when you have a Candle standing by you." (John Arbuthnot, "Of the Laws of Chance", 1692)

🪷On Mind: On Reasoning (600-1499)

"To master this instrument the religious thinker must make a preliminary study of logic, just as the lawyer must study legal reasoning. This is no more heretical in the one case than in the other." (Averroes, "The Decisive Treatise", 1178)

"Reasoning draws a conclusion and makes us grant the conclusion, but does not make the conclusion certain, nor does it remove doubt so that the mind may rest on the intuition of truth, unless the mind discovers it by the path of experience.(Roger Bacon, "Opus Majus", cca. 1267)

"There are two modes of acquiring knowledge, namely, by reasoning and experience. Reasoning draws a conclusion and makes us grant the conclusion, but does not make the conclusion certain, nor does it remove doubt so that the mind may rest on the intuition of truth unless the mind discovers it by the path of experience." (Roger Bacon, Opus Majus", 1267)

"Geometry enlightens the intellect and sets one’s mind right. All of its proofs are very clear and orderly. It is hardly possible for errors to enter into geometrical reasoning, because it is well arranged and orderly. Thus, the mind that constantly applies itself to geometry is not likely to fall into error. In this convenient way, the person who knows geometry acquires intelligence." (Ibn Khaldun, "The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History", 1377)

"Geometry enlightens the intellect and sets one's mind right. All of its proofs are very clear and orderly. It is hardly possible for errors to enter into geometrical reasoning, because it is well arranged and orderly. Thus, the mind that constantly applies itself to geometry is not likely to fall into error. In this convenient way, the person who knows geometry acquires intelligence." (Ibn Khaldun, cca. 14th century)

"Among all the studies of natural causes and reasoning, Light chiefly delights the beholder; and among the great features of mathematics the certainty of its demonstrations is what preeminently tends to elevate the mind of the investigator: Perspective, therefore, might be preferred to all the discourses and systems of the human learning." (Leonardo da Vinci, 1497)

🪷On Mind: On Reasoning (-599)

"Analysis is the obtaining of the thing sought by assuming it and so reasoning up to an admitted truth; synthesis is the obtaining of the thing sought by reasoning up to the inference and proof of it." (Eudoxus, cca. 4th c. BC)

"But in synthesis, reversing the process, we start from the point which we reached last of all in the analysis, from the thing already known or admittedly true. We derive from it what preceded it in the analysis, and go on making derivations until, retracing our steps, we finally succeed in arriving at what is required. This procedure we call synthesis, or constructive solution, or progressive reasoning." (Pappus of Alexandria, cca. 4th c. BC)

"In analysis, we start from what is required, we take it for granted, and we draw consequences from it, and consequences from the consequences, till we reach a point that we can use as starting point in synthesis. For in analysis we assume what is required to be done as already done" (what is sought as already found, what we have to prove as true). We inquire from what antecedent the desired result could be derived; then we inquire again what could be the antecedent of that antecedent, and so on, until passing from antecedent to antecedent, we come eventually upon something already known or admittedly true. This procedure we call analysis, or solution backwards, or regressive reasoning." (Pappus of Alexandria, cca. 4th c. BC)

"It is evidently equally foolish to accept probable reasoning from a mathematician and to demand from a rhetorician demonstrative proofs." (Aristotle, cca. 4th c. BC)

"Thus, of all the honorable arts, which are carried out either naturally or proceed in imitation of nature, geometry takes the skill of reasoning as its field. It is hard at the beginning and difficult of access, delightful in its order, full of beauty, unsurpassable in its effect. For with its clear processes of reasoning it illuminates the field of rational thinking, so that it may be understood that geometry belongs to the arts or that the arts are from geometry." (Agennius Urbicus,"Controversies about Fields", cca. 4th c. BC)

[...] so external sensation is the image of this perception of the soul, which is in its essence truer and is a contemplation of forms alone without being affected. From these forms, from which the soul alone receives its lordship over the living being, come reasonings, and opinions and noetic acts; and this is precisely where ‘we’ are." (Plotinus, "Enneads", cca. 270 AD)