"In addition to this it [mathematics] provides its disciples with pleasures similar to painting and music. They admire the delicate harmony of the numbers and the forms; they marvel when a new discovery opens up to them an unexpected vista; and does the joy that they feel not have an aesthetic character even if the senses are not involved at all? […] For this reason I do not hesitate to say that mathematics deserves to be cultivated for its own sake, and I mean the theories which cannot be applied to physics just as much as the others." (Henri Poincaré, 1897)
"The use of figures is, above all, then, for the purpose of making known certain relations between the objects that we study, and these relations are those which occupy the branch of geometry that we have called Analysis Situs [that is, topology], and which describes the relative situation of points and lines on surfaces, without consideration of their magnitude." (Henri Poincaré, "Analysis Situs", Journal de l'Ecole Polytechnique 1, 1895)
"Experiment is the sole source of truth. It alone can teach us something new; it alone can give us certainty." (Henri Poincaré, "Science and Hypothesis", 1902)
"Mathematicians do not study objects, but the relations between objects; to them it is a matter of indifference if these objects are replaced by others, provided that the relations do not change. Matter does not engage their attention, they are interested by form alone." (Henri Poincaré, "Science and Hypothesis", 1902)
"Mathematicians therefore proceed 'by construction', they 'construct' more complicated combinations. When they analyse these combinations, these aggregates, so to speak, into their primitive elements, they see the relations of the elements and deduce the relations of the aggregates themselves. The process is purely analytical, but it is not a passing from the general to the particular, for the aggregates obviously cannot be regarded as more particular than their elements." (Henri Poincaré, "Science and Hypothesis", 1902)
"No theorem can be new unless a new axiom intervenes in its demonstration; reasoning can only give us immediately evident truths borrowed from direct intuition; it would only be an intermediary parasite." (Henri Poincaré, "Science and Hypothesis", 1902)
"New ideas emerge dimly into intuition, come into consciousness from nobody knows where, and become the material on which the mind operates, forging them gradually into consistent doctrine, which can be welded on to existing domains of knowledge. But this process is never complete: a crude connection can always be pointed to by a logician as an indication of the imperfection of human constructions." (Henri Poincaré, "Science and Hypothesis", 1902)
"One does not ask whether a scientific theory is true, but only whether it is convenient." (Henri Poincaré, "Science and Hypothesis", 1902)
"The aim of science is not things themselves, as the dogmatists in their simplicity imagine, but the relation between things." (Henri Poincaré, "Science and Hypothesis", 1902)
"One does not ask whether a scientific theory is true, but only whether it is convenient." (Henri Poincaré, "Science and Hypothesis", 1902)
"The aim of science is not things themselves, as the dogmatists in their simplicity imagine, but the relation between things." (Henri Poincaré, "Science and Hypothesis", 1902)
"[,,,] the mind has the faculty of creating symbols, and it is thus that it has constructed the mathematical continuum, which is only a particular system of symbols. The only limit to its power is the necessity of avoiding all contradiction; but the mind only makes use of it when experiment gives a reason for it." (Henri Poincaré, "Science and Hypothesis", 1902)
"The object of geometry is the study of a particular 'group'; but the general concept of group preexists in our minds, at least potentially. It is imposed on us not as a form of our sensitiveness, but as a form of our understanding; only, from among all possible groups, we must choose one that will be the standard, so to speak, to which we shall refer natural phenomena." (Henri Poincaré, "Science and Hypothesis", 1902)
"The state of a system at a given moment depends on two things - its initial state, and the law according to which that state varies. If we know both this law and this initial state, we have a simple mathematical problem to solve, and we fall back upon our first degree of ignorance. Then it often happens that we know the law and do not know the initial state. It may be asked, for instance, what is the present distribution of the minor planets? We know that from all time they have obeyed the laws of Kepler, but we do not know what was their initial distribution. In the kinetic theory of gases we assume that the gaseous molecules follow rectilinear paths and obey the laws of impact and elastic bodies; yet as we know nothing of their initial velocities, we know nothing of their present velocities. The calculus of probabilities alone enables us to predict the mean phenomena which will result from a combination of these velocities. This is the second degree of ignorance. Finally it is possible, that not only the initial conditions but the laws themselves are unknown. We then reach the third degree of ignorance, and in general we can no longer affirm anything at all as to the probability of a phenomenon. It often happens that instead of trying to discover an event by means of a more or less imperfect knowledge of the law, the events may be known, and we want to find the law; or that, instead of deducing effects from causes, we wish to deduce the causes." (Henri Poincaré, "Science and Hypothesis", 1902)
"There is not in Nature any system perfectly isolated, perfectly abstracted from all external action; but there are systems which are nearly isolated. If we observe such a system, we can study not only the relative motion of its different parts with respect to each other, but the motion of its centre of gravity with respect to the other parts of the universe." (Henri Poincaré, "Science and Hypothesis", 1902)
"To observe is not enough. We must use our observations, and to do that we must generalize." (Henri Poincaré, "Science and Hypothesis", 1902)
"So is not mathematical analysis then not just a vain game of the mind? To the physicist it can only give a convenient language; but isn't that a mediocre service, which after all we could have done without; and, it is not even to be feared that this artificial language be a veil, interposed between reality and the physicist's eye? Far from that, without this language most of the initimate analogies of things would forever have remained unknown to us; and we would never have had knowledge of the internal harmony of the world, which is, as we shall see, the only true objective reality." (Henri Poincaré, "The Value of Science", 1905)
"The chief end of mathematical instruction is to develop certain powers of the mind, and among these the intuition is not the least precious. By it the mathematical world comes in contact with the real world, and even if pure mathematics could do without it, it would always be necessary to turn to it to bridge the gulf between symbol and reality. The practician will always need it, and for one mathematician there are a hundred practicians. However, for the mathematician himself the power is necessary, for while we demonstrate by logic, we create by intuition; and we have more to do than to criticize others’ theorems, we must invent new ones, this art, intuition teaches us." (Henri Poincaré, "The Value of Science", 1905)
"The laws of nature are drawn from experience, but to express them one needs a special language: for, ordinary language is too poor and too vague to express relations so subtle, so rich, so precise. Here then is the first reason why a physicist cannot dispense with mathematics: it provides him with the one language he can speak […]. Who has taught us the true analogies, the profound analogies which the eyes do not see, but which reason can divine? It is the mathematical mind, which scorns content and clings to pure form." (Henri Poincaré, "The Value of Science", 1905)
"We believe that in our reasonings we no longer appeal to intuition; the philosophers will tell us this is an illusion. Pure logic could never lead us to anything but tautologies; it could create nothing new; not from it alone can any science issue. In one sense these philosophers are right; to make arithmetic, as to make geometry, or to make any science, something else than pure logic is necessary. To designate this something else we have no word other than intuition. But how many different ideas are hidden under this same word?" (Henri Poincaré , "Intuition and Logic in Mathematics", 1905)
"To observe is not enough. We must use our observations, and to do that we must generalize." (Henri Poincaré, "Science and Hypothesis", 1902)
"So is not mathematical analysis then not just a vain game of the mind? To the physicist it can only give a convenient language; but isn't that a mediocre service, which after all we could have done without; and, it is not even to be feared that this artificial language be a veil, interposed between reality and the physicist's eye? Far from that, without this language most of the initimate analogies of things would forever have remained unknown to us; and we would never have had knowledge of the internal harmony of the world, which is, as we shall see, the only true objective reality." (Henri Poincaré, "The Value of Science", 1905)
"The chief end of mathematical instruction is to develop certain powers of the mind, and among these the intuition is not the least precious. By it the mathematical world comes in contact with the real world, and even if pure mathematics could do without it, it would always be necessary to turn to it to bridge the gulf between symbol and reality. The practician will always need it, and for one mathematician there are a hundred practicians. However, for the mathematician himself the power is necessary, for while we demonstrate by logic, we create by intuition; and we have more to do than to criticize others’ theorems, we must invent new ones, this art, intuition teaches us." (Henri Poincaré, "The Value of Science", 1905)
"The laws of nature are drawn from experience, but to express them one needs a special language: for, ordinary language is too poor and too vague to express relations so subtle, so rich, so precise. Here then is the first reason why a physicist cannot dispense with mathematics: it provides him with the one language he can speak […]. Who has taught us the true analogies, the profound analogies which the eyes do not see, but which reason can divine? It is the mathematical mind, which scorns content and clings to pure form." (Henri Poincaré, "The Value of Science", 1905)
"We believe that in our reasonings we no longer appeal to intuition; the philosophers will tell us this is an illusion. Pure logic could never lead us to anything but tautologies; it could create nothing new; not from it alone can any science issue. In one sense these philosophers are right; to make arithmetic, as to make geometry, or to make any science, something else than pure logic is necessary. To designate this something else we have no word other than intuition. But how many different ideas are hidden under this same word?" (Henri Poincaré , "Intuition and Logic in Mathematics", 1905)
"Mathematical discoveries - small or great, and whatever their content (new subjects of research, divination of methods or of lines to follow, presentiments of truths and of solutions not yet demonstrated, etc.) - are never born by spontaneous generation. They always presuppose a ground sown with preliminary knowledge and well prepared by work both conscious and subconscious." (Henri Poincaré, [answer given as part of a questionnaire for 'L'Enseignement Mathématique'] cca. 1905-1908)
"Every definition implies an axiom, since it asserts the existence of the object defined. The definition then will not be justified, from the purely logical point of view, until we have proved that it involves no contradiction either in its terms or with the truths previously admitted." (Henri Poincaré," Science and Method", 1908)
"It is by logic that we prove, but by intuition that we discover. [...] Every definition implies an axiom, since it asserts the existence of the object defined. The definition then will not be justified, from the purely logical point of view, until we have proved that it involves no contradiction either in its terms or with the truths previously admitted." (Henri Poincaré, "Science and Method", 1908)
"The true method of foreseeing the future of mathematics is to study its history and its actual state." (Henri Poincaré, "Science and Method", 1908)
"Every definition implies an axiom, since it asserts the existence of the object defined. The definition then will not be justified, from the purely logical point of view, until we have proved that it involves no contradiction either in its terms or with the truths previously admitted." (Henri Poincaré," Science and Method", 1908)
"It is by logic that we prove, but by intuition that we discover. [...] Every definition implies an axiom, since it asserts the existence of the object defined. The definition then will not be justified, from the purely logical point of view, until we have proved that it involves no contradiction either in its terms or with the truths previously admitted." (Henri Poincaré, "Science and Method", 1908)
"The true method of foreseeing the future of mathematics is to study its history and its actual state." (Henri Poincaré, "Science and Method", 1908)
"To obtain a result of real value, it is not enough to grind out calculations or to have a machine to put things in order; it is not order alone, it is unexpected order, which is worth while. The machine may gnaw on the crude fact, the soul of the fact will always escape it. (Henri Poincaré," Science and Method", 1908)
"What, in fact, is mathematical discovery? It does not consist in making new combinations with mathematical entities that are already known. That can be done by anyone, and the combinations that could be so formed would be infinite in number, and the greater part of them would be absolutely devoid of interest. Discovery consists precisely in not constructing useless combinations, but in constructing those that are useful, which are an infinitely small minority. Discovery is discernment, selection." (Henri Poincaré, "Science and Method", 1908)
"Arithmetic does not present to us that feeling of continuity which is such a precious guide; each whole number is separate from the next of its kind and has in a sense individuality; each in a manner is an exception and that is why general theorems are rare in the theory of numbers; and that is why those theorems which may exist are more hidden and longer escape those who are searching for them." (Henri Poincaré, "Annual Report of the Board of Regents of the Smithsonian Institution", 1909)
"Mathematicians attach great importance to the elegance of their methods and their results. This is not pure dilettantism. What is it indeed that gives us the feeling of elegance in a solution, in a demonstration? It is the harmony of the diverse parts, their symmetry, their happy balance; in a word it is all that introduces order, all that gives unity, that permits us to see clearly and to comprehend at once both the ensemble and the details." (Henri Poincaré, "The Future of Mathematics", Monist Vol. 20, 1910)
"[...] what are the mathematic entities to which we attribute this character of beauty and elegance, and which are capable of developing in us a sort of esthetic emotion? They are those whose elements are harmoniously disposed so that the mind without effort can embrace their totality while realizing the details. This harmony 'is at once a satisfaction of our esthetic needs and an aid to the mind, sustaining and guiding." (Henri Poincaré, "Mathematical Creation", Monist Vol. 20, 1910)
"One can hardly give a satisfactory definition of probability." (Henri Poincaré, "Calcul des Probabilités", 1912)
"It may be surprising to see emotional sensibility invoked apropos of mathematical demonstrations which, it would seem, can interest only the intellect. This would be to forget the feeling of mathematical beauty, of the harmony of numbers and forms, of geometric elegance. This is a true esthetic feeling that all real mathematicians know, and surely it belongs to emotional sensibility." (Henri Poincaré, 1913)
"And here is what makes this analysis situs interesting to us; it is that geometric intuition really intervenes there. When, in a theorem of metric geometry, one appeals to this intuition, it is because it is impossible to study the metric properties of a figure as abstractions of its qualitative properties, that is, of those which are the proper business of analysis situs. It has often been said that geometry is the art of reasoning correctly from badly drawn figures. This is not a capricious statement; it is a truth that merits reflection. But what is a badly drawn figure? It is what might be executed by the unskilled draftsman spoken of earlier; he alters the properties more or less grossly; his straight lines have disquieting zigzags; his circles show awkward bumps. But this does not matter; this will by no means bother the geometer; this will not prevent him from reasoning." (Henri Poincaré, "Dernières pensées", 1913)
"But it is a third geometry from which quantity is completely excluded and which is purely qualitative; this is analysis situs. In this discipline, two figures are equivalent whenever one can pass from one to the other by a continuous deformation; whatever else the law of this deformation may be, it must be continuous. Thus, a circle is equivalent to an ellipse or even to an arbitrary closed curve, but it is not equivalent to a straight-line segment since this segment is not closed. A sphere is equivalent to any convex surface; it is not equivalent to a torus since there is a hole in a torus and in a sphere there is not. Imagine an arbitrary design and a copy of this same design executed by an unskilled draftsman; the properties are altered, the straight lines drawn by an inexperienced hand have suffered unfortunate deviations and contain awkward bends. From the point of view of metric geometry, and even of projective geometry, the two figures are not equivalent; on the contrary, from the point of view of analysis situs, they are.” (Henri Poincaré, “Dernières pensées”, 1913)
"Geometers usually distinguish two kinds of geometry, the first of which they qualify as metric and the second as projective. Metric geometry is based on the notion of distance; two figures are there regarded as equivalent when they are 'congruent' in the sense that mathematicians give to this word. Projective geometry is based on the notion of straight line; in order for two figures considered there to be equivalent, it is not necessary that they be congruent; it suffices that one can pass from one to the other by a projective transformation, that is, that one be the perspective of the other. This second body of study has often been called qualitative geometry, and in fact it is if one opposes it to the first; it is clear that measure and quantity play a less important role. This is not entirely so, however. The fact that a line is straight is not purely qualitative; one cannot assure himself that a line is straight without making measurements, or without sliding on this line an instrument called a straightedge, which is a kind of instrument of measure.” (Henri Poincaré, “Dernières pensées”, 1913)
"No matter how solidly founded a prediction may appear to us, we are never absolutely sure that experiment will not contradict it, if we undertake to verify it . […] It is far better to foresee even without certainty than not to foresee at all." (Henri Poincaré, "The Foundations of Science", 1913)
"Imagine any sort of model and a copy of it done by an awkward artist: the proportions are altered, lines drawn by a trembling hand are subject to excessive deviation and go off in unexpected directions. From the point of view of metric or even projective geometry these figures are not equivalent, but they appear as such from the point of view of geometry of position [that is, topology]." (Henri Poincaré, "Dernières pensées", 1920)
"[…] the feeling of mathematical beauty, of the harmony of numbers and of forms, of geometric elegance. It is a genuinely esthetic feeling, which all mathematicians know. And this is sensitivity." (Henri Poincaré)
"[…] the desire to understand nature has had on the development of mathematics the most important and happiest influence." (Henri Poincaré)
"A reality completely independent of the spirit that conceives it, sees it, or feels it, is an impossibility. A world so external as that, even if it existed, would be forever inaccessible to us." (Henri Poincaré)
"Let us notice first of all, that every generalization implies in some measure the belief in the unity and simplicity of nature." (Henri Poincaré)
"Mathematicians do not study objects, but relations between objects. Thus, they are free to replace some objects by others so long as the relations remain unchanged. Content to them is irrelevant: they are interested in form only." (Henri Poincaré)
"Mathematics is the art of giving the same name to different things. [As opposed to the quotation: Poetry is the art of giving different names to the same thing]. (Henri Poincaré)
"One would have to have completely forgotten the history of science so as to not remember that the desire to know nature has had the most constant and the happiest influence on the development of mathematics." (Henri Poincaré)
"Point set topology is a disease from which the human race will soon recover." (Henri Poincaré)
"The science of physics does not only give us [mathematicians] an oportunity to solve problems, but helps us also to discover the means of solving them, and it does this in two ways: it leads us to anticipate the solution and suggests suitable lines of argument." (Henri Poincaré)
"The scientist does not study nature because it is useful; he studies it because he delights in it, and he delights in it because it is beautiful. If nature were not beautiful, it would not be worth knowing, and if nature were not worth knowing, life would not be worth living. Of course I do not here speak of that beauty that strikes the senses, the beauty of qualities and appearances; not that I undervalue such beauty, far from it, but it has nothing to do with science; I mean that profounder beauty which comes from the harmonious order of the parts, and which a pure intelligence can grasp." (Henri Poincaré)
"What, in fact, is mathematical discovery? It does not consist in making new combinations with mathematical entities that are already known. That can be done by anyone, and the combinations that could be so formed would be infinite in number, and the greater part of them would be absolutely devoid of interest. Discovery consists precisely in not constructing useless combinations, but in constructing those that are useful, which are an infinitely small minority. Discovery is discernment, selection." (Henri Poincaré, "Science and Method", 1908)
"Arithmetic does not present to us that feeling of continuity which is such a precious guide; each whole number is separate from the next of its kind and has in a sense individuality; each in a manner is an exception and that is why general theorems are rare in the theory of numbers; and that is why those theorems which may exist are more hidden and longer escape those who are searching for them." (Henri Poincaré, "Annual Report of the Board of Regents of the Smithsonian Institution", 1909)
"Mathematicians attach great importance to the elegance of their methods and their results. This is not pure dilettantism. What is it indeed that gives us the feeling of elegance in a solution, in a demonstration? It is the harmony of the diverse parts, their symmetry, their happy balance; in a word it is all that introduces order, all that gives unity, that permits us to see clearly and to comprehend at once both the ensemble and the details." (Henri Poincaré, "The Future of Mathematics", Monist Vol. 20, 1910)
"[...] what are the mathematic entities to which we attribute this character of beauty and elegance, and which are capable of developing in us a sort of esthetic emotion? They are those whose elements are harmoniously disposed so that the mind without effort can embrace their totality while realizing the details. This harmony 'is at once a satisfaction of our esthetic needs and an aid to the mind, sustaining and guiding." (Henri Poincaré, "Mathematical Creation", Monist Vol. 20, 1910)
"One can hardly give a satisfactory definition of probability." (Henri Poincaré, "Calcul des Probabilités", 1912)
"It may be surprising to see emotional sensibility invoked apropos of mathematical demonstrations which, it would seem, can interest only the intellect. This would be to forget the feeling of mathematical beauty, of the harmony of numbers and forms, of geometric elegance. This is a true esthetic feeling that all real mathematicians know, and surely it belongs to emotional sensibility." (Henri Poincaré, 1913)
"And here is what makes this analysis situs interesting to us; it is that geometric intuition really intervenes there. When, in a theorem of metric geometry, one appeals to this intuition, it is because it is impossible to study the metric properties of a figure as abstractions of its qualitative properties, that is, of those which are the proper business of analysis situs. It has often been said that geometry is the art of reasoning correctly from badly drawn figures. This is not a capricious statement; it is a truth that merits reflection. But what is a badly drawn figure? It is what might be executed by the unskilled draftsman spoken of earlier; he alters the properties more or less grossly; his straight lines have disquieting zigzags; his circles show awkward bumps. But this does not matter; this will by no means bother the geometer; this will not prevent him from reasoning." (Henri Poincaré, "Dernières pensées", 1913)
"But it is a third geometry from which quantity is completely excluded and which is purely qualitative; this is analysis situs. In this discipline, two figures are equivalent whenever one can pass from one to the other by a continuous deformation; whatever else the law of this deformation may be, it must be continuous. Thus, a circle is equivalent to an ellipse or even to an arbitrary closed curve, but it is not equivalent to a straight-line segment since this segment is not closed. A sphere is equivalent to any convex surface; it is not equivalent to a torus since there is a hole in a torus and in a sphere there is not. Imagine an arbitrary design and a copy of this same design executed by an unskilled draftsman; the properties are altered, the straight lines drawn by an inexperienced hand have suffered unfortunate deviations and contain awkward bends. From the point of view of metric geometry, and even of projective geometry, the two figures are not equivalent; on the contrary, from the point of view of analysis situs, they are.” (Henri Poincaré, “Dernières pensées”, 1913)
"Geometers usually distinguish two kinds of geometry, the first of which they qualify as metric and the second as projective. Metric geometry is based on the notion of distance; two figures are there regarded as equivalent when they are 'congruent' in the sense that mathematicians give to this word. Projective geometry is based on the notion of straight line; in order for two figures considered there to be equivalent, it is not necessary that they be congruent; it suffices that one can pass from one to the other by a projective transformation, that is, that one be the perspective of the other. This second body of study has often been called qualitative geometry, and in fact it is if one opposes it to the first; it is clear that measure and quantity play a less important role. This is not entirely so, however. The fact that a line is straight is not purely qualitative; one cannot assure himself that a line is straight without making measurements, or without sliding on this line an instrument called a straightedge, which is a kind of instrument of measure.” (Henri Poincaré, “Dernières pensées”, 1913)
"No matter how solidly founded a prediction may appear to us, we are never absolutely sure that experiment will not contradict it, if we undertake to verify it . […] It is far better to foresee even without certainty than not to foresee at all." (Henri Poincaré, "The Foundations of Science", 1913)
"Imagine any sort of model and a copy of it done by an awkward artist: the proportions are altered, lines drawn by a trembling hand are subject to excessive deviation and go off in unexpected directions. From the point of view of metric or even projective geometry these figures are not equivalent, but they appear as such from the point of view of geometry of position [that is, topology]." (Henri Poincaré, "Dernières pensées", 1920)
"[…] the feeling of mathematical beauty, of the harmony of numbers and of forms, of geometric elegance. It is a genuinely esthetic feeling, which all mathematicians know. And this is sensitivity." (Henri Poincaré)
"[…] the desire to understand nature has had on the development of mathematics the most important and happiest influence." (Henri Poincaré)
"A reality completely independent of the spirit that conceives it, sees it, or feels it, is an impossibility. A world so external as that, even if it existed, would be forever inaccessible to us." (Henri Poincaré)
"Let us notice first of all, that every generalization implies in some measure the belief in the unity and simplicity of nature." (Henri Poincaré)
"Mathematicians do not study objects, but relations between objects. Thus, they are free to replace some objects by others so long as the relations remain unchanged. Content to them is irrelevant: they are interested in form only." (Henri Poincaré)
"Mathematics is the art of giving the same name to different things. [As opposed to the quotation: Poetry is the art of giving different names to the same thing]. (Henri Poincaré)
"One would have to have completely forgotten the history of science so as to not remember that the desire to know nature has had the most constant and the happiest influence on the development of mathematics." (Henri Poincaré)
"Point set topology is a disease from which the human race will soon recover." (Henri Poincaré)
"The science of physics does not only give us [mathematicians] an oportunity to solve problems, but helps us also to discover the means of solving them, and it does this in two ways: it leads us to anticipate the solution and suggests suitable lines of argument." (Henri Poincaré)
"The scientist does not study nature because it is useful; he studies it because he delights in it, and he delights in it because it is beautiful. If nature were not beautiful, it would not be worth knowing, and if nature were not worth knowing, life would not be worth living. Of course I do not here speak of that beauty that strikes the senses, the beauty of qualities and appearances; not that I undervalue such beauty, far from it, but it has nothing to do with science; I mean that profounder beauty which comes from the harmonious order of the parts, and which a pure intelligence can grasp." (Henri Poincaré)
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