"A spirit is one simple, undivided, active being: as it perceives ideas, it is called the understanding, and as it produces or otherwise operates about them, it is called the will. Hence there can be no idea formed of a soul or spirit: for all ideas whatever, being passive and inert, vide, they cannot represent unto us, by way of image or likeness, that which acts." (George Berkeley, "Principles of Human Knowledge", 1710)
"Colour, Figure, Motion, Extension and the like, considered only so many Sensations in the Mind, are perfectly known, there being nothing in them which is not perceived. But if they are looked on as notes or Images, referred to Things or Archetypes existing without the Mind, then are we involved all in Scepticism."(George Berkeley, "Principles of Human Knowledge", 1710)
"In a large sense indeed, we may be said to have an idea, or rather a notion of spirit, that is, we understand the meaning of the word, otherwise we could not affirm or deny anything of it. Moreover, as we conceive the ideas that are in the minds of other spirits by means of our own, which we suppose to be resemblances of them: so we know other spirits by means of our own soul, which in that sense is the image or idea of them, it having a like respect to other spirits, that blueness or heat by me perceived hath to those ideas perceived by another." (George Berkeley, "Principles of Human Knowledge", 1710)
"Colour, Figure, Motion, Extension and the like, considered only so many Sensations in the Mind, are perfectly known, there being nothing in them which is not perceived. But if they are looked on as notes or Images, referred to Things or Archetypes existing without the Mind, then are we involved all in Scepticism."(George Berkeley, "Principles of Human Knowledge", 1710)
"In a large sense indeed, we may be said to have an idea, or rather a notion of spirit, that is, we understand the meaning of the word, otherwise we could not affirm or deny anything of it. Moreover, as we conceive the ideas that are in the minds of other spirits by means of our own, which we suppose to be resemblances of them: so we know other spirits by means of our own soul, which in that sense is the image or idea of them, it having a like respect to other spirits, that blueness or heat by me perceived hath to those ideas perceived by another." (George Berkeley, "Principles of Human Knowledge", 1710)
"Some there are who make a distinction betwixt primary and secondary qualities: by the former, they mean extension, figure motion, rest, solidity or impenetrability and number: by the latter they denote all other sensible qualities, as colours, sounds, tastes, and so forth. The ideas we have of these they acknowledge not to be the resemblances of anything existing without the mind or unperceived; but they will have our ideas of the primary qualities to be patterns or images of things which exist without the mind, in an unthinking substance which they call matter. By matter therefore we are to under-stand an inert, senseless substance, in which extension, figure, and motion, do actually subsist." (George Berkeley, "Principles of Human Knowledge", 1710)
"That an idea which is inactive, and the existence whereof consists in being perceived, should be the image or likeness of an agent subsisting by itself, seems to need no other refutation, than barely attending to what is meant by those words. But perhaps you will say, that though an idea cannot resemble a spirit, in its thinking, acting, or subsisting by itself, yet it may in some other respects: and it is not necessary that an idea or image be in all respects like the original."(George Berkeley, "Principles of Human Knowledge", 1710)
"The ideas imprinted on the senses by the Author of Nature are called real things: and those excited in the imagination being less regular, vivid and constant, are more properly termed ideas, or images of things, which they copy and represent. But then our sensations, be they never so vivid and distinct, are nevertheless ideas, that is, they exist in the mind, or are perceived by it, as truly as the ideas of its own framing. The ideas of sense are allowed to have more reality in them, that is, to be more strong, orderly, and coherent than the creatures of the mind; but this is no argument that they exist without the mind. They are also less dependent on the spirit, or thinking substance which perceives them, in that they are excited by the will of another and more powerful spirit: yet still they are ideas, and certainly no idea, whether faint or strong, can exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving it." (George Berkeley, "Principles of Human Knowledge", 1710)
"The largest views are not always the clearest, and that he who is short-sighted will be obliged to draw the object nearer, and may, perhaps, by a close and narrow survey, discern that which had escaped far better eyes." (George Berkeley, "A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge", 1710)
"The largest views are not always the clearest, and that he who is short-sighted will be obliged to draw the object nearer, and may, perhaps, by a close and narrow survey, discern that which had escaped far better eyes." (George Berkeley, "A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge", 1710)
"The only properties that we can conceive of as they are in themselves are ones that can be presented in, or constructed from features presented in, experience." (George Berkeley, "Principles of Human Knowledge", 1710)
"This perceiving, active being is what I call mind, spirit, soul, or myself. By which words I do not denote any one of my ideas, but a thing entirely distinct from them, wherein they exist, or, which is the same thing, whereby they are perceived; for the existence of an idea consists in being perceived." (George Berkeley, "Principles of Human Knowledge", 1710)
"But to pass over all this; if I understand you rightly, you say our ideas do not exist with-out the mind; but that they are copies, images, or representations of certain originals that do." (George Berkeley, "Three Dialogues", 1713)
"Doth the reality of sensible things consist in being perceived? or, is it something distinct from their being perceived, and that bears no relation to the mind?" (George Berkeley, "Three Dialogues", 1713)
"It is your opinion, the ideas we perceive by our senses are not real things, but images, or copies of them. Our knowledge therefore is no farther real, than as our ideas are the true representations of those originals. But as these supposed originals are in themselves unknown, it is impossible to know how far our ideas resemble them; or whether they resemble them at all. We cannot therefore be sure we have any real knowledge." (George Berkeley, "Three Dialogues", 1713)
"The same principles which at first view lead to scepticism, pursued to a certain point bring men back to common sense." (George Berkeley, "Three Dialogues", 1713)
"To speak the truth, Philonous, I think there are two kinds of objects, the one perceived immediately, which are likewise called ideas, the other are real things or external objects perceived by the mediation of ideas, which are their images and representations. Now I own, ideas do not exist without the mind; but the latter sort of objects do." (George Berkeley, "Three Dialogues", 1713)
"But to pass over all this; if I understand you rightly, you say our ideas do not exist with-out the mind; but that they are copies, images, or representations of certain originals that do." (George Berkeley, "Three Dialogues", 1713)
"Doth the reality of sensible things consist in being perceived? or, is it something distinct from their being perceived, and that bears no relation to the mind?" (George Berkeley, "Three Dialogues", 1713)
"It is your opinion, the ideas we perceive by our senses are not real things, but images, or copies of them. Our knowledge therefore is no farther real, than as our ideas are the true representations of those originals. But as these supposed originals are in themselves unknown, it is impossible to know how far our ideas resemble them; or whether they resemble them at all. We cannot therefore be sure we have any real knowledge." (George Berkeley, "Three Dialogues", 1713)
"The same principles which at first view lead to scepticism, pursued to a certain point bring men back to common sense." (George Berkeley, "Three Dialogues", 1713)
"To speak the truth, Philonous, I think there are two kinds of objects, the one perceived immediately, which are likewise called ideas, the other are real things or external objects perceived by the mediation of ideas, which are their images and representations. Now I own, ideas do not exist without the mind; but the latter sort of objects do." (George Berkeley, "Three Dialogues", 1713)
"As arithmetic and algebra are sciences of great clearness, certainty, and extent, which are immediately conversant about signs, upon the skillful use whereof they entirely depend, so a little attention to them may possibly help us to judge of the progress of the mind in other sciences, which, though differing in nature, design, and object, may yet agree in the general methods of proof and inquiry." (George Berkeley, "Alciphron: or the Minute Philosopher", 1732)
"The same principles which at first view lead to scepticism, pursued to a certain point bring men back to common sense." (George Berkeley, "Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous", 1734)
"And what are these fluxions? The velocities of evanescent increments. And what are these same evanescent increments? They are neither finite quantities, nor quantities infinitely small, nor yet nothing. May we not call them ghosts of departed quantities?" (George Berkeley, "The Analyst; Or, A Discourse Addressed to an Infidel Mathematician", 1734)
"He who can digest a second or third fluxion, a second or third difference, need not, we think, be squeamish about any point of divinity." (George Berkeley, "The Analyst; Or, A Discourse Addressed to an Infidel Mathematician", 1734)
"The same principles which at first view lead to scepticism, pursued to a certain point bring men back to common sense." (George Berkeley, "Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous", 1734)
"And what are these fluxions? The velocities of evanescent increments. And what are these same evanescent increments? They are neither finite quantities, nor quantities infinitely small, nor yet nothing. May we not call them ghosts of departed quantities?" (George Berkeley, "The Analyst; Or, A Discourse Addressed to an Infidel Mathematician", 1734)
"He who can digest a second or third fluxion, a second or third difference, need not, we think, be squeamish about any point of divinity." (George Berkeley, "The Analyst; Or, A Discourse Addressed to an Infidel Mathematician", 1734)
"It hath been an old remark, that Geometry is an excellent Logic. And it must be owned that when the definitions are clear; when the postulata cannot be refused, nor the axioms denied; when from the distinct contemplation and comparison of figures, their properties are derived, by a perpetual well-connected chain of consequences, the objects being still kept in view, and the attention ever fixed upon them; there is acquired a habit of reasoning, close and exact and methodical; which habit strengthens and sharpens the mind, and being transferred to other subjects is of general use in the inquiry after truth." (George Berkeley, "The Analyst; Or, A Discourse Addressed to an Infidel Mathematician", 1734)
"The method of Fluxions is the general key by help whereof the modern mathematicians unlock the secrets of Geometry, and consequently of Nature." (George Berkeley, "The Analyst; Or, A Discourse Addressed to an Infidel Mathematician", 1734)
"He that would make a real progress in knowledge must dedicate his age as well as first fruits - the latter growth as well as the first-fruits - at the altar of truth." (George Berkeley, "Siris", 1744)
"A ray of imagination or of wisdom may enlighten the universe, and glow into remotest centuries." (George Berkeley)
"The method of Fluxions is the general key by help whereof the modern mathematicians unlock the secrets of Geometry, and consequently of Nature." (George Berkeley, "The Analyst; Or, A Discourse Addressed to an Infidel Mathematician", 1734)
"He that would make a real progress in knowledge must dedicate his age as well as first fruits - the latter growth as well as the first-fruits - at the altar of truth." (George Berkeley, "Siris", 1744)
"A ray of imagination or of wisdom may enlighten the universe, and glow into remotest centuries." (George Berkeley)
"Make a point never so clear, it is great odds that a man whose habits and the bent of whose mind lie a contrary way, shall be unable to comprehend it. So weak a thing is reason in competition with inclination." (George Berkeley)
"That neither our thoughts, nor passions, nor ideas formed by the imagination, exist without the mind, is what every body will allow." (George Berkeley)
"Whatever is immediately perceived is an idea: and can any idea exist out of the mind?" (George Berkeley)
"That neither our thoughts, nor passions, nor ideas formed by the imagination, exist without the mind, is what every body will allow." (George Berkeley)
"Whatever is immediately perceived is an idea: and can any idea exist out of the mind?" (George Berkeley)
"Whenever I attempt to frame a simple idea of time, abstracted from the succession of ideas in my mind, which flows uniformly, and is participated by all beings, I am lost and embrangled in inextricable difficulties." (George Berkeley)
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