On Concepts IX

"[In mathematics] we behold the conscious logical activity of the human mind in its purest and most perfect form. Here we learn to realize the laborious nature of the process, the great care with which it must proceed, the accuracy which is necessary to determine the exact extent of the general propositions arrived at, the difficulty of forming and comprehending abstract concepts; but here we learn also to place confidence in the certainty, scope and fruitfulness of such intellectual activity." (Hermann von Helmholtz, "Über das Verhältnis der Naturwissenschaften zur Gesammtheit der Wissenschaft", 1896)

"Former ages thought in terms of images of the imagination, whereas we moderns have concepts. Formerly the guiding ideas of life presented themselves in concrete visual form as divinities, whereas today they are conceptualized. The ancients excelled in creation; our own strength lies rather in destruction, in analysis." (Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, 1806)

"'You cannot base a general mathematical theory on imprecisely defined concepts. You can make some progress that way; but sooner or later the theory is bound to dissolve in ambiguities which prevent you from extending it further.' Failure to recognize this fact has another unfortunate consequence which is, in a practical sense, even more disastrous: 'Unless the conceptual problems of a field have been clearly resolved, you cannot say which mathematical problems are the relevant ones worth working on; and your efforts are more than likely to be wasted.'" (Edwin T Jaynes, "Foundations of Probability Theory and Statistical Mechanics", 1967)

"To master a concept means to be able to recognize it, that is, to be able to determine whether or not any given situation belongs to the set that characterizes this concept." (Valentin F Turchin, "The Phenomenon of Science: A cybernetic approach to human evolution", 1977)

"A conceptual system is an integrated system of concepts that supports a coherent vision of some aspect of the world. A conceptual system is personal; it is a 'way of seeing', that is, a 'way of knowing'. [...] You cannot do mathematics or science without a conceptual system but such systems are not objective and permanent. They are subject to change and development. Therefore we cannot claim that the reality that we experience and work with in science is independent of the mind of the scientist." (William Byers, "Deep Thinking: What Mathematics Can Teach Us About the Mind", 2015)

"A mathematical concept, then, is an organised pattern of ideas that are somehow interrelated, drawing on the experience of concepts already established. Psychologists call such an organised pattern of ideas a ‘schema’. " (Ian Stewart & David Tall, "The Foundations of Mathematics" 2nd Ed., 2015)

"Facts and concepts only acquire real meaning and significance when viewed through the lens of a conceptual system. [...] Facts do not exist independently of knowledge and understanding for without some conceptual basis one would not know what data to even consider. The very act of choosing implies some knowledge. One could say that data, knowledge, and understanding are different ways of describing the same situation depending on the type of human involvement implied - 'data' means a de-emphasis on the human dimension whereas 'understanding' highlights it." (William Byers, "Deep Thinking: What Mathematics Can Teach Us About the Mind", 2015)

"The problem of teaching is the problem of introducing concepts and conceptual systems. In this crucial task the procedures of formal mathematical argument are of little value. The way we reason in formal mathematics is itself a conceptual system - deductive logic - but it is a huge mistake to identify this with mathematics. [...] Mathematics lives in its concepts and conceptual systems, which need to be explicitly addressed in the teaching of mathematics." (William Byers, "Deep Thinking: What Mathematics Can Teach Us About the Mind", 2015)

Virginia Anderson - Collected Quotes

"A system is a group of interacting, interrelated, or interdependent components that form a complex and unified whole." (Virginia Anderson & Lauren Johnson, "Systems Thinking Basics: From Concepts to Causal Loops", 1997)

"[…] dynamic behavior is produced by a combination of reinforcing and balancing loops. Behind any growth or collapse is at least one reinforcing loop, and for every sign of goal-seeking behavior, there is a balancing loop. A period of rapid growth or collapse followed by a slowdown typically signals a shift in dominance from a reinforcing loop that is driving the structure, to a balancing loop." (Virginia Anderson & Lauren Johnson, "Systems Thinking Basics: From Concepts to Causal Loops", 1997)

"[…] feedback is not necessarily transmitted and returned through the same system component - or even through the same system. It may travel through several intervening components within the system first, or return from an external system, before finally arriving again at the component where it started." (Virginia Anderson & Lauren Johnson, "Systems Thinking Basics: From Concepts to Causal Loops", 1997)

"Feedback is the transmission and return of information. […] A system has feedback within itself. But because all systems are part of larger systems, a system also has feedback between itself and external systems. In some systems, the feedback and adjustment processes happen so quickly that it is relatively easy for an observer to follow. In other systems, it may take a long time before the feedback is returned, so an observer would have trouble identifying the action that prompted the feedback." (Virginia Anderson & Lauren Johnson, "Systems Thinking Basics: From Concepts to Causal Loops", 1997)

"In a complex system, it is not uncommon for subsystems to have goals that compete directly with or diverge from the goals of the overall system. […] Feedback gathered from small, local subsystems for use by larger subsystems may be either inaccurately conveyed or inaccurately interpreted. Yet it is this very flexibility and looseness that allow large, complex systems to endure, although it can be hard to predict what these organizations are likely to do next." (Virginia Anderson & Lauren Johnson, "Systems Thinking Basics: From Concepts to Causal Loops", 1997)

"Left to themselves, systems seek to maintain their stability. […] Systems achieve this stability through the interactions, feedback, and adjustments that continually circulate among the system parts, and between the system and its environment." (Virginia Anderson & Lauren Johnson, "Systems Thinking Basics: From Concepts to Causal Loops", 1997)

"One of the strongest benefits of the systems thinking perspective is that it can help you learn to ask the right questions. This is an important first step toward understanding a problem. […] Much of the value of systems thinking comes from the different framework that it gives us for looking at problems in new ways." (Virginia Anderson & Lauren Johnson, "Systems Thinking Basics: From Concepts to Causal Loops", 1997)

"Reinforcing loops can be seen as the engines of growth and collapse. That is, they compound change in one direction with even more change in that direction. Many reinforcing loops have a quality of accelerating movement in a particular direction, a sense that the more one variable changes, the more another changes." (Virginia Anderson & Lauren Johnson, "Systems Thinking Basics: From Concepts to Causal Loops", 1997)

"Systems thinking is most effective when it’s used to look at a problem in a new way, not to advocate a predetermined solution. Strong advocacy will create resistance - both to your ideas, and to systems thinking itself. Present systems thinking in the spirit of inquiry, not inquisition." (Virginia Anderson & Lauren Johnson, "Systems Thinking Basics: From Concepts to Causal Loops", 1997)

📁 On DIKW: On Knowledge (1990-1999)

"[By understanding] I mean simply a sufficient grasp of concepts, principles, or skills so that one can bring them to bear on new problems and situations, deciding in which ways one’s present competencies can suffice and in which ways one may require new skills or knowledge." (Howard Gardner, "The Unschooled Mind", 1991)

"The worst, i.e., most dangerous, feature of 'accepting the null hypothesis' is the giving up of explicit uncertainty. [...] Mathematics can sometimes be put in such black-and-white terms, but our knowledge or belief about the external world never can." (John Tukey, "The Philosophy of Multiple Comparisons", Statistical Science Vol. 6 (1), 1991)

"We live on an island surrounded by a sea of ignorance. As our island of knowledge grows, so does the shore of our ignorance." (John A Wheeler, Scientific American Vol. 267, 1992)

"Indeed, knowledge that one will be judged on some criterion of ‘creativeness’ or ‘originality’ tends to narrow the scope of what one can produce (leading to products that are then judged as relatively conventional); in contrast, the absence of an evaluations seems to liberate creativity." (Howard Gardner, "Creating Minds", 1993)

"Knowledge is theory. We should be thankful if action of management is based on theory. Knowledge has temporal spread. Information is not knowledge. The world is drowning in information but is slow in acquisition of knowledge. There is no substitute for knowledge." (William E Deming, "The New Economics for Industry, Government, Education", 1993)

"Worldviews are social constructions, and they channel the search for facts. But facts are found and knowledge progresses, however fitfully. Fact and theory are intertwined, and all great scientists understand the interaction." (Stephen J Gould, "Shields of Expectation - and Actuality", 1993)

"At the very least (there is certainly more), cybernetics implies a new philosophy about (1) what we can know, (2) about what it means for something to exist, and (3) about how to get things done. Cybernetics implies that knowledge is to be built up through effective goal-seeking processes, and perhaps not necessarily in uncovering timeless, absolute, attributes of things, irrespective of our purposes and needs." (Jeff Dooley, "Thoughts on the Question: What is Cybernetics", 1995)

"Crude complexity is ‘the length of the shortest message that will describe a system, at a given level of coarse graining, to someone at a distance, employing language, knowledge, and understanding that both parties share (and know they share) beforehand." (Murray Gell-Mann, "What is Complexity?" Complexity Vol. 1 (1), 1995)

"Humans may crave absolute certainty; they may aspire to it; they may pretend, as partisans of certain religions do, to have attained it. But the history of science - by far the most successful claim to knowledge accessible to humans - teaches that the most we can hope for is successive improvement in our understanding, learning from our mistakes, an asymptotic approach to the Universe, but with the proviso that absolute certainty will always elude us. We will always be mired in error. The most each generation can hope for is to reduce the error bars a little, and to add to the body of data to which error bars apply." (Carl Sagan, "The Demon-Haunted World: Science as a Candle in the Dark", 1995)

"The amount of understanding produced by a theory is determined by how well it meets the criteria of adequacy - testability, fruitfulness, scope, simplicity, conservatism - because these criteria indicate the extent to which a theory systematizes and unifies our knowledge." (Theodore Schick Jr., "How to Think about Weird Things: Critical Thinking for a New Age", 1995)

"The representational nature of maps, however, is often ignored - what we see when looking at a map is not the word, but an abstract representation that we find convenient to use in place of the world. When we build these abstract representations we are not revealing knowledge as much as are creating it." (Alan MacEachren, "How Maps Work: Representation, Visualization, and Design", 1995)

"The term mental model refers to knowledge structures utilized in the solving of problems. Mental models are causal and thus may be functionally defined in the sense that they allow a problem solver to engage in description, explanation, and prediction. Mental models may also be defined in a structural sense as consisting of objects, states that those objects exist in, and processes that are responsible for those objects’ changing states." (Robert Hafner & Jim Stewart, "Revising Explanatory Models to Accommodate Anomalous Genetic Phenomena: Problem Solving in the ‘Context of Discovery’", Science Education 79 (2), 1995) 

"Generalization is the process of matching new, unknown input data with the problem knowledge in order to obtain the best possible solution, or one close to it. Generalization means reacting properly to new situations, for example, recognizing new images, or classifying new objects and situations. Generalization can also be described as a transition from a particular object description to a general concept description. This is a major characteristic of all intelligent systems." (Nikola K Kasabov, "Foundations of Neural Networks, Fuzzy Systems, and Knowledge Engineering", 1996)

"In the new systems thinking, the metaphor of knowledge as a building is being replaced by that of the network. As we perceive reality as a network of relationships, our descriptions, too, form an interconnected network of concepts and models in which there are no foundations. For most scientists such a view of knowledge as a network with no firm foundations is extremely unsettling, and today it is by no means generally accepted. But as the network approach expands throughout the scientific community, the idea of knowledge as a network will undoubtedly find increasing acceptance." (Fritjof Capra," The Web of Life: a new scientific understanding of living systems", 1996)

"Discourses are ways of referring to or constructing knowledge about a particular topic of practice: a cluster (or formation) of ideas, images and practices, which provide ways of talking about, forms of knowledge and conduct associated with, a particular topic, social activity or institutional site in society. These discursive formations, as they are known, define what is and is not appropriate in our formulation of, and our practices in relation to, a particular subject or site of social activity." (Stuart Hall, "Representation: Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices", 1997)

"Data is discrimination between physical states of things (black, white, etc.) that may convey or not convey information to an agent. Whether it does so or not depends on the agent's prior stock of knowledge." (Max Boisot, "Knowledge Assets", 1998)

"The social constructivist thesis is that mathematics is a social construction, a cultural product, fallible like any other branch of knowledge." (Paul Ernest, "Social Constructivism as a Philosophy of Mathematics", 1998)

"An individual understands a concept, skill, theory, or domain of knowledge to the extent that he or she can apply it appropriately in a new situation." (Howard Gardner, "The Disciplined Mind", 1999)

"Analysis of a system reveals its structure and how it works. It provides the knowledge required to make it work efficiently and to repair it when it stops working. Its product is know-how, knowledge, not understanding. To enable a system to perform effectively we must understand it - we must be able to explain its behavior—and this requires being aware of its functions in the larger systems of which it is a part." (Russell L Ackoff, "Re-Creating the Corporation", 1999)

📁 On DIKW: On Knowledge (1980-1989)

"Definitions, like questions and metaphors, are instruments for thinking. Their authority rests entirely on their usefulness, not their correctness. We use definitions in order to delineate problems we wish to investigate, or to further interests we wish to promote. In other words, we invent definitions and discard them as suits our purposes." (Neil Postman, "Language Education in a Knowledge Context", 1980)

"A schema, then is a data structure for representing the generic concepts stored in memory. There are schemata representing our knowledge about all concepts; those underlying objects, situations, events, sequences of events, actions and sequences of actions. A schema contains, as part of its specification, the network of interrelations that is believed to normally hold among the constituents of the concept in question. A schema theory embodies a prototype theory of meaning. That is, inasmuch as a schema underlying a concept stored in memory corresponds to the meaning of that concept, meanings are encoded in terms of the typical or normal situations or events that instantiate that concept." (David E Rumelhart, "Schemata: The building blocks of cognition", 1980)

“Analogies, metaphors, and emblems are the threads by which the mind holds on to the world even when, absentmindedly, it has lost direct contact with it, and they guarantee the unity of human experience. Moreover, in the thinking process itself they serve as models to give us our bearings lest we stagger blindly among experiences that our bodily senses with their relative certainty of knowledge cannot guide us through.” (Hannah Arendt, “The Life of the Mind”, 1981)

"Knowledge specialists may ascribe a degree of certainty to their models of the world that baffles and offends managers. Often the complexity of the world cannot be reduced to mathematical abstractions that make sense to a manager. Managers who expect complete, one-to-one correspondence between the real world and each element in a model are disappointed and skeptical." (Dale E Zand, "Information, Organization, and Power", 1981)

"The thinking person goes over the same ground many times. He looks at it from varying points of view - his own, his arch-enemy’s, others’. He diagrams it, verbalizes it, formulates equations, constructs visual images of the whole problem, or of troublesome parts, or of what is clearly known. But he does not keep a detailed record of all this mental work, indeed could not. […] Deep understanding of a domain of knowledge requires knowing it in various ways. This multiplicity of perspectives grows slowly through hard work and sets the state for the re-cognition we experience as a new insight." (Howard E Gruber, "Darwin on Man", 1981)

"Definitions are temporary verbalizations of concepts, and concepts - particularly difficult concepts - are usually revised repeatedly as our knowledge and understanding grows." (Ernst Mayr, "The Growth of Biological Thought", 1982)

"We are drowning in information but starved for knowledge." (John Naisbitt, "Megatrends: Ten New Directions Transforming Our Lives", 1982)

"We define a semantic network as 'the collection of all the relationships that concepts have to other concepts, to percepts, to procedures, and to motor mechanisms' of the knowledge." (John F Sowa, "Conceptual Structures", 1984)

"Contrary to the impression students acquire in school, mathematics is not just a series of techniques. Mathematics tells us what we have never known or even suspected about notable phenomena and in some instances even contradicts perception. It is the essence of our knowledge of the physical world. It not only transcends perception but outclasses it." (Morris Kline, "Mathematics and the Search for Knowledge", 1985)

"Knowledge is the appropriate collection of information, such that it's intent is to be useful. Knowledge is a deterministic process. When someone 'memorizes' information (as less-aspiring test-bound students often do), then they have amassed knowledge. This knowledge has useful meaning to them, but it does not provide for, in and of itself, an integration such as would infer further knowledge." (Russell L Ackoff, "Towards a Systems Theory of Organization", 1985)

"Although science literally means ‘knowledge’, the scientific attitude is concerned much more with rational perception through the mind and with testing such perceptions against actual fact, in the form of experiments and observations." (David Bohm & F David Peat, "Science, Order, and Creativity", 1987)

"There is no coherent knowledge, i.e. no uniform comprehensive account of the world and the events in it. There is no comprehensive truth that goes beyond an enumeration of details, but there are many pieces of information, obtained in different ways from different sources and collected for the benefit of the curious. The best way of presenting such knowledge is the list - and the oldest scientific works were indeed lists of facts, parts, coincidences, problems in several specialized domains." (Paul K Feyerabend, "Farewell to Reason", 1987)

"We admit knowledge whenever we observe an effective (or adequate) behavior in a given context, i.e., in a realm or domain which we define by a question (explicit or implicit)." (Humberto Maturana & Francisco J Varela, "The Tree of Knowledge", 1987)

"In the Information Age, the first step to sanity is FILTERING. Filter the information: extract for knowledge. Filter first for substance. Filter second for significance. […] Filter third for reliability. […] Filter fourth for completeness." (Marc Stiegler, "David’s Sling", 1988)

"Probabilities are summaries of knowledge that is left behind when information is transferred to a higher level of abstraction." (Judea Pearl, "Probabilistic Reasoning in Intelligent Systems: Network of Plausible, Inference", 1988)

"Science doesn't purvey absolute truth. Science is a mechanism. It's a way of trying to improve your knowledge of nature. It's a system for testing your thoughts against the universe and seeing whether they match. And this works, not just for the ordinary aspects of science, but for all of life. I should think people would want to know that what they know is truly what the universe is like, or at least as close as they can get to it." (Isaac Asimov, [Interview by Bill Moyers] 1988)

"A discovery in science, or a new theory, even where it appears most unitary and most all-embracing, deals with some immediate element of novelty or paradox within the framework of far vaster, unanalyzed, unarticulated reserves of knowledge, experience, faith, and presupposition. Our progress is narrow: it takes a vast world unchallenged and for granted." (James R Oppenheimer, "Atom and Void", 1989)

On Principles V: Identity

"The topics of ontology, or metaphysic, are cause, effect, action, passion, identity, opposition, subject, adjunct, and sign." (Isaac Watts, "Logic, or The right use of reason, in the inquiry after truth", 1725)

"Science arises from the discovery of Identity amid Diversity." (William S Jevons, "The Principles of Science: A Treatise on Logic and Scientific Method", 1874)

"The very possibility of mathematical science seems an insoluble contradiction. If this science is only deductive in appearance, from whence is derived that perfect rigour which is challenged by none? If, on the contrary, all the propositions which it enunciates may be derived in order by the rules of formal logic, how is it that mathematics is not reduced to a gigantic tautology? The syllogism can teach us nothing essentially new, and if everything must spring from the principle of identity, then everything should be capable of being reduced to that principle." (Henri Poincaré, "Science and Hypothesis", 1901)

"Metaphors deny distinctions between things: problems often arise from taking structural metaphors too literally. Because unexamined metaphors lead us to assume the identity of unidentical things, conflicts can arise which can only be resolved by understanding the metaphor (which requires its recognition as such), which means reconstructing the analogy on which it is based. […] The unexplained extension of concepts can too often result in the destruction rather than the expansion of meaning." (David Pimm,"Metaphor and Analogy in Mathematics", For the Learning of Mathematics Vol. 1 (3), 1981)

"The idea that one can 'introduce' a kind of objects simply by laying down an identity criterion for them really inverts the proper order of explanation. As Locke clearly understood, one must first have a clear conception of what kind of objects one is dealing with in order to extract a criterion of identity for them from that conception. […] So, rather than 'abstract' a kind of object from a criterion of identity, one must in general 'extract' a criterion of identity from a metaphysically defensible conception of a given kind of objects." (Edward J Lowe, The metaphysics of abstract objects, Journal of Philosophy 92 (10), 1995) 

"There is no unique, global, and universal relation of identity for abstract objects. [...] Abstract objects are of different sorts and this should mean, almost by definition, that there is no global, universal identity for sorts. Each sort X is equipped with an internal relation of identity but there is no identity relation that would apply to all sorts." (Jean-Pierre Marquis," Categorical foundations of mathematics, or how to provide foundations for abstract mathematics", The Review of Symbolic Logic Vol. 6 (1), 2012) 

"Reason is indeed all about identity, or, rather, tautology. Mathematics is the eternal, necessary system of rational, analytic tautology. Tautology is not 'empty', as it is so often characterized by philosophers. It is in fact the fullest thing there, the analytic ground of existence, and the basis of everything. Mathematical tautology has infinite masks to wear, hence delivers infinite variety. Mathematical tautology provides Leibniz’s world that is 'simplest in hypothesis and the richest in phenomena'. No hypothesis cold be simpler than the one revolving around tautologies concerning 'nothing'. There is something - existence - because nothing is tautologous, and 'something' is how that tautology is expressed. If we write x = 0, where x is any expression that has zero as its net result, then we have a world of infinite possibilities where something ('x') equals nothing (0)." (Thomas Stark, "God Is Mathematics: The Proofs of the Eternal Existence of Mathematics", 2018)

On Concepts IX

"The symbols organized by knowledge, or concepts, themselves belong to social nature as its ideological elements. Therefore, by operating upon them, knowledge is able to expand its organizing function much more broadly than labour in its technological operation of real things; and as we have already seen that many things, which are not organized in practice, can be organized by knowledge, i.e. in symbols: where the ingression of things is absent, the ingression of their concepts is still possible." (Alexander A Bogdanov, "Tektology: The Universal Organizational Science" Vol. I, 1913)

"Every object that we perceive appears in innumerable aspects. The concept of the object is the invariant of all these aspects." (Max Born physicist, "The Statistical Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics", [Nobel lecture] 1954)

"It is one of the consolations of philosophy that the benefit of showing how to dispense with a concept does not hinge on dispensing with it." (Willard v O Quine, "Word and Object", 1960)

"The idea that one can 'introduce' a kind of objects simply by laying down an identity criterion for them really inverts the proper order of explanation. As Locke clearly understood, one must first have a clear conception of what kind of objects one is dealing with in order to extract a criterion of identity for them from that conception. […] So, rather than 'abstract' a kind of object from a criterion of identity, one must in general 'extract' a criterion of identity from a metaphysically defensible conception of a given kind of objects." (Edward J Lowe," The metaphysics of abstract objects", Journal of Philosophy 92(10), 1995)

"The realm of the particularity of each experienced item differs from the formal realm of concepts. [...] The power of paradigmatic thought is to bring order to experience by seeing individual things as belonging to a category." (Donald E Polkinghorne, “Narrative configuration in qualitative analysis", International Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education Vol. 8 (1), 1995)

"In the new systems thinking, the metaphor of knowledge as a building is being replaced by that of the network. As we perceive reality as a network of relationships, our descriptions, too, form an interconnected network of concepts and models in which there are no foundations. For most scientists such a view of knowledge as a network with no firm foundations is extremely unsettling, and today it is by no means generally accepted. But as the network approach expands throughout the scientific community, the idea of knowledge as a network will undoubtedly find increasing acceptance." (Fritjof Capra, "The Web of Life: a new scientific understanding of living systems", 1996)

"Abstraction is an essential knowledge process, the process (or, to some, the alleged process) by which we form concepts. It consists in recognizing one or several common features or attributes (properties, predicates) in individ­uals, and on that basis stating a concept subsuming those common features or attributes. Concept is an idea, associated with a word expressing a prop­erty or a collection of properties inferred or derived from different samples. Subsumption is the logical technique to get generality from particulars." (Hourya B Sinaceur," Facets and Levels of Mathematical Abstraction", Standards of Rigor in Mathematical Practice 18-1, 2014)

Gert Rickheit - Collected Quotes

"According to the representational format claim, images constitute a class of mental models that is particularly suited to represent visually perceptible information. More specifically, an image can be conceived of as a viewer centered projection of an underlying mental model which, in turn, represents spatiotemporal aspects of external objects or events. Unlike propositional or network representations, images depict, rather than describe, a particular state of affairs." (Gert Rickheit & Lorenz Sichelschmidt, „Mental Models: Some Answers, Some Questions, Some Suggestions", 1999)

"From a functional point of view, mental models can be described as symbolic structures which permit people: to generate descriptions of the purpose of a system, to generate descriptions of the architecture of a system, to provide explanations of the state of a system, to provide explanations of the functioning of a system, to make predictions of future states of a system." (Gert Rickheit & Lorenz Sichelschmidt, "Mental Models: Some Answers, Some Questions, Some Suggestions", 1999)

"In broad terms, a mental model is to be understood as a dynamic symbolic representation of external objects or events on the par. t of some natural or artificial cognitive system. Mental models are thought to have certain properties which make them stand out against other forms of symbolic representations." (Gert Rickheit & Lorenz Sichelschmidt, "Mental Models: Some Answers, Some Questions, Some Suggestions", 1999)

"In order to be able to embrace a multitude of external situations, mental models must cope with a variety of representational formats - from quasi-verbal propositions to quasi-pictorial images."  (Gert Rickheit & Lorenz Sichelschmidt, "Mental Models: Some Answers, Some Questions, Some Suggestions", 1999)

"In the end, structural analogy may turn out to be the defining characteristic of mental models. Provided that the modeling function is specified with respect to the aspects figured and the aspects disregarded, and provided that there is sufficient circumstantial evidence for assuming a correspondence in structure between an external situation and its internal representation, regarding mental models as a unique form of symbolic representation may be justified." (Gert Rickheit & Lorenz Sichelschmidt, "Mental Models: Some Answers, Some Questions, Some Suggestions", 1999)

"The major problem of the mental model approach lies in the fact that the external world is to be represented in a highly specific way. Representing indeterminacy in terms of mental models thus poses difficulties, casting some doubt on the contention that mental models can do without variables." (Gert Rickheit & Lorenz Sichelschmidt, "Mental Models: Some Answers, Some Questions, Some Suggestions", 1999)

"Under the label 'cognitive maps', mental models have been conceived of as the mental representation of spatial aspects of the environment. A mental model, in this sense, comprises the topology of an area, including relevant districts, landmarks, and paths. [...] Under the label 'naive physics', mental models have been conceived of as the mental representation of natural or technical systems. A mental model, in this sense, comprises the effective determinants, true or not, of the functioning of a physical system. [...] Under the label 'model based reasoning', the mental models notion is featured in yet another area of cognitive science - deductive reasoning. In contrast to the commonly held view that logical competence depends on formal rules of deduction, it has been argued that reasoning is a semantic process based on the manipulation of mental models. [...] Finally, under terms like 'discourse model', 'situation model', or 'scenario', mental models have been conceived of as the mental representation of a verbal description of some real or fictional state of affairs. The role of mental models in the comprehension of discourse is discussed in more detail below." (Gert Rickheit & Lorenz Sichelschmidt, "Mental Models: Some Answers, Some Questions, Some Suggestions", 1999)

"A mental model is an internal representation with analogical relations to its referential object, so that local and temporal aspects of the object are preserved. It comes somewhat close to the mental images people report having in their minds whilst processing information. The great advantage of the notion of mental models, however, is its ability to include the notion of a partner model and the notion of a situation model. Thus, mental models can build a bridge to the other two dimensions of communication, namely interaction and situation." (Gert Rickheit et al, "The concept of communicative competence" [in "Handbook of Communication Competence"], 2008)

♾️On Complex Numbers XIX (Euler's Formula II)

"The equation e^πi+1 = 0 is true only by virtue of a large number of profound connections across many fields. It is true because of what it means! And it means what it means because of all those metaphors and blends in the conceptual system of a mathematician who understands what it means. To show why such an equation is true for conceptual reasons is to give what we have called an idea analysis of the equation." (George Lakoff & Rafael E Nuñez, "Where Mathematics Come From: How the Embodied Mind Brings Mathematics into Being", 2000)

"The equation e^πi =-1 says that the function w= e^z, when applied to the complex number πi as input, yields the real number -1 as the output, the value of w. In the complex plane, πi is the point [0,π) - π on the i-axis. The function w=e^z maps that point, which is in the z-plane, onto the point (-1, 0) - that is, -1 on the x-axis-in the w-plane. […] But its meaning is not given by the values computed for the function w=e^z. Its meaning is conceptual, not numerical. The importance of  e^πi =-1 lies in what it tells us about how various branches of mathematics are related to one another - how algebra is related to geometry, geometry to trigonometry, calculus to trigonometry, and how the arithmetic of complex numbers relates to all of them." (George Lakoff & Rafael E Nuñez, "Where Mathematics Come From: How the Embodied Mind Brings Mathematics into Being", 2000)

"The significance of e^πi+1 = 0 is thus a conceptual significance. What is important is not just the numerical values of e, π, i, 1, and 0 but their conceptual meaning. After all, e, π, i, 1, and 0 are not just numbers like any other numbers. Unlike, say, 192,563,947.9853294867, these numbers have conceptual meanings in a system of common, important nonmathematical concepts, like change, acceleration, recurrence, and self-regulation. [...] They are not mere numbers; they are the arithmetizations of concepts. When they are placed in a formula, the formula incorporates the ideas the function expresses as well as the set of pairs of complex numbers it mathematically determines by virtue of those ideas." (George Lakoff & Rafael E Nuñez, "Where Mathematics Come From: How the Embodied Mind Brings Mathematics into Being", 2000)

"We will now turn to e^πi+1 = 0. Our approach will be there as it was here. e^πi+1 = 0 uses the conceptual structure of all the cases we have discussed so far - trigonometry, the exponentials, and the complex numbers. Moreover, it puts together all that conceptual structure. In other words, all those metaphors and blends are simultaneously activated and jointly give rise to inferences that they would not give rise to separately. Our job is to see how e^πi+1 = 0 is a precise consequence that arises when the conceptual structure of these three domains is combined to form a single conceptual blend." (George Lakoff & Rafael E Nuñez, "Where Mathematics Come From: How the Embodied Mind Brings Mathematics into Being", 2000)

"[…] the equation’s five seemingly unrelated numbers (e, i, π, 1, and 0) fit neatly together in the formula like contiguous puzzle pieces. One might think that a cosmic carpenter had jig-sawed them one day and mischievously left them conjoined on Euler’s desk as a tantalizing hint of the unfathomable connectedness of things.[…] when the three enigmatic numbers are combined in this form, e^iπ, they react together to carve out a wormhole that spirals through the infinite depths of number space to emerge smack dab in the heartland of integers." (David Stipp, "A Most Elegant Equation: Euler's Formula and the Beauty of Mathematics", 2017)

"Thus, while feelings may be the essence of subjectivity, they are by no means part of our weaker nature - the valences they automatically generate are integral to our thought processes and without them we’d simply be lost. In particular, we’d have no sense of beauty at all, much less be able to feel (there’s that word again) that we’re in the presence of beauty when contemplating a work such as Euler’s formula. After all, e^iπ + 1 = 0 can give people limbic-triggered goosebumps when they first peer with understanding into its depths." (David Stipp, "A Most Elegant Equation: Euler's Formula and the Beauty of Mathematics", 2017)

"Today, Euler’s formula is a tool as basic to electrical engineers and physicists as the spatula is to short-order cooks. It’s arguable that the formula’s ability to simplify the design and analysis of circuits contributed to the accelerating pace of electrical innovation during the twentieth century." (David Stipp, "A Most Elegant Equation: Euler's Formula and the Beauty of Mathematics", 2017)

"[…] when the three enigmatic numbers are combined in this form, e^iπ, they react together to carve out a wormhole that spirals through the infinite depths of number space to emerge smack dab in the heartland of integers." (David Stipp, "A Most Elegant Equation: Euler's Formula and the Beauty of Mathematics", 2017)

"Euler’s formula - although deceptively simple - is actually staggeringly conceptually difficult to apprehend in its full glory, which is why so many mathematicians and scientists have failed to see its extraordinary scope, range, and ontology, so powerful and extensive as to render it the master equation of existence, from which the whole of mathematics and science can be derived, including general relativity, quantum mechanics, thermodynamics, electromagnetism and the strong and weak nuclear forces! It’s not called the God Equation for nothing. It is much more mysterious than any theistic God ever proposed." (Thomas Stark, "God Is Mathematics: The Proofs of the Eternal Existence of Mathematics", 2018)

Mental Models LXI (Conceptual Models IV)

"This making or imagining of models (not necessarily or usually a material model, but a conceptual model) is a recognised way of arriving at an understanding of recondite and ultra-sensual occurring say in the ether or elsewhere." (Hugh MacColl, Mind: a quarterly review of psychology and philosophy Vol. 14, 1905)

"We realize, however, that all scientific laws merely represent abstractions and idealizations expressing certain aspects of reality. Every science means a schematized picture of reality, in the sense that a certain conceptual construct is unequivocally related to certain features of order in reality […]" (Ludwig von Bertalanffy, "General System Theory", 1968)

"A conceptual model is neither idle nor faithful: it is, or rather it is supposed to be and so taken until further notice, an approximate representation of a real thing." (Mario Bunge, "Philosophy of Physics", 1972)

"A conceptual model is a qualitative description of the system and includes the processes taking place in the system, the parameters chosen to describe the processes, and the spatial and temporal scales of the processes." (A Avogadro & R C Ragaini, "Technologies for Environmental Cleanup", 1993)

"A conceptual model is a model of the projected system that is independent of implementation details." (Michael Worboys, "GIS: A Computing Perspective", 1995)

"A conceptual model is what in the model theory is called a set of formulas making statements about the world." (Dickson Lukose [Eds.], "Conceptual Structures: Fulfilling Peirce's Dream" Vol 5, 1997)

"A conceptual model is a representation of the system expertise using this formalism. An internal model is derived from the conceptual model and from a specification of the system transactions and the performance constraints." (Zbigniew W. Ras & Andrzej Skowron [Eds.], Foundations of Intelligent Systems: 10th International Symposium Vol 10, 1997)

"When we entrust the domain of values to those whose intellectual concerns are essentially centred on empirical facts, and whose conceptual frameworks are inevitably constructed around sets of empirical facts, we need not be surprised if the result is moral confusion." (Ronald W K Paterson, "The New Patricians", 1998)

"The purpose of a conceptual model is to provide a vocabulary of terms and concepts that can be used to describe problems and/or solutions of design. It is not the purpose of a model to address specific problems, and even less to propose solutions for them. Drawing an analogy with linguistics, a conceptual model is analogous to a language, while design patterns are analogous to rhetorical figures, which are predefined templates of language usages, suited particularly to specific problems." (Peter P Chen [Ed.], "Advances in Conceptual Modeling", 1999)

"To put it simply, we communicate when we display a convincing pattern, and we discover when we observe deviations from our expectations. These may be explicit in terms of a mathematical model or implicit in terms of a conceptual model. How a reader interprets a graphic will depend on their expectations. If they have a lot of background knowledge, they will view the graphic differently than if they rely only on the graphic and its surrounding text." (Andrew Gelman & Antony Unwin, "Infovis and Statistical Graphics: Different Goals, Different Looks", Journal of Computational and Graphical Statistics Vol. 22(1), 2013)

Complexity vs Mathematics II

"[Mathematics] guides our minds in an orderly way, and furnishes us simple and rational principles by means of which ambiguities are clarified, disorder is converted into order, and complexities are analyzed into their component parts." (Johann B Mencken, "The Charlatanry of the Learned", 1715)

"These sciences, Geometry, Theoretical Arithmetic and Algebra, have no principles besides definitions and axioms, and no process of proof but deduction; this process, however, assuming a most remarkable character; and exhibiting a combination of simplicity and complexity, of rigour and generality, quite unparalleled in other subjects." (William Whewell, "The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences", 1840)

"The value of mathematical instruction as a preparation for those more difficult investigations, consists in the applicability not of its doctrines but of its methods. Mathematics will ever remain the past perfect type of the deductive method in general; and the applications of mathematics to the simpler branches of physics furnish the only school in which philosophers can effectually learn the most difficult and important of their art, the employment of the laws of simpler phenomena for explaining and predicting those of the more complex." (John S Mill, "System of Logic", 1843)

"It is certainly true that all physical phenomena are subject to strictly mathematical conditions, and mathematical processes are unassailable in themselves. The trouble arises from the data employed. Most phenomena are so highly complex that one can never be quite sure that he is dealing with all the factors until the experiment proves it. So that experiment is rather the criterion of mathematical conclusions and must lead the way." (Amos E Dolbear, "Matter, Ether, Motion", 1894)

"Mathematics, the science of the ideal, becomes the means of investigating, understanding and making known the world of the real. The complex is expressed in terms of the simple. From one point of view mathematics may be defined as the science of successive substitutions of simpler concepts for more complex [...]" (William F White, "A Scrap-book of Elementary Mathematics", 1908)

"A great department of thought must have its own inner life, however transcendent may be the importance of its relations to the outside. No department of science, least of all one requiring so high a degree of mental concentration as Mathematics, can be developed entirely, or even mainly, with a view to applications outside its own range. The increased complexity and specialisation of all branches of knowledge makes it true in the present, however it may have been in former times, that important advances in such a department as Mathematics can be expected only from men who are interested in the subject for its own sake, and who, whilst keeping an open mind for suggestions from outside, allow their thought to range freely in those lines of advance which are indicated by the present state of their subject, untrammelled by any preoccupation as to  applications to other departments of science." (Ernst W Hobson, Nature Vol. 84, [address] 1910)

"Elegance may produce the feeling of the unforeseen by the unexpected meeting of objects we are not accustomed to bring together; there again it is fruitful, since it thus unveils for us kinships before unrecognized. It is fruitful even when it results only from the contrast between the simplicity of the means and the complexity of the problem set; it makes us then think of the reason for this contrast and very often makes us see that chance is not the reason; that it is to be found in some unexpected law. In a word, the feeling of  mathematical elegance is only the satisfaction due to any adaptation of the solution to the needs of our mind, and it is because of this very adaptation that this solution can be for us an instrument. Consequently this esthetic satisfaction is bound up with the economy of thought." (Jules Henri Poincaré, "The Future of Mathematics", Monist Vol. 20, 1910)

"The mathematical laws presuppose a very complex elaboration. They are not known exclusively either a priori or a posteriori, but are a creation of the mind; and this creation is not an arbitrary one, but, owing to the mind’s resources, takes place with reference to experience and in view of it. Sometimes the mind starts with intuitions which it freely creates; sometimes, by a process of elimination, it gathers up the axioms it regards as most suitable for producing a harmonious development, one that is both simple and fertile. The mathematics is a voluntary and intelligent adaptation of thought to things, it represents the forms that will allow of qualitative diversity being surmounted, the moulds into which reality must enter in order to become as intelligible as possible." (Émile Boutroux, "Natural Law in Science and Philosophy", 1914)

"No equation, however impressive and complex, can arrive at the truth if the initial assumptions are incorrect." (Arthur C Clarke, "Profiles of the Future: An Inquiry into the Limits of the Possible", 1973)

"Economists are all too often preoccupied with petty mathematical problems of interest only to themselves. This obsession with mathematics is an easy way of acquiring the appearance of scientificity without having to answer the far more complex questions posed by the world we live in." (Thomas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century, 2013)

🪷On Mind: Mental Models LVI (Conceptual Models III)

"Mere deductive logic, whether you clothe it in mathematical symbols and phraseology or whether you enlarge its scope into a more general symbolic technique, can never take the place of clear relevant initial concepts of the meaning of your symbols, and among symbols I include words. If you are dealing with nature, your meanings must directly relate to the immediate facts of observation. We have to analyse first the most general characteristics of things observed, and then the more casual contingent occurrences. There can be no true physical science which looks first to mathematics for the provision of a conceptual model. Such a procedure is to repeat the errors of the logicians of the middle-ages." (Alfred N Whitehead, "Principle of Relativity", 1922)

"The 'physical' does not mean any particular kind of reality, but a particular kind of denoting reality, namely a system of concepts in the natural sciences which is necessary for the cognition of reality. 'The physical' should not be interpreted wrongly as an attribute of one part of reality, but not of the other ; it is rather a word denoting a kind of conceptual construction, as, e.g., the markers 'geographical' or 'mathematical', which denote not any distinct properties of real things, but always merely a manner of presenting them by means of ideas." (Moritz Schlick, "Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre", 1925)

"The rule is derived inductively from experience, therefore does not have any inner necessity, is always valid only for special cases and can anytime be refuted by opposite facts. On the contrary, the law is a logical relation between conceptual constructions; it is therefore deductible from upper laws and enables the derivation of lower laws; it has as such a logical necessity in concordance with its upper premises; it is not a mere statement of probability, but has a compelling, apodictic logical value once its premises are accepted."(Ludwig von Bertalanffy, "Kritische Theorie der Formbildung", 1928)

"As perceivers we select from all the stimuli falling on our senses only those which interest us, and our interests are governed by a pattern-making tendency, sometimes called a schema." (Mary Douglas, "Purity and Danger", 1966)

"Whether or not a given conceptual model or representation of a physical system happens to be picturable, is irrelevant to the semantics of the theory to which it eventually becomes attached. Picturability is a fortunate psychological occurrence, not a scientific necessity. Few of the models that pass for visual representations are picturable anyhow. For one thing, the model may be and usually is constituted by imperceptible items such as unextended particles and invisible fields. True, a model can be given a graphic representation - but so can any idea as long as symbolic or conventional diagrams are allowed. Diagrams, whether representational or symbolic, are meaningless unless attached to some body of theory. On the other hand theories are in no need of diagrams save for psychological purposes. Let us then keep theoretical models apart from visual analogues."  (Mario Bunge, "Philosophy of Physics", 1973)

"The understanding of a thing begins and ends with some conceptual model of it. The model is the better, the more accurate, and inclusive. But even rough models can be used to guide - or misguide - research." (Bunge A Mario, "Philosophy in Crisis: The Need for Reconstruction", 2001)

"A conceptual model is a mental image of a system, its components, its interactions. It lays the foundation for more elaborate models, such as physical or numerical models. A conceptual model provides a framework in which to think about the workings of a system or about problem solving in general. An ensuing operational model can be no better than its underlying conceptualization." (Henry N Pollack, "Uncertain Science … Uncertain World", 2005)

"[...] a single thing may elicit several appearances, various conceptual models of it, or several plans of action for it, depending on the subject’s abilities and interests." (Mario Bunge, "Chasing Reality: Strife over Realism", 2006)

"Although fiction is not fact, paradoxically we need some fictions, particularly mathematical ideas and highly idealized models, to describe, explain, and predict facts.  This is not because the universe is mathematical, but because our brains invent or use refined and law-abiding fictions, not only for intellectual pleasure but also to construct conceptual models of reality." (Mario Bunge, "Chasing Reality: Strife over Realism", 2006)

"At all events, our world pictures may have components of all three kinds: perceptual, conceptual, and praxiological (action-theoretical).  This is because there are three gates to the outer world: perception, conception, and action. However, ordinarily only one or two of them need be opened: combinations of all three, as in building a house according to a blueprint, are the exception.  We may contemplate a landscape without forming either a conceptual model of it or a plan to act upon it.  And we may build a theoretical model of an imperceptible thing, such as an invisible extrasolar planet, on which we cannot act." (Mario Bunge, "Chasing Reality: Strife over Realism", 2006)

Fuzzy Logic I

"A fuzzy set is a class of objects with a continuum of grades of membership. Such a set is characterized by a membership (characteristic) function which assigns to each object a grade of membership ranging between zero and one. The notions of inclusion, union, intersection, complement, relation, convexity, etc., are extended to such sets, and various properties of these notions in the context of fuzzy sets are established. In particular, a separation theorem for convex fuzzy sets is proved without requiring that the fuzzy sets be disjoint." (Lotfi A Zadeh, "Fuzzy Sets", 1965)

"The notion of a fuzzy set provides a convenient point of departure for the construction of a conceptual framework which parallels in many respects the framework used in the case of ordinary sets, but is more general than the latter and, potentially, may prove to have a much wider scope of applicability, particularly in the fields of pattern classification and information processing. Essentially, such a framework provides a natural way of dealing with problems in which the source of imprecision is the absence of sharply denned criteria of class membership rather than the presence of random variables." (Lotfi A Zadeh, "Fuzzy Sets", 1965)

"In general, complexity and precision bear an inverse relation to one another in the sense that, as the complexity of a problem increases, the possibility of analysing it in precise terms diminishes. Thus 'fuzzy thinking' may not be deplorable, after all, if it makes possible the solution of problems which are much too complex for precise analysis." (Lotfi A Zadeh, "Fuzzy languages and their relation to human intelligence", 1972)

"Let me say quite categorically that there is no such thing as a fuzzy concept. [...] We do talk about fuzzy things but they are not scientific concepts. Some people in the past have discovered certain interesting things, formulated their findings in a non-fuzzy way, and therefore we have progressed in science." (Rudolf E Kálmán, 1972)

"[Fuzzy logic is] a logic whose distinguishing features are (1) fuzzy truth-values expressed in linguistic terms, e. g., true, very true, more or less true, or somewhat true, false, nor very true and not very false, etc.; (2) imprecise truth tables; and (3) rules of inference whose validity is relative to a context rather than exact." (Lotfi A. Zadeh, "Fuzzy logic and approximate reasoning", 1975)

"[...] much of the information on which human decisions are based is possibilistic rather than probabilistic in nature, and the intrinsic fuzziness of natural languages - which is a logical consequence of the necessity to express information in a summarized form - is, in the main, possibilistic in origin." (Lotfi A Zadeh, "Fuzzy Sets as the Basis for a Theory of Possibility", Fuzzy Sets and Systems, 1978) 

"Philosophical objections may be raised by the logical implications of building a mathematical structure on the premise of fuzziness, since it seems (at least superficially) necessary to require that an object be or not be an element of a given set. From an aesthetic viewpoint, this may be the most satisfactory state of affairs, but to the extent that mathematical structures are used to model physical actualities, it is often an unrealistic requirement. [...] Fuzzy sets have an intuitively plausible philosophical basis. Once this is accepted, analytical and practical considerations concerning fuzzy sets are in most respects quite orthodox." (James Bezdek, 1981)

"Fuzziness, then, is a concomitant of complexity. This implies that as the complexity of a task, or of a system for performing that task, exceeds a certain threshold, the system must necessarily become fuzzy in nature. Thus, with the rapid increase in the complexity of the information processing tasks which the computers are called upon to perform, we are reaching a point where computers will have to be designed for processing of information in fuzzy form. In fact, it is the capability to manipulate fuzzy concepts that distinguishes human intelligence from the machine intelligence of current generation computers. Without such capability we cannot build machines that can summarize written text, translate well from one natural language to another, or perform many other tasks that humans can do with ease because of their ability to manipulate fuzzy concepts." (Lotfi A Zadeh, "The Birth and Evolution of Fuzzy Logic", 1989)

"It is important to observe that there is an intimate connection between fuzziness and complexity. Thus, a basic characteristic of the human brain, a characteristic shared in varying degrees with all information processing systems, is its limited capacity to handle classes of high cardinality, that is, classes having a large number of members. Consequently, when we are presented with a class of very high cardinality, we tend to group its elements together into subclasses in such a way as to reduce the complexity of the information processing task involved. When a point is reached where the cardinality of the class of subclasses exceeds the information handling capacity of the human brain, the boundaries of the subclasses are forced to become imprecise and fuzziness becomes a manifestation of this imprecision." (Lotfi A Zadeh, "The Birth and Evolution of Fuzzy Logic", 1989)

"A fuzzy set can be defined mathematically by assigning to each possible individual in the universe of discourse a value representing its grade of membership in the fuzzy set. This grade corresponds to the degree to which that individual is similar or compatible with the concept represented by the fuzzy set. Thus, individuals may belong in the fuzzy act to a greater or lesser degree as indicated by a larger or smaller membership grade. As already mentioned, these membership grades are very often represented by real-number values ranging in the closed interval between 0 and 1." (George J Klir & Bo Yuan, "Fuzzy Sets and Fuzzy Logic: Theory and Applications", 1995)

George J Klir - Collected Quotes

"Applying this approach, systems belonging to different scientific disciplines are investigated in their natural forms. On the basis of experimental results, isomorphic relations between different systems are studied and, finally, some general principles applicable for all systems of a certain class are formulated." (George Klir, "An approach to general systems theory", 1969)

"In mathematics, logic, linguistics, and other abstract disciplines, the systems are not assigned to objects. They are defined by an enumeration of the variables, their admissible values, and their algebraic, topological, grammatical, and other properties which, in the given case, determine the relations between the variables under consideration." (George Klir, "An approach to general systems theory", 1969)

"Systems science is a science whose domain of inquiry consists of those properties of systems and associated problems that emanate from the general notion of systemhood." (George Klir, "Facets of Systems Science", 1991)

"The term system is unquestionably one of the most widely used terms not only in science, but in other areas of human endeavor as well. It is a highly overworked term, which enjoys different meanings under different circumstances and for different people. However, when separated from its specific connotations and uses, the term "system" is almost never explicitly defined." (George Klir, "Facets of Systems Science", 1991)

"What is systems science? This question, which I have been asked on countless occasions, can basically be answered either in terms of activities associated with systems science or in terms of the domain of its inquiry. The most natural answers to the question are, almost inevitably, the following definitions: Systems science is what systems scientists do when they claim they do science. Systems science is that field of scientific inquiry whose objects of study are systems." (George Klir, "Facets of Systems Science", 1991)

"A fuzzy set can be defined mathematically by assigning to each possible individual in the universe of discourse a value representing its grade of membership in the fuzzy set. This grade corresponds to the degree to which that individual is similar or compatible with the concept represented by the fuzzy set. Thus, individuals may belong in the fuzzy act to a greater or lesser degree as indicated by a larger or smaller membership grade. As already mentioned, these membership grades are very often represented by real-number values ranging in the closed interval between 0 and 1." (George J Klir & Bo Yuan, "Fuzzy Sets and Fuzzy Logic: Theory and Applications", 1995)

"Among the various paradigmatic changes in science and mathematics in this century, one such change concerns the concept of uncertainty. In science, this change has been manifested by a gradual transition from the traditional view, which insists that uncertainty is undesirable in science and should be avoided by all possible means, to an alternative view, which is tolerant of uncertainty and insists that science cannot avoid it. According to the traditional view, science should strive for certainty in all its manifestations (precision, specificity, sharpness, consistency, etc.); hence, uncertainty (imprecision, nonspecificity, vagueness, inconsistency, etc.) is regarded as unscientific. According to the alternative (or modem) view, uncertainty is considered essential to science; it is not only an unavoidable plague, but it has, in fact, a great utility." (George Klir, "Fuzzy sets and fuzzy logic", 1995)

"In constructing a model, we always attempt to maximize its usefulness. This aim is closely connected with the relationship among three key characteristics of every systems model: complexity, credibility, and uncertainty. This relationship is not as yet fully understood. We only know that uncertainty (predictive, prescriptive, etc.) has a pivotal role in any efforts to maximize the usefulness of systems models. Although usually (but not always) undesirable when considered alone, uncertainty becomes very valuable when considered in connection to the other characteristics of systems models: in general, allowing more uncertainty tends to reduce complexity and increase credibility of the resulting model. Our challenge in systems modelling is to develop methods by which an optimal level of allowable uncertainty can be estimated for each modelling problem." (George J Klir & Bo Yuan, "Fuzzy Sets and Fuzzy Logic: Theory and Applications", 1995)

"In spite of the insurmountable computational limits, we continue to pursue the many problems that possess the characteristics of organized complexity. These problems are too important for our well being to give up on them. The main challenge in pursuing these problems narrows down fundamentally to one question: how to deal with systems and associated problems whose complexities are beyond our information processing limits? That is, how can we deal with these problems if no computational power alone is sufficient?"  (George Klir, "Fuzzy sets and fuzzy logic", 1995)

"Probability theory is an ideal tool for formalizing uncertainty in situations where class frequencies are known or where evidence is based on outcomes of a sufficiently long series of independent random experiments. Possibility theory, on the other hand, is ideal for formalizing incomplete information expressed in terms of fuzzy propositions." (George Klir, "Fuzzy sets and fuzzy logic", 1995)

"To select an appropriate fuzzy implication for approximate reasoning under each particular situation is a difficult problem. Although some theoretically supported guidelines are now available for some situations, we are still far from a general solution to this problem." (George Klir, "Fuzzy sets and fuzzy logic", 1995)

"Intuition, insight, and the ability of global comprehension are possibly the most valuable assets of the human mind, particularly one that is appropriately trained." (George J Klir & Doug Elias, "Architecture of Systems Problem Solving" 2nd Ed, 2003) 

"Mathematics can roughly be divided into pure and applied. Pure mathematics is basically oriented to the development of various axiomatic theories, regardless of whether or not they have any real-world meaning. The proper activity of the pure mathematician is thus to derive theorems from postulated assumptions (axioms), and it is not his or her concern to determine whether there is some interpretation of the theory in which the assumptions are true. […] The role of applied mathematics is to search for practical interpretations of the various mathematical theories and, when such interpretations are found, to further develop the theories into useful methodological tools for dealing with the interpreted systems and associated problems. As such, applied mathematics is oriented to the development of methods based on specific mathematical theories and their use in as many interpreted areas as possible." (George J Klir & Doug Elias, "Architecture of Systems Problem Solving" 2nd Ed, 2003) 

"Systems whose variables are classified into input and output variables are called directed systems; those for which no such classification is given are called neutral systems. A number of additional distinctions are recognized for state sets associated with the involved variables (basic or supporting) and provide a basis for further methodological classification of source systems. They include, for in￾stance, the distinctions between crisp and fuzzy variables, discrete and continuous variables, and variables of different scales." (George J Klir & Doug Elias, "Architecture of Systems Problem Solving" 2nd Ed, 2003)

"The aim of architectural design is to prepare overall specifications, derived from the needs and desires of the user, for subsequent design and construction stages. The first task for the architect in each design project is thus to determine what the real needs and desires of the user are […]" (George J Klir & Doug Elias, "Architecture of Systems Problem Solving" 2nd Ed, 2003)

"The domain of systems science consists thus of all kinds of relational properties which are valid for particular classes of systems, or, in some rare instances, are valid for all systems. The chosen relational classification of systems determines the way in which the domain of systems is divided into subdomains, in a similar fashion as the domain of traditional science has been divided into subdomains of the various disciplines and specializations." (George J Klir & Doug Elias, "Architecture of Systems Problem Solving" 2nd Ed, 2003) 

"The principle of maximum entropy is employed for estimating unknown probabilities (which cannot be derived deductively) on the basis of the available information. According to this principle, the estimated probability distribution should be such that its entropy reaches maximum within the constraints of the situation, i.e., constraints that represent the available information. This principle thus guarantees that no more information is used in estimating the probabilities than available." (George J Klir & Doug Elias, "Architecture of Systems Problem Solving" 2nd Ed, 2003) 

"The principle of minimum entropy is employed in the formulation of resolution forms and related problems. According to this principle, the entropy of the estimated probability distribution, conditioned by a particular classification of the given events (e.g., states of the variable involved), is minimum subject to the constraints of the situation. This principle thus guarantees that all available information is used, as much as possible within the given constraints (e.g., required number of states), in the estimation of the unknown probabilities." (George J Klir & Doug Elias, "Architecture of Systems Problem Solving" 2nd Ed, 2003)

"The reconstruction problem can be stated as follows: Given a behavior system, viewed as an overall system, determine which sets of its subsystems, each viewed as a reconstruction hypothesis, are adequate for reconstructing the given system with an acceptable degree of approximation, solely from the information contained in the subsystems." (George J Klir & Doug Elias, "Architecture of Systems Problem Solving" 2nd Ed, 2003)

"Nevertheless, the use of fuzzy logic is supported by at least the following three arguments. First, fuzzy logic is rooted in the intuitively appealing idea that the truths of propositions used by humans are a matter of degree. An important consequence is that the basic principles and concepts of fuzzy logic are easily understood. Second, fuzzy logic has led to many successful applications, including many commercial products, in which the crucial part relies on representing and dealing with statements in natural language that involve vague terms. Third, fuzzy logic is a proper generalization of classical logic, follows an agenda similar to that of classical logic, and has already been highly developed. An important consequence is that fuzzy logic extends the rich realm of applications of classical logic to applications in which the bivalent character of classical logic is a limiting factor." (Radim Belohlavek & George J Klir, "Concepts and Fuzzy Logic", 2011)

"The principal idea employed by fuzzy logic is to allow for a partially ordered scale of truth-values, called also truth degrees, which contains the values representing false and true , but also some additional, intermediary truth degrees. That is, the set {0,1} of truth-values of classical logic, where 0 and 1 represent false and true , respectively, is replaced in fuzzy logic by a partially ordered scale of truth degrees with the smallest degree being 0 and the largest one being 1." (Radim Belohlavek & George J Klir, "Concepts and Fuzzy Logic", 2011)

"We use the term fuzzy logic to refer to all aspects of representing and manipulating knowledge that employ intermediary truth-values. This general, commonsense meaning of the term fuzzy logic encompasses, in particular, fuzzy sets, fuzzy relations, and formal deductive systems that admit intermediary truth-values, as well as the various methods based on them." (Radim Belohlavek & George J Klir, "Concepts and Fuzzy Logic", 2011)

On Symbols (1910-1919)

"Pure mathematics is a collection of hypothetical, deductive theories, each consisting of a definite system of primitive, undefined, concepts or symbols and primitive, unproved, but self-consistent assumptions (commonly called axioms) together with their logically deducible consequences following by rigidly deductive processes without appeal to intuition." (Graham Fitch, "The Fourth Dimension simply Explained", 1910)

"Things and events explain themselves, and the business of thought is to brush aside the verbal and conceptual impediments which prevent them from doing so. Start with the notion that it is you who explain the Object, and not the Object that explains itself, and you are bound to end in explaining it away. It ceases to exist, its place being taken by a parcel of concepts, a string of symbols, a form of words, and you find yourself contemplating, not the thing, but your theory of the thing." (Lawrence P Jacks, "The Usurpation Of Language", 1910)

"A symbol which has not been properly defined is not a symbol at all. It is merely a blot of ink on paper which has an easily recognized shape. Nothing can be proved by a succession of blot, except the existence of a bad pen or a careless writer." (Alfred N Whitehead, "An Introduction to Mathematics", 1911)

"The symbols organized by knowledge, or concepts, themselves belong to social nature as its ideological elements. Therefore, by operating upon them, knowledge is able to expand its organizing function much more broadly than labour in its technological operation of real things; and as we have already seen that many things, which are not organized in practice, can be organized by knowledge, i.e. in symbols: where the ingression of things is absent, the ingression of their concepts is still possible." (Alexander A Bogdanov, "Tektology: The Universal Organizational Science" Vol. I, 1913)

"This diagrammatic method has, however, serious inconveniences as a method for solving logical problems. It does not show how the data are exhibited by cancelling certain constituents, nor does it show how to combine the remaining constituents so as to obtain the consequences sought. In short, it serves only to exhibit one single step in the argument, namely the equation of the problem; it dispenses neither with the previous steps, i.e., 'throwing of the problem into an equation' and the transformation of the premises, nor with the subsequent steps, i.e., the combinations that lead to the various consequences. Hence it is of very little use, inasmuch as the constituents can be represented by algebraic symbols quite as well as by plane regions, and are much easier to deal with in this form." (Louis Couturat, "The Algebra of Logic", 1914)

"The rigor of mathematics is not absolute - absolute rigor is an ideal, to be, like other ideals, aspired unto, forever approached, but never quite attained, for such attainment would mean that every possibility of error or indetermination, however slight, had been eliminated from idea, from symbol, and from argumentation." (Cassius J Keyser, "The Human Worth of Rigorous Thinking: Essays and Addresses", 1916)

"In obedience to the feeling of reality, we shall insist that, in the analysis of propositions, nothing 'unreal' is to be admitted. But, after all, if there is nothing unreal, how, it may be asked, could we admit anything unreal? The reply is that, in dealing with propositions, we are dealing in the first instance with symbols, and if we attribute significance to groups of symbols which have no significance, we shall fall into the error of admitting unrealities, in the only sense in which this is possible, namely, as objects described." (Bertrand Russell, "Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy" , 1919)

On Symbols (1920-1929)

"Language is a purely human and non-instinctive method of communicating ideas, emotions and desires by means of a system of voluntarily produced symbols." (Edward Sapir, "Language", 1921) 

"The essence of language lies, not in the use of this or that special means of communication, but in the employment of fixed associations (however these may have originated) in order that something now sensible - a spoken word, a picture, a gesture, or what not — may call up the 'idea' of something else. Whenever this is done, what is now sensible may be called a 'sign' or 'symbol', and that of which it is intended to call up the 'idea' may be called its 'meaning'." This is a rough outline of what constitutes 'meaning'." (Bertrand Russell, "Analysis of Mind", 1921)

"Mere deductive logic, whether you clothe it in mathematical symbols and phraseology or whether you enlarge its scope into a more general symbolic technique, can never take the place of clear relevant initial concepts of the meaning of your symbols, and among symbols I include words. If you are dealing with nature, your meanings must directly relate to the immediate facts of observation. We have to analyse first the most general characteristics of things observed, and then the more casual contingent occurrences. There can be no true physical science which looks first to mathematics for the provision of a conceptual model. Such a procedure is to repeat the errors of the logicians of the middle-ages." (Alfred N Whitehead, "Principle of Relativity", 1922)

"The fundamental concepts of each science, the instruments with which it pro pounds its questions and formulates its solutions, are regarded no longer as passive images of something but as symbols created by the intellect itself." (Ernst Cassirer, "The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms", 1923)

"The logic of things, i.e., of the material concepts and relations on which the structure of a science rests, cannot be separated by the logic of signs. For the sign is no mere accidental cloak of the idea, but its necessary and essential organ. It serves not merely to communicate a complete and given thought content, but is an instrument, by means of which this content develops and fully defines itself. […] Consequently, all truly strict and exact thought is sustained by the symbolic and semiotics on which it is based." (Ernst Cassirer, "The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms", 1923)

"These symbols are so constituted that the necessary logical consequences of the image are always images of the necessary natural consequences of the imagined objects." (Ernst Cassirer, "The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms", 1923)

"All traditional logic habitually assumes that precise symbols are being employed. It is therefore not applicable to this terrestrial life but only to an imagined celestial existence." (Bertrand Russell, 1923)

"A poem therefore is to be defined as a structure of words whose sound constitutes a rhythmical unity, complete in itself, irrefragable, unanalyzable, completing its symbolic references within the ambit of its sound effects." (Herbert Read, "What is a Poem", 1926) 

"Once a statement is cast into mathematical form it may be manipulated in accordance with [mathematical] rules and every configuration of the symbols will represent facts in harmony with and dependent on those contained in the original statement. Now this comes very close to what we conceive the action of the brain structures to be in performing intellectual acts with the symbols of ordinary language. In a sense, therefore, the mathematician has been able to perfect a device through which a part of the labor of logical thought is carried on outside the central nervous system with only that supervision which is requisite to manipulate the symbols in accordance with the rules." (Horatio B Williams, "Mathematics and the Biological Sciences", Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society Vol. 38, 1927)

"The self-organisation of society depends on commonly diffused symbols evoking commonly diffused ideas, and at the same time indicating commonly understood action." (Alfred N Whitehead, "Symbolism: Its Meaning and Effect", 1927)

"Science aims at constructing a world which shall be symbolic of the world of commonplace experience." (Sir Arthur S Eddington, "The Nature of the Physical World", 1928)

"If to-day you ask a physicist what he has finally made out the æther or the electron to be, the answer will not be a description in terms of billiard balls or fly-wheels or anything concrete; he will point instead to a number of symbols and a set of mathematical equations which they satisfy. What do the symbols stand for? The mysterious reply is given that physics is indifferent to that; it has no means of probing beneath the symbolism. To understand the phenomena of the physical world it is necessary to know the equations which the symbols obey but not the nature of that which is being symbolised [...]" (Arthur S Eddington, "Science and the Unseen World", 1929)

"Natural law is not applicable to the unseen world behind the symbols, because it is unadapted to anything except symbols, and its perfection is a perfection of symbolic linkage. You cannot apply such a scheme to the parts of our personality which are not measurable by symbols any more than you can extract the square root of a sonnet." (Arthur S Eddington, "Science and the Unseen World", 1929)

"Our environment may and should mean something towards us which is not to be measured with the tools of the physicist or described by the metrical symbols of the mathematician." (Arthur S Eddington, "Science and the Unseen World", 1929)

"The exploration of the external world by the methods of physical science leads not to a concrete reality but to a shadow world of symbols, beneath which those methods are unadapted for penetrating." (Arthur S Eddington, "Science and the Unseen World", 1929)

"Language is the communicative process par excellence in every known society, and it is exceedingly important to observe that whatever may be the shortcomings of a primitive society judged from the vantage point of civilization its language inevitably forms as sure, complete and potentially creative an apparatus of referential symbolism as the most sophisticated language that we know of." (Edward Sapir, "Communication", 1931)

On Symbols (1940-1949)

"Symbols have a trick of stealing the show away from the thing they stand for." (Henry S Haskins, "Meditations in Wall Street", 1940) 

"We now come to a decisive step of mathematical abstraction: we forget about what the symbols stand for […] The mathematician] need not be idle; there are many operations which he may carry out with these symbols, without ever having to look at the things they stand for." (Hermann Weyl, "The Mathematical Way of Thinking", 1940)

"A formula is simply a mathematical statement of a principle or a rule describing the relation between two or more quantities. This mathematical statement shows that there is an equality between certain quantities; in other words, the formula translates a verbal rule into algebraic symbols. Thus a formula is very similar to an equation." (William L Schaaf, "Mathematics for Mechanics", 1942)

"Nothing is harder to understand than a symbolic work. A symbol always transcends the one who makes use of it and makes him say in reality more than he is aware of expressing." (Albert Camus, "The Myth of Sisyphus", 1942)

"The methods of algebra are essentially an extension of arithmetic. In other words, the numbers, symbols and operations used in algebra are the same as those used in arithmetic, only they are more general in character. This means (1) that letters as well as numbers are are used te to represent quantities, and (2) that numbers are regarded as having quality as well as quantity." (William L Schaaf, "Mathematics for Mechanics", 1942)

"[The power of understanding symbols] issues in an unconscious, spontaneous process of abstraction, which goes on all the time in the human mind: a process of recognizing the concept in any configuration given to experience, and forming a conception accordingly." (Suzanne K Langer, "Philosophy in a New Key: A Study in the Symbolism of Reason, Rite, and Art", 1942)

"It is generally agreed that thought employs symbols such as written or spoken words or tokens; but it is not generally considered whether the whole of thought may not consist of a process of symbolism, nor is the nature of symbolism and its presence or absence in the inorganic world discussed." (Kenneth Craik, "The Nature of Explanation", 1943)

"My hypothesis then is that thought models, or parallels, reality - that its essential feature is not ‘the mind’, ‘the self’, ‘sense-data’, nor propositions but symbolism, and that this symbolism is largely of the same kind as that which is familiar to us in mechanical devices which aid thought and calculation." (Kenneth Craik, "The Nature of Explanation", 1943)

"Thus there are instances of symbolisation in nature; we use such instances as an aid to thinking; there is evidence of similar mechanisms at work in our own sensory and central nervous systems; and the function of such symbolisation is plain. If the organism carries a ’small-scale model’ of external reality and of its own possible actions within its head, it is able to try out various alternatives, conclude which is the best of them, react to future situations before they arise […]" (Kenneth Craik, "The Nature of Explanation", 1943)

"Thus we do not try to prove the existence of the external world – we discover it, because the fundamental power of words or other symbols to represent events [...] permits us to put forward hypotheses and test their truth by reference to experience. [..] A particular type of symbolism may always fail in a particular case, as Euclidean geometry apparently fails to represent stellar space; but if all types of symbolism always failed, we should be unable to recognise any objects or exist at all." (Kenneth Craik, "The Nature of Explanation", 1943)

"Without falling into the trap of attempting a precise definition, we may suggest a theory as to the general nature of symbolism, viz. that it is the ability of processes to parallel or imitate each other, or the fact that they can do so since there are recurrent patterns in reality." (Kenneth Craik, "The Nature of Explanation", 1943)

"Man has [...] discovered a new method of adapting himself to his environment. Between the receptor system and the effector system, which are to be found in all animal species, we find in man a third link which we may describe as the symbolic system." (Ernst Cassirer, "An Essay on Man", 1944)

"A mathematician is not a man who can readily manipulate figures; often he cannot. He is not even a man who can readily perform the transformations of equations by the use of calculus. He is primarily an individual who is skilled in the use of symbolic logic on a high plane, and especially he is a man of intuitive judgment in the choice of the manipulative processes he employs." (Vannevar Bush, "As We May Think", 1945)

"Figures and symbols are closely connected with mathematical thinking, their use assists the mind. […] At any rate, the use of mathematical symbols is similar to the use of words. Mathematical notation appears as a sort of language, une langue bien faite, a language well adapted to its purpose, concise and precise, with rules which, unlike the rules of ordinary grammar, suffer no exception." (George Pólya, "How to solve it", 1945)

"For, in mathematics or symbolic logic, reason can crank out the answer from the symboled equations -even a calculating machine can often do so - but it cannot alone set up the equations. Imagination resides in the words which define and connect the symbols - subtract them from the most aridly rigorous mathematical treatise and all meaning vanishes." (Ralph W Gerard, "The Biological Basis of Imagination", American Thought, 1947)

"When one analyzes the pre-conscious step to concepts, one always finds ideas which consist of 'symbolic images'. The first step to thinking is a painted vision of these inner pictures whose origin cannot be reduced only and firstly to the sensual perception but which are produced by an 'instinct to imagining' and which are re-produced by different individuals independently, i.e. collectively [...] But the archaic image is also the necessary predisposition and the source of a scientific attitude. To a total recognition belong also those images out of which have grown the rational concepts." (Wolfgang Pauli, [Letter to Markus Fierz] 1948)

"Belief has its structures, and its symbols change. Its tradition changes. All the relationships within these forms are inter-dependent. We look at the symbols, we hope to read them, we hope for sharing and communication." (Muriel Rukeyser, "The Life of Poetry", 1949)

"However obvious these facts may appear at first glance, they are actually not so obvious as they seem except when we take special pains to think about the subject. Symbols and things symbolized are independent of each other; nevertheless, we all have a way of feeling as if […] there were necessary connections." (Samuel I Hayakawa, "Language in Thought and Action", 1949)

"Men cannot be treated as units in operations of political arithmetic because they behave like the symbols for zero and the infinite, which dislocate all mathematical operations." (Arthur Koestler, "Crossman", 1949)

"The first of the principles governing symbols is this: The symbol is NOT the thing symbolized; the word is NOT the thing; the map is NOT the territory it stands for." (Samuel I Hayakawa, "Language in Thought and Action", 1949)

On Symbols (2000-2009)

"Precision is greatly enhanced by the human capacity to symbolize. Symbols can be devised to stand for mathematical ideas, entities, operations, and relations. Symbols also permit precise and repeatable calculation." (George Lakoff & Rafael E Nuñez, "Where Mathematics Come From: How the Embodied Mind Brings Mathematics into Being, 2000)

"The motion of the mind is conveyed along a cloud of meaning. There is this paradox that we get to meaning only when we strip the meaning from symbols." (David Berlinski, "The Advent of the Algorithm: The Idea that Rules the World", 2000)

"A symbol is a mental representation regarding the internal reality referring to its object by a convention and produced by the conscious interpretation of a sign. In contrast to signals, symbols may be used every time if the receiver has the corresponding representation. Symbols also relate to feelings and thus give access not only to information but also to the communicator’s motivational and emotional state. The use of symbols makes it possible for the organism using it to evoke in the receiver the same response it evokes in himself. To communicate with symbols is to use a language." (Lars Skyttner, "General Systems Theory: Ideas and Applications", 2001)

"In the definition of meaning, it is assumed that both the source and receiver have previously coded (and stored) signals of the same or similar referents, such that the messages may have meaning and relate to behaviour. That is, the used symbols must have the same signification for both sender and receiver. If not, the receiver will create a different mental picture than intended by the transmitter. Meaning is generated by individuals in a process of social interaction with a more or less common environment. It is a relation subsisting within a field of experience and appears as an emergent property of a symbolic representation when used in culturally accepted interaction. The relation between the symbolic representation and its meaning is random. Of this, however, the mathematical theory has nothing to say. If human links in the chain of communication are missing, of course no questions of meaning will arise." (Lars Skyttner, "General Systems Theory: Ideas and Applications", 2001)

"A person thinking in the nonverbal mode is actually thinking with the meaning of the language in the form of mental pictures of the concepts and ideas it contains. Nonverbal thought doesn't require literacy. An illiterate person can communicate without knowing what the symbols look like. [...] Literacy, then, is established as the person learns how the symbols look and becomes able to recognize them as representing certain things or concepts." (Ronald D Davis & Eldon M Braun, "The Gift of Learning", 2003)

"Science does not speak of the world in the language of words alone, and in many cases it simply cannot do so. The natural language of science is a synergistic integration of words, diagrams, pictures, graphs, maps, equations, tables, charts, and other forms of visual and mathematical expression. […] [Science thus consists of] the languages of visual representation, the languages of mathematical symbolism, and the languages of experimental operations." (Jay Lemke, "Teaching all the languages of science: Words, symbols, images and actions", 2003)

"I often told the fanatics of realism that there is no such thing as realism in art: it only exists in the mind of the observer. Art is a symbol, a thing conjuring up reality in our mental image. That is why I don't see any contradiction between abstract and figurative art either." (Antoni Tàpies, "Tàpies, Werke auf Papier 1943 – 2003", 2004)

"A symbol is an object, act, or event that conveys meaning to others. Symbols can be considered a rich, non-verbal language that vibrantly conveys the organization’s important values concerning how people relate to one another and interact with the environment" (Richard L Daft & Dorothy Marcic, "Understanding Management" 5th Ed., 2006)

"But because of the way in which depictions represent, there is a correspondence between parts and spatial relations of the representation and those of the object; this structural mapping, which confers a type of resemblance, underlies the way images convey specific content. In this respect images are like pictures. Unlike words and symbols, depictions are not arbitrarily paired with what they represent." (Stephen Kosslyn et al," The Case for Mental Imagery", 2006)

"Imagination has the creative task of making symbols, joining things together in such a way that they throw new light on each other and on everything around them. The imagination is a discovering faculty, a faculty for seeing relationships, for seeing meanings that are special and even quite new." (Thomas Merton, "Angelic Mistakes: The Art of Thomas Merton", 2006)

"[...] the scientific models of concrete things are symbolic rather than iconic: they are systems of propositions, not pictures. Besides, such models are seldom if ever completely accurate, if only because they involve more or less brutal simplifications, such as pretending that a metallic surface is smooth, a crystal has no impurities, a biopopulation has a single predator, or a market is in equilibrium.  These are all fictions. However, they are stylizations rather than wild fantasies. Hence, introducing and using them to account for real existents does not commit us to fictionism, just as defending the role of experience need not make us empiricists, nor is admitting the role of intuition enough to qualify as intuitionist." (Mario Bunge, "Chasing Reality: Strife over Realism", 2006)

"But notice, a subatomic particle is itself a holon [hole/parts]. And so is a cell. And so is a symbol, and an image, and a concept. What all of those entities are, before they are anything else, is a holon. So the world is not composed of atoms or symbols or cells or concepts. It is composed of holons." (Ken Wilber, "A Brief History of Everything", 2007)

"Language use is a curious behavior, but once the transition to language is made, literature is a likely consequence, since it is linked to the dynamic of the linguistic symbol through the functioning of the imagination." (Russell Berman, "Fiction Sets You Free: Literature, Liberty and Western Culture", 2007)

"Images and pictures […] have played a key role in shaping our scientific picture of the world. […] Carefully constructed families of pictures can act as a calculus all their own. Like any successful systems of symbols, with an appropriate grammar they enlarge the number of things that we can do without consciously thinking." (John D Barrow, "Cosmic Imagery: Key Images in the History of Science", 2008)

"How are we to explain the contrast between the matter-of-fact way in which √-1 and other imaginary numbers are accepted today and the great difficulty they posed for learned mathematicians when they first appeared on the scene? One possibility is that mathematical intuitions have evolved over the centuries and people are generally more willing to see mathematics as a matter of manipulating symbols according to rules and are less insistent on interpreting all symbols as representative of one or another aspect of physical reality. Another, less self-congratulatory possibility is that most of us are content to follow the computational rules we are taught and do not give a lot of thought to rationales." (Raymond S Nickerson, "Mathematical Reasoning: Patterns, Problems, Conjectures, and Proofs", 2009)

"Mathematicians are sometimes described as living in an ideal world of beauty and harmony. Instead, our world is torn apart by inconsistencies, plagued by non sequiturs and, worst of all, made desolate and empty by missing links between words, and between symbols and their referents; we spend our lives patching and repairing it. Only when the last crack disappears are we rewarded by brief moments of harmony and joy." (Alexandre V Borovik, "Mathematics under the Microscope: Notes on Cognitive Aspects of Mathematical Practice", 2009)

"Mathematical ideas like number can only be really 'seen' with the 'eyes of the mind' because that is how one 'sees' ideas. Think of a sheet of music which is important and useful but it is nowhere near as interesting, beautiful or powerful as the music it represents. One can appreciate music without reading the sheet of music. Similarly, mathematical notation and symbols on a blackboard are just like the sheet of music; they are important and useful but they are nowhere near as interesting, beautiful or powerful as the actual mathematics (ideas) they represent." (Fiacre O Cairbre, "The Importance of Being Beautiful in Mathematics", IMTA Newsletter 109, 2009)