🧩Out of Context: On Diagrams (Definitions)

 "Diagrams are of great utility for illustrating certain questions of vital statistics by conveying ideas on the subject through the eye, which cannot be so readily grasped when contained in figures." (Florence Nightingale, "Mortality of the British Army", 1857)

"Diagrams are sometimes used, not merely to convey several pieces of information such as several time series on one chart, but also to provide visual evidence of relationships between the series." (Alfred R Ilersic, "Statistics", 1959)

"Diagrams, whether representational or symbolic, are meaningless unless attached to some body of theory. On the other hand theories are in no need of diagrams save for psychological purposes. Let us then keep theoretical models apart from visual analogues."  (Mario Bunge, "Philosophy of Physics", 1973)

"Schematic diagrams are more abstract than pictorial drawings, showing symbolic elements and their interconnection to make clear the configuration and/or operation of a system." (Ernest O Doebelin, "Engineering experimentation: planning, execution, reporting", 1995)

"[...] (4) Diagrams are psychologically useful, but prove nothing; (5) Diagrams can even be misleading [...]" (James R Brown,"Philosophy of Mathematics", 1999)

"A model diagram declares some sets and binary relations, and imposes some basic constraints on them. A diagram is a good way to convey the outline of a model, but diagrams aren’t expressive enough to include detailed constraints." (Daniel Jackson, "Software Abstractions", 2006) 

"[...] diagrams are models, graphical in nature, that are used to illustrate structure (e.g., how components are physically interconnected); they do not capture functional behavior of a system. "  (Robbie T Nakatsu, "Diagrammatic Reasoning in AI", 2010)

🗺️On Knowledge Representation: Definitions

"A diagram is a representamen [representation] which is predominantly an icon of relations and is aided to be so by conventions. Indices are also more or less used. It should be carried out upon a perfectly consistent system of representation, founded upon a simple and easily intelligible basic idea." (Charles S Peirce, 1903)

"A diagram is an icon or schematic image embodying the meaning of a general predicate; and from the observation of this icon we are supposed to construct a new general predicate." (Charles S Peirce, "New Elements" ["Kaina stoiceia"], 1904)

"[The diagram] is only an heuristic to prompt certain trains of inference; [...] it is dispensable as a proof-theoretic device; indeed, [...] it has no proper place in the proof as such. For the proof is a syntactic object consisting only of sentences arranged in a finite and inspectable array." (Neil Tennant, "The withering away of formal semantics", Mind and Language Vol. 1 (4), 1986)

"Diagrams are a means of communication and explanation, and they facilitate brainstorming. They serve these ends best if they are minimal. Comprehensive diagrams of the entire object model fail to communicate or explain; they overwhelm the reader with detail and they lack meaning." (Eric Evans, "Domain-Driven Design: Tackling complexity in the heart of software", 2003)

"A diagram is a graphic shorthand. Though it is an ideogram, it is not necessarily an abstraction. It is a representation of something in that it is not the thing itself. In this sense, it cannot help but be embodied. It can never be free of value or meaning, even when it attempts to express relationships of formation and their processes. At the same time, a diagram is neither a structure nor an abstraction of structure." (Peter Eisenman, "Written Into the Void: Selected Writings", 1990-2004, 2007)

"Diagrams are information graphics that are made up primarily of geometric shapes, such as rectangles, circles, diamonds, or triangles, that are typically (but not always) interconnected by lines or arrows. One of the major purposes of a diagram is to show how things, people, ideas, activities, etc. interrelate and interconnect. Unlike quantitative charts and graphs, diagrams are used to show interrelationships in a qualitative way." (Robbie T Nakatsu, "Diagrammatic Reasoning in AI", 2010)

"[...] diagrams are models, graphical in nature, that are used to illustrate structure (e.g., how components are physically interconnected); they do not capture functional behavior of a system. "  (Robbie T Nakatsu, "Diagrammatic Reasoning in AI", 2010)

On Construction V: Diagrams

"[…] deduction consists in constructing an icon or diagram the relations of whose parts shall present a complete analogy with those of the parts of the object of reasoning, of experimenting upon this image in the imagination, and of observing the result so as to discover unnoticed and hidden relations among the parts." (Charles S Peirce, 1885)

"A diagram is an icon or schematic image embodying the meaning of a general predicate; and from the observation of this icon we are supposed to construct a new general predicate." (Charles S Peirce, "New Elements" ["Kaina stoiceia"], 1904)

"A theorem […] is an inference obtained by constructing a diagram according to a general precept, and after modifying it as ingenuity may dictate, observing in it certain relations, and showing that they must subsist in every case, retranslating the proposition into general terms." (Charles S Peirce, "New Elements" ["Kaina stoiceia"], 1904)

"Exact figures have, in principle, the same role in geometry as exact measurements in physics; but, in practice, exact figures are less important than exact measurements because the theorems of geometry are much more extensively verified than the laws of physics. The beginner, however, should construct many figures as exactly as he can in order to acquire a good experimental basis; and exact figures may suggest geometric theorems also to the more advanced. Yet, for the purpose of reasoning, carefully drawn free-hand figures are usually good enough, and they are much more quickly done." (George Pólya, "How to solve it", 1945)

"The diagrams incorporate a large amount of information. Their use provides extensive savings in space and in mental effort. In the case of many theorems, the setting up of the correct diagram is the major part of the proof. We therefore urge that the reader stop at the end of each theorem and attempt to construct for himself the relevant diagram before examining the one which is given in the text. Once this is done, the subsequent demonstration can be followed more readily; in fact, the reader can usually supply it himself." (Samuel Eilenberg & Norman E. Steenrod, "Foundations of Algebraic Topology", 1952)

"When the correspondences on the plane can be established between: - all the divisions of one component - and all the divisions of another component, the construction is a DIAGRAM." (Jacques Bertin, "Semiology of graphics", 1967)

"In the geometry of similarities the only geometric properties of a figure are angles and ratios of distances. So in that geometry the only possible construction problems involve certain angles between lines of the figure and ratios of distances between its points." (Isaak Yaglom, "Geometric Transformations", 1973)

"The thinking person goes over the same ground many times. He looks at it from varying points of view - his own, his arch-enemy’s, others’. He diagrams it, verbalizes it, formulates equations, constructs visual images of the whole problem, or of troublesome parts, or of what is clearly known. But he does not keep a detailed record of all this mental work, indeed could not. […] Deep understanding of a domain of knowledge requires knowing it in various ways. This multiplicity of perspectives grows slowly through hard work and sets the state for the re-cognition we experience as a new insight." (Howard E Gruber, "Darwin on Man", 1981)

"According to mental model theory, human reasoning relies on the construction of integrated mental representations of the information that is given in the reasoning problem's premises. These integrated representations are the mental models. A mental model is a mental representation that captures what is common to all the different ways in which the premises can be interpreted. It represents in 'small scale' how 'reality' could be - according to what is stated in the premises of a reasoning problem. Mental models, though, must not be confused with images. A mental model often forms the basis of one or more visual images, but some of them represent situations that cannot be visualized. Instead, mental models are often likened to diagrams since, as with diagrams, their structure is analogous to the structure of the states of affairs they represent." (Carsten Held et al, "Mental Models and the Mind", 2006)

🅽Robbie T Nakatsu - Collected Quotes

"Why do people use mental models? First, they are used as inference tools to predict the behavior of a system under novel conditions. They enable us to predict system outcomes from system parameters: We may run our mental model by modifying the system parameters and observing how the behavior of the system changes. Second, mental models can be used to produce explanations and justifications. Such explanations may give us confidence in using e system and enable us to more readily trust the results of the system. Third, mental models can be used as mnemonic devices to facilitate remembering and long-term retention of information. Here, a mental model may provide one with a "cover story" to make the understanding of the system more memorable and easier to recall." (Robbie Nakatsu, "Diagrammatic Reasoning in AI", 1994)

"A hierarchy is a diagram that shows how various components of a system are related, often with a downward direction (or alternatively a left-to-right direction) that moves from more general to more specific. One way to envision a hierarchy is as an inverted tree: We start with a single component (referred to as the root node or topmost node), typically denoted by a square, and then we draw one or more paths leading from it to other nodes. Each of these nodes, in turn, may subdivide into additional subpaths to other nodes. This process may be repeated any number of times to arrive at a multitiered, tree-like structure." (Robbie T Nakatsu, "Diagrammatic Reasoning in AI", 2010)

"A mental model is the user's model of a target system; it is a model of a system that exists in a person's head. Through interaction with a complex system, it is a 'naturally evolving model. As a person develops more experience with a system, the model develops and becomes more refined. Hence, at any given point in time, the mental model, as seen through the eyes of the user, is a dynamic, usually incomplete specification of the target system. A conceptual model, on the other hand, is typically the designer's complete specification of a target system. As such, it is intended to be an accurate, consistent, and complete representation of a target system. Ideally, we would want the user's mental model to be the same as the system designer's conceptual model." (Robbie T Nakatsu, "Diagrammatic Reasoning in AI", 2010)

"Diagrams are information graphics that are made up primarily of geometric shapes, such as rectangles, circles, diamonds, or triangles, that are typically (but not always) interconnected by lines or arrows. One of the major purposes of a diagram is to show how things, people, ideas, activities, etc. interrelate and interconnect. Unlike quantitative charts and graphs, diagrams are used to show interrelationships in a qualitative way." (Robbie T Nakatsu, "Diagrammatic Reasoning in AI", 2010)

"Models are an important form of knowledge representation because expertise often lies in one's ability to reason about how the objects, or components, of a system are interconnected - whether physically, causally, relationally, or otherwise - in a domain of discourse." (Robbie T Nakatsu, "Diagrammatic Reasoning in AI", 2010)

"On the one hand, a conceptual model seeks to faithfully represent the components, the connections, the relations, and the processes that act on the components. On the other hand, a mental model that employs analogical representations is chosen to invite comparisons between two dissimilar domains, never to faithfully and completely represent the target domain." (Robbie T Nakatsu, "Diagrammatic Reasoning in AI", 2010)

"Prototyping is a method of developing systems rapidly by creating a quick-and-dirty mockup of a system, called a prototype. Once created, the prototype is given to end users so that they can provide their feedback and suggestions for improvement. Based on this feedback, you modify and enhance the prototype. It is an iterative process in that you can get feedback multiple times and enhance the prototype accordingly." (Robbie T Nakatsu, "Diagrammatic Reasoning in AI", 2010)

"Rule-based expert systems require that you preprogram all the rules that represent the knowledge in the domain. To create a realistic and complete solution. the knowledge engineer must be well versed in the domain and have a clear sense of what the decision procedures are. This understanding must take place beforehand, before the system is created: misunderstandings about the domain can be very costly later on because rule-based expert systems can be extremely difficult to modify and extend into other areas. Even when this is possible. the new rules must be created manually - the expert system does not learn how to tine-tune the rules on its own. Case-based reasoning and neural networks are two Al approaches that are more suitable when you want to create a system that 'learns' how to solve problems on its own." (Robbie T Nakatsu, "Diagrammatic Reasoning in AI", 2010)

"Semantic networks are used to illustrate how people organize information in their memories. Such representations have been used by cognitive psychologists to understand and theorize how one retrieves and processes information from long-term memory. In AI, semantic networks can also be used as a knowledge representation scheme that programs can use to retrieve information efficiently just like humans do." (Robbie T Nakatsu, "Diagrammatic Reasoning in AI", 2010)

"Structure is the way that the individual components of a system are interconnected (as given by a system's topology); Behavior refers to what each of these components is supposed to do. From this definition, we may distinguish three levels of system description. First, diagrams are models, graphical in nature, that are used to illustrate structure (e.g., how components are physically interconnected); they do not capture functional behavior of a system. Second, heuristics describe relationships between inputs and outputs, based on the way that experts describe how inputs are transformed into outputs. (Heuristics may be represented as IF-THEN rules). Heuristic knowledge, however, does not attempt to create an explicit representation of system structure. Model-based reasoning is a more complete representation system in the sense that it describes both structure and behavior. From this, three levels of system description can be distinguished, based on whether they describe structure, behavior, or both."  (Robbie T Nakatsu, "Diagrammatic Reasoning in AI", 2010)

"The development of a mental model, then, can be chronicled, much like the development of a cognitive skill. Three developmental processes8 seem to be at play when a mental model evolves. that mental model becomes more powerful because it works for a wider variety of situations. Second, discrimination means that a mental model is more sensitive to variations in a given situation so that a mental model may add an important new condition where previously it had been overlooked. Third, strengthening means that those aspects of a mental model that have been successfully applied in the past are strengthened and rendered more salient and significant." (Robbie T Nakatsu, "Diagrammatic Reasoning in AI", 2010)

"This is always the case in analogical reasoning: Relations between two dissimilar domains never map completely to one another. In fact, it is often the salient similarities between the base and target domains that provoke thought and increase the usefulness of an analogy as a problem-solving tool." (Robbie T Nakatsu, "Diagrammatic Reasoning in AI", 2010)

"Venn diagramming, it turns out, is a very effective technique for performing syllogistic reasoning. Its chief advantage (over the Euler graph in particular as we noted earlier) is the ability to incrementally add knowledge to the diagram. While an Euler graph has visual power in terms of representing the relations between sets very intuitively, it is impossible to combine more than one piece of information onto a Euler graph. A Venn diagram, on the other hand, easily lends itself to the representation of partial knowledge and can be manipulated to add successively more knowledge to the diagram. This means that when our knowledge of the relations between sets increases, we simply put in more symbols and shadings into the appropriate compartments of the Venn diagram. Thus we are able to accumulate knowledge in a Venn diagram. This capability turns out to be a powerful feature, one that endows Venn diagrams with a more dynamic quality that is sorely lacking in the Euler system." (Robbie T Nakatsu, "Diagrammatic Reasoning in AI", 2010)

"What advantages do diagrams have over verbal descriptions in promoting system understanding? First, by providing a diagram, massive amounts of information can be presented more efficiently. A diagram can strip down informational complexity to its core - in this sense, it can result in a parsimonious, minimalist description of a system. Second, a diagram can help us see patterns in information and data that may appear disordered otherwise. For example, a diagram can help us see mechanisms of cause and effect or can illustrate sequence and flow in a complex system. Third, a diagram can result in a less ambiguous description than a verbal description because it forces one to come up with a more structured description." (Robbie T Nakatsu, "Diagrammatic Reasoning in AI", 2010)

🗺️On Knowledge Representation: Venn Diagrams

"[...] for merely theoretical purposes the rule of formation would be very simple. It would merely be to begin by drawing any closed figure, and then proceed [sic] to draw others, subject to the one condition that each is to intersect once and once only all the existing subdivisions produced by those which had gone before." (John Venn, "On the Diagrammatic and Mechanical Representation of Propositions and Reasonings", 1880)

"[…] it must be noticed that these diagrams do not naturally harmonize with the propositions of ordinary life or ordinary logic. […] The great bulk of the propositions which we commonly meet with are founded, and rightly founded, on an imperfect knowledge of the actual mutual relations of the implied classes to one another. […] one very marked characteristic about these circular diagrams is that they forbid the natural expression of such uncertainty, and are therefore only directly applicable to a very small number of such propositions as we commonly meet with." (John Venn, "On the Diagrammatic and Mechanical Representation of Propositions and Reasonings", 1880)

"[...] we can not readily break up a complicated problem into successive steps which can be taken independently. We have, in fact, to solve the problem first, by determining what are the actual mutual relations of the classes involved, and then to draw the circles to represent this final result; we cannot work step-by-step towards the conclusion by aid of our figures." (John Venn, "On the Diagrammatic and Mechanical Representation of Propositions and Reasonings", 1880)

"Whereas the Eulerian plan endeavoured at once and directly to represent propositions, or relations of class terms to one another, we shall find it best to begin by representing only classes, and then proceed to modify these in some way so as to make them indicate what our propositions have to say. How, then, shall we represent all the subclasses which two or more class terms can produce? Bear in mind that what we have to indicate is the successive duplication of the number of subdivisions produced by the introduction of each successive term. and we shall see our way to a very important departure from the Eulerian conception. All that we have to do is to draw our figures, say circles, so that each successive one which we introduce shall intersect once, and once only, all the subdivisions already existing, and we then have what may be called a general framework indicating every possible combination producible by the given class terms." (John Venn, "On the Diagrammatic and Mechanical Representation of Propositions and Reasonings", 1880)

"It will be found that there is a tendency for the resultant outlines thus successively drawn to assume a comb-like shape after the first four or five [...]The fifth-term figure will have two teeth, the sixth four, and so on. [...] There is no trouble in drawing such a diagram for any number of terms which our paper will find room for. But, as has already been repeatedly remarked, the visual aid for which mainly such diagrams exist is soon lost on such a path."  (John Venn, "Symbolic Logic", [footnote], 1881)

"There is no need here to exhibit such figures, as they would probably be distasteful to any but the mathematician, and he would see his way to drawing them readily enough for himself [...]" (John Venn, "Symbolic Logic", 1881)

"We endeavour to employ only symmetrical figures, such as should not only be an aid to reasoning, through the sense of sight, but should also be to some extent elegant in themselves." (John Venn, "Symbolic Logic", 1881)

"At the basis of our Symbolic Logic, however represented, whether by words by letters or by diagrams, we shall always find the same state of things. What we ultimately have to do is to break up the entire field before us into a definite number of classes or compartments which are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive." (John Venn, "Symbolic Logic" 2nd Ed., 1894)

"The best way of introducing this question will be to enquire a little more strictly whether it is really classes that we thus represent, or merely compartments into which classes may be put? […] The most accurate answer is that our diagrammatic subdivisions, or for that matter our symbols generally, stand for compartments and not for classes. We may doubtless regard them as representing the latter, but if we do so we should never fail to keep in mind the proviso, 'if there be such things in existence'. And when this condition is insisted upon, it seems as if we expressed our meaning best by saying that what our symbols stand for are compartments which may or may not happen to be occupied." (John Venn, "Symbolic Logic" 2nd Ed., 1894)

 "My Method of Diagrams resembles Mr. Venn's, in having separate Compartments assigned to the various Classes, and in marking these Compartments as occupied or as empty; but it differs from his Method, in assigning a closed area to the Universe of Discourse, so that the Class which, under Mr. Venn's liberal sway, has been ranging at will through Infinite Space, is suddenly dismayed to find itself "cabin'd, cribb'd, confined" in a limited Cell like any other Class! Also I use rectilinear, instead of curvilinear Figures" (Charles Dogson [Lews Carroll], 1896)

"This is why a 'web' of notes with links (like references) between them is far more useful than a fixed hierarchical system. When describing a complex system, many people resort to diagrams with circles and arrows. Circles and arrows leave one free to describe the interrelationships between things in a way that tables, for example, do not. The system we need is like a diagram of circles and arrows, where circles and arrows can stand for anything." (Tim Berners-Lee, "Information Management: A Proposal", 1989)

"Venn diagrams are widely used to solve problems in set theory and to test the validity of syllogisms in logic. […] However, it is a fact that Venn diagrams are not considered valid proofs, but heuristic tools for finding valid formal proofs." (Sun-Joo Shin, "Situation-Theoretic Account of Valid Reasoning with Venn Diagrams", [in "Logical Reasoning with Diagrams"], 1996)

"Venn diagrams provide us with a formalism that consists of a standardized system of representations, together with rules for manipulating them. In this regard, they could be considered a primitive visual analog of the formal systems of deduction developed in logic." (Jon Barwise & John Etchemendy, "Visual Information and Valid Reasoning", [in "Logical Reasoning with Diagrams"], 1996)

"A Venn diagram is a simple representation of the sample space, that is often helpful in seeing 'what is going on'. Usually the sample space is represented by a rectangle, with individual regions within the rectangle representing events. It is Often helpful to imagine that the actual areas Of the various regions in a Venn diagram are in proportion to the corresponding probabilities. However, there is no need to spend a long time drawing these diagrams - their use is simply as a reminder of what is happening." (Graham Upton & Ian Cook, "Introducing Statistics", 2001)

"Two types of graphic organizers are commonly used for comparison: the Venn diagram and the comparison matrix [...] the Venn diagram provides students with a visual display of the similarities and differences between two items. The similarities between elements are listed in the intersection between the two circles. The differences are listed in the parts of each circle that do not intersect. Ideally, a new Venn diagram should be completed for each characteristic so that students can easily see how similar and different the elements are for each characteristic used in the comparison." (Robert J. Marzano et al, "Classroom Instruction that Works: Research-based strategies for increasing student achievement, 2001)

"It is a curious fact that if you draw an endless line on a piece of paper so that it cuts itself any number of times (but never cuts itself more than once at the same point), then you can color the resulting regions using only two colors without any adjoining regions being the same color. [...] Venn diagrams also possess this property, but for a separate reason, which at first sight seems to be nicely demonstrated by induction." (Anthony W F Edwards, "Cogwheels of the mind: The story of Venn diagrams", 2004)

"The notion of outcomes covering a space is a very useful mental image, as it ties in strongly with the use of Venn diagrams and tables for clarifying the nature of possible events resulting from a trial. There are two important aspects to this. First, when enumerating the various outcomes that comprise an event, the number of (equally. likely) outcomes should correspond, visually, with the area of that part of the diagram represented by the event in question - the greater the probability, the larger the area. Secondly, where events overlap (for example, when rolling a die, consider the two events 'getting an even score' and 'getting a score greater than 2' ), the various regions in the Venn diagram help to clarify the various combinations of events that might occur." (Alan Graham, "Developing Thinking in Statistics", 2006)

"Venn diagrams visually ground symbolic logic and abstract set operations. They do not ground probability. Their common overuse in introducing probability, especially in teaching, can have undesirable consequences." (R W Oldford & W H Cherry, "Picturing Probability: the poverty of Venn diagrams, the richness of Eikosograms", 2006)

"Venn diagramming, it turns out, is a very effective technique for performing syllogistic reasoning. Its chief advantage (over the Euler graph in particular as we noted earlier) is the ability to incrementally add knowledge to the diagram. While an Euler graph has visual power in terms of representing the relations between sets very intuitively, it is impossible to combine more than one piece of information onto a Euler graph. A Venn diagram, on the other hand, easily lends itself to the representation of partial knowledge and can be manipulated to add successively more knowledge to the diagram. This means that when our knowledge of the relations between sets increases, we simply put in more symbols and shadings into the appropriate compartments of the Venn diagram. Thus we are able to accumulate knowledge in a Venn diagram. This capability turns out to be a powerful feature, one that endows Venn diagrams with a more dynamic quality that is sorely lacking in the Euler system." (Robbie T Nakatsu, "Diagrammatic Reasoning in AI", 2010)

On Heuristics I

"The materialistic point of view in psychology can claim, at best, only the value of an heuristic hypothesis." (Wilhelm Wundt, "Principles of Physiological Psychology", 1874)

"Heuristic reasoning is good in itself. What is bad is to mix up heuristic reasoning with rigorous proof. What is worse is to sell heuristic reasoning for rigorous proof." (George Pólya, "How to Solve It", 1945)

"Heuristic, or heuretic, or 'ars inveniendi' was the name of a certain branch of study, not very clearly circumscribed, belonging to logic, or to philosophy, or to psychology, often outlined, seldom presented in detail, and as good as forgotten today. The aim of heuristic is to study the methods and rules of discovery and invention. [...] Heuristic, as an adjective, means 'serving to discover'." (George Pólya, "How to Solve It", 1945)

"Heuristic reasoning is reasoning not regarded as final and strict but as provisional and plausible only, whose purpose is to discover the solution of the present problem. We are often obliged to use heuristic reasoning. We shall attain complete certainty when we shall have obtained the complete solution, but before obtaining certainty we must often be satisfied with a more or less plausible guess. We may need the provisional before we attain the final. We need heuristic reasoning when we construct a strict proof as we need scaffolding when we erect a building." (George Pólya, "How to Solve It", 1945)

"The attempt to characterize exactly models of an empirical theory almost inevitably yields a more precise and clearer understanding of the exact character of a theory. The emptiness and shallowness of many classical theories in the social sciences is well brought out by the attempt to formulate in any exact fashion what constitutes a model of the theory. The kind of theory which mainly consists of insightful remarks and heuristic slogans will not be amenable to this treatment. The effort to make it exact will at the same time reveal the weakness of the theory." (Patrick Suppes," A Comparison of the Meaning and Uses of Models in Mathematics and the Empirical Sciences", Synthese  Vol. 12 (2/3), 1960)

"Factoring big numbers is a strange kind of mathematics that closely resembles the experimental sciences, where nature has the last and definitive word. […] as with the experimental sciences, both rigorous and heuristic analyses can be valuable in understanding the subject and moving it forward. And, as with the experimental sciences, there is sometimes a tension between pure and applied practitioners." (Carl B Pomerance, "A Tale of Two Sieves", The Notices of the American Mathematical Society 43, 1996)

"[…] mathematics does not come to us written indelibly on Nature’s Tablets, but rather is the product of a controlled search governed by metaphorical considerations, the premier instance being the heuristics of the conservation principles." (Philip Mirowski, "More Heat than Light: Economics as Social Physics: Physics as Nature’s Economics", 1989)

"Mathematicians, like the rest of us, cherish clever ideas; in particular they delight in an ingenious picture. But this appreciation does not overwhelm a prevailing skepticism. After all, a diagram is - at best - just a special case and so can't establish a general theorem. Even worse, it can be downright misleading. Though not universal, the prevailing attitude is that pictures are really no more than heuristic devices; they are psychologically suggestive and pedagogically important - but they prove nothing. I want to oppose this view and to make a case for pictures having a legitimate role to play as evidence and justification - a role well beyond the heuristic.  In short, pictures can prove theorems." (James R Brown, "Philosophy of Mathematics: An Introduction to the World of Proofs and Pictures", 1999)

"In the language of mental models, such past experience provided the default assumptions necessary to fill the gaps in the emerging and necessarily incomplete framework of a relativistic theory of gravitation. It was precisely the nature of these default assumptions that allowed them to be discarded again in the light of novel information - provided, for instance, by the further elaboration of the mathematical formalism - without, however, having to abandon the underlying mental models which could thus continue to function as heuristic orientations." (Jürgen Renn, "Before the Riemann Tensor: The Emergence of Einstein’s Double Strategy", [in "The Universe of General Relativity"] 2000)

"You can often hear from non-mathematicians, especially from philosophers, that mathematics consists exclusively in drawing conclusions from clearly stated premises; and that in this process, it makes no difference what these premises signify, whether they are true or fa1se, provided only that they do not contradict one another. But a per. son who has done productive mathematical work will talk quite differently. In fact these people [the non-mathematicians] are thinking only of the crystallized form into which finished mathematica1 theories are finally cast. However, the investigator himself, in mathematics as in every other science, does not work in this rigorous deductive fashion. On the contrary, he makes essential use of his imagination and proceeds inductively aided by heuristic expedients. One can give numerous examples of mathematicians who have discovered theorems of the greatest importance which they were unable to prove. Should one then refuse to recognize this as a great accomplishment and in deference to the above definition insist that this is not mathematics? After all it is an arbitrary thing how the word is to be used, but no judgment of value can deny that the inductive work of the person who first announces the theorem is at least as valuable as the deductive work. of the one who proves it. For both are equally necessary and the discovery is the presupposition of the later conclusion." (Felix Klein)

📁 On DIKW: On Facts (1890-1899)

"The study of theory must go hand in hand with that of facts: and for dealing with most modern problems it is modern facts that are of the greatest use." (Alfred Marshall, "Principles of Economics", 1890)

"The graphical method has considerable superiority for the exposition of statistical facts over the tabular. A heavy bank of figures is grievously wearisome to the eye, and the popular mind is as incapable of drawing any useful lessons from it as of extracting sunbeams from cucumbers." (Arthur B Farquhar & Henry Farquhar, "Economic and Industrial Delusions", 1891)

"All great scientists have, in a certain sense, been great artists; the man with no imagination may collect facts, but he cannot make great discoveries." (Karl Pearson, "The Grammar of Science", 1892)

"It is a capital mistake to theorize before one has data. Insensibly one begins to twist facts to suit theories, instead of theories to suit facts." (Sir Arthur C Doyle, "The Adventures of Sherlock Holmes", 1892)

"The classification of facts, the recognition of their sequence and relative significance is the function of science, and the habit of forming a judgment upon these facts unbiased by personal feeling is characteristic of what may be termed the scientific frame of mind." (Karl Pearson, "The Grammar of Science", 1892)

"The true aim of the teacher must be to impart an appreciation of method and not a knowledge of facts." (Karl Pearson, "The Grammar of Science", 1892)

"Facts are not much use, considered as facts. They bewilder by their number and their apparent incoherency. Let them be digested into theory, however, and brought into mutual harmony, and it is another matter. Theory is of the essence of facts. Without theory scientific knowledge would be only worthy of the mad house." (Oliver Heaviside, "Electromagnetic Theory", 1893)

"Scientific facts accumulate rapidly, and give rise to theories with almost equal rapidity. These theories are often wonderfully enticing, and one is apt to pass from one to another, from theory to theory, without taking care to establish each before passing on to the next, without assuring oneself that the foundation on which one is building is secure. Then comes the crash; the last theory breaks down utterly, and on attempting to retrace our steps to firm ground and start anew, we may find too late that one of the cards, possibly at the very foundation of the pagoda, is either faultily placed or in itself defective, and that this blemish easily remedied if detected in time has, neglected, caused the collapse of the whole structure on whose erection so much skill and perseverance have been spent." (Arthur M Marshall, 1894)

"Without a theory all our knowledge of nature would be reduced to a mere inventory of the results of observation. Every scientific theory must be regarded as an effort of the human mind to grasp the truth, and as long as it is consistent with the facts, it forms a chain by which they are linked together and woven into harmony." (Thomas Preston, "The Theory of Heat", 1894)

"The first step, whenever a practical problem is set before a mathematician, is to form the mathematical hypothesis. It is neither needful nor practical that we should take account of the details of the structure as it will exist. We have to reason about a skeleton diagram in which bearings are reduced to points, pieces to lines, etc. and [in] which it is supposed that certain relations between motions are absolutely constrained, irrespective of forces. Some writers call such a hypothesis a fiction, and say that the mathematician does not solve the real problem, but only a fictitious one. That is one way of looking at the matter, to which I have no objection to make: only, I notice, that in precisely the same sense in which the mathematical hypothesis is 'false', so also is this statement 'false', that it is false. Namely, both representations are false in the sense that they omit subsidiary elements of the fact, provided that element of the case can be said to be subsidiary which those writers overlook, namely, that the skeleton diagram is true in the only sense in which from the nature of things any mental representation, or understanding, of the brute existent can be true. For every possible conception, by the very nature of thought, involves generalization; now generalization omits, means to omit, and professes to omit, the differences between the facts generalized." (Charles S Peirce, "Report on Live Loads", cca. 1895)

"The world is chiefly a mental fact. From mind it receives the forms of time and space, the principle of causality, color, warmth, and beauty. Were there no mind, there would be no world." (John L Spalding, "Means and Ends of Education", 1895)

"In scientific investigations, it is permitted to invent any hypothesis and, if it explains various large and independent classes of facts, it rises to the ranks of a well-grounded theory." (Charles Darwin, "The Variations of Animals and Plants Under Domestication" Vol. 1, 1896)

"Mathematics is the most abstract of all the sciences. For it makes no external observations, nor asserts anything as a real fact. When the mathematician deals with facts, they become for him mere ‘hypotheses’; for with their truth he refuses to concern himself. The whole science of mathematics is a science of hypotheses; so that nothing could be more completely abstracted from concrete reality." (Charles S Peirce, "The Regenerated Logic", The Monist Vol. 7 (1), 1896)

"Round about the accredited and orderly facts of every science there ever fl oats a sort of dust-cloud of exceptional observations, of occurrences minute and irregular and seldom met with, which it always proves more easy to ignore than to attend to […]" (William James, "The Will to Believe", 1896)

"Science like life feeds on its own decay. New facts burst old rules; then newly developed concepts bind old and new together into a reconciling law." (William James, "The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy", 1896)

"The scientific value of truth is not, however, ultimate or absolute. It rests partly on practical, partly on aesthetic interests. As our ideas are gradually brought into conformity with the facts by the painful process of selection, - for intuition runs equally into truth and into error, and can settle nothing if not controlled by experience, - we gain vastly in our command over our environment. This is the fundamental value of natural science" (George Santayana, "The Sense of Beauty: Being the Outlines of Aesthetic Theory", 1896)

"To use an old analogy - and here we can hardly go except upon analogy - while the building of Nature is growing spontaneously from within, the model of it, which we seek to construct in our descriptive science, can only be constructed by means of scaffolding from without, a scaffolding of hypotheses. While in the real building all is continuous, in our model there are detached parts which must be connected with the rest by temporary ladders and passages, or which must be supported till we can see how to fill in the understructure. To give the hypotheses equal validity with facts is to confuse the temporary scaffolding with the building itself." (John H Poynting, 1899)

On Symbols (1910-1919)

"Pure mathematics is a collection of hypothetical, deductive theories, each consisting of a definite system of primitive, undefined, concepts or symbols and primitive, unproved, but self-consistent assumptions (commonly called axioms) together with their logically deducible consequences following by rigidly deductive processes without appeal to intuition." (Graham Fitch, "The Fourth Dimension simply Explained", 1910)

"Things and events explain themselves, and the business of thought is to brush aside the verbal and conceptual impediments which prevent them from doing so. Start with the notion that it is you who explain the Object, and not the Object that explains itself, and you are bound to end in explaining it away. It ceases to exist, its place being taken by a parcel of concepts, a string of symbols, a form of words, and you find yourself contemplating, not the thing, but your theory of the thing." (Lawrence P Jacks, "The Usurpation Of Language", 1910)

"A symbol which has not been properly defined is not a symbol at all. It is merely a blot of ink on paper which has an easily recognized shape. Nothing can be proved by a succession of blot, except the existence of a bad pen or a careless writer." (Alfred N Whitehead, "An Introduction to Mathematics", 1911)

"The symbols organized by knowledge, or concepts, themselves belong to social nature as its ideological elements. Therefore, by operating upon them, knowledge is able to expand its organizing function much more broadly than labour in its technological operation of real things; and as we have already seen that many things, which are not organized in practice, can be organized by knowledge, i.e. in symbols: where the ingression of things is absent, the ingression of their concepts is still possible." (Alexander A Bogdanov, "Tektology: The Universal Organizational Science" Vol. I, 1913)

"This diagrammatic method has, however, serious inconveniences as a method for solving logical problems. It does not show how the data are exhibited by cancelling certain constituents, nor does it show how to combine the remaining constituents so as to obtain the consequences sought. In short, it serves only to exhibit one single step in the argument, namely the equation of the problem; it dispenses neither with the previous steps, i.e., 'throwing of the problem into an equation' and the transformation of the premises, nor with the subsequent steps, i.e., the combinations that lead to the various consequences. Hence it is of very little use, inasmuch as the constituents can be represented by algebraic symbols quite as well as by plane regions, and are much easier to deal with in this form." (Louis Couturat, "The Algebra of Logic", 1914)

"The rigor of mathematics is not absolute - absolute rigor is an ideal, to be, like other ideals, aspired unto, forever approached, but never quite attained, for such attainment would mean that every possibility of error or indetermination, however slight, had been eliminated from idea, from symbol, and from argumentation." (Cassius J Keyser, "The Human Worth of Rigorous Thinking: Essays and Addresses", 1916)

"In obedience to the feeling of reality, we shall insist that, in the analysis of propositions, nothing 'unreal' is to be admitted. But, after all, if there is nothing unreal, how, it may be asked, could we admit anything unreal? The reply is that, in dealing with propositions, we are dealing in the first instance with symbols, and if we attribute significance to groups of symbols which have no significance, we shall fall into the error of admitting unrealities, in the only sense in which this is possible, namely, as objects described." (Bertrand Russell, "Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy" , 1919)

On Symbols (2000-2009)

"Precision is greatly enhanced by the human capacity to symbolize. Symbols can be devised to stand for mathematical ideas, entities, operations, and relations. Symbols also permit precise and repeatable calculation." (George Lakoff & Rafael E Nuñez, "Where Mathematics Come From: How the Embodied Mind Brings Mathematics into Being, 2000)

"The motion of the mind is conveyed along a cloud of meaning. There is this paradox that we get to meaning only when we strip the meaning from symbols." (David Berlinski, "The Advent of the Algorithm: The Idea that Rules the World", 2000)

"A symbol is a mental representation regarding the internal reality referring to its object by a convention and produced by the conscious interpretation of a sign. In contrast to signals, symbols may be used every time if the receiver has the corresponding representation. Symbols also relate to feelings and thus give access not only to information but also to the communicator’s motivational and emotional state. The use of symbols makes it possible for the organism using it to evoke in the receiver the same response it evokes in himself. To communicate with symbols is to use a language." (Lars Skyttner, "General Systems Theory: Ideas and Applications", 2001)

"In the definition of meaning, it is assumed that both the source and receiver have previously coded (and stored) signals of the same or similar referents, such that the messages may have meaning and relate to behaviour. That is, the used symbols must have the same signification for both sender and receiver. If not, the receiver will create a different mental picture than intended by the transmitter. Meaning is generated by individuals in a process of social interaction with a more or less common environment. It is a relation subsisting within a field of experience and appears as an emergent property of a symbolic representation when used in culturally accepted interaction. The relation between the symbolic representation and its meaning is random. Of this, however, the mathematical theory has nothing to say. If human links in the chain of communication are missing, of course no questions of meaning will arise." (Lars Skyttner, "General Systems Theory: Ideas and Applications", 2001)

"A person thinking in the nonverbal mode is actually thinking with the meaning of the language in the form of mental pictures of the concepts and ideas it contains. Nonverbal thought doesn't require literacy. An illiterate person can communicate without knowing what the symbols look like. [...] Literacy, then, is established as the person learns how the symbols look and becomes able to recognize them as representing certain things or concepts." (Ronald D Davis & Eldon M Braun, "The Gift of Learning", 2003)

"Science does not speak of the world in the language of words alone, and in many cases it simply cannot do so. The natural language of science is a synergistic integration of words, diagrams, pictures, graphs, maps, equations, tables, charts, and other forms of visual and mathematical expression. […] [Science thus consists of] the languages of visual representation, the languages of mathematical symbolism, and the languages of experimental operations." (Jay Lemke, "Teaching all the languages of science: Words, symbols, images and actions", 2003)

"I often told the fanatics of realism that there is no such thing as realism in art: it only exists in the mind of the observer. Art is a symbol, a thing conjuring up reality in our mental image. That is why I don't see any contradiction between abstract and figurative art either." (Antoni Tàpies, "Tàpies, Werke auf Papier 1943 – 2003", 2004)

"A symbol is an object, act, or event that conveys meaning to others. Symbols can be considered a rich, non-verbal language that vibrantly conveys the organization’s important values concerning how people relate to one another and interact with the environment" (Richard L Daft & Dorothy Marcic, "Understanding Management" 5th Ed., 2006)

"But because of the way in which depictions represent, there is a correspondence between parts and spatial relations of the representation and those of the object; this structural mapping, which confers a type of resemblance, underlies the way images convey specific content. In this respect images are like pictures. Unlike words and symbols, depictions are not arbitrarily paired with what they represent." (Stephen Kosslyn et al," The Case for Mental Imagery", 2006)

"Imagination has the creative task of making symbols, joining things together in such a way that they throw new light on each other and on everything around them. The imagination is a discovering faculty, a faculty for seeing relationships, for seeing meanings that are special and even quite new." (Thomas Merton, "Angelic Mistakes: The Art of Thomas Merton", 2006)

"[...] the scientific models of concrete things are symbolic rather than iconic: they are systems of propositions, not pictures. Besides, such models are seldom if ever completely accurate, if only because they involve more or less brutal simplifications, such as pretending that a metallic surface is smooth, a crystal has no impurities, a biopopulation has a single predator, or a market is in equilibrium.  These are all fictions. However, they are stylizations rather than wild fantasies. Hence, introducing and using them to account for real existents does not commit us to fictionism, just as defending the role of experience need not make us empiricists, nor is admitting the role of intuition enough to qualify as intuitionist." (Mario Bunge, "Chasing Reality: Strife over Realism", 2006)

"But notice, a subatomic particle is itself a holon [hole/parts]. And so is a cell. And so is a symbol, and an image, and a concept. What all of those entities are, before they are anything else, is a holon. So the world is not composed of atoms or symbols or cells or concepts. It is composed of holons." (Ken Wilber, "A Brief History of Everything", 2007)

"Language use is a curious behavior, but once the transition to language is made, literature is a likely consequence, since it is linked to the dynamic of the linguistic symbol through the functioning of the imagination." (Russell Berman, "Fiction Sets You Free: Literature, Liberty and Western Culture", 2007)

"Images and pictures […] have played a key role in shaping our scientific picture of the world. […] Carefully constructed families of pictures can act as a calculus all their own. Like any successful systems of symbols, with an appropriate grammar they enlarge the number of things that we can do without consciously thinking." (John D Barrow, "Cosmic Imagery: Key Images in the History of Science", 2008)

"How are we to explain the contrast between the matter-of-fact way in which √-1 and other imaginary numbers are accepted today and the great difficulty they posed for learned mathematicians when they first appeared on the scene? One possibility is that mathematical intuitions have evolved over the centuries and people are generally more willing to see mathematics as a matter of manipulating symbols according to rules and are less insistent on interpreting all symbols as representative of one or another aspect of physical reality. Another, less self-congratulatory possibility is that most of us are content to follow the computational rules we are taught and do not give a lot of thought to rationales." (Raymond S Nickerson, "Mathematical Reasoning: Patterns, Problems, Conjectures, and Proofs", 2009)

"Mathematicians are sometimes described as living in an ideal world of beauty and harmony. Instead, our world is torn apart by inconsistencies, plagued by non sequiturs and, worst of all, made desolate and empty by missing links between words, and between symbols and their referents; we spend our lives patching and repairing it. Only when the last crack disappears are we rewarded by brief moments of harmony and joy." (Alexandre V Borovik, "Mathematics under the Microscope: Notes on Cognitive Aspects of Mathematical Practice", 2009)

"Mathematical ideas like number can only be really 'seen' with the 'eyes of the mind' because that is how one 'sees' ideas. Think of a sheet of music which is important and useful but it is nowhere near as interesting, beautiful or powerful as the music it represents. One can appreciate music without reading the sheet of music. Similarly, mathematical notation and symbols on a blackboard are just like the sheet of music; they are important and useful but they are nowhere near as interesting, beautiful or powerful as the actual mathematics (ideas) they represent." (Fiacre O Cairbre, "The Importance of Being Beautiful in Mathematics", IMTA Newsletter 109, 2009)

🗺️On Knowledge Representation: On Diagrams (-1899)

"It hath been an old remark, that Geometry is an excellent Logic. And it must be owned that when the definitions are clear; when the postulata cannot be refused, nor the axioms denied; when from the distinct contemplation and comparison of figures, their properties are derived, by a perpetual well-connected chain of consequences, the objects being still kept in view, and the attention ever fixed upon them; there is acquired a habit of reasoning, close and exact and methodical; which habit strengthens and sharpens the mind, and being transferred to other subjects is of general use in the inquiry after truth." (George Berkeley, "The Analyst; Or, A Discourse Addressed to an Infidel Mathematician", 1734)

"In mathematics, such processes [of reasoning] are much longer than in any other science; and hence the study of it is peculiarly calculated to strengthen the power of steady and concatenated thinking, - a power which, in all the pursuits of life, whether speculative or active, is one of the most valuable endowments we can possess. This command of attention, however, it may be proper to add, is to be acquired, not by the practice of modern methods, but by the study of Greek geometry, more particularly, by accustoming ourselves to pursue long trains of demonstration, without availing ourselves of the aid of any sensible diagrams; the thoughts being directed solely by those ideal delineations which the powers of conception and of memory enable us to form." (Dugald Stewart, "Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind", 1792)

 "[…] the speculative propositions of mathematics do not relate to facts; […] all that we are convinced of by any demonstration in the science, is of a necessary connection subsisting between certain suppositions and certain conclusions. When we find these suppositions actually take place in a particular instance, the demonstration forces us to apply the conclusion. Thus, if I could form a triangle, the three sides of which were accurately mathematical lines, I might affirm of this individual figure, that its three angles are equal to two right angles; but as the imperfection of my senses puts it out of my power to be, in any case, certain of the exact correspondence of the diagram which I delineate, with the definitions given in the elements of geometry, I never can apply with confidence to a particular figure, a mathematical theorem." (Dugald Stewart, "Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind", 1792)

"There are, undoubtedly, the most ample reasons for stating both the principles and theorems [of geometry] in their general form […] But, that an unpractised learner, even in making use of one theorem to demonstrate another, reasons rather from particular to particular than from the general proposition, is manifest from the difficulty he finds in applying a theorem to a case in which the configuration of the diagram is extremely unlike that of the diagram by which the original theorem was demonstrated. A difficulty which, except in cases of unusual mental powers, long practice can alone remove, and removes chiefly by rendering us familiar with all the configurations consistent with the general conditions of the theorem." (John S Mill, "A System of Logic", 1843)

"Diagrams are of great utility for illustrating certain questions of vital statistics by conveying ideas on the subject through the eye, which cannot be so readily grasped when contained in figures." (Florence Nightingale, "Mortality of the British Army", 1857)

"Whenever I am infuriated, I revenge myself with a new Diagram." (Florence Nightingale, [letter to Sidney Herbert] 1857)

"They [diagrams] are designed not so much to allow of reference to particular numbers, which can be better had from printed tables of figures, as to exhibit to the eye the general results of large masses of figures which it is hopeless to attack in any other way than by graphical representation." (William S Jevons, [letter to Richard Hutton] 1863)

"Every process of what has been called Universal Geometry - the great creation of Descartes and his successors, in which a single train of reasoning solves whole classes of problems at once, and others common to large groups of them - is a practical lesson in the management of wide generalizations, and abstraction of the points of agreement from those of difference among objects of great and confusing diversity, to which the purely inductive sciences cannot furnish many superior. Even so elementary an operation as that of abstracting from the particular configuration of the triangles or other figures, and the relative situation of the particular lines or points, in the diagram which aids the apprehension of a common geometrical demonstration, is a very useful, and far from being always an easy, exercise of the faculty of generalization so strangely imagined to have no place or part in the processes of mathematics." (John S Mill, "An Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy", 1865)

"[…] it must be noticed that these diagrams do not naturally harmonize with the propositions of ordinary life or ordinary logic. […] The great bulk of the propositions which we commonly meet with are founded, and rightly founded, on an imperfect knowledge of the actual mutual relations of the implied classes to one another. […] one very marked characteristic about these circular diagrams is that they forbid the natural expression of such uncertainty, and are therefore only directly applicable to a very small number of such propositions as we commonly meet with." (John Venn, "On the Diagrammatic and Mechanical Representation of Propositions and Reasonings", 1880)

"I call a sign which stands for something merely because it resembles it, an icon. Icons are so completely substituted for their objects as hardly to be distinguished from them. Such are the diagrams of geometry. A diagram, indeed, so far as it has a general signification, is not a pure icon; but in the middle part of our reasonings we forget that abstractness in great measure, and the diagram is for us the very thing. So in contemplating a painting, there is a moment when we lose the consciousness that it is not the thing, the distinction of the real and the copy disappears, and it is for the moment a pure dream, - not any particular existence, and yet not general. At that moment we are contemplating an icon." (Charles S Peirce, "On The Algebra of Logic : A Contribution to the Philosophy of Notation" in The American Journal of Mathematics 7, 1885)

"At the basis of our Symbolic Logic, however represented, whether by words by letters or by diagrams, we shall always find the same state of things. What we ultimately have to do is to break up the entire field before us into a definite number of classes or compartments which are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive." (John Venn, "Symbolic Logic" 2nd Ed., 1894)

"The best way of introducing this question will be to enquire a little more strictly whether it is really classes that we thus represent, or merely compartments into which classes may be put? […] The most accurate answer is that our diagrammatic subdivisions, or for that matter our symbols generally, stand for compartments and not for classes. We may doubtless regard them as representing the latter, but if we do so we should never fail to keep in mind the proviso, 'if there be such things in existence'. And when this condition is insisted upon, it seems as if we expressed our meaning best by saying that what our symbols stand for are compartments which may or may not happen to be occupied." (John Venn, "Symbolic Logic" 2nd Ed., 1894)

"Deduction is that mode of reasoning which examines the state of things asserted in the premises, forms a diagram of that state of things, perceives in the parts of the diagram relations not explicitly mentioned in the premises, satisfies itself by mental experiments upon the diagram that these relations would always subsist, or at least would do so in a certain proportion of cases, and concludes their necessary, or probable, truth." (Charles S Peirce, "Kinds of Reasoning", cca. 1896)

🗺️On Knowledge Representation: On Diagrams (1925-1949)

"The preliminary examination of most data is facilitated by the use of diagrams. Diagrams prove nothing, but bring outstanding features readily to the eye; they are therefore no substitutes for such critical tests as may be applied to the data, but are valuable in suggesting such tests, and in explaining the conclusions founded upon them." (Sir Ronald A Fisher, "Statistical Methods for Research Workers", 1925)

"What the diagram has in common with the symbolic schema is the fact that the diagram spatially represents an abstract and unextended object. But there is here nothing other than a determinate location in space. This location serves as a mooring, an attachment, an orientation for our memory, but does not play any role in our thought." (Jean-Paul Sartre, "The Imaginary: A phenomenological psychology of the imagination", 1940)

"[…] statistical literacy. That is, the ability to read diagrams and maps; a 'consumer' understanding of common statistical terms, as average, per cent, dispersion, correlation, and index number." (Douglas Scates, “Statistics: The Mathematics for Social Problems”, 1943)

"When I undertake some geometrical research, I have generally a mental view of the diagram itself, though generally an inadequate or incomplete one, in spite of which it affords the necessary synthesis - a tendency which, it would appear, results from a training which goes back to my very earliest childhood." (Jacques Hadamard, "The Psychology of Invention in the Mathematical Field”, 1949)

"I believe, that the decisive idea which brings the solution of a problem is rather often connected with a well-turned word or sentence. The word or the sentence enlightens the situation, gives things, as you say, a physiognomy. It can precede by little the decisive idea or follow on it immediately; perhaps, it arises at the same time as the decisive idea. […] The right word, the subtly appropriate word, helps us to recall the mathematical idea, perhaps less completely and less objectively than a diagram or a mathematical notation, but in an analogous way. […] It may contribute to fix it in the mind." (George Polya [in a letter to Jaque Hadamard, "The Psychology of Invention in the Mathematical Field", 1949])

🪷On Mind: Mental Models LVIII

"We form in the imagination some sort of diagrammatic, that is, iconic, representation of the facts, as skeletonized as possible. The impression of the present writer is that with ordinary persons this is always a visual image, or mixed visual and muscular; but this is an opinion not founded on any systematic examination." (Charles S Peirce, "Notes on Ampliative Reasoning", 1901)

"A mental model is conceived here as a knowledge structure possessing slots that can be filled not only with empirically gained information but also with 'default assumptions' resulting from prior experience. These default assumptions can be substituted by updated information so that inferences based on the model can be corrected without abandoning the model as a whole. Information is assimilated to the slots of a mental model in the form of 'frames' which are understood here as 'chunks' of knowledge with a well-defined meaning anchored in a given body of shared knowledge." (Jürgen Renn, "Before the Riemann Tensor: The Emergence of Einstein’s Double Strategy", [in "The Universe of General Relativity"] 2000)

"In the language of mental models, such past experience provided the default assumptions necessary to fill the gaps in the emerging and necessarily incomplete framework of a relativistic theory of gravitation. It was precisely the nature of these default assumptions that allowed them to be discarded again in the light of novel information - provided, for instance, by the further elaboration of the mathematical formalism - without, however, having to abandon the underlying mental models which could thus continue to function as heuristic orientations." (Jürgen Renn, "Before the Riemann Tensor: The Emergence of Einstein’s Double Strategy", [in "The Universe of General Relativity"] 2000)

"A mental model represents a possibility, or, to be precise, the structure and content of the model capture what is common to the different ways in which the possibility could occur [...]" (Philip N Johnson-Laird, Mental Models, Sentential Reasoning, and Illusory Inferences, [in "Mental Models and the Mind"], 2006)

"According to mental model theory, human reasoning relies on the construction of integrated mental representations of the information that is given in the reasoning problem's premises. These integrated representations are the mental models. A mental model is a mental representation that captures what is common to all the different ways in which the premises can be interpreted. It represents in 'small scale' how "reality" could be— according to what is stated in the premises of a reasoning problem. Mental models, though, must not be confused with images. A mental model often forms the basis of one or more visual images, but some of them represent situations that cannot be visualized. Instead, mental models are often likened to diagrams since, as with diagrams, their structure is analogous to the structure of the states of affairs they represent." (Carsten Held et al, "Mental Models and the Mind", 2006)

"Mental models are mental representations of a certain type. The main problem in the philosophy of mental representation is to characterize the relation between a mental representation and the represented object. Naively speaking, a mental representation is an entity that 'stands for' another—the represented object - , but here 'stands for' is just a metaphoric place-holder for 'represents', thus requires further explanation." (Carsten Held et al, "Mental Models and the Mind", 2006)

"Prom the processing view, the model theory distinguishes between three different operations. In the construction phase, reasoners construct the mental model that reflects the information from the premises. In the inspection phase, this model is inspected to find new information that is not explicitly given in the premises. In most variants of the model theory, the inspection process is conceptualized as a spatial focus that scans the model to find new information not given in the premises.. In the variation phase, reasoners try to construct alternative models from the premises that refute the putative conclusion. If no such model is found, the putative conclusion is considered true." (Carsten Held et al, "Mental Models and the Mind", 2006)

"The model theory postulates that mental models are parsimonious. They represent what is possible, but not what is impossible, according to assertions. This principle of parsimony minimizes the load on working memory, and so it applies unless something exceptional occurs to overrule it." (Philip N Johnson-Laird, Mental Models, Sentential Reasoning, and Illusory Inferences, [in "Mental Models and the Mind"], 2006)

"Just as physicists have created models of the atom based on observed data and intuitive synthesis of the patterns in their data, so must designers create models of users based on observed behaviors and intuitive synthesis of the patterns in the data. Only after we formalize such patterns can we hope to systematically construct patterns of interaction that smoothly match the behavior patterns, mental models, and goals of users. Personas provide this formalization." (Alan Cooper et al, "About Face 3: The Essentials of Interaction Design", 2007)

"We tend to form mental models that are simpler than reality; so if we create represented models that are simpler than the actual implementation model, we help the user achieve a better understanding. […] Understanding how software actually works always helps someone to use it, but this understanding usually comes at a significant cost. One of the most significant ways in which computers can assist human beings is by putting a simple face on complex processes and situations. As a result, user interfaces that are consistent with users’ mental models are vastly superior to those that are merely reflections of the implementation model." (Alan Cooper et al,  "About Face 3: The Essentials of Interaction Design", 2007)

🗺️On Knowledge Representation: On Diagrams (2000-2019)

"Concept maps have long provided visual languages widely used in many different disciplines and application domains. Abstractly, they are sorted graphs visually represented as nodes having a type, name and content, some of which are linked by arcs. Concretely, they are structured diagrams having discipline- and domain-specific interpretations for their user communities, and, sometimes, formally defining computer data structures. Concept maps have been used for a wide range of purposes and it would be useful to make such usage available over the World Wide Web." (Brian R Gaines, "WebMap: Concept Mapping on the Web", 2001) 

"Data is transformed into graphics to understand. A map, a diagram are documents to be interrogated. But understanding means integrating all of the data. In order to do this it’s necessary to reduce it to a small number of elementary data. This is the objective of the 'data treatment' be it graphic or mathematic." (Jacques Bertin, [interview] 2003)

"Science does not speak of the world in the language of words alone, and in many cases it simply cannot do so. The natural language of science is a synergistic integration of words, diagrams, pictures, graphs, maps, equations, tables, charts, and other forms of visual and mathematical expression. […] [Science thus consists of] the languages of visual representation, the languages of mathematical symbolism, and the languages of experimental operations." (Jay Lemke, "Teaching all the languages of science: Words, symbols, images and actions", 2003)

"A causal map is a word-and-arrow diagram in which ideas and actions are causally linked with one another through the use of arrows. The arrows indicate how one idea or action leads to another. Causal mapping makesit possible to articulate a large number of ideas and their interconnections in such a way that people can know what to do in an area of concern, how to do it and why, because the arrows indicate the causes and consequences of an idea or action. Causal mapping is therefore a technique for linking strategic thinking and acting, helping make sense of complex problems, and communicating to oneself and others what might be done about them." (John M Bryson et al, "Visible Thinking: Unlocking Causal Mapping For Practical Business Results", 2004)

"Graphical design notations have been with us for a while [...] their primary value is in communication and understanding. A good diagram can often help communicate ideas about a design, particularly when you want to avoid a lot of details. Diagrams can also help you understand either a software system or a business process. As part of a team trying to figure out something, diagrams both help understanding and communicate that understanding throughout a team. Although they aren't, at least yet, a replacement for textual programming languages, they are a helpful assistant." (Martin Fowler," UML Distilled: A Brief Guide to the Standard Object Modeling", 2004)

"In mathematics a good diagram is an invaluable aid to clear reasoning, whereas a bad one can seriously mislead. But it is not often that a diagram is good enough to suggest fresh avenues of inquiry altogether." (Anthony W F Edwards, "Cogwheels of the mind: The story of Venn diagrams", 2004)

"Good diagrams clarify. Very good diagrams force the ideas upon the viewer. The best diagrams compellingly embody the ideas themselves." (R W Oldford & W H Cherry, "Picturing Probability: the poverty of Venn diagrams, the richness of Eikosograms", 2006)

"A diagram is a graphic shorthand. Though it is an ideogram, it is not necessarily an abstraction. It is a representation of something in that it is not the thing itself. In this sense, it cannot help but be embodied. It can never be free of value or meaning, even when it attempts to express relationships of formation and their processes. At the same time, a diagram is neither a structure nor an abstraction of structure." (Peter Eisenman, "Written Into the Void: Selected Writings", 1990-2004, 2007)

"A modeling language is usually based on some kind of computational model, such as a state machine, data flow, or data structure. The choice of this model, or a combination of many, depends on the modeling target. Most of us make this choice implicitly without further thinking: some systems call for capturing dynamics and thus we apply for example state machines, whereas other systems may be better specified by focusing on their static structures using feature diagrams or component diagrams. For these reasons a variety of modeling languages are available." (Steven Kelly & Juha-Pekka Tolvanen, "Domain-specific Modeling", 2008)

"What was clearly useful was the use of diagrams to prove certain results either in algebraic topology, homological algebra or algebraic geometry. It is clear that doing category theory, or simply applying category theory, implies manipulating diagrams: constructing the relevant diagrams, chasing arrows by going via various paths in diagrams and showing they are equal, etc. This practice suggests that diagram manipulation, or more generally diagrams, constitutes the natural syntax of category theory and the category-theoretic way of thinking. Thus, if one could develop a formal language based on diagrams and diagrams manipulation, one would have a natural syntactical framework for category theory. However, moving from the informal language of categories which includes diagrams and diagrammatic manipulations to a formal language based on diagrams and diagrammatic manipulations is not entirely obvious." (Jean-Pierre Marquis, "From a Geometrical Point of View: A Study of the History and Philosophy of Category Theory", 2009)

"Diagrams are information graphics that are made up primarily of geometric shapes, such as rectangles, circles, diamonds, or triangles, that are typically (but not always) interconnected by lines or arrows. One of the major purposes of a diagram is to show how things, people, ideas, activities, etc. interrelate and interconnect. Unlike quantitative charts and graphs, diagrams are used to show interrelationships in a qualitative way." (Robbie T Nakatsu, "Diagrammatic Reasoning in AI", 2010)

"What advantages do diagrams have over verbal descriptions in promoting system understanding? First, by providing a diagram, massive amounts of information can be presented more efficiently. A diagram can strip down informational complexity to its core - in this sense, it can result in a parsimonious, minimalist description of a system. Second, a diagram can help us see patterns in information and data that may appear disordered otherwise. For example, a diagram can help us see mechanisms of cause and effect or can illustrate sequence and flow in a complex system. Third, a diagram can result in a less ambiguous description than a verbal description because it forces one to come up with a more structured description." (Robbie T Nakatsu, "Diagrammatic Reasoning in AI", 2010)

"[…] a conceptual model is a diagram connecting variables and constructs based on theory and logic that displays the hypotheses to be tested." (Mary Wolfinbarger Celsi et al, "Essentials of Business Research Methods", 2011)

"Diagrams furnish only approximate information. They do not add anything to the meaning of the data and, therefore, are not of much use to a statistician or research worker for further mathematical treatment or statistical analysis. On the other hand, graphs are more obvious, precise and accurate than the diagrams and are quite helpful to the statistician for the study of slopes, rates of change and estimation, (interpolation and extrapolation), wherever possible." (S C Gupta & Indra Gupta, "Business Statistics", 2013)

"Systems archetypes thus provide a good starting theory from which we can develop further insights into the nature of a particular system. The diagram that results from working with an archetype should not be viewed as the 'truth', however, but rather a good working model of what we know at any point in time." (Daniel H Kim, "Systems Archetypes as Dynamic Theories", The Systems Thinker Vol. 24 (1), 2013)

"As mathematics gets more abstract, diagrams become more and more prominent as the ways that things fit together abstractly become both more subtle and more important. Moreover, the diagram often sums up the situation more succinctly than the explanation in words, [..]" (Eugenia Cheng, "Beyond Infinity: An Expedition to the Outer Limits of Mathematics", 2017)

"Models are formal structures represented in mathematics and diagrams that help us to understand the world. Mastery of models improves your ability to reason, explain, design, communicate, act, predict, and explore." (Scott E Page, "The Model Thinker", 2018) 

🗺️On Knowledge Representation: On Diagrams (1975-1999)

"Pencil and paper for construction of distributions, scatter diagrams, and run-charts to compare small groups and to detect trends are more efficient methods of estimation than statistical inference that depends on variances and standard errors, as the simple techniques preserve the information in the original data." (W Edwards Deming, "On Probability as Basis for Action", American Statistician, Volume 29, Number 4, November 1975)

"The formalist makes a distinction between geometry as a deductive structure and geometry as a descriptive science. Only the first is regarded as mathematical. The use of pictures or diagrams, or even mental imagery, all are non- mathematical. In principle, they should be unnecessary. Consequently. he regards them as inappropriate in a mathematics text, perhaps even in a mathematics class." (Philip J Davis & Reuben Hersh, "The Mathematical Experience", 1981)

"The thinking person goes over the same ground many times. He looks at it from varying points of view - his own, his arch-enemy’s, others’. He diagrams it, verbalizes it, formulates equations, constructs visual images of the whole problem, or of troublesome parts, or of what is clearly known. But he does not keep a detailed record of all this mental work, indeed could not. […] Deep understanding of a domain of knowledge requires knowing it in various ways. This multiplicity of perspectives grows slowly through hard work and sets the state for the re-cognition we experience as a new insight." (Howard E Gruber, "Darwin on Man", 1981)

"[The diagram] is only an heuristic to prompt certain trains of inference; [...] it is dispensable as a proof-theoretic device; indeed, [...] it has no proper place in the proof as such. For the proof is a syntactic object consisting only of sentences arranged in a finite and inspectable array." (Neil Tennant, "The withering away of formal semantics", Mind and Language Vol. 1 (4), 1986)

"We distinguish diagrammatic from sentential paper-and-pencil representations of information by developing alternative models of information-processing systems that are informationally equivalent and that can be characterized as sentential or diagrammatic. Sentential representations are sequential, like the propositions in a text. Diagrammatic representations are indexed by location in a plane. Diagrammatic representations also typically display information that is only implicit in sentential representations and that therefore has to be computed, sometimes at great cost, to make it explicit for use. We then contrast the computational efficiency of these representations for solving several. illustrative problems in mathematics and physics." (Herbert A Simon, "Why a diagram is (sometimes) worth ten thousand words", 1987) 

"People who have a casual interest in mathematics may get the idea that a topologist is a mathematical playboy who spends his time making Möbius bands and other diverting topological models. If they were to open any recent textbook in topology, they would be surprised. They would find page after page of symbols, seldom relieved by a picture or diagram." (Martin Gardner, "Hexaflexagons and Other Mathematical Diversions", 1988)

"The value of diagram techniques even at this rudimentary level should be clear by now: it is easier to visualize where simplifications may be found in a complicated network by searching for a reducible linkage than by examining a complicated algebraic expression."(Geoffrey E Stedman, "Diagram Techniques in Group Theory", 1990)

"Diagrams are physical situations. They must be, since we can see them. As such, they obey their own set of constraints. […] By choosing a representational scheme appropriately, so that the constraints on the diagrams have a good match with the constraints on the described situation, the diagram can generate a lot of information that the user never need infer. Rather, the user can simply read off facts from the diagram as needed." (Jon Barwise & John Etchemendy, "Visual information and valid reasoning", [in "Visualization in Teaching and Learning Mathematics"], 1991)

"It has been said that the art of geometry is to reason well from false diagrams." (Jean Dieudonné, "Mathematics - The Music of Reason", 1992)

"A mental model is not normally based on formal definitions but rather on concrete properties that have been drawn from life experience. Mental models are typically analogs, and they comprise specific contents, but this does not necessarily restrict their power to deal with abstract concepts, as we will see. The important thing about mental models, especially in the context of mathematics, is the relations they represent. We will use diagrams to depict mental models for a variety of concepts, and it is important to keep in mind that any diagram, or even a non-diagrammatic representation that represents the same essential relations would be equally effective." (Lyn D English & Graeme S Halford," "Mathematics Education: Models and Processes", 1995) 

"Schematic diagrams are more abstract than pictorial drawings, showing symbolic elements and their interconnection to make clear the configuration and/or operation of a system." (Ernest O Doebelin, "Engineering experimentation: planning, execution, reporting", 1995)

"Given particular tasks of reasoning, different types of diagrams show different degrees of suitedness. For example, Euler diagrams are superior in handling certain problems concerning inclusion and membership among classes and individuals, but they cannot be generally applied to such problems without special provisos. Diagrams make many proofs in geometry shorter and more intuitive, while they take certain precautions of the reasoner's to be used validly. […] Mathematicians experience that coming up with the 'right' sorts of diagrams is more than half-way to the solution of most complicated problems." (Atsushi Shimojima, "Operational Constraints in Diagrammatic Reasoning" , [in "Logical Reasoning with Diagrams"], 1996)

"Making a good choice of representational conventions is always important in solving a problem, but especially true of charts. This sensitivity of type of chart to the particularities of the task at hand makes a very general logic of charts useless." (Jon Barwise & Eric Hammer, "Diagrams and the Concept of Logical System", [in "Logical Reasoning with Diagrams"], 1996)

"Mathematicians, like the rest of us, cherish clever ideas; in particular they delight in an ingenious picture. But this appreciation does not overwhelm a prevailing skepticism. After all, a diagram is - at best - just a special case and so can't establish a general theorem. Even worse, it can be downright misleading. Though not universal, the prevailing attitude is that pictures are really no more than heuristic devices; they are psychologically suggestive and pedagogically important - but they prove nothing. I want to oppose this view and to make a case for pictures having a legitimate role to play as evidence and justification - a role well beyond the heuristic.  In short, pictures can prove theorems." (James R Brown, "Philosophy of Mathematics: An Introduction to the World of Proofs and Pictures", 1999)

🗺️On Knowledge Representation: On Diagrams (1950-1974)

"The diagrams incorporate a large amount of information. Their use provides extensive savings in space and in mental effort. In the case of many theorems, the setting up of the correct diagram is the major part of the proof. We therefore urge that the reader stop at the end of each theorem and attempt to construct for himself the relevant diagram before examining the one which is given in the text. Once this is done, the subsequent demonstration can be followed more readily; in fact, the reader can usually supply it himself." (Samuel Eilenberg & Norman E. Steenrod, "Foundations of Algebraic Topology", 1952)

"A logic machine is a device, electrical or mechanical, designed specifically for solving problems in formal logic. A logic diagram is a geometrical method for doing the same thing. […] A logic diagram is a two-dimensional geometric figure with spatial relations that are isomorphic with the structure of a logical statement. These spatial relations are usually of a topological character, which is not surprising in view of the fact that logic relations are the primitive relations underlying all deductive reasoning and topological properties are, in a sense, the most fundamental properties of spatial structures. Logic diagrams stand in the same relation to logical algebras as the graphs of curves stand in relation to their algebraic formulas; they are simply other ways of symbolizing the same basic structure." (Martin Gardner, "Logic Machines and Diagrams", 1958)

"The diagrams and circles aid the understanding by making it easy to visualize the elements of a given argument. They have considerable mnemonic value […] They have rhetorical value, not only arousing interest by their picturesque, cabalistic character, but also aiding in the demonstration of proofs and the teaching of doctrines. It is an investigative and inventive art. When ideas are combined in all possible ways, the new combinations start the mind thinking along novel channels and one is led to discover fresh truths and arguments, or to make new inventions. Finally, the Art possesses a kind of deductive power." (Martin Gardner, "Logic Machines and Diagrams", 1958) 

"An information retrieval system is therefore defined here as any device which aids access to documents specified by subject, and the operations associated with it. The documents can be books, journals, reports, atlases, or other records of thought, or any parts of such records - articles, chapters, sections, tables, diagrams, or even particular words. The retrieval devices can range from a bare list of contents to a large digital computer and its accessories. The operations can range from simple visual scanning to the most detailed programming." (Brian C Vickery, "The Structure of Information Retrieval Systems", 1959)

"Diagrams are sometimes used, not merely to convey several pieces of information such as several time series on one chart, but also to provide visual evidence of relationships between the series." (Alfred R Ilersic, "Statistics", 1959)

"It is extremely helpful to the imagination to have a geometric picture available in terms of which we can visualize sets and operations on sets. […] Diagrammatic thought of this kind is admittedly loose and imprecise; nevertheless, the reader will find it invaluable. No mathematics, however abstract it may appear, is ever carried on without the help of mental images of some kind, and these are often nebulous, personal, and difficult to describe." (George F Simmons, "Introduction to Topology and Modern Analysis", 1963)

"A model is a qualitative or quantitative representation of a process or endeavor that shows the effects of those factors which are significant for the purposes being considered. A model may be pictorial, descriptive, qualitative, or generally approximate in nature; or it may be mathematical and quantitative in nature and reasonably precise. It is important that effective means for modeling be understood such as analog, stochastic, procedural, scheduling, flow chart, schematic, and block diagrams." (Harold Chestnut, "Systems Engineering Tools", 1965) 

"A diagram thus enables us to discover the internal categorization which characterizes the information being processed in a much shorter time than does a map. […] A diagram permits the rapid and precise internal processing of information having three components, but it does not permit introducing the information into a universal system of visual memorization and geographic comparison. It is a closed graphic system, limited solely to the information being processed. […] In a diagram, one begins by attributing a meaning to the planar dimensions, then one plots the correspondences." (Jacques Bertin, "Semiology of graphics", 1967) 

"A graphic is a diagram when correspondences on the plane can be established among all elements of another component." (Jacques Bertin, "Semiology of graphics", 1967) 

"To analyse graphic representation precisely, it is helpful to distinguish it from musical, verbal and mathematical notations, all of which are perceived in a linear or temporal sequence. The graphic image also differs from figurative representation essentially polysemic, and from the animated image, governed by the laws of cinematographic time. Within the boundaries of graphics fall the fields of networks, diagrams and maps. The domain of graphic imagery ranges from the depiction of atomic structures to the representation of galaxies and extends into the spheres of topography and cartography."  (Jacques Bertin, "Semiology of graphics", 1967) 

"When the correspondences on the plane can be established between: - all the divisions of one component - and all the divisions of another component, the construction is a DIAGRAM." (Jacques Bertin, "Semiology of graphics", 1967) 

"Pure mathematics are concerned only with abstract propositions, and have nothing to do with the realities of nature. There is no such thing in actual existence as a mathematical point, line or surface. There is no such thing as a circle or square. But that is of no consequence. We can define them in words, and reason about them. We can draw a diagram, and suppose that line to be straight which is not really straight, and that figure to be a circle which is not strictly a circle. It is conceived therefore by the generality of observers, that mathematics is the science of certainty." (William Godwin, "Thoughts on Man", 1969)

"A diagram is worth a thousand proofs." (Carl E Linderholm, "Mathematics Made Difficult", 1971)

"Category theory starts with the observation that many properties of mathematical systems can be unified and simplified by a presentation with diagrams of arrows." (Saunders Mac Lane, "Categories for the Working Mathematician", 1971)

"The result of the implementation, the logical design, is traditionally shown as a series of block diagrams. These blocks represent in effect a series of statements, Actually, a direct presentation of these statements is more suitable and, although less familiar, more easily understood. The Harvard Mark IV was to large degree designed and described by such statements, as has been the case with several subsequent developments." (Gerrit Blaauw, "Computer Architecture", 1972) 

"Whether or not a given conceptual model or representation of a physical system happens to be picturable, is irrelevant to the semantics of the theory to which it eventually becomes attached. Picturability is a fortunate psychological occurrence, not a scientific necessity. Few of the models that pass for visual representations are picturable anyhow. For one thing, the model may be and usually is constituted by imperceptible items such as unextended particles and invisible fields. True, a model can be given a graphic representation - but so can any idea as long as symbolic or conventional diagrams are allowed. Diagrams, whether representational or symbolic, are meaningless unless attached to some body of theory. On the other hand theories are in no need of diagrams save for psychological purposes. Let us then keep theoretical models apart from visual analogues."  (Mario Bunge, "Philosophy of Physics", 1973)

🗺️On Knowledge Representation: On Diagrams (1900-1924)

"We form in the imagination some sort of diagrammatic, that is, iconic, representation of the facts, as skeletonized as possible. The impression of the present writer is that with ordinary persons this is always a visual image, or mixed visual and muscular; but this is an opinion not founded on any systematic examination." (Charles S Peirce, "Notes on Ampliative Reasoning", 1901)

"We imagine cases, place mental diagrams before our mind's eye, and multiply these cases, until a habit is formed of expecting that always to turn out the case, which has been seen to be the result in all the diagrams. To appeal to such a habit is a very different thing from appealing to any immediate instinct of rationality. That the process of forming a habit of reasoning by the use of diagrams is often performed there is no room for doubt. It is perfectly open to consciousness." (Charles S Peirce,"Fallibility of Reasoning and the Feeling of Rationality", cca. 1902)

"Arithmetical symbols are written diagrams and geometrical figures are graphic formulas." (David Hilbert, Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society, Mathematical Problems Vol. 8, 1902)

"A diagram is a representamen [representation] which is predominantly an icon of relations and is aided to be so by conventions. Indices are also more or less used. It should be carried out upon a perfectly consistent system of representation, founded upon a simple and easily intelligible basic idea." (Charles S Peirce, 1903)

"A diagram is an icon or schematic image embodying the meaning of a general predicate; and from the observation of this icon we are supposed to construct a new general predicate." (Charles S Peirce, "New Elements" ["Kaina stoiceia"], 1904) 

"A theorem […] is an inference obtained by constructing a diagram according to a general precept, and after modifying it as ingenuity may dictate, observing in it certain relations, and showing that they must subsist in every case, retranslating the proposition into general terms." (Charles S Peirce, "New Elements" ["Kaina stoiceia"], 1904)

"I never satisfy myself until I can make a mechanical model of a thing. If I can make a mechanical model, I understand it." (William T Kelvin, 1904)

"By [diagrams] it is possible to present at a glance all the facts which could be obtained from figures as to the increase,  fluctuations, and relative importance of prices, quantities, and values of different classes of goods and trade with various countries; while the sharp irregularities of the curves give emphasis to the disturbing causes which produce any striking change." (Arthur L Bowley, "A Short Account of England's Foreign Trade in the Nineteenth Century, its Economic and Social Results", 1905)

"Diagrammatic reasoning is the only really fertile reasoning. If logicians would only embrace this method, we should no longer see attempts to base their science on the fragile foundations of metaphysics or a psychology not based on logical theory; and there would soon be such an advance in logic that every science would feel the benefit of it." (Charles S Peirce, "Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism", Monist 16(4), 1906)

"To facilitate eyeless observation of his sense-transcending world, the mathematician invokes the aid of physical diagrams and physical symbols in endless variety and combination [...]" (Cassius J Keyser, "Lectures on Science, Philosophy and Art", 1907-1908, 1908)

"This diagrammatic method has, however, serious inconveniences as a method for solving logical problems. It does not show how the data are exhibited by cancelling certain constituents, nor does it show how to combine the remaining constituents so as to obtain the consequences sought. In short, it serves only to exhibit one single step in the argument, namely the equation of the problem; it dispenses neither with the previous steps, i.e., 'throwing of the problem into an equation' and the transformation of the premises, nor with the subsequent steps, i.e., the combinations that lead to the various consequences. Hence it is of very little use, inasmuch as the constituents can be represented by algebraic symbols quite as well as by plane regions, and are much easier to deal with in this form." (Louis Couturat, "The Algebra of Logic", 1914)

"We rise from the conception of form to an understanding of the forces which gave rise to it. [...] in the representation of form we see a diagram of forces in equilibrium, and in the comparison of kindred forms we discern the magnitude and the direction of the forces which have sufficed to convert the one form into the other." (D'Arcy Wentworth Thompson, "On Growth and Form" Vol. II, 1917)