Kenneth Craik - Collected Quotes

"By a model we thus mean any physical or chemical system which has a similar relation-structure to that of the process it imitates. By ’relation-structure’ I do not mean some obscure non-physical entity which attends the model, but the fact that it is a physical working model which works in the same way as the process it parallels, in the aspects under consideration at any moment." (Kenneth Craik, "The Nature of Explanation", 1943)

"If the organism carries a ‘small-scale model’ of external reality and of its possible actions within its head, it is able to try out various alternatives, conclude which is the best of them, react to future simulations before they arise, utilize the knowledge of past events in dealing with the present and the future, and in every way to react in a much fuller, safer, and more competent manner to the emergencies which face it." (Kenneth Craik, "The Nature of Explanation", 1943)

"It is generally agreed that thought employs symbols such as written or spoken words or tokens; but it is not generally considered whether the whole of thought may not consist of a process of symbolism, nor is the nature of symbolism and its presence or absence in the inorganic world discussed." (Kenneth Craik, "The Nature of Explanation", 1943)

"It is likely then that the nervous system is in a fortunate position, as far as modelling physical processes is concerned, in that it has only to produce combinations of excited arcs, not physical objects; its ’answer’ need only be a combination of consistent patterns of excitation - not a new object that is physically and chemically stable." (Kenneth Craik, "The Nature of Explanation", 1943)

"My hypothesis then is that thought models, or parallels, reality - that its essential feature is not ‘the mind’, ‘the self’, ‘sense-data’, nor propositions but symbolism, and that this symbolism is largely of the same kind as that which is familiar to us in mechanical devices which aid thought and calculation." (Kenneth Craik, "The Nature of Explanation", 1943)

"Of course we have still to face the question why these analogies between different mechanisms - these similarities of relation-structure - should exist. To see common principles and simple rules running through such complexity is at first perplexing though intriguing. When, however, we find that the apparently complex objects around us are combinations of a few almost indestructible units, such as electrons, it becomes less perplexing." (Kenneth Craik, "The Nature of Explanation", 1943)

"Our theory has some bleaker consequences. [...] What is knowledge, if we are but a part of the mechanical system of the world we seek to know? What becomes of our ceaseless effort to explain the universe we live in, if explanation is but a part of the mechanical process?" (Kenneth Craik, "The Nature of Explanation", 1943)

"Some may object that this reduces thought to a mere ‘copy’ of reality and that we ought not to want such an internal ‘copy’; are not electrons, causally interacting, good enough? […] only this internal model of reality - this working model - enables us to predict events which have not yet occurred in the physical world, a process which saves time, expense, and even life." (Kenneth Craik, "The Nature of Explanation", 1943)

"Perhaps the extraordinary pervasiveness of number, and the multiplicity of operations which can be performed on number without leading to inconsistency, is not a proof of the ’real existence’ of numbers as such, but a proof of the extreme flexibility of the neural model or calculating machine. This flexibility renders a far greater number of operations possible for it than for any other single process or model." (Kenneth Craik, "The Nature of Explanation", 1943)

"[…] there is something wonderful in the idea that man’s brain is the greatest machine of all, imitating within its tiny network events happening in the most distant stars, […] On our model theory neural or other mechanisms can imitate or parallel the behaviour and interaction of physical objects and so supply us with information on physical processes which are not directly observable to us." (Kenneth Craik, "The Nature of Explanation", 1943)

"This, however, is very speculative; the point of interest for our present enquiry is that physical reality is built up, apparently, from a few fundamental types of units whose properties determine many of the properties of the most complicated phenomena, and this seems to afford a sufficient explanation of the emergence of analogies between mechanisms and similarities of relation-structure among these combinations without the necessity of any theory of objective universals." (Kenneth Craik, "The Nature of Explanation", 1943)

"Thus the use of language itself is based on the principle that any symbolism which works has objective validity; and it is illegitimate to use words to contradict this principle." (Kenneth Craik, "The Nature of Explanation", 1943)

"Thus there are instances of symbolisation in nature; we use such instances as an aid to thinking; there is evidence of similar mechanisms at work in our own sensory and central nervous systems; and the function of such symbolisation is plain. If the organism carries a ’small-scale model’ of external reality and of its own possible actions within its head, it is able to try out various alternatives, conclude which is the best of them, react to future situations before they arise […]" (Kenneth Craik, "The Nature of Explanation", 1943)

"Thus we do not try to prove the existence of the external world – we discover it, because the fundamental power of words or other symbols to represent events [...] permits us to put forward hypotheses and test their truth by reference to experience. [..] A particular type of symbolism may always fail in a particular case, as Euclidean geometry apparently fails to represent stellar space; but if all types of symbolism always failed, we should be unable to recognise any objects or exist at all." (Kenneth Craik, "The Nature of Explanation", 1943)

"We have now to enquire how the neural mechanism, in producing numerical measurement and calculation, has managed to function in a way so much more universal and flexible than any other. Our question, to emphasize it once again, is not to ask what kind of thing a number is, but to think what kind of mechanism could represent so many physically possible or impossible, and yet self-consistent, processes as number does." (Kenneth Craik, "The Nature of Explanation", 1943)

"Without falling into the trap of attempting a precise definition, we may suggest a theory as to the general nature of symbolism, viz. that it is the ability of processes to parallel or imitate each other, or the fact that they can do so since there are recurrent patterns in reality." (Kenneth Craik, "The Nature of Explanation", 1943)

"[...] in a state of dynamic equilibrium with their environments. If they do not maintain this equilibrium they die; if they do maintain it they show a degree of spontaneity, variability, and purposiveness of response unknown in the non-living world. This is what is meant by ‘adaptation to environment’ […] [Its] essential feature […] is stability - that is, the ability to withstand disturbances." (Kenneth Craik, 'Living organisms', “The Nature of Psychology”, 1966)

"[…] there is perhaps a difference between the ideas which are associated in the sense of their patterns being tired to the original one and available in connexion with it, and being actually associated or aroused. Our mental modelling of the outer world may imitate it and its sequences from moment to moment, but only that which is fairly frequent, or fits into other patterns, will remain for long, and of that only a portion will arise in response to other ideas. " (Kenneth J W Craik, 'Laws of Association', “The Nature of Psychology”, 1966)