"The act of discovery escapes logical analysis; there are no logical rules in terms of which a 'discovery machine' could be constructed that would take over the creative function of the genius. But it is not the logician’s task to account for scientific discoveries; all he can do is to analyze the relation between given facts and a theory presented to him with the claim that it explains these facts. In other words, logic is concerned with the context of justification." (Hans Reichenbach, "The Rise of Scientific Philosophy", 1951)
"The philosopher of science is not much interested in the thought processes which lead to scientific discoveries; he looks for a logical analysis of the completed theory, including the relationships establishing its validity. That is, he is not interested in the context of discovery, but in the context of justification" (Hans Reichenbach, "The Rise of Scientific Philosophy", 1951)
"The ultimate origin of the difficulty lies in the fact" (or philosophical principle) that we are compelled to use the words of common language when we wish to describe a phenomenon, not by logical or mathematical analysis, but by a picture appealing to the imagination. Common language has grown by everyday experience and can never surpass these limits. Classical physics has restricted itself to the use of concepts of this kind; by analysing visible motions it has developed two ways of representing them by elementary processes; moving particles and waves. There is no other way of giving a pictorial description of motions - we have to apply it even in the region of atomic processes, where classical physics breaks down." (Max Born, "Atomic Physics", 1957)
"In bringing techniques of logical and mathematical analysis gives men an opportunity to bring conflicts up from the level of fights, where the intellect is beclouded by passions, to the level of games, where the intellect has a chance to operate." (Anatol Rapoport, "The Use and Misuse of Game Theory", Scientific American 207, 1962)
"Foundations provide an analysis of practice. To deserve this name, foundations must be | expected to introduce notions which do not occur in practice. Thus in foundations of set theory, types of sets are treated explicitly while in practice they are generally absent; and in foundations of constructive mathematics, the analysis of the logical operations involves (intuitive) proofs while in practice there is no explicit mention of the latter." (Georg Kreisel & Jean-Louis Krivine, "Elements of Mathematical Logic: Model Theory", 1967)
"A person who thinks by images becomes less and less capable of thinking by reasoning, and vice versa. The intellectual process based on images is contradictory to the intellectual process of reasoning that is related to the word. There are two different ways of dealing with an object. They involve not only different approaches, but even more important, opposing mental attitudes. This is not a matter of complementary processes, such as analysis and synthesis or logic and dialectic. These processes lack any qualitative common denominator." (Jacques Ellul, "The Humiliation of the Word", 1981)
"The most persuasive positive argument for mental images as objects is [that] whenever one thinks one is seeing something there must be something one is seeing. It might be an object directly, or it might be a mental picture. [This] point is so plausible that it is deniable only at the peril of becoming arbitrary. One should concede that the question whether mental images are entities of some sort is not resolvable by logical or linguistic analysis, and believe what makes sense of experience." (Eva T H Brann,"The World of Imagination" , 1991))
"Dialectical thinking opposes formalism because of its separation of form from content. We make errors by abstracting the elements of a problem into a formal model and ignoring facts and contexts crucial to correct analysis. Overemphasis on logical approaches leads to distortion, error, and rigidity." (Richard E Nisbett, "Mindware: Tools for Smart Thinking", 2015)