On Mechanisms (1925-1949)

"The methods of progress in theoretical physics have undergone a vast change during the present century. The classical tradition has been to consider the world to be an association of observable objects (particles, fluids, fields, etc.) moving about according to definite laws of force, so that one could form a mental picture in space and time of the whole scheme. This led to a physics whose aim was to make assumptions about the mechanism and forces connecting these observable objects, to account for their behaviour in the simplest possible way. It has become increasingly evident in recent times, however, that nature works on a different plan. Her fundamental laws do not govern the world as it appears in our mental picture in any very direct way, but instead they control a substratum of which we cannot form a mental picture without introducing irrelevancies.' (Paul A M Dirac, "The Principles of Quantum Mechanics", 1930)

"The classical tradition has been to consider the world to be an association of observable objects (particles, fluids, fields, etc.) moving according to definite laws of force, so that one could form a mental picture in space and time of the whole scheme. This led to a physics whose aim was to make assumptions about the mechanism and forces connecting these observable objects in the simplest possible way. It has become increasingly evident in recent times, however, that nature works on a different plan. Her fundamental laws do not govern the world as it appears in our mental picture in any very direct way, but instead they control a substratum of which we cannot form a mental picture without introducing irrelevancies." (Paul A M Dirac,"The Principles of Quantum Mechanics", 1930)

"Certain exterior impulses hit the economic mechanism and thereby initiate more or less regular oscillations." (Ragnar Frisch, "Propagation problems and impulse problems in dynamic economics", 1933)

"When we approach the study of business cycle with the intention of carrying through an analysis that is truly dynamic and determinate in the above sense, we are naturally led to distinguish between two types of analyses: the micro-dynamic and the macro-dynamic types. The micro-dynamic analysis is an analysis by which we try to explain in some detail the behaviour of a certain section of the huge economic mechanism, taking for granted that certain general parameters are given. Obviously it may well be that we obtain more or less cyclical fluctuations in such sub-systems, even though the general parameters are given. The essence of this type of analysis is to show the details of the evolution of a given specific market, the behaviour of a given type of consumers, and so on." (Ragnar Frisch, "Propagation problems and impulse problems in dynamic economics", 1933)

"Physical concepts are free creations of the human mind, and are not, however it may seem, uniquely determined by the external world In our endeavor to understand reality we are somewhat like a man trying to understand the mechanism of a closed watch. He sees the face and the moving hands, even hears its ticking, but he has no way of opening the case. If he is ingenious he may form some picture of a mechanism which could be responsible for all the things he observes, but he may never be quite sure his picture is the only one which could explain his observations. He will never be able to compare his picture with the real mechanism and he cannot even imagine the possibility of the meaning of such a comparison." (Albert Einstein & Leopold Infeld, "The Evolution of Physics ", 1938)

"[…] there is something wonderful in the idea that man’s brain is the greatest machine of all, imitating within its tiny network events happening in the most distant stars, […] On our model theory neural or other mechanisms can imitate or parallel the behaviour and interaction of physical objects and so supply us with information on physical processes which are not directly observable to us." (Kenneth Craik, "The Nature of Explanation", 1943)

"Of course we have still to face the question why these analogies between different mechanisms - these similarities of relation-structure - should exist. To see common principles and simple rules running through such complexity is at first perplexing though intriguing. When, however, we find that the apparently complex objects around us are combinations of a few almost indestructible units, such as electrons, it becomes less perplexing." (Kenneth Craik, "The Nature of Explanation", 1943)

"This, however, is very speculative; the point of interest for our present enquiry is that physical reality is built up, apparently, from a few fundamental types of units whose properties determine many of the properties of the most complicated phenomena, and this seems to afford a sufficient explanation of the emergence of analogies between mechanisms and similarities of relation-structure among these combinations without the necessity of any theory of objective universals." (Kenneth Craik, "The Nature of Explanation", 1943)

"Thus there are instances of symbolisation in nature; we use such instances as an aid to thinking; there is evidence of similar mechanisms at work in our own sensory and central nervous systems; and the function of such symbolisation is plain. If the organism carries a ’small-scale model’ of external reality and of its own possible actions within its head, it is able to try out various alternatives, conclude which is the best of them, react to future situations before they arise […]" (Kenneth Craik, "The Nature of Explanation", 1943)

"We have now to enquire how the neural mechanism, in producing numerical measurement and calculation, has managed to function in a way so much more universal and flexible than any other. Our question, to emphasize it once again, is not to ask what kind of thing a number is, but to think what kind of mechanism could represent so many physically possible or impossible, and yet self-consistent, processes as number does." (Kenneth Craik, "The Nature of Explanation", 1943)

"The words of the language, as they are written or spoken, do not seem to play any role in any mechanism of thought. The physical entities which seem to serve as elements in thought are certain signs and more or less clear images which can be 'voluntarily' reproduced or combined. […] But taken from a psychological viewpoint, this combinatory play seems to be the essential feature in productive thought - before there is any connection with logical construction in words or other kinds of signs which can be communicated to others. The above-mentioned elements are, in my case, of visual and some of muscular type. Conventional words or other signs have to be sought for laboriously only in a secondary stage, when the mentioned associative play is sufficiently established and can be reproduced at will. " (Albert Einstein, [letter to Hadamard, in (Jacques Hadamard, "The Psychology of Invention in the Mathematical Field, 1945)])

"The concept of teleological mechanisms however it be expressed in many terms, may be viewed as an attempt to escape from these older mechanistic formulations that now appear inadequate, and to provide new and more fruitful conceptions and more effective methodologies for studying self-regulating processes, self-orienting systems and organisms, and self-directing personalities. Thus, the terms feedback, servomechanisms, circular systems, and circular processes may be viewed as different but equivalent expressions of much the same basic conception." (Lawrence K Frank, 1948)

"We have decided to call the entire field of control and communication theory, whether in the machine or in the animal, by the name Cybernetics, which we form from the Greek [...] for steersman. In choosing this term, we wish to recognize that the first significant paper on feedback mechanisms is an article on governors, which was published by Clerk Maxwell in 1868, and that governor is derived from a Latin corruption [...] We also wish to refer to the fact that the steering engines of a ship are indeed one of the earliest and best-developed forms of feedback mechanisms." (Norbert Wiener, "Cybernetics", 1948)

"If God has made the world a perfect mechanism, He has at least conceded so much to our imperfect intellect that in order to predict little parts of it, we need not solve innumerable differential equations, but can use dice with fair success." (Max Born, "Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist", 1949)

"It is the normal lot of people who must live this life [in space] to be - by terrestrial standards - insane. Insanity under such conditions is a useful and logical defense mechanism, an invaluable and salutary retreat from reality." (Charles L Harness, "The Paradox Men", 1949)