Mental Models XIX

"'Schema' refers to an active organisation of past reactions, or of past experiences, which must always be supposed to be operating in any well-adapted organic response. That is, whenever there is any order or regularity of behavior, a particular response is possible only because it is related to other similar responses which have been serially organised, yet which operate, not simply as individual members coming one after another, but as a unitary mass. Determination by schemata is the most fundamental of all the ways in which we can be influenced by reactions and experiences which occurred some time in the past. All incoming impulses of a certain kind, or mode, go together to build up an active, organised setting: visual, auditory, various types of cutaneous impulses and the like, at a relatively low level; all the experiences connected by a common interest: in sport, in literature, history, art, science, philosophy, and so on, on a higher level." (Frederic C Bartlett, "Remembering: A study in experimental and social psychology", 1932)

"[T]he sudden inventions characteristic of the sixth stage [of infant development] are in reality the product of a long evolution of schemata and not only of an internal maturation of perceptive structures. [..] This is revealed by the existence of a fifth stage, characterized by experimental groping. […] What does this mean if not that the practice of actual experience is necessary in order to acquire the practice of mental experience and that invention does not arise entirely preformed despite appearances? (Jean Piaget, "The origin of intelligence in children" 1936)

"My hypothesis then is that thought models, or parallels, reality - that its essential feature is not ‘the mind’, ‘the self’, ‘sense-data’, nor propositions but symbolism, and that this symbolism is largely of the same kind as that which is familiar to us in mechanical devices which aid thought and calculation." (Kenneth Craik, "The Nature of Explanation", 1943)

"A person is changed by the contingencies of reinforcement under which he behaves; he does not store the contingencies. In particular, he does not store copies of the stimuli which have played a part in the contingencies. There are no 'iconic representations' in his mind; there are no 'data structures stored in his memory'; he has no 'cognitive map' of the world in which he has lived. He has simply been changed in such a way that stimuli now control particular kinds of perceptual behavior." (Burrhus F Skinner, "About behaviorism", 1974)

"Imagining is not perceiving, but images are indeed derivatives of perceptual activity. In particular, they are the anticipatory phases of that activity, schemata that the perceiver has detached from the perceptual cycle for other purposes. […] The experience of having an image is just the inner aspect of a readiness to perceive the imagined object. (Ulrich Neisser, "Cognition and Reality" 1976)

"[I]t seems (to many) that we cannot account for perception unless we suppose it provides us with an internal image (or model or map) of the external world, and yet what good would that image do us unless we have an inner eye to perceive it, and how are we to explain its capacity for perception? It also seems (to many) that understanding a heard sentence must be somehow translating it into some internal message, but how will this message be understood: by translating it into something else? The problem is an old one, and let’s call it Hume’s Problem, for while he did not state it explicitly, he appreciated its force and strove mightily to escape its clutches. (Daniel Dennett, "Brainstorms: Philosophical essays on mind and psychology", 1978)

"A schema, then is a data structure for representing the generic concepts stored in memory. There are schemata representing our knowledge about all concepts; those underlying objects, situations, events, sequences of events, actions and sequences of actions. A schema contains, as part of its specification, the network of interrelations that is believed to normally hold among the constituents of the concept in question. A schema theory embodies a prototype theory of meaning. That is, inasmuch as a schema underlying a concept stored in memory corresponds to the meaning of that concept, meanings are encoded in terms of the typical or normal situations or events that instantiate that concept." (David E Rumelhart, "Schemata: The building blocks of cognition", 1980)

"Once we have accepted a configuration of schemata, the schemata themselves provide a richness that goes far beyond our observations. […] In fact, once we have determined that a particular schema accounts for some event, we may not be able to determine which aspects of our beliefs are based on direct sensory information and which are merely consequences of our interpretation." (David E Rumelhart, "Schemata: The building blocks of cognition", 1980)

"Since mental models can take many forms and serve many purposes, their contents are very varied. They can contain nothing but tokens that represent individuals and identities between them, as in the sorts of models that are required for syllogistic reasoning. They can represent spatial relations between entities, and the temporal or causal relations between events. A rich imaginary model of the world can be used to compute the projective relations required for an image. Models have a content and form that fits them to their purpose, whether it be to explain, to predict, or to control." (Philip Johnson-Laird, "Mental models: Toward a cognitive science of language, inference, and consciousness", 1983)

"The basic idea is that schemata are data structures for representing the generic concepts stored in memory. There are schemata for generalized concepts underlying objects, situations, events, sequences of events, actions, and sequences of actions. Roughly, schemata are like models of the outside world. To process information with the use of a schema is to determine which model best fits the incoming information. Ultimately, consistent configurations of schemata are discovered which, in concert, offer the best account for the input. This configuration of schemata together constitutes the interpretation of the input. (David E Rumelhart, Paul Smolensky, James L McClelland & Geoffrey E Hinton, "Schemata and sequential thought processes in PDP models", 1986)