"In other words then, if a machine is expected to be infallible, it cannot also be intelligent. There are several theorems which say almost exactly that. But these theorems say nothing about how much intelligence may be displayed if a machine makes no pretense at infallibility." (Alan M Turing, 1946)
"The brain has been compared to a digital computer because the neuron, like a switch or valve, either does or does not complete a circuit. But at that point the similarity ends. The switch in the digital computer is constant in its effect, and its effect is large in proportion to the total output of the machine. The effect produced by the neuron varies with its recovery from [the] refractory phase and with its metabolic state. The number of neurons involved in any action runs into millions so that the influence of any one is negligible. [...] Any cell in the system can be dispensed with. [...] The brain is an analogical machine, not digital. Analysis of the integrative activities will probably have to be in statistical terms. (Karl S Lashley, "The problem of serial order in behavior", 1951)
"Although it sounds implausible, it might turn out that above a certain level of complexity, a machine ceased to be predictable, even in principle, and started doing things on its own account, or, to use a very revealing phrase, it might begin to have a mind of its own." (John R Lucas, "Minds, Machines and Gödel", 1959)
"There are now machines in the world that think, that learn and create. Moreover, their ability to do these things is going to increase rapidly until - in the visible future - the range of problems they can handle will be coextensive with the range to which the human mind has been applied." (Allen Newell & Herbert A Simon, "Human problem solving", 1976)
"We can divide those who uphold the doctrine that men are machines, or a similar doctrine, into two categories: those who deny the existence of mental events, or personal experiences, or of consciousness; [...] and those who admit the existence of mental events, but assert that they are 'epiphenomena' - that everything can be explained without them, since the material world is causally closed." (Karl Popper & John Eccles, "The self and its brain", 1977)
"It is essential to realize that a computer is not a mere 'number cruncher', or supercalculating arithmetic machine, although this is how computers are commonly regarded by people having no familiarity with artificial intelligence. Computers do not crunch numbers; they manipulate symbols. [...] Digital computers originally developed with mathematical problems in mind, are in fact general purpose symbol manipulating machines." (Margaret A Boden, "Minds and mechanisms", 1981)
"What makes people smarter than machines? They certainly are not quicker or more precise. Yet people are far better at perceiving objects in natural scenes and noting their relations, at understanding language and retrieving contextually appropriate information from memory, at making plans and carrying out contextually appropriate actions, and at a wide range of other natural cognitive tasks. People are also far better at learning to do these things more accurately and fluently through processing experience." (James L McClelland et al, "The appeal of parallel distributed processing", 1986)
"A popular myth says that the invention of the computer diminishes our sense of ourselves, because it shows that rational thought is not special to human beings, but can be carried on by a mere machine. It is a short stop from there to the conclusion that intelligence is mechanical, which many people find to be an affront to all that is most precious and singular about their humanness." (Jeremy Campbell, "The improbable machine", 1989)
"Looking at ourselves from the computer viewpoint, we cannot avoid seeing that natural language is our most important 'programming language'. This means that a vast portion of our knowledge and activity is, for us, best communicated and understood in our natural language. [...] One could say that natural language was our first great original artifact and, since, as we increasingly realize, languages are machines, so natural language, with our brains to run it, was our primal invention of the universal computer. One could say this except for the sneaking suspicion that language isn’t something we invented but something we became, not something we constructed but something in which we created, and recreated, ourselves. (Justin Leiber, "Invitation to cognitive science", 1991)
"On the other hand, those who design and build computers know exactly how the machines are working down in the hidden depths of their semiconductors. Computers can be taken apart, scrutinized, and put back together. Their activities can be tracked, analyzed, measured, and thus clearly understood - which is far from possible with the brain. This gives rise to the tempting assumption on the part of the builders and designers that computers can tell us something about brains, indeed, that the computer can serve as a model of the mind, which then comes to be seen as some manner of information processing machine, and possibly not as good at the job as the machine." (Theodore Roszak, "The Cult of Information", 1994)
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