"If a fact is to be a picture, it must have something in common with what it depicts. […] What a picture must have in common with reality, in order to be able to depict it correctly or incorrectly - in the way it does, is its pictorial form. […] What any picture, of whatever form, must have in common with reality, in order to be able to depict it - correctly or incorrectly in any way at all, is logical form, i.e., the form of reality. […] Logical pictures can depict the world." (Ludwig Wittgenstein, "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus", 1922)
"The logical picture of the facts is the thought. […] A picture is a model of reality. In a picture objects have the elements of the picture corresponding to them. The fact that the elements of a picture are related to one another in a determinate way represents that things are related to one another in the same way." (Ludwig Wittgenstein, "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus", 1922)
"The process of induction is the process of assuming the simplest law that can be made to harmonize with our experience. This process, however, has no logical foundation but only a psychological one. It is clear that there are no grounds for believing that the simplest course of events will really happen." (Ludwig Wittgenstein, "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus", 1922)
"The so-called law of induction cannot possibly be a law of logic, since it is obviously a proposition with a sense. - Nor, therefore, can it be an a priori law." (Ludwig Wittgenstein, "Tractatus Logico Philosophicus", 1922)
"For a large class of cases - though not for all - in which we employ the word 'meaning' it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in language." (Ludwig Wittgenstein, "Philosophical investigations", 1953)
"Like everything metaphysical the harmony between thought and reality is to be found in the grammar of the language." (Ludwig Wittgenstein, "Philosophical Investigations", 1953)
"All right: the concept of number is defined for you as the logical sum of these individual interrelated concepts: cardinal numbers, rational numbers, real numbers etc.; and, in the same way the concept of a game is the logical sum of a corresponding set of sub-concepts." - It need not be so. For I can give the concept 'number' rigid limits in this way, that is, use the word "number" for a rigidly limited concept, but I can also use it so that the extension of the concept is not closed by a frontier. And this is how we use the word "game". For how is the concept of a game bounded?" (Ludwig Wittgenstein, "Philosophical Investigations", 1953)
"The problems are solved, not by giving new information, but by arranging what we have known since long." (Ludwig Wittgenstein, "Philosophical Investigations", 1953)
"Why do we call something a 'number'? Well, perhaps because it has a direct relationship with several things that have hitherto been called number; and this can be said to give it an indirect relationship to other things we call the same name. And we extend our concept of number as in spinning a thread we twist fibre on fibre. And the strength of the thread does not reside in the fact that some one fibre runs through its whole length, but in the overlapping of many fibres. But if someone wished to say: 'There is something common to all these constructions - namely the disjunction of all their common properties' - I should reply: 'Now you are only playing with words. One might as well say: 'Something runs through the whole thread - namely the continuous overlapping of those fibres.' " (Ludwig Wittgenstein, "Philosophical Investigations", 1953)
"To convince someone of the truth, it is not enough to state
it, but rather one must find the path from error to truth." (Ludwig
Wittgenstein, "Philosophical Occasions", 1953)
"Our craving for generality has [as one] source […] our preoccupation with the method of science. I mean the method the method of reducing the explanation of natural phenomena to the smallest possible number of primitive natural laws; and, in mathematics, of unifying the treatment of different topics by using a generalization. Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes, and are irresistibly tempted to ask and answer in the way science does. This tendency is the real source of metaphysics, and leads the philosopher into complete darkness. I want to say here that it can never be our job to reduce anything to anything, or to explain anything. Philosophy really is ‘purely descriptive’." (Ludwig Wittgenstein, "The Blue and Brown Books", 1958)
"Images tell us nothing, either right or wrong, about the external world. […] It is just because forming images is a voluntary activity that it does not instruct us about the external world. […] When we form an image of something we are not observing. The coming and going of the pictures is not something that happens to us. We are not surprised by these pictures, saying ‘Look!’" (Ludwig Wittgenstein, "Zettel", 1967)
"All testing, all confirmation and disconfirmation of a hypothesis takes place already within a system. And this system is not a more or less arbitrary and doubtful point of departure for all our arguments; no it belongs to the essence of what we call an argument. The system is not so much the point of departure, as the element in which our arguments have their life." (Ludwig Wittgenstein, "On Certainty", 1969)
"People are deeply imbedded in philosophical, i.e., grammatical confusions. And to free them presupposes pulling them out of the immensely manifold connections they are caught up in." (Ludwig Wittgenstein, "Philosophical Occasions 1912-1951", 1993)
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