"A heuristic is ecologically rational to the degree that it is adapted to the structure of an environment. Thus, simple heuristics and environmental structure can both work hand in hand to provide a realistic alternative to the ideal of optimization, whether unbounded or constrained." (Gerd Gigerenzer & Peter M Todd, "Fast and Frugal Heuristics: The Adaptive Toolbox" [in "Simple Heuristics That Make Us Smart"], 1999)
"Fast and frugal heuristics employ a minimum of time, knowledge, and computation to make adaptive choices in real environments. They can be used to solve problems of sequential search through objects or options, as in satisficing. They can also be used to make choices between simultaneously available objects, where the search for information (in the form of cues, features, consequences, etc.) about the possible options must be limited, rather than the search for the options themselves. Fast and frugal heuristics limit their search of objects or information using easily computable stopping rules, and they make their choices with easily computable decision rules." (Gerd Gigerenzer & Peter M Todd, "Fast and Frugal Heuristics: The Adaptive Toolbox" [in "Simple Heuristics That Make Us Smart"], 1999)
"At present, high school education in some countries covers only little, if any, statistical thinking. Algebra, geometry, and calculus teach thinking in a world of certainty - not in the real world, which is uncertain. [...] Furthermore, in the medical and social sciences, data analysis is typically taught as a set of statistical rituals rather than a set of methods for statistical thinking." (Gerd Gigerenzer, "Calculated Risks: How to know when numbers deceive you", 2002)
"External representations are not just passive inputs to an active mind. They can do part of the reasoning or calculation, making relevant properties of the same information more accessible." (Gerd Gigerenzer, "Calculated Risks: How to know when numbers deceive you", 2002)
"Good numeric representation is a key to effective thinking that is not limited to understanding risks. Natural languages show the traces of various attempts at finding a proper representation of numbers. [...] The key role of representation in thinking is often downplayed because of an ideal of rationality that dictates that whenever two statements are mathematically or logically the same, representing them in different forms should not matter. Evidence that it does matter is regarded as a sign of human irrationality. This view ignores the fact that finding a good representation is an indispensable part of problem solving and that playing with different representations is a tool of creative thinking." (Gerd Gigerenzer, "Calculated Risks: How to know when numbers deceive you", 2002)
"Ignorance of relevant risks and miscommunication of those risks are two aspects of innumeracy. A third aspect of innumeracy concerns the problem of drawing incorrect inferences from statistics. This third type of innumeracy occurs when inferences go wrong because they are clouded by certain risk representations. Such clouded thinking becomes possible only once the risks have been communicated." (Gerd Gigerenzer, "Calculated Risks: How to know when numbers deceive you", 2002)
"In my view, the problem of innumeracy is not essentially 'inside' our minds as some have argued, allegedly because the innate architecture of our minds has not evolved to deal with uncertainties. Instead, I suggest that innumeracy can be traced to external representations of uncertainties that do not match our mind’s design - just as the breakdown of color constancy can be traced to artificial illumination. This argument applies to the two kinds of innumeracy that involve numbers: miscommunication of risks and clouded thinking. The treatment for these ills is to restore the external representation of uncertainties to a form that the human mind is adapted to." (Gerd Gigerenzer, "Calculated Risks: How to know when numbers deceive you", 2002)
"Information needs representation. The idea that it is possible to communicate information in a 'pure' form is fiction. Successful risk communication requires intuitively clear representations. Playing with representations can help us not only to understand numbers (describe phenomena) but also to draw conclusions from numbers (make inferences). There is no single best representation, because what is needed always depends on the minds that are doing the communicating." (Gerd Gigerenzer, "Calculated Risks: How to know when numbers deceive you", 2002)
"Natural frequencies facilitate inferences made on the basis of numerical information. The representation does part of the reasoning, taking care of the multiplication the mind would have to perform if given probabilities. In this sense, insight can come from outside the mind." (Gerd Gigerenzer, "Calculated Risks: How to know when numbers deceive you", 2002)
"Overcoming innumeracy is like completing a three-step program to statistical literacy. The first step is to defeat the illusion of certainty. The second step is to learn about the actual risks of relevant events and actions. The third step is to communicate the risks in an understandable way and to draw inferences without falling prey to clouded thinking. The general point is this: Innumeracy does not simply reside in our minds but in the representations of risk that we choose." (Gerd Gigerenzer, "Calculated Risks: How to know when numbers deceive you", 2002)
"Statistical innumeracy is the inability to think with numbers that represent uncertainties. Ignorance of risk, miscommunication of risk, and clouded thinking are forms of innumeracy. Like illiteracy, innumeracy is curable. Innumeracy is not simply a mental defect 'inside' an unfortunate mind, but is in part produced by inadequate 'outside' representations of numbers. Innumeracy can be cured from the outside." (Gerd Gigerenzer, "Calculated Risks: How to know when numbers deceive you", 2002)
"The creation of certainty seems to be a fundamental tendency of human minds. The perception of simple visual objects reflects this tendency. At an unconscious level, our perceptual systems automatically transform uncertainty into certainty, as depth ambiguities and depth illusions illustrate." (Gerd Gigerenzer, "Calculated Risks: How to know when numbers deceive you", 2002)
"The key role of representation in thinking is often downplayed because of an ideal of rationality that dictates that whenever two statements are mathematically or logically the same, representing them in different forms should not matter. Evidence that it does matter is regarded as a sign of human irrationality. This view ignores the fact that finding a good representation is an indispensable part of problem solving and that playing with different representations is a tool of creative thinking." (Gerd Gigerenzer, "Calculated Risks: How to know when numbers deceive you", 2002)
"The possibility of translating uncertainties into risks is much more restricted in the propensity view. Propensities are properties of an object, such as the physical symmetry of a die. If a die is constructed to be perfectly symmetrical, then the probability of rolling a six is 1 in 6. The reference to a physical design, mechanism, or trait that determines the risk of an event is the essence of the propensity interpretation of probability. Note how propensity differs from the subjective interpretation: It is not sufficient that someone’s subjective probabilities about the outcomes of a die roll are coherent, that is, that they satisfy the laws of probability. What matters is the die’s design. If the design is not known, there are no probabilities." (Gerd Gigerenzer, "Calculated Risks: How to know when numbers deceive you", 2002)
"When does an uncertainty qualify as a risk? The answer depends on one’s interpretation of probability, of which there are three major versions: degree of belief, propensity, and frequency. Degrees of belief are sometimes called subjective probabilities. Of the three interpretations of probability, the subjective interpretation is most liberal about expressing uncertainties as quantitative probabilities, that is, risks. Subjective probabilities can be assigned even to unique or novel events." (Gerd Gigerenzer, "Calculated Risks: How to know when numbers deceive you", 2002)
"When natural frequencies are transformed into conditional probabilities, the base rate information is taken out (this is called normalization). The benefit of this normalization is that the resulting values fall within the uniform range of 0 and 1. The cost, however, is that when drawing inferences from probabilities (as opposed to natural frequencies), one has to put the base rates back in by multiplying the conditional probabilities by their respective base rates." (Gerd Gigerenzer, "Calculated Risks: How to know when numbers deceive you", 2002)
"Why does representing information in terms of natural frequencies rather than probabilities or percentages foster insight? For two reasons. First, computational simplicity: The representation does part of the computation. And second, evolutionary and developmental primacy: Our minds are adapted to natural frequencies." (Gerd Gigerenzer, "Calculated Risks: How to know when numbers deceive you", 2002)
"A heuristic is defined as a simple rule that exploits both evolved abilities to act fast and struc- tures of the environment to act accurately and frugally. The complexity and uncertainty of an environment cannot be determined independently of the actor. What matters is the degree of complexity and uncertainty encountered by the decision maker." (Christoph Engel & Gerd Gigerenzer, "Law and Heuristics: An interdisciplinary venture" [in "Heuristics and the Law", 2006)
"Heuristics are needed in situations where the world does not permit optimization. For many real-world problems (as opposed to optimization-tuned textbook problems), optimal solutions are unknown because the problems are computationally intractable or poorly defined." (Christoph Engel & Gerd Gigerenzer, "Law and Heuristics: An interdisciplinary venture" [in "Heuristics and the Law", 2006)
"[...] a gut feeling is not caprice or a sixth sense. An executive may be buried under a mountain of information, some of which is contradictory, some of questionable reliability, and some that makes one wonder why it was sent in the first place. But despite the excess of data, there is no algorithm to calculate the best decision. In this situation, an experienced executive may have a feeling of what the best action is - a gut feeling. By definition, the reasons behind this feeling are unconscious." (Gerd Gigerenzer, "Risk Savvy: How to make good decisions", 2014)
"A rule of thumb, or heuristic, enables us to make a decision fast, without much searching for information, but nevertheless with high accuracy. [...] A heuristic can be safer and more accurate than a calculation, and the same heuristic can underlie both conscious and unconscious decisions." (Gerd Gigerenzer, "Risk Savvy: How to make good decisions", 2014)
"Probability theory provides the best answer only when the rules of the game are certain, when all alternatives, consequences, and probabilities are known or can be calculated. [...] In the real game, probability theory is not enough. Good intuitions are needed, which can be more challenging than calculations. One way to reduce uncertainty is to rely on rules of thumb." (Gerd Gigerenzer, "Risk Savvy: How to make good decisions", 2014)
"Teaching statistical thinking means giving people tools for problem solving in the real world. It should not be taught as pure mathematics. Instead of mechanically solving a dozen problems with the help of a particular formula, children and adolescents should be asked to find solutions to real-life problems. That’s what teaches them how to solve problems, and also shows that there may be more than one good answer in the first place. Equally important is encouraging curiosity, such as asking for answers to questions by doing experiments." (Gerd Gigerenzer, "Risk Savvy: How to make good decisions", 2014)
"The taming of chance created mathematical probability. [...] Probability is not one of a kind; it was born with three faces: frequency, physical design, and degrees of belief. [...] n the first of its identities, probability is about counting. [...] Second, probability is about constructing. For example, if a die is constructed to be perfectly symmetrical, then the probability of rolling a six is one in six. You don’t have to count. [...] Probabilities by design are called propensities. Historically, games of chance were the prototype for propensity. These risks are known because people crafted, not counted, them. [...] Third, probability is about degrees of belief. A degree of belief can be based on anything from experience to personal impression." (Gerd Gigerenzer, "Risk Savvy: How to make good decisions", 2014)
"There is a mathematical theory that tells us why and when simple is better. It is called the bias-variance dilemma. [...] How far we go in simplifying depends on three features. First, the more uncertainty, the more we should make it simple. The less uncertainty, the more complex it should be. [...] Second, the more alternatives, the more we should simplify; the fewer, the more complex it can be. The reason is that complex methods need to estimate risk factors, and more alternatives mean that more factors need to be estimated, which leads to more estimation errors being made. [...] Finally, the more past data there are, the more beneficial for the complex methods." (Gerd Gigerenzer, "Risk Savvy: How to make good decisions", 2014)
"To calculate a risk is one thing, to communicate it is another. Risk communication is an important skill for laypeople and experts alike. Because it’s rarely taught, misinterpreting numbers is the rule rather than the exception. Each of the three kinds of probability - relative frequency, design, or degree of belief - can be framed in either a confusing or a transparent way. So far we have seen two communication tools for reporting risks: Use frequencies instead of single-event probabilities. Use absolute instead of relative risks." (Gerd Gigerenzer, "Risk Savvy: How to make good decisions", 2014)
"A heuristic is a strategy that ignores part of the information, with the goal of making decisions more quickly, frugally, and/or accurately than more complex methods." (Gerd Gigerenzer et al, "Simply Rational: Decision Making in the Real World", 2015)
"Probability theory is not the only tool for rationality. In situations of uncertainty, as opposed to risk, simple heuristics can lead to more accurate judgments, in addition to being faster and more frugal. Under uncertainty, optimal solutions do not exist (except in hindsight) and, by definition, cannot be calculated. Thus, it is illusory to model the mind as a general optimizer, Bayesian or otherwise. Rather, the goal is to achieve satisficing solutions, such as meeting an aspiration level or coming out ahead of a competitor." (Gerd Gigerenzer et al, "Simply Rational: Decision Making in the Real World", 2015)
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