“Thus, joining the rigor of demonstrations in mathematics with the uncertainty of chance, and conciliating these apparently contradictory matters, it can, taking its name from both of them, with justice arrogate the stupefying name: The Mathematics of Chance.” (Blaise Pascal, [Address to the Academie Parisienne de Mathematiques] 1654)
“As a Foundation to the following Proposition, I shall take Leave to lay down this Self-evident Truth: That any one Chance or Expectation to win any thing is worth just such a Sum, as wou’d procure in the same Chance and Expectation at a fair Lay.“ (Christiaan Huygens, “De ratiociniis in ludo aleae”, 1657)
“The good or evil of an event should be considered in view of the event's likelihood of occurrence.” (Antoine Amauld & Pierre Nicole, “The Art of Thinking: Port-Royal Logic”, 1662)
“Take away probability, and you can no longer please the world; give probability, and you can no longer displease it.” (Blaise Pascal, “Thoughts“, 1670)
“In practical life we are compelled to follow what is most probable; in speculative thought we are compelled to follow truth. […] we must take care not to admit as true anything, which is only probable. For when one falsity has been let in, infinite others follow.” (Baruch Spinoza, [letter to Hugo Boxel], 1674)
“Probability is a degree of possibility.” (Gottfried W Leibniz, “On estimating the uncertain”, 1676)
“Probability, however, is not something absolute, [it is] drawn from certain information which, although it does not suffice to resolve the problem, nevertheless ensures that we judge correctly which of the two opposites is the easiest (facilius) given the conditions known to us.” (Gottfried W Leibniz, “Forethoughts for an encyclopaedia or universal science”, cca. 1679)
“Consider however (imitating Mathematicians) certainty or truth to be like the whole; and probabilities [to be like] parts, such that probabilities would be to truths what an acute angle [is] to a right [angle].” (Gottfried W Leibniz, [ to Vincent Placcius] 1687)
“The probable is something which lies midway between truth and error” (Christian Thomasius, “Institutes of Divine Jurisprudence”, 1688)
“Probability is the appearance of agreement upon fallible proofs. As demonstration is the showing the agreement or disagreement of two ideas by the intervention of one or more proofs, which have a constant, immutable, and visible connexion one with another; so probability is nothing but the appearance of such an agreement or disagreement by the intervention of proofs, whose connexion is not constant and immutable, or at least is not perceived to be so, but is, or appears for the most part to be so, and is enough to induce the mind to judge the proposition to be true or false, rather than the contrary.” (John Locke, “An Essay Concerning Human Understanding”, Book IV, 1689)
“Probability is likeliness to be true, the very notation of the word signifying such a proposition, for which there be arguments or proofs to make it pass, or be received for true. […] The grounds of probability are two: conformity with our own experience, or the testimony of others' experience. Probability then, being to supply the defect of our knowledge and to guide us where that fails, is always conversant about propositions whereof we have no certainty, but only some inducements to receive them for true.” (John Locke, “An Essay Concerning Human Understanding”, Book IV, 1689)
“It is impossible for a Die, with such determin’d force and direction, not to fall on such a determin’d side, only I don’t know the force and direction which makes it fall on such a determin’d side, and therefore I call that Chance, which is nothing but want of Art…” (John Arbuthnot, “Of the Laws of Chance”, 1692)
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