"The likeness of a visible thing is that in virtue of which sight sees. And the likeness of an intellectively cognized thing, an intelligible species, is the form in virtue of which intellect cognizes. […] That which is intellectively cognized first is the thing of which the intelligible species is a likeness." (Thomas Aquinas, "Quaestiones disputatae de veritate", cca. 1256-1259)
"One who doesn't perceive the essence and quiddity of a thing, but only its image, can't know the thing. For one who has seen only a picture of Hercules doesn't know Hercules. A human being, however, perceives nothing of a thing, except only its image, that is, a species received through the senses, which is an image of the thing and not the thing itself. For not the stone but a species of the stone is in the soul." (Thomas Aquinas, "Summa Theologiae", cca. 1266-1273)
"[…] one ought to say that one may perceive the image of a thing in two ways. In one way, as the object of cognition. In this way it is true that one perceiving only the thing's image does not cognize the thing; for example, someone seeing the image of Hercules painted on a wall does not thereby either see or cognize Hercules. In another way, as the basis [ratio] of cognizing, and in this way the claim is not true. For through only a species perceived of a thing the thing is truly cognized - as a stone is truly seen through its sensible species alone, received in the eye, and is truly intellectively cognized through its intelligible species alone, received in intellect." (Thomas Aquinas, "Summa Theologiae", cca. 1266-1273)
"Phantasms don't have the same manner of existing that the human intellect has [...] and so they cannot through their own power make an impression on the possible intellect. But through the power of the agent intellect, a kind of likeness results in the possible intellect as a result of agent intellect's turning toward the phantasms […] And this is how intelligible species are said to be abstracted from phantasms. It's not that some form that is numerically the same is first in phantasms and then produced in the possible intellect."(Thomas Aquinas, "Summa Theologiae", cca. 1266-1273)
"The attention will tend toward the species either in such a way that it would not pass beyond so as to attend to the object, or in such a way that it would pass beyond. If in the first way, then the thing will not be seen in itself but only its image will be seen as if it were the thing itself." (Peter J Olivi, "Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum", cca. 1280- 1282)
"No prior assimilation through a species is required before an act of intellectively cognizing. Rather, the assimilation suffices that comes about through the act of intellectively cognizing, which is [itself] a likeness of the thing cognized." (William Ockham," Expositio in librum Perihermenias", cca. 1321-1324)
"Such an image or fictum was postulated for no other reason than to supposit for a thing in such a way that both a proposition might be composed out of it and it might be common to things. For these are denied of things." (William Ockham, "Expositio in librum Perihermenias", cca, 1321-1324)
"The thing represented needs to be cognized in advance - otherwise the representative would never lead to a cognition of the thing represented as to something similar." (William Ockham, "Expositio in librum Perihermenias", cca. 1321-1324)
"Within image theory, it is suggested that important components of decision-making processes are the different 'images' that a person may use to evaluate choice options. Images may represent a person's principles, goals, or plans. Decision options may then match or not match these images and be adopted, rejected, considered further, depending on circumstances." (Deborah J Terry & Michael A Hogg, "Attitudes, Behavior, and Social Context: The Role of Norms and Group Membership", 1999)
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