On Stories (1975-1999)

"Exploratory data analysis can never be the whole story, but nothing else can serve as the foundation stone - as the first step." (John W. Tukey, "Exploratory Data Analysis", 1977)

"There are certain basic, known principles about how people's minds go about the business of understanding, and communicating understanding by means of language, which have been known and used for many centuries. No matter how these principles are addressed, they always end up with hierarchic decomposition as being the heart of good storytelling." (Douglas T Ross, "Structured analysis (SA): A language for communicating ideas", IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering Vol. 3 No. 1, 1977)

"A model […] is a story with a specified structure: to explain this catch phrase is to explain what a model is. The structure is given by the logical and mathematical form of a set of postulates, the assumptions of the model. The structure forms an uninterpreted system, in much the way the postulates of a pure geometry are now commonly regarded as doing. The theorems that follow from the postulates tell us things about the structure that may not be apparent from an examination of the postulates alone." (Allan Gibbard & Hal R. Varian, "Economic Models", The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 75, No. 11, 1978)

"However, for most of us, science functions like myth in that we have no personal experience in the matter. We put our trust in the scientific view given us by our culture and enshrined in its myths. If asked why leaves are green, most of us would probably mutter something about “chlorophyll.” But unless we were specialists, we would simply be repeating the story of someone else’s experience." (Wallace B Clift, "Jung and Christianity", 1982)

"Scientific theories (I have said) begin as imaginative constructions. The begin, if you like, as stories, and the purpose of the critical or rectifying episode in scientific reasoning is precisely to find out whether or not these stories are stories about real life. Literal or empiric truthfulness is not therefore the starting-point of scientific enquiry, but rather the direction in which scientific reasoning moves. If this is a fair statement, it follows that scientific and poetic or imaginative accounts of the world are not distinguishable in their origins. They start in parallel, but diverge from one another at some later stge. We all tell stories, but the stories differ in the purposes we expect them to fulfil and in the kinds of evaluations to which they are exposed." (Sir Peter B Medawar, "Pluto’s Republic: Incorporating the Art of the Soluble and Induction Intuition in Scientific Thought", 1982)

"The purpose of scientific enquiry is not to compile an inventory of factual information, nor to build up a totalitarian world picture of Natural Laws in which every event that is not compulsory is forbidden. We should think of it rather as a logically articulated structure of justifiable beliefs about nature. It begins as a story about a Possible World - a story which we invent and criticize and modify as we go along, so that it winds by being, as nearly as we can make it, a story about real life." (Sir Peter B Medawar, "Pluto’s Republic: Incorporating the Art of the Soluble and Induction Intuition in Scientific Thought", 1982)

"Myth is the system of basic metaphors, images, and stories that in-forms the perceptions, memories, and aspirations of a people; provides the rationale for its institutions, rituals and power structure; and gives a map of the purpose and stages of life." (Sam Keen, "The Passionate Life", 1983)

"Mental models are the images, assumptions, and stories which we carry in our minds of ourselves, other people, institutions, and every aspect of the world. Like a pane of glass framing and subtly distorting our vision, mental models determine what we see. Human beings cannot navigate through the complex environments of our world without cognitive ‘mental maps’; and all of these mental maps, by definition, are flawed in some way." (Peter M Senge, "The Fifth Discipline Fieldbook: Strategies and Tools for Building a Learning Organization", 1994)

"The story of π has been extensively told, no doubt because its history goes back to ancient times, but also because much of it can be grasped without a knowledge of advanced mathematics." (Eli Maor, "e: The Story of a Number", 1994)

"Mystery is found as much in mathematics as in detective stories. Indeed, the mathematician could well be described as a detective, brilliantly exploiting a few initial clues to solve the problem and reveal its innermost secrets. An especially mathematical mystery is that you can often search for some mathematical object, and actually know a lot about it, if it exists, only to discover that in fact it does not exist at all - you knew a lot about something which cannot be." (David Wells, "You Are a Mathematician: A wise and witty introduction to the joy of numbers", 1995)

"The story of calculus brings out two of the main things that mathematics is for: providing tools that let scientists calculate what nature is doing, and providing new questions for mathematicians to sort out to their own satisfaction. These are the external and internal aspects of mathematics, often referred to as applied and pure mathematics." (Ian Stewart, "Nature's Numbers: The unreal reality of mathematics", 1995)

"There is much beauty in nature's clues, and we can all recognize it without any mathematical training. There is beauty, too, in the mathematical stories that start from the clues and deduce the underlying rules and regularities, but it is a different kind of beauty, applying to ideas rather than things." (Ian Stewart, "Nature's Numbers: The unreal reality of mathematics", 1995)

"The most erroneous stories are those we think we know best - and therefore never scrutinize or question." (Stephen Jay Gould, "Life's Grandeur: The Spread of Excellence From Plato to Darwin", 1996)

"When scientists need to explain difficult points of theory, illustration by hypothetical example - rather than by total abstraction - works well (perhaps indispensably) as a rhetorical device. Such cases do not function as speculations in the pejorative sense - as silly stories that provide insight into complex mechanisms - but rather as idealized illustrations to exemplify a difficult point of theory." (Stephen Jay Gould, "Leonardo's Mountain of Clams and the Diet of Worms", 1998)