"When you understand physics, you have entered the hall; and when, after completing the study of natural philosophy, you master metaphysics, you have entered the innermost court and are with the king in the same palace." (Moses Maimonides, "The Guide for the Perplexed", 1190)
"Philosophy is written in this grand book, the universe, which stands continually open to our gaze. But the book cannot be understood unless one first learns to comprehend the language and read the letters in which it is composed. It is written in the language of mathematics, and its characters are triangles, circles, and other geometric figures without which it is humanly impossible to understand a single word of it; without these, one wanders about in a dark labyrinth." (Galileo Galilei, "The Assayer", 1623)
"Mathematics in gross, it is plain, are a grievance in natural philosophy, and with reason: for mathematical proofs, like diamonds, are hard as well as clear, and will be touched with nothing but strict reasoning. Mathematical proofs are out of the reach of topical arguments; and are not to be attacked by the equivocal use of words or declaration, that make so great a part of other discourses, - nay, even of controversies." (John Locke, "An Essay Concerning Human Understanding", 1690)
"As in Mathematicks, so in Natural Philosophy, the Investigation of difficult Things by the Method of Analysis, ought ever to precede the Method of Composition." (Sir Isaac Newton, "Opticks", 1704)
"There is nothing more pleasant for man than the certainty of knowledge; whoever has once tasted of it is repelled by everything in which he perceives nothing but uncertainty. This is why the mathematicians who always deal with certain knowledge have been repelled by philosophy and other things, and have found nothing more pleasant than to spend their time with lines and letters." (Christian Wolff, 1741)
"It is not therefore the business of philosophy, in our present situation in the universe, to attempt to take in at once, in one view, the whole scheme of nature; but to extend, with great care and circumspection, our knowledge, by just steps, from sensible things, as far as our observations or reasonings from them will carry us, in our enquiries concerning either the greater motions and operations of nature, or her more subtile and hidden works." (Colin Maclaurin, "An Account of Sir Isaac Newton's Philosophical Discoveries, in Four Books", 1748)
"Is it not therefore the business of philosophy, in our present situation in the universe, to attempt to take in at once, in one view, the whole scheme of nature; but to extend, with great care and circumspection, our knowledge, by just steps, from sensible things as far as our observations or reasonings from them will carry us in our enquiries concerning either the greater motions and operations of nature, or her more subtle and hidden works." (Colin Maclaurin, "An Account of Sir Isaac Newton’s Philosophical Discoveries", 1748)
"Conjecture may lead you to form opinions, but it cannot produce knowledge. Natural philosophy must be built upon the phenomena of nature discovered by observation and experiment." (George Adams, "Lectures on Natural and Experimental Philosophy" Vol. 1, 1794)
"Conjectures in philosophy are termed hypotheses or theories; and the investigation of an hypothesis founded on some slight probability, which accounts for many appearances in nature, has too often been considered as the highest attainment of a philosopher. If the hypothesis (sic) hangs well together, is embellished with a lively imagination, and serves to account for common appearances - it is considered by many, as having all the qualities that should recommend it to our belief, and all that ought to be required in a philosophical system." (George Adams, "Lectures on Natural and Experimental Philosophy" Vol. 1, 1794)
"It is an acknowledged truth in philosophy that a just theory will always be confirmed by experiment." (Thomas R Malthus, "An Essay on The Principle of Population", 1798)
"With the synthesis of every new concept in the aggregation of coordinate characteristics the extensive or complex distinctness is increased; with the further analysis of concepts in the series of subordinate characteristics the intensive or deep distinctness is increased. The latter kind of distinctness, as it necessarily serves the thoroughness and conclusiveness of cognition, is therefore mainly the business of philosophy and is carried farthest especially in metaphysical investigations." (Immanuel Kant, "Logic", 1800)
"The foundations of chemical philosophy are observation, experiment, and analogy. By observation, facts are distinctly and minutely impressed on the mind. By analogy, similar facts are connected. By experiment, new facts are discovered; and, in the progression of knowledge, observation, guided by analogy, lends to experiment, and analogy confirmed by experiment, becomes scientific truth." (Sir Humphry Davy, "Elements of Chemical Philosophy" Vol. 4, 1812)
"Each of the parts of philosophy is a philosophical whole, a circle rounded and complete in itself. In each of these parts, however, the philosophical Idea is found in a particular specificality or medium. The single circle, because it is a real totality, bursts through the limits imposed by its special medium, and gives rise to a wider circle. The whole of philosophy in this way resembles a circle of circles. The Idea appears in each single circle, but, at the same time, the whole Idea is constituted by the system of these peculiar phases, and each is a necessary member of the organisation." (Georg W F Hegel, "Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences", 1816)
"To repeat abstractly, universally, and distinctly in concepts the whole inner nature of the world, and thus to deposit it as a reflected image in permanent concepts always ready for the faculty of reason, this and nothing else is philosophy." (Arthur Schopenhauer, "The World as Will and Representation", 1819)
"Primary causes are unknown to us; but are subject to simple and constant laws, which may be discovered by observation, the study of them being the object of natural philosophy." (Jean-Baptiste-Joseph Fourier, "The Analytical Theory of Heat", 1822)
"Mathematics in gross, it is plain, are a grievance in natural philosophy, and with reason. […] Mathematical proofs are out of the reach of topical arguments, and are not to be attacked by the equivocal use of words or declamation, that make so great a part of other discourses; nay, even of controversies." (John Locke, 1824)
"Every presentation of philosophy, whether oral or written, is to be taken and can only be taken in the sense of a means. Every system is only an expression or image of reason, and hence only an object of reason, an object which reason - a living power that procreates itself in new thinking beings - distinguishes from itself and posits as an object of criticism. Every system that is not recognized and appropriated as just a means, limits and warps the mind for it sets up the indirect and formal thought in the place of the direct, original and material thought." (Ludwig A Feuerbach, "Towards a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy", 1839)
"Science asks no questions about the ontological pedigree or a priori character of a theory, but is content to judge it by its performance; and it is thus that a knowledge of nature, having all the certainty which the senses are competent to inspire, has been attained - a knowledge which maintains a strict neutrality toward all philosophical systems and concerns itself not with the genesis or a priori grounds of ideas." (Chauncey Wright, "The Philosophy of Herbert Spencer", North American Review, 1865)
"The most distinct and beautiful statement of any truth [in science] must take at last the mathematical form. We might so simplify the rules of moral philosophy, as well as of arithmetic, that one formula would express them both." (Henry Thoreau, "A Week on the Concord and Merrimack Rivers", 1873)
"Thought is symbolical of Sensation as Algebra is of Arithmetic, and because it is symbolical, is very unlike what it symbolises. For one thing, sensations are always positive; in this resembling arithmetical quantities. A negative sensation is no more possible than a negative number. But ideas, like algebraic quantities, may be either positive or negative. However paradoxical the square of a negative quantity, the square root of an unknown quantity, nay, even in imaginary quantity, the student of Algebra finds these paradoxes to be valid operations. And the student of Philosophy finds analogous paradoxes in operations impossible in the sphere of Sense. Thus although it is impossible to feel non-existence, it is possible to think it; although it is impossible to frame an image of Infinity, we can, and do, form the idea, and reason on it with precision." (George H Lewes "Problems of Life and Mind", 1873)
"The philosopher believes that the value of his philosophy lies in the whole, in the building: posterity discovers it in the bricks with which he built and which are then often used again for better building: in the fact, that is to say, that building can be destroyed and nonetheless possess value as material." (Friedrich Nietzsche, "Human, all-too-human", 1878)
"Questions of Definition are of the very highest importance in Philosophy, and they need to be watched accordingly." (George Campbell, "A Fourth State of Matter, Nature", 1880)
"Without poetry our science will appear incomplete, and most of what now passes with us for religion and philosophy will be replaced by poetry." (Matthew Arnold, "The Study of Poetry", 1880)
"Mathematics connect themselves on the one side with common life and physical science; on the other side with philosophy in regard to our notions of space and time, and in the questions which have arisen as to the universality and necessity of the truths of mathematics and the foundation of our knowledge of them." (Arthur Cayley, 1888)
"The real finisher of our education is philosophy, but it is the office of mathematics to ward off the dangers of philosophy." (Johann F Herbart, "Pestalozzi's Idee eines ABC der Anschauung", 1890)
"It is a common and necessary feature of human intelligence that we can neither conceive of things nor define them conceptually without adding attributes to them that simply do not exist. This applies not only to every thought and imagination of ordinary life, even the sciences do not proceed otherwise. Only philosophy seeks and finds the difference between things that exist and things that we perceive, and also sees the necessity of this difference. […] What we add are therefore not incorrect conceptions but the conditions for such conceptions in general. We cannot simply remove them and replace them with better ones; either we must add them, or we must abstain from all conceptions of this kind." (Heinrich Hertz, "Die Prinzipien der Mechanik in neuem Zusammenhange dargestellt", 1894)
"The most ordinary things are to philosophy a source of insoluble puzzles. In order to explain our perceptions it constructs the concept of matter and then finds matter quite useless either for itself having or for causing perceptions in a mind. With infinite ingenuity it constructs a concept of space or time and then finds it absolutely impossible that there be objects in this space or that processes occur during this time [...] The source of this kind of logic lies in excessive confidence in the so-called laws of thought." (Ludwig E Boltzmann, "On Statistical Mechanics", 1904)
"Reduced to their most pregnant difference, empiricism means the habit of explaining wholes by parts, and rationalism means the habit of explaining parts by wholes. Rationalism thus preserves affinities with monism, since wholeness goes with union, while empiricism inclines to pluralistic views. No philosophy can ever be anything but a summary sketch, a picture of the world in abridgment, a foreshortened bird's-eye view of the perspective of events. And the first thing to notice is this, that the only material we have at our disposal for making a picture of the whole world is supplied by the various portions of that world of which we have already had experience. We can invent no new forms of conception, applicable to the whole exclusively, and not suggested originally by the parts." (William James, "A Pluralistic Universe", 1908)
"What is a philosophy? It Is an answer satisfactory to the reason to all the great problems of life. That is what is meant by philosophy. It must satisfy the reason, and it must show the unity underlying the endless diversity of the facts that science observes." (Annie Besant, "The Immediate Future", 1911)
"For a long time it has been known that the first systems of representations with which men have pictured to themselves the world and themselves were of religious origin. There is no religion that is not a cosmology at the same time that it is a speculation upon divine things. If philosophy and the sciences were born of religion, it is because religion began by taking the place of the sciences and philosophy." (Émile Durkheim, "The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life", 1912)
"Theoretical philosophy aimed to discover the unity of experience, namely, in the form of some universal explanation. It strived to yield a world picture, one which is harmoniously integral and completely understandable." (Alexander Bogdanov, "Tektology: The Universal Organizational Science" Vol. I, 1913)
"Philosophy in its old form could exist only in the absence of engineering, but with engineering in existence and daily more active and far reaching, the old verbalistic philosophy and metaphysics have lost their reason to exist. They were no more able to understand the ‘production’ of the universe and life than they are now able to understand or grapple with 'production' as a means to provide a happier existence for humanity. They failed because their venerated method of ‘speculation’ can not produce, and its place must be taken by mathematical thinking. Mathematical reasoning is displacing metaphysical reasoning. Engineering is driving verbalistic philosophy out of existence and humanity gains decidedly thereby." (Alfred Korzybski, "Manhood of Humanity", 1921)
"It can, you see, be said, with the same approximation to truth, that the whole of science, including mathematics, consists in the study of transformations or in the study of relations." (Cassius J Keyser. "Mathematical Philosophy: A Study of Fate and Freedom", 1922)
"A system of philosophy, or metaphysics, is a union of a world view and a life view in one harmonious, complete, integral conception. In so far as any man strives to attain, by rational inquiry, a consistent and comprehensive view of life and reality, he is a metaphysician." (Joseph Alexander Leighton, "Man and the Cosmos - An introduction to Metaphysics", 1922)
"[…] to the scientific mind the living and the non-living form one continuous series of systems of differing degrees of complexity […], while to the philosophic mind the whole universe, itself perhaps an organism, is composed of a vast number of interlacing organisms of all sizes." (James G Needham, "Developments in Philosophy of Biology", Quarterly Review of Biology Vol. 3 (1), 1928)
"[Philosophy] has tried to combine acceptance of the conclusions of scientific inquiry as to the natural world with the acceptance of doctrines about the nature of mind and knowledge which originated before there was such a thing as systematic experimental inquiry. Between the two there is an inherent incompatibility." (John Dewey, "Quest for Certainty: A Study of the Relation of Knowledge and Action", 1929)
"Our system of philosophy is itself on trial; it must stand or fall according as it is broad enough to find room for this experience as an element of life." (Sir Arthur S Eddington, "Science and the Unseen World", 1929)
"In the history of mathematics, the ‘how’ always preceded the ‘why’, the technique of the subject preceded its philosophy." (Tobias Dantzig, "Number: The Language of Science", 1930)
"Most mistakes in philosophy and logic occur because the human mind is apt to take the symbol for the reality." (Albert Einstein, "Cosmic Religion: With Other Opinions and Aphorisms", 1931)
"The fundamental concepts of physical science, it is now understood, are abstractions, framed by our mind, so as to bring order to an apparent chaos of phenomena." (Sir William C Dampier, "A History of Science and its Relations with Philosophy & Religion", 1931)
"It is this ideal of progress through cumulative effort rather than through genius - progress by organised effort, progress which does not wait for some brilliant stroke, some lucky discovery, or the advent of some superman, has been the chief gift of science to social philosophy." (William Wickenden, [Address to 48th annual summer convention of the American Institute of Electriccal Engineers, Cleveland] 1932)
"To create a healthy philosophy you should renounce metaphysics but be a good mathematician." (Bertrand Russell, [lecture] 1935)
"In every writer on philosophy there is a concealed metaphysic, usually unconscious; even if his subject is metaphysics, he is almost certain to have an uncritically believed system which underlies his specific arguments." (Bertrand Russell, "Dewey’s New Logic" [in "The Philosophy of John Dewey", ed. by Paul A Schilpp & Lewis E Hahn, 1939])
"The harmony of the world is made manifest in Form and Number, and the heart and soul and all the poetry of Natural Philosophy are embodied in the concept of mathematical beauty." (Sir D’Arcy W Thompson, "On Growth and Form", 1951)
"Equilibrium requires that the whole of the structure, the form of its elements, and the means of interconnection be so combined that at the supports there will automatically be produced passive forces or reactions that are able to balance the forces acting upon the structures, including the force of its own weight." (Eduardo Torroja, "Philosophy of Structure", 1951)
"Everyone has some kind of philosophy, some general worldview, which to men of other views will seem mythological." (H Richard Niebuhr, "Christ and Culture", 1951)
"Philosophy is in history, and is never independent of historical discourse. But for the tacit symbolism of life it substitutes, in principle, a conscious symbolism; for a latent meaning, one that is manifest. It is never content to accept its historical situation. It changes this situation by revealing it to itself." (Maurice Merleau-Ponty, "Éloge de la philosophie" ["In Praise of Philosophy"], 1953)
"Science cannot be based on dogma or authority of any kind, nor on any institution or revelation, unless indeed it be of the Book of Nature that lies open before our eyes. We need not dwell on the processes of acquiring knowledge by observation, experiment, and inductive and deductive reasoning. The study of scientific method both in theory and practice is of great importance. It is inherent in the philosophy that the record may be imperfect and the conceptions erroneous; the potential fallibility of our science is not only acknowledged but also insisted upon." (Sir Robert Robinson, "Science and the Scientist", Nature Vol. 176 (4479), 1955)
"Above all, we see from these formulations how difficult it is when we try to push new ideas into an old system of concepts belonging to an earlier philosophy, or, to use an old metaphor, when we attempt to put new wine into old bottles. Such attempts are always distressing, for they mislead us into continually occupying with the inevitable cracks in the old bottles, instead of rejoicing over the new wine." (Werner K Heisenberg, "Physics and Philosophy: The Revolution in Modern Science", 1958)
"Our craving for generality has [as one] source […] our preoccupation with the method of science. I mean the method the method of reducing the explanation of natural phenomena to the smallest possible number of primitive natural laws; and, in mathematics, of unifying the treatment of different topics by using a generalization. Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes, and are irresistibly tempted to ask and answer in the way science does. This tendency is the real source of metaphysics, and leads the philosopher into complete darkness. I want to say here that it can never be our job to reduce anything to anything, or to explain anything. Philosophy really is ‘purely descriptive’." (Ludwig Wittgenstein, "The Blue and Brown Books", 1958)
"Science, philosophy and religion are bound to converge as they draw nearer to the whole." (Pierre T de Chardin, "The Phenomenon of Man", 1959)
"The exact verbal definition of qualitative concepts is more often the province of philosophy than of physical science." (Ronnie Bell, "The Proton in Chemistry", 1959)
"It seems to me that science has a much greater likelihood of being true in the main than any philosophy hitherto advanced (I do not, of course, except my own). In science there are many matters about which people are agreed; in philosophy there are none. Therefore, although each proposition in a science may be false, and it is practically certain that there are some that are false, yet we shall be wise to build our philosophy upon science, because the risk of error in philosophy is pretty sure to be greater than in science. If we could hope for certainty in philosophy, the matter would be otherwise, but so far as I can see such a hope would be a chimerical." (Bertrand Russel, "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", 1959)
"Mathematics is neither a description of nature nor an explanation of its operation; it is not concerned with physical motion or with the metaphysical generation of quantities. It is merely the symbolic logic of possible relations, and as such is concerned with neither approximate nor absolute truth, but only with hypothetical truth. That is, mathematics determines what conclusions will follow logically from given premises. The conjunction of mathematics and philosophy, or of mathematics and science is frequently of great service in suggesting new problems and points of view." (Carl B Boyer, "The History of the Calculus and Its Conceptual Development", 1959)
"[...] mathematics is not free to develop as it will, but is bound by certain restrictions: by conceptions derived either a posteriori from natural science, or assumed to be imposed a priori by an absolutistic philosophy." (Carl B Boyer, "The History of the Calculus and Its Conceptual Development", 1959)
"A world view is not merely a philosophical by-product of each culture, like a shadow, but the very skeleton of concrete cognitive assumptions on which the flesh of customary behavior is hung. World view, accordingly, may be expressed, more or less systematically in cosmology, philosophy, ethics, religious ritual, scientific belief, and so on, but it is implicit in almost every act. In Parsonian terms, it constitutes the set of cognitive orientations of the members of a society." (Anthony F C Wallace, "Culture and Personality", 1961)
"The important distinction between science and those other systematizations [i.e., art, philosophy, and theology] is that science is self-testing and self-correcting. Here the essential point of science is respect for objective fact. What is correctly observed must be believed [...] the competent scientist does quite the opposite of the popular stereotype of setting out to prove a theory; he seeks to disprove it." (George G Simpson, "Notes on the Nature of Science", 1962)
"Philosophy is metaphysics. Metaphysics thinks beings as a whole - the world, man, God - with respect to Being, with respect to the belonging together of beings in Being. Metaphysics thinks beings as being in the manner of representational thinking which gives reasons." (Martin Heidegger, "The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking", 1964)
"Engineering is a method and a philosophy for coping with that which is uncertain at the earliest possible moment and to the ultimate service to mankind. It is not a science struggling for a place in the sun. Engineering is extrapolation from existing knowledge rather than interpolation between known points. Because engineering is science in action - the practice of decision making at the earliest moment - it has been defined as the art of skillful approximation. No situation in engineering is simple enough to be solved precisely, and none worth evaluating is solved exactly. Never are there sufficient facts, sufficient time, or sufficient money for an exact solution, for if by chance there were, the answer would be of academic and not economic interest to society. These are the circumstances that make engineering so vital and so creative." (Ronald B Smith, "Engineering Is…", Mechanical Engineering Vol. 86 (5), 1964)
"We must accept, I think, that there is an inherent limitation in the structure of science that prevents a scientific theory from ever giving us an adequate total explanation of the universe. Always, there is a base in nature (or, correspondingly, a set of assumptions in theory) which cannot be explained by reference to some yet more fundamental property. This feature of science has been commented on by many writers in the philosophy of science; and, certainly the limitation is a point of difference between science and those religious or metaphysical systems in which there is an attempt to present a doctrine that gives answers for all ultimate questions." (Richard Schlegel, "Completeness in Science", 1967)
"Under the present dominance of formalism, one is tempted to paraphrase Kant: the history of mathematics, lacking the guidance of philosophy, has become blind, while the philosophy of mathematics, turning its back on the most intriguing phenomena in the of mathematics, has become empty." (Imre Lakatos, "Proofs and Refutations: The Logic of Mathematical Discovery", 1976)
"It is hard for us today to assimilate all the new ideas that are being suggested in response to the new information we have. We must remember that our picture of the universe is based not only on our scientific knowledge but also on our culture and our philosophy. What new discoveries lie ahead no one can say. There may well be civilizations in other parts of our galaxy or in other galaxies that have already accomplished much of what lies ahead for mankind. Others may just be beginning. The universe clearly presents an unending challenge." (Necia H Apfel & J Allen Hynek, "Architecture of the Universe", 1979)
"Modern philosophy of science has gone far beyond the naive belief that science reveals the truth. Even if it could, we would have no means of proving it. Certainty seems unattainable. All scientific statements remain open to doubt. […] We cannot reach the absolute at least as far as science is concerned; we have to content ourselves with the relative." (Rolf Sattler, "Biophilosophy", 1986)
"All great theories are expansive, and all notions so rich in scope and implication are underpinned by visions about the nature of things. You may call these visions ‘philosophy’, or ‘metaphor’, or ‘organizing principle’, but one thing they are surely not - they are not simple inductions from observed facts of the natural world." (Stephen J Gould, "Time’s Arrow, Time’s Cycle", 1987)
"An image of thought called philosophy has been formed historically and it effectively stops people from thinking." (Gilles Deleuze,"Dialogues II", 1987)
"It is generally recognized that it is dangerous to apply any part of science without understanding what is behind the theory. This is especially true in the field of probability since in practice there is not a single agreed upon model of probability, but rather there are many widely different models of varying degrees of relevance and reliability. Thus the philosophy behind probability should not be neglected by presenting a nice set of postulates and then going forward; even the simplest applications of probability can involve the underlying philosophy." (Richard W Hamming, "The Art of Probability for Scientists and Engineers", 1991)
"The philosophy of mathematics is the branch of philosophy whose task is to reflect on, and account for the nature of mathematics. [...] The role of the philosophy of mathematics is to provide a systematic and absolutely secure foundation for mathematical knowledge, that is for mathematical truth." (Paul Ernest, "The Philosophy of Mathematics Education", 1991)
"Philosophy, art, and science are not the mental objects of an objectified brain but the three aspects under which the brain becomes subject." (Gilles Deleuze, What is Philosophy?", 1991)
"Systems philosophy brings forth a reorganization of ways of thinking. It creates a new worldview, a new paradigm of perception and explanation, which is manifested in integration, holistic thinking, purpose-seeking, mutual causality, and process-focused inquiry." (Béla H Bánáthy, "Systems Design of Education", 1991)
"To find the simple in the complex, the finite in the infinite - that is not a bad description of the aim and essence of mathematics. (Jacob T Schwartz, "Discrete Thoughts: Essays on Mathematics, Science, and Philosophy", 1992)
"I believe that philosophy is part of literature, and not the reverse. Writing is not possible without images. Yet, images don't have to be descriptive; they can be concepts […]. Concepts are mental images." (Paul Virilio, [interview with Louise Wilson] 1994)
"Clearly, science is not simply a matter of observing facts. Every scientific theory also expresses a worldview. Philosophical preconceptions determine where facts are sought, how experiments are designed, and which conclusions are drawn from them." (Nancy R Pearcey & Charles B. Thaxton, "The Soul of Science: Christian Faith and Natural Philosophy", 1994)
"At the very least (there is certainly more), cybernetics implies a new philosophy about (1) what we can know, (2) about what it means for something to exist, and (3) about how to get things done. Cybernetics implies that knowledge is to be built up through effective goal-seeking processes, and perhaps not necessarily in uncovering timeless, absolute, attributes of things, irrespective of our purposes and needs." (Jeff Dooley, "Thoughts on the Question: What is Cybernetics", 1995)
"[P]art of the job of the philosopher is to keep at a certain critical distance from current doctrines, whether in the sciences or the arts, and to examine instead how the various elements in our world-view clash, or fit together." (John Cottingham, "Western Philosophy: An anthology", 1996)
"The controversy between those who think mathematics is discovered and those who think it is invented may run and run, like many perennial problems of philosophy. Controversies such as those between idealists and realists, and between dogmatists and sceptics, have already lasted more than two and a half thousand years. I do not expect to be able to convert those committed to the discovery view of mathematics to the inventionist view." (Paul Ernst, "Is Mathematics Discovered or Invented", 1996)
"The philosophy of mathematics is neither mathematics nor a subset of mathematics. It is a field of study which reflects on mathematics from the outside. It is one of a number of metatheories of mathematics, which also include the sociology, history, psychology, and anthropology of mathematics as well as mathematics education." (Paul Ernest, "Social Constructivism as a Philosophy of Mathematics", 1998)
"Despite being partly familiar to all, because of these contradictory aspects, mathematics remains an enigma and a mystery at the heart of human culture. It is both the language of the everyday world of commercial life and that of an unseen and perfect virtual reality. It includes both free-ranging ethereal speculation and rock-hard certainty. How can this mystery be explained? How can it be unraveled? The philosophy of mathematics is meant to cast some light on this mystery: to explain the nature and character of mathematics. However this philosophy can be purely technical, a product of the academic love of technique expressed in the foundations of mathematics or in philosophical virtuosity. Too often the outcome of philosophical inquiry is to provide detailed answers to the how questions of mathematical certainty and existence, taking for granted the received ideology of mathematics, but with too little attention to the deeper why questions." (Paul Ernest, "Social Constructivism as a Philosophy of Mathematics", 1998)
"Metaphysics in philosophy is, of course, supposed to characterize what is real - literally real. The irony is that such a conception of the real depends upon unconscious metaphors." (George Lakoff, "Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and its Challenge to Western Thought", 1999)
"[…] philosophical theories are structured by conceptual metaphors that constrain which inferences can be drawn within that philosophical theory. The (typically unconscious) conceptual metaphors that are constitutive of a philosophical theory have the causal effect of constraining how you can reason within that philosophical framework." (George Lakoff, "Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and its Challenge to Western Thought", 1999)
"One might think this means that imaginary numbers are just a mathematical game having nothing to do with the real world. From the viewpoint of positivist philosophy, however, one cannot determine what is real. All one can do is find which mathematical models describe the universe we live in. It turns out that a mathematical model involving imaginary time predicts not only effects we have already observed but also effects we have not been able to measure yet nevertheless believe in for other reasons. So what is real and what is imaginary? Is the distinction just in our minds?" (Stephen W Hawking, "The Universe in a Nutshell", 2001).
"An opportunity for cybernetics to change the course of the philosophy of mind was missed when intentionality was misinterpreted as 'the providing of coded knowledge'." (Igor Aleksander, New Scientist Vol. 169, 2001)
"Elegance and simplicity should remain important criteria in judging mathematics, but the applicability and consequences of a result are also important, and sometimes these criteria conflict. I believe that some fundamental theorems do not admit simple elegant treatments, and the proofs of such theorems may of necessity be long and complicated. Our standards of rigor and beauty must be sufficiently broad and realistic to allow us to accept and appreciate such results and their proofs. As mathematicians we will inevitably use such theorems when it is necessary in the practice our trade; our philosophy and aesthetics should reflect this reality." (Michael Aschbacher, "Highly complex proofs and implications", 2005)
"Mathematics is not a matter of ‘anything goes,’ and every mathematician is guided by explicit or unspoken assumptions as to what counts as legitimate – whether we choose to view these assumptions as the product of birth, experience, indoctrination, tradition, or philosophy. At the same time, mathematicians are primarily problem solvers and theory builders, and answer first and foremost to the internal exigencies of their subject." (Jeremy Avigad, "Methodology and Metaphysics in the Development of Dedekind’s Theory of Ideals", 2006)
"Mental models are mental representations of a certain type. The main problem in the philosophy of mental representation is to characterize the relation between a mental representation and the represented object. Naively speaking, a mental representation is an entity that 'stands for' another—the represented object - , but here 'stands for' is just a metaphoric place-holder for 'represents', thus requires further explanation." (Carsten Held et al, "Mental Models and the Mind", 2006)
"Thinking in models has enormous advantages for us as a species, in representing the unknowable world in a form in which we can locate ourselves and with which we can engage. But it also has disadvantages for us whether as natural scientists, psychoanalytic theorists, practising analysts, or simply as individuals. We can become in Wittgenstein’s phrase the fly in the ‘fly bottle’ of our own model, with its own language from which philosophy might have a part to play in rescuing us." (Ronald Britton, "Between Mind and Brain: Models of the mind and models in the mind", 2015)
"Different models are both competitive and complementary. Their standing will depend on their benefits in practice. If philosophy of mathematics were seen as modeling rather than as taking positions, it might consider paying attention to mathematics research and mathematics teaching as testing grounds for its models." (Reuben Hersh, "Mathematics as an Empirical Phenomenon, Subject to Modeling", 2017)
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