🪷On Mind: Mental Models VI

“The intellectual capacity thinks the forms in the phantasmata (mental images) […] And for the following reason, as without having perceptual awareness no one could either learn or understand anything, so when one engages in intellectual activity one must at that time do so by means of a phantasma. For, phantasmata are just as perceptual states (aisthemata) are [in actual external perception] but without matter.” (Aristotle, “De Anima” III, cca. 350 BC)

“Nor is it enough to say that the intelligible notions formed by the active intellect subsist somehow in the phantasmata (mental image), which are certainly intrinsic to us; for as we have already observed in treating the passive intellect, objects only become actually intelligible when abstracted from phantasmata; so that merely by way of the phantasmata, we cannot attribute the work of the active intellect to ourselves” (St. Thomas Aquinas, “De Anima” III, cca. 1268) [On Aristotle's phantasmata]

“From all this I am beginning to have a rather better understanding of what I am. But it still appears - and I cannot stop thinking this - that the corporeal things of which images are formed in my thought, and which the senses investigate, are known with much more distinctness than this puzzling 'I' which cannot be pictured in the imagination.” (René Descartes, “Meditations” II, 1641)

“For after the object is removed, or the eye shut, we still retain an image of the thing seen, though more obscure than when we see it. And this is it the Latins call imagination, from the image made in seeing, and apply the same, though improperly, to all the other senses. But the Greeks call it fancy, which signifies appearance, and is as proper to one sense as to another. IMAGINATION, therefore, is nothing but decaying sense; and is found in men and many other living creatures, as well sleeping as waking.” (Thomas Hobbes, “Leviathan: The Matter, Form and Power of a Commonwealth  Ecclesiastical and Civil”, 1651)

“It is also only by virtue of the continual action of God upon us that we have in our soul the ideas of all things; that is to say, since every effect expresses its cause, the essence of our soul is a certain expression, imitation or image of the divine essence, thought, and will and of all the ideas which are comprised in God.“ (Gottfried W Leibniz, “Discourse on Metaphysics”, 1686)

“As in a block of marble all possible figures are potentially contained in it, and can be drawn out of it by the movement or by the action of the chisel, so in the same way all intelligible figures are potentially in intelligible extension and are discovered in it according to the different ways in which this extension is represented to the mind, as a consequence of the general laws which God has established according to which he continuously acts in us. “ (Nicolas Malebranche , “Dialogues On Metaphysics And Religion”, 1688)

“But to form the idea of an object, and to form an idea simply is the same thing; the reference of the idea to an object being an extraneous denomination, of which in itself it bears no mark or character. Now as it is impossible to form an idea of an object, that is possessed of quantity and quality, and yet is possessed of no precise degree of either; it follows, that there is an equal impossibility of forming an idea, that is not limited and confined in both these particulars. Abstract ideas are therefore in themselves individual, however they may become general in their representation. The image in the mind is only that of a particular object, though the application of it in our reasoning be the same, as if it were universal.” (David Hume, “Treatise of Human Nature”, 1738)

“While all that we have is a relation of phenomena, a mental image, as such, in juxtaposition with or soldered to a sensation, we can not as yet have assertion or denial, a truth or a falsehood. We have mere reality, which is, but does not stand for anything, and which exists, but by no possibility could be true. […] the image is not a symbol or idea. It is itself a fact, or else the facts eject it. The real, as it appears to us in perception, connects the ideal suggestion with itself, or simply expels it from the world of reality. […] you possess explicit symbols all of which are universal and on the other side you have a mind which consists of mere individual impressions and images, grouped by the laws of a mechanical attraction.” (Francis H Bradley, "Principles of Logic", 1883)

“Memory-images, it is true, cannot be directly aroused through external sense impressions, but follow them after a longer or shorter interval. Still, it is obvious that their attributes, and especially their relation to the primary ideas through direct impressions, can be most accurately be learned, not by waiting for their chance arrival, but by using such memory-ideas as may be aroused in a systematic, experimental way, through immediately preceding impressions.” (Wilhelm M Wundt, “Outlines of Psychology”, 1897)

“In perception, a knowledge forms itself slowly; in the [mental] image the knowledge is immediate. We see now that the image is a synthetic act which unites a concrete, nonimagined, knowledge to elements which are more actually representative. The image teaches nothing: it is organized exactly like the objects which do produce knowledge, but it is complete at the very moment of its appearance. […] Thus, the object presents itself in the image as having to be apprehended in a multiplicity of synthetic acts. Due to this fact, and because its content retains a sensible opacity, like a phantom, because it does not involve either essences or generating laws but only an irrational quality, it gives the impression of being an object of observation: from this point of view the image appears to be more like a perception than a concept.” (Jean-Paul Sartre, “The Psychology of Imagination”, 1940)

See also:
Mental Models I, II, III, IV, V, VII, VIII

🪷On Mind: Mental Models V

"He [Simonides] inferred that persons desiring to train this faculty [of memory] must select places and form mental images of the things they wish to remember and store those images in the places, so that the order of the places will preserve the order of the things, and the images of the things will denote the things themselves, and we shall employ the places and images respectively as a wax writing-tablet and the letters written on it." (Marcus Tullius Cicero [cited in Yates 1966], “De Oratore”, 55 BC)

“For the Mind feels those things that it conceives in understanding no less than those it has in the memory. For the eyes of the mind, by which it sees and observes things, are demonstrations [descriptions] themselves.” (Baruch Spinoza, “Ethics, Demonstrated in Geometrical Order”, 1677)

“One says of a person who has travelled much, that he has seen the world. to the knowledge of the world than just seeing it. Whoever wants to must draw up a plan beforehand and must not just regard the world senses.” (Immanuel Kant “Physische Geographie” [Physical Geography], 1802)

“Acting is the physical representation of a mental picture and the projection of an emotional concept.” (Laurette Taylor, “The Quality You Need Most”, Green Book Magazine, 1914)

“The conception of lines of force was introduced by Faraday to form a mental picture of the processes going on in the electric field. To him these lines were not mere mathematical abstractions. He ascribed to them properties that gave them a real physical significance.” (Hendrik van der Bijl, “The Thermionic Vacuum Tube and Its Applications”, 1920)

“A geometrical-physical theory as such is incapable of being directly pictured, being merely a system of concepts. But these concepts serve the purpose of bringing a multiplicity of real or imaginary sensory experiences into connection in the mind. To ‘visualise’ a theory, or bring it home to one's mind, therefore means to give a representation to that abundance of experiences for which the theory supplies the schematic arrangement” (Albert Einstein, “Geometry and Experience”, 1921)

“[…] learning consists not in stimulus-response connections but in the building up in the nervous system of sets which function like cognitive maps […] such cognitive maps may be usefully characterized as varying from a narrow strip variety to a broader comprehensive variety.” (Edward C Tolman, "Cognitive maps in rats and men", 1948)

"We never have any understanding of any subject matter except in terms of our own mental constructs of ‘things’ and ‘happenings’ of that subject matter.” (Douglas T Ross, "Structured analysis (SA): A language for communicating ideas", IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering Vol. 3 No. 1, 1977)

“I often told the fanatics of realism that there is no such thing as realism in art: it only exists in the mind of the observer. Art is a symbol, a thing conjuring up reality in our mental image. That is why I don't see any contradiction between abstract and figurative art either.” (Antoni Tàpies, “Tàpies, Werke auf Papier 1943 – 2003”, 2004)

“A conceptual model is a mental image of a system, its components, its interactions. It lays the foundation for more elaborate models, such as physical or numerical models. A conceptual model provides a framework in which to think about the workings of a system or about problem solving in general. An ensuing operational model can be no better than its underlying conceptualization.” (Henry N Pollack, “Uncertain Science … Uncertain World”, 2005)

See also:
Mental Models I, II, III, IV, VI, VII, VIII

🪷On Mind: Mental Models IV (Limitations I)

“However, and conversely, our models fall far short of representing the world fully. That is why we make mistakes and why we are regularly surprised. In our heads, we can keep track of only a few variables at one time. We often draw illogical conclusions from accurate assumptions, or logical conclusions from inaccurate assumptions. Most of us, for instance, are surprised by the amount of growth an exponential process can generate. Few of us can intuit how to damp oscillations in a complex system.” (Donella H Meadows, “Limits to Growth”, 1972)

"The problem with mental models lie not in whether they are right or wrong - by definition, all models are simplifications. The problem with mental models arise when they become implicit - when they exist below the level of our awareness. “[…] models, if unexamined, limit an organization's range of actions to what is familiar and comfortable. [...] Each person's mental model focuses on different parts of the system. Each emphasizes different cause-effect chains. This makes it virtually impossible for a shared picture of the system as a whole to emerge in normal conversation." (Peter Senge, “The Fifth Discipline”, 1990)

“Mental models are the images, assumptions, and stories which we carry in our minds of ourselves, other people, institutions, and every aspect of the world. Like a pane of glass framing and subtly distorting our vision, mental models determine what we see. Human beings cannot navigate through the complex environments of our world without cognitive ‘mental maps’; and all of these mental maps, by definition, are flawed in some way.” (Peter M Senge et al, “The Fifth Discipline Fieldbook: Strategies and Tools for Building a Learning Organization”, 1994)

“What are the models? Well, the first rule is that you’ve got to have multiple models - because if you just have one or two that you’re using, the nature of human psychology is such that you’ll torture reality so that it fits your models, or at least you’ll think it does.” (Charles Munger, 1994)

"Our generational perspective contributes to the mental models we hold about ourselves, the world, and the way things ‘should’ be. These beliefs create blind spots that can become our undoing as we pursue our values and seek to accomplish our goals. Likewise, they can have a powerful effect on our culture.” (Deborah Gilburg, “Empowering Multigenerational Collaboration in the Workplace”, The Systems Thinker Vol. 18 No. 4, 2007)

“[…] our mental models fail to take into account the complications of the real world - at least those ways that one can see from a systems perspective. It is a warning list. Here is where hidden snags lie. You can’t navigate well in an interconnected, feedback-dominated world unless you take your eyes off short-term events and look for long-term behavior and structure; unless you are aware of false boundaries and bounded rationality; unless you take into account limiting factors, nonlinearities and delays. You are likely to mistreat, misdesign, or misread systems if you don’t respect their properties of resilience, self-organization, and hierarchy.” (Donella H Meadows, “Thinking in Systems: A Primer”, 2008)

“The discrepancy between our mental models and the real world may be a major problem of our times; especially in view of the difficulty of collecting, analyzing, and making sense of the unbelievable amount of data to which we have access today.” (Ugo Bardi, “The Limits to Growth Revisited”, 2011)

🪷On Mind: Mental Models III

"Theories usually result from the precipitate reasoning of an impatient mind which would like to be rid of phenomena and replace them with images, concepts, indeed often with mere words." (Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, "Maxims and Reflections", 1833) 

“Everything we think we know about the world is a model. Every word and every language is a model. All maps and statistics, books and databases, equations and computer programs are models. So are the ways I picture the world in my head - my mental models. None of these is or ever will be the real world. […] Our models usually have a strong congruence with the world. That is why we are such a successful species in the biosphere. Especially complex and sophisticated are the mental models we develop from direct, intimate experience of nature, people, and organizations immediately around us.” (Donella Meadows, “Limits to Growth”, 1972)

“Concepts are inventions of the human mind used to construct a model of the world. They package reality into discrete units for further processing, they support powerful mechanisms for doing logic, and they are indispensable for precise, extended chains of reasoning. […] A mental model is a cognitive construct that describes a person's understanding of a particular content domain in the world.” (John Sown, “Conceptual Structures: Information Processing in Mind and Machine”, 1984)

“We construct mental models that provide us with situations in which we can interact with mental objects that represent objects, properties and relations and that behave in ways that simulate the objects, properties and relations that our models represent. […] The concepts and principles that a person understands, in this sense, are embedded in the kinds of objects that he or she includes in mental models and in the ways in which those objects behave, including how they combine and separate to form other objects.” (James G Greeno, “Number sense as situated knowing in a conceptual domain”, Journal for Research on Mathematics Education Vol. 22 No. 3, 1991)

“A mental model is conceived […] as a knowledge structure possessing slots that can be filled not only with empirically gained information but also with ‘default assumptions’ resulting from prior experience. These default assumptions can be substituted by updated information so that inferences based on the model can be corrected without abandoning the model as a whole. Information is assimilated to the slots of a mental model in the form of ‘frames’ which are understood here as ‘chunks’ of knowledge with a well-defined meaning anchored in a given body of shared knowledge.” (Jürgen Renn, “Before the Riemann Tensor: The Emergence of Einstein’s Double Strategy”, “The Universe of General Relativity” Ed. by A.J. Kox & Jean Eisenstaedt, 2005)

“Mental models can be literal representations of the external world (as they often are with visual imagery) or arbitrary representations (as they are with propositional, mathematical, or verbal models). In either case, they are explanatory or descriptive representations of the external world.” (Gregory J Feist, “The Psychology of Science and the Origins of the Scientific Mind”, 2006)

“Mental models reflect the beliefs, values, and assumptions that we personally hold, and they underlie our reasons for doing things the way we do.” (Kambiz E Maani & Robert Y Cavana, “Systems Methodology”, The Systems Thinker Vol. 18 No. 8, 2007)

“All models (whether mental or those turned into computer maps/models) are developed using a particular lens of what we value - what we think is important to understand, or what performance we wish to develop or improve. Although organizations can build forum models focusing on the performance measure du jour, they would be well advised to use a systemic or integral framework for what to include.” (Peggy Holman et al, “The Change Handbook”, 2007)

"[...] a model is a tool for taking decisions and any decision taken is the result of a process of reasoning that takes place within the limits of the human mind. So, models have eventually to be understood in such a way that at least some layer of the process of simulation is comprehensible by the human mind. Otherwise, we may find ourselves acting on the basis of models that we don’t understand, or no model at all.” (Ugo Bardi, “The Limits to Growth Revisited”, 2011)

See also:
Mental Models I, II, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII

🗼On Philosophy of Science: On Mathematical Models (1970-1979)

"This distinction between regular and catastrophic points is obviously somewhat arbitrary because it depends on the fineness of the observation used. One might object, not without reason, that each point is catastrophic to sufficiently sensitive observational techniques. This is why the distinction is an idealization, to be made precise by a mathematical model, and to this end we summarize some ideas of qualitative dynamics." (René F Thom, "Structural Stability and Morphogenesis", 1972)

"[...] a system is represented by a mathematical model which may take many forms, such as algebraic equations, finite state machines, difference equations, ordinary differential equations, partial differential equations, and functional equations. The system model may be uncertain, as the mathematical model may not be known completely." (Fred C Scweppe, "Uncertain dynamic systems", 1973)

"Modeling is definitely the most important and critical problem. If the mathematical model is not valid, any subsequent analysis, estimation, or control study is meaningless. The development of the model in a convenient form can greatly reduce the complexity of the actual studies. (Fred C Scweppe, "Uncertain dynamic systems", 1973)

"System theory is a tool which engineers use to help them design the 'best' system to do the job that must be done. A dominant characteristic of system theory is the interest in the analysis and design (synthesis) of systems from an input-output point of view. System theory uses mathematical manipulation of a mathematical model to help design the actual system." (Fred C Scweppe, "Uncertain dynamic systems", 1973)

"The pre-eminence of astronomy rests on the peculiarity that it can be treated mathematically; and the progress of physics, and most recently biology, has hinged equally on finding formulations of their laws that can be displayed as mathematical models." (Jacob Bronowski, "The Ascent of Man", 1973)

"Specifically, it seems to me preferable to use, systematically: 'random' for that which is the object of the theory of probability […]; I will therefore say random process, not stochastic process. 'stochastic' for that which is valid 'in the sense of the calculus of probability': for instance; stochastic independence, stochastic convergence, stochastic integral; more generally, stochastic property, stochastic models, stochastic interpretation, stochastic laws; or also, stochastic matrix, stochastic distribution, etc. As for 'chance', it is perhaps better to reserve it for less technical use: in the familiar sense of'by chance', 'not for a known or imaginable reason', or (but in this case we should give notice of the fact) in the sense of, 'with equal probability' as in 'chance drawings from an urn', 'chance subdivision', and similar examples." (Bruno de Finetti, "Theory of Probability", 1974)

"Thus, the construction of a mathematical model consisting of certain basic equations of a process is not yet sufficient for effecting optimal control. The mathematical model must also provide for the effects of random factors, the ability to react to unforeseen variations and ensure good control despite errors and inaccuracies." (Yakov Khurgin, "Did You Say Mathematics?", 1974)

"Today, science in a number of cases is able to indicate the rules or, as the accepted term is, the strategy for making the best (or a sufficiently good) decision. Under other circumstances, there is no such strategy, but there are certain recommendations on how to pose questions in a more reasonable fashion, how to construct a suitable mathematical model of the situation and how to study the model." (Yakov Khurgin, "Did You Say Mathematics?", 1974)

"The accounting methods based on mathematical models, the use of computers for computations and information data processing make up only one part of the control mechanism, another part is the control structure." (Leonid V Kantorovich, "Mathematics in Economics: Achievements, Difficulties, Perspectives", [Nobel lecture] 1975)

"A cognitive map is a particular kind of mathematical model of a person's belief system; in actual practice, cognitive maps are derived from assertions of beliefs. [...] Like all mathematical models, a cognitive map can be useful in two quite distinct ways: as a normative model and as an empirical model. Interpreted as a normative model, a cognitive map makes no claims to reflect accurately how a person deduces new beliefs from old ones, how he makes decisions, and so on, but instead claims to show how he should do these things. Interpreted as an empirical model, a cognitive map claims to indicate how a person actually does perform certain cognitive operations, in the sense that the results of the various operations that are possible with the model do, in fact, correspond to the behavior of the per son who is being modeled." (Robert M Axelrod, "Structure of Decision: The cognitive maps of political elites", 1976)

"A mathematical model is a tremendous simplification of what it represents. But it does not simplify everything about its object, or there would be nothing left to model. Instead, it simplifies everything that is not to be examined, and leaves in the model what is to be examined." (Robert M Axelrod, "Structure of Decision: The cognitive maps of political elites", 1976)

"To use set theory in the way it is used by modern mathematics, however, it is not at all necessary to force one's imagination and try to picture actual infinity. The 'sets' which are used in mathematics are simply symbols, linguistic objects used to construct models of reality. The postulated attributes of these objects correspond partially to intuitive concepts of aggregateness and potential infinity; therefore intuition helps to some extent in the development of set theory, but sometimes it also deceives. Each new mathematical (linguistic) object is defined as a 'set' constructed in some particular way. This definition has no significance for relating the object to the external world, that is for interpreting it: it is needed only to coordinate it with the frame of mathematics, to mesh the internal wheels of mathematical models. So the language of set theory is in fact a metalanguage in relation to the language of contentual mathematics, and in this respect it is similar to the language of logic. If logic is the theory of proving mathematical statements, then set theory is the theory of constructing mathematical linguistic objects." (Valentin F Turchin, "The Phenomenon of Science: a cybernetic approach to human evolution", 1977)

"A mathematical model is any complete and consistent set of mathematical equations which are designed to correspond to some other entity, its prototype. The prototype may be a physical, biological, social, psychological or conceptual entity, perhaps even another mathematical model." (Rutherford Aris, "Mathematical Modelling", 1978)

"A model […] is a story with a specified structure: to explain this catch phrase is to explain what a model is. The structure is given by the logical and mathematical form of a set of postulates, the assumptions of the model. The structure forms an uninterpreted system, in much the way the postulates of a pure geometry are now commonly regarded as doing. The theorems that follow from the postulates tell us things about the structure that may not be apparent from an examination of the postulates alone." (Allan Gibbard & Hal R. Varian, "Economic Models", The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 75, No. 11, 1978)

"The unfoldings are called catastrophes because each of them has regions where a dynamic system can jump suddenly from one state to another, although the factors controlling the process change continuously. Each of the seven catastrophes represents a pattern of behavior determined only by the number of control factors, not by their nature or by the interior mechanisms that connect them to the system's behavior. Therefore, the elementary catastrophes can be models for a wide variety of processes, even those in which we know little about the quantitative laws involved." (Alexander Woodcock & Monte Davis, "Catastrophe Theory", 1978)

"Game theory is a collection of mathematical models designed to study situations involving conflict and/or cooperation. It allows for a multiplicity of decision makers who may have different preferences and objectives. Such models involve a variety of different solution concepts concerned with strategic optimization, stability, bargaining, compromise, equity and coalition formation." (Notices of the American Mathematical Society Vol. 26 (1), 1979)

🗼On Philosophy of Science: Are All Models Wrong?

"[…] no models are [true] = not even the Newtonian laws. When you construct a model you leave out all the details which you, with the knowledge at your disposal, consider inessential. […] Models should not be true, but it is important that they are applicable, and whether they are applicable for any given purpose must of course be investigated. This also means that a model is never accepted finally, only on trial." (Georg Rasch, "Probabilistic Models for Some Intelligence and Attainment Tests", 1960)

"Celestial navigation is based on the premise that the Earth is the center of the universe. The premise is wrong, but the navigation works. An incorrect model can be a useful tool." (R A J Phillips, "A Day in the Life of Kelvin Throop", Analog Science Fiction and Science Fact, Vol. 73 No. 5, 1964)

"A mathematical model is neither an hypothesis nor a theory. Unlike the scientific hypothesis, a model is not verifiable directly by experiment. For all models are both true and false. Almost any plausible proposed relation among aspects of nature is likely to be true in the sense that it occurs (although rarely and slightly). Yet all models leave out a lot and are in that sense false, incomplete, inadequate. The validation of a model is not that it is 'true' but that it generates good testable hypotheses relevant to important problems. A model may be discarded in favor of a more powerful one, but it usually is simply outgrown when the live issues are not any longer those for which it was designed." (Richard Levins, "The Strategy of Model Building in Population Biology", American Scientist 54(4), 1966)

"Since all models are wrong the scientist cannot obtain a ‘correct’ one by excessive elaboration. On the contrary following William of Occam he should seek an economical description of natural phenomena. Just as the ability to devise simple but evocative models is the signature of the great scientist so overelaboration and overparameterization is often the mark of mediocrity." (George Box, "Science and Statistics", Journal of the American Statistical Association 71, 1976)

"A model of the universe does not require faith, but a telescope. If it is wrong, it is wrong." (Paul C W Davies, "Space and Time in the Modern Universe", 1977)

"Competent scientists do not believe their own models or theories, but rather treat them as convenient fictions. […] The issue to a scientist is not whether a model is true, but rather whether there is another whose predictive power is enough better to justify movement from today's fiction to a new one." (Steve Vardeman," Comment", Journal of the American Statistical Association 82, 1987)

"The fact that [the model] is an approximation does not necessarily detract from its usefulness because models are approximations. All models are wrong, but some are useful." (George Box, 1987)

"Statistical models for data are never true. The question whether a model is true is irrelevant. A more appropriate question is whether we obtain the correct scientific conclusion if we pretend that the process under study behaves according to a particular statistical model." (Scott Zeger, "Statistical reasoning in epidemiology", American Journal of Epidemiology, 1991)

"[…] it does not seem helpful just to say that all models are wrong. The very word model implies simplification and idealization. The idea that complex physical, biological or sociological systems can be exactly described by a few formulae is patently absurd. The construction of idealized representations that capture important stable aspects of such systems is, however, a vital part of general scientific analysis and statistical models, especially substantive ones, do not seem essentially different from other kinds of model." (David Cox, "Comment on ‘Model uncertainty, data mining and statistical inference’", Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series A 158, 1995)

"I do not know that my view is more correct; I do not even think that ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ are good categories for assessing complex mental models of external reality - for models in science are judged [as] useful or detrimental, not as true or false." (Stephen Jay Gould, "Dinosaur in a Haystack: Reflections in Natural History", 1995)

"No matter how beautiful the whole model may be, no matter how naturally it all seems to hang together now, if it disagrees with experiment, then it is wrong." (John Gribbin, "Almost Everyone’s Guide to Science", 1999)

"A model is a simplification or approximation of reality and hence will not reflect all of reality. […] Box noted that ‘all models are wrong, but some are useful’. While a model can never be ‘truth’, a model might be ranked from very useful, to useful, to somewhat useful to, finally, essentially useless." (Kenneth P Burnham & David R Anderson, "Model Selection and Multimodel Inference: A Practical Information-Theoretic Approach" 2nd Ed., 2005)

"You might say that there’s no reason to bother with model checking since all models are false anyway. I do believe that all models are false, but for me the purpose of model checking is not to accept or reject a model, but to reveal aspects of the data that are not captured by the fitted model." (Andrew Gelman, "Some thoughts on the sociology of statistics", 2007)

"First, we affirm that all models are wrong, some of them are useful. Since a model is an abstraction of reality, and that too only from a particular perspective, they are fundamentally wrong because they are not reality. That gives no license to models that are wrongly built - after all, two wrongs don’t make a right. So usefulness, or purpose, is what determines a model’s role, given that it is correctly formed. Models therefore have teleological value even though they are ontologically erroneous." (John Boardman & Brian Sauser, "Systems Thinking: Coping with 21st Century Problems", 2008)

"In general, when building statistical models, we must not forget that the aim is to understand something about the real world. Or predict, choose an action, make a decision, summarize evidence, and so on, but always about the real world, not an abstract mathematical world: our models are not the reality - a point well made by George Box in his oft-cited remark that "all models are wrong, but some are useful". (David Hand, "Wonderful examples, but let's not close our eyes", Statistical Science 29, 2014)

"A model is a metaphor, a description of a system that helps us to reason more clearly. Like all metaphors, models are approximations, and will never account for every last detail. A useful mantra here is: all models are wrong, but some models are useful." (James G Scott, "Statistical Modeling: A Gentle Introduction", 2017)

Models with a Twist

"Every theory of the course of events in nature is necessarily based on some process of simplification and is to some extent, therefore, a fairy tale." (Sir Napier Shaw, "Manual of Meteorology", 1932)

"The best model of a cat is a cat. Preferably the same cat." (Arturo Rosenblueth, "Philosophy of Science", 1945) [also attributed to Norbert Wiener]

"A theory has only the alternative of being right or wrong. A model has a third possibility: it may be right, but irrelevant." (Manfred Eigen, 'The Origin of Biological Information' [in “The Physicists's Conception of Nature”, Ed. by Jagdish Mehra, 1973)

"Models - in contrast to those who sat for Renoir - improve with age." (Erwin Chargaff, "Heraclitean Fire", 1978)

"A model is a work of fiction." (Nancy Cartwright, 1983) 

"Old models never die; they just fade away." (Robert M Solow, "How Did Economics Get That Way and What Way Did It Get?", Daedalus, Vol. 126, No. 1, 1997) 

"There are no surprising facts, only models that are surprised by facts; and if a model is surprised by the facts, it is no credit to that model." (Eliezer S Yudkowsky, "Quantum Explanations", 2008)

"In science, as in life, it is extremely dangerous to fall in love with beautiful models." (Vijay Pande)

"It is a paradox in mathematics and physics that we have no good model for the teaching of models." (Hartley Rogers Jr)

"Classical models tell us more than we at first can know." (Karl Popper)

"What is a model? A model is like an Austrian timetable. Austrian trains are always late. A Prussian visitor asks the Austrian conductor why they bother to print timetables. The conductor replies ‘If we did not, howwould we know how late the trains are?’" (Victor F Weisskopf)

Models in Physics

“Physics is the attempt at the conceptual construction of a model of the real world and its lawful structure.” (Albert Einstein, [letter to Moritz Schlick] 1931)

“The atomic theory plays a part in physics similar to that of certain auxiliary concepts in mathematics: it is a mathematical model for facilitating the mental reproduction of facts.” (Ernst Mach, “The Science of Mechanics” 5th Ed, 1942)

“All great discoveries in experimental physics have been due to the intuition of men who made free use of models, which were for them not products of the imagination, but representatives of real things.” (Max Born, “Physical Reality”, Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 3, 1953)

"Pedantry and sectarianism aside, the aim of theoretical physics is to construct mathematical models such as to enable us, from the use of knowledge gathered in a few observations, to predict by logical processes the outcomes in many other circumstances. Any logically sound theory satisfying this condition is a good theory, whether or not it be derived from 'ultimate' or 'fundamental' truth. It is as ridiculous to deride continuum physics because it is not obtained from nuclear physics as it would be to reproach it with lack of foundation in the Bible." (Clifford Truesdell & Walter Noll, "The Non-Linear Field Theories of Mechanics", 1965)

“The pre-eminence of astronomy rests on the peculiarity that it can be treated mathematically; and the progress of physics, and most recently biology, has hinged equally on finding formulations of their laws that can be displayed as mathematical models.” (Jacob Bronowski, “The Ascent of Man”, 1973)

“Here is one way to look at physics: the physicists are men looking for new interpretations of the Book of Nature. After each pedestrian period of normal science, they dream up a new model, a new picture, a new vocabulary, and then they announce that the true meaning of the Book has been discovered.” (Richard Rorty, “Philosophy as a Kind of Writing”, 1978)

“[…] the more you see how strangely Nature behaves, the harder it is to make a model that explains how even the simplest phenomena actually work. So theoretical physics has given up on that.” (Richard P Feynman, “QED: The Strange Theory of Light and Matter”, 1985)

“Physicists are all too apt to look for the wrong sorts of generalizations, to concoct theoretical models that are too neat, too powerful, and too clean. Not surprisingly, these seldom fit well with data. To produce a really good biological theory, one must try to see through the clutter produced by evolution to the basic mechanisms. What seems to physicists to be a hopelessly complicated process may have been what nature found simplest, because nature could build on what was already there.” (Francis H C Crick, “What Mad Pursuit?: A Personal View of Scientific Discovery”, 1988)

“Even if there is only one possible unified theory, it is just a set of rules and equations. What is it that breathes fire into the equations and makes a universe for them to describe? The usual approach of science of constructing a mathematical model cannot answer the questions of why there should be a universe for the model to describe. Why does the universe go to all the bother of existing?” (Stephen W Hawking, “A Brief History of Time: From the Big Bang to Black Holes”, 1988)

“Physicists’ models are like maps: never final, never complete until they grow as large and complex as the reality they represent.” (James Gleick, “Genius”, 1992)

On Metaphors (1800-1899)

"Metaphor [...] may be said to be the algebra of language." (Charles C Colton, "Lacon", 1820)

"The world is emblematic. Parts of speech are metaphors, because the whole of nature is a metaphor of the human mind." (Ralph W Emerson, "Nature", 1836)

"The figure of speech or of thought by which we  transfer the language and ideas of a familiar  science to one with which we are less acquainted  may be called Scientific Metaphor." (James C Maxwell, British Association for the Advancement of Science, 1871)

"These generalized forms of elementary ideas may be called metaphorical terms in the sense in which every abstract term is metaphorical. The characteristic of a truly scientific system of metaphors is that each term in its metaphorical use retains all the formal relations to the other terms of the system which it had in its original use. The method is then truly scientific - that is, not only a legitimate product of science but capable of generating science in its turn." (James C Maxwell, British Association for the Advancement of Science, 1871)

"Everything which distinguishes man from the animals depends upon this ability to volatilize perceptual metaphors in a schema, and thus to dissolve an image into a concept. For something is possible in the realm of these schemata which could never be achieved with the vivid first impressions: the construction of a pyramidal order according to castes and degrees, the creation of a new world of laws, privileges, subordinations, and clearly marked boundaries - a new world, one which now confronts that other vivid world of first impressions as more solid, more universal, better known, and more human than the immediately perceived world, and thus as the regulative and imperative world." (Friedrich Nietzsche, "On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense", 1873)

“The drive toward the formation of metaphors is the fundamental human drive, which one cannot for a single instant dispense with in thought, for one would thereby dispense with man himself.” (Friedrich Nietzsche, “On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense”, 1873)

"The various languages placed side by side show that with words it is never a question of truth, never a question of adequate expression; otherwise, there would not be so many languages. The ‘thing in itself’ (which is precisely what the pure truth, apart from any of its consequences, would be) is likewise something quite incomprehensible to the creator of language and something not in the least worth striving for. This creator only designates the relations of things to men, and for expressing these relations he lays hold of the boldest metaphors. To begin with, a nerve stimulus is transferred into an image: first metaphor. The image, in turn, is imitated in a sound: second metaphor. And each time there is a complete overleaping of one sphere, right into the middle of an entirely new and different one." (Friedrich Nietzsche, "On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense", 1873)

"The folly of mistaking a paradox for a discovery, a metaphor for a proof, a torrent of verbiage for a spring of capital truths, and oneself for an oracle, is inborn in us." (Paul Valéry, "Introduction to the Method of Leonardo da Vinci", 1895)

🪷On Mind: Mental Models II

"’Mental models’ are deeply ingrained assumptions, generalizations, or even pictures or images that influence how we understand the world and how we take action. Very often, we are not consciously aware of our mental models or the effects they have on our behavior. […] Mental models focus on the openness needed to unearth shortcomings in our present ways of seeing the world. [...] Mental models are deeply held internal images of how the world works, images that limit us to familiar ways of thinking and acting. Very often, we are not consciously aware of our mental models or the effects they have on our behavior.” (Peter Senge, “The Fifth Discipline”, 1990)

“A mental model is a knowledge structure that incorporates both declarative knowledge (e.g., device models) and procedural knowledge (e.g., procedures for determining distributions of voltages within a circuit), and a control structure that determines how the procedural and declarative knowledge are used in solving problems (e.g., mentally simulating the behavior of a circuit).” (Barbara Y White & John R Frederiksen, “Causal Model Progressions as a Foundation for Intelligent Learning Environments”, Artificial Intelligence 42, 1990)

"We all depend on models to interpret our everyday experiences. We interpret what we see in terms of mental models constructed on past experience and education. They are constructs that we use to understand the pattern of our experiences." (David Bartholomew, “What is Statistics?”, 1995)

“I do not know that my view is more correct; I do not even think that ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ are good categories for assessing complex mental models of external reality - for models in science are judged [as] useful or detrimental, not as true or false.” (Stephen Jay Gould, “Dinosaur in a Haystack: Reflections in Natural History”, 1995)

“The term mental model refers to knowledge structures utilized in the solving of problems. Mental models are causal and thus may be functionally defined in the sense that they allow a problem solver to engage in description, explanation, and prediction. Mental models may also be defined in a structural sense as consisting of objects, states that those objects exist in, and processes that are responsible for those objects’ changing states.” (Robert Hafner & Jim Stewart, “Revising Explanatory Models to Accommodate Anomalous Genetic Phenomena: Problem Solving in the ‘Context of Discovery’”, Science Education 79 (2), 1995)

“Our mental model of the way the world works must shift from images of a clockwork, machinelike universe that is fixed and determined, to the model of a universe that is open, dynamic, interconnected, and full of living qualities.” (Joseph Jaworski, “Synchronicity: The Inner Path of Leadership”, 1996)

“Science begins with the world we have to live in, accepting its data and trying to explain its laws. From there, it moves toward the imagination: it becomes a mental construct, a model of a possible way of interpreting experience. The further it goes in this direction, the more it tends to speak the language of mathematics, which is really one of the languages of the imagination, along with literature and music.” (Northrop Frye, “The Educated Imagination”, 2002)

“Each generation builds a mental picture that reflects their own understanding of this world. They construct mental tools that penetrate more and more deeply into it, so that they can explore aspects of it that were previously hidden.” (Alain Connes, “The Princeton Companion to Mathematics”, Ed. by Timothy Gowers et al, 2008)

"When a particular image appears in the mind's eye often enough it begins to connect apparently unrelated ideas leading to models and theories. […] Patterns experienced again and again become intuitions. […] Intuitive judgments are made by our use of imagery; intuition is the result of mental model building. […] The mental model used and the form of the intuition is dependent upon the question being answered." (Roger Frantz, “Two Minds”, 2005)

“We all have mental models: the lens through which we see the world that drive our responses to everything we experience. Being aware of your mental models is key to being objective.” (Elizabeth Thornton, “Learn to Be an Objective Leader without Losing Everything”, 2015)

See also:
Mental Models I, III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII