🪷On Mind: On Reasoning (1960-1869)

 "It has long been a complaint against mathematicians that they are hard to convince: but it is a far greater disqualification both for philosophy, and for the affairs of life, to be too easily convinced; to have too low a standard of proof. The only sound intellects are those which, in the first instance, set their standards of proof high. Practice in concrete affairs soon teaches them to make the necessary abatement: but they retain the consciousness, without which there is no sound practical reasoning, that in accepting inferior evidence because there is no better to be had, they do not by that acceptance raise it to completeness." (John S Mill, "An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy", 1865)

"[...] observation is the mind's support in reasoning [...]" (Claude Bernard, "An Introduction to the Study of Experimental Medicine", 1865)

"An anticipative idea or an hypothesis is, then, the necessary starting point for all experimental reasoning. Without it, we could not make any investigation at all nor learn anything; we could only pile up sterile observations. If we experiment without a preconceived idea, we should move at random […]" (Claude Bernard, "An Introduction to the Study of Experimental Medicine", 1865)

"Considered by itself, the experimental method is nothing but reasoning by whose help we methodically submit our ideas to experience, - the experience of facts." (Claude Bernard, "An Introduction to the Study of Experimental Medicine", 1865)

"Every process of what has been called Universal Geometry - the great creation of Descartes and his successors, in which a single train of reasoning solves whole classes of problems at once, and others common to large groups of them - is a practical lesson in the management of wide generalizations, and abstraction of the points of agreement from those of difference among objects of great and confusing diversity, to which the purely inductive sciences cannot furnish many superior. Even so elementary an operation as that of abstracting from the particular configuration of the triangles or other figures, and the relative situation of the particular lines or points, in the diagram which aids the apprehension of a common geometrical demonstration, is a very useful, and far from being always an easy, exercise of the faculty of generalization so strangely imagined to have no place or part in the processes of mathematics." (John S Mill, "An Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy", 1865)

"If the facts used as a basis of reasoning are ill-established or erroneous, everything will crumble or be falsified; and it is thus that errors in scientific theories most often originate in errors of fact." (Claude Bernard, "An Introduction to the Study of Experimental Medicine", 1865)

"It has long been a complaint against mathematicians that they are hard to convince: but it is a far greater disqualification both for philosophy, and for the affairs of life, to be too easily convinced; to have too low a standard of proof. The only sound intellects are those which, in the first instance, set their standards of proof high. Practice in concrete affairs soon teaches them to make the necessary abatement: but they retain the consciousness, without which there is no sound practical reasoning, that in accepting inferior evidence because there is no better to be had, they do not by that acceptance raise it to completeness." (John S Mill, "An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy", 1865)

"Speaking concretely, when we say ‘making experiments or making observations’, we mean that we devote ourselves to investigation and to research, that we make attempts and trials in order to gain facts from which the mind, through reasoning, may draw knowledge or instruction. Speaking in the abstract, when we say, ‘relying on observation and gaining experience’, we mean that observation is the mind’s support in reasoning, and experience the mind’s support in deciding, or still better, the fruit of exact reasoning applied to the interpretation of facts. Observation, then, is what shows facts; experiment is what teaches about facts and gives experience in relation to anything." (Claude Bernard, "An Introduction to the Study of Experimental Medicine", 1865)

"The degree in which each mind habitually substitutes signs for images will be, CETERIS PARIBUS [with other conditions remaining the same], the degree in which it is liable to error. This is not contradicted by the fact that mathematical, astronomical, and physical reasonings may, when complex, be carried on more successfully by the employment of signs; because in these cases the signs themselves accurately represent the abstractness of the relations. Such sciences deal only with relations, and not with objects; hence greater simplification ensures greater accuracy. But no sooner do we quit this sphere of abstractions to enter that of concrete things, than the use of symbols becomes a source of weakness. Vigorous and effective minds habitually deal with concrete images." (George H Lewes, "The Principles of Success in Literature", 1865)

"It has long been a complaint against mathematicians that they are hard to convince: but it is a far greater disqualification both for philosophy, and for the affairs of life, to be too easily convinced; to have too low a standard of proof. The only sound intellects are those which, in the first instance, set their standards of proof high. Practice in concrete affairs soon teaches them to make the necessary abatement: but they retain the consciousness, without which there is no sound practical reasoning, that in accepting inferior evidence because there is no better to be had, they do not by that acceptance raise it to completeness." (John S Mill, "An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy", 1865)

🪷On Mind: On Reasoning (1880-1889)

"[…] it must be noticed that these diagrams do not naturally harmonize with the propositions of ordinary life or ordinary logic. […] The great bulk of the propositions which we commonly meet with are founded, and rightly founded, on an imperfect knowledge of the actual mutual relations of the implied classes to one another. […] one very marked characteristic about these circular diagrams is that they forbid the natural expression of such uncertainty, and are therefore only directly applicable to a very small number of such propositions as we commonly meet with." (John Venn, "On the Diagrammatic and Mechanical Representation of Propositions and Reasonings", 1880)

"Symbolical reasoning may be said to have pretty much the same relation to ordinary reasoning that machine-labour has to manual labour. In the case of machine labour we see some ingeniously contrived arrangement of wheels, levers, &c., producing with speed and facility results which the hands of man without such aid could only accomplish slowly and with difficulty, or which they would be utterly powerless to accomplish at all. In the case of symbolical reasoning we find in an analogous manner some regular system of rules and formulae, easy to retain in the memory from their general symmetry and interdependence, economizing or superseding the labour of the brain, and enabling any ordinary mind to obtain by simple mechanical processes results which would be beyond the reach of the strongest intellect if left entirely to its own resources." (Hugh MacColl, Symbolical reasoning. Mind 5" (17), 1880)

"We endeavour to employ only symmetrical figures, such as should not only be an aid to reasoning, through the sense of sight, but should also be to some extent elegant in themselves." (John Venn, "Symbolic Logic", 1881)

"[…] in the Law of Errors we are concerned only with the objective quantities about which mathematical reasoning is ordinarily exercised; whereas in the Method of Least Squares, as in the moral sciences, we are concerned with a psychical quantity - the greatest possible quantity of advantage." (Francis Y Edgeworth, "The method of least squares", 1883)

"Our reasoning appears to become more accurate as our ignorance becomes more complete; that when we have embarked upon chaos we seem to drop down into a cosmos." (Francis Y Edgeworth, "The Philosophy of Chance", Mind Vol. 9, 1884) 

"[…] deduction consists in constructing an icon or diagram the relations of whose parts shall present a complete analogy with those of the parts of the object of reasoning, of experimenting upon this image in the imagination, and of observing the result so as to discover unnoticed and hidden relations among the parts." (Charles S Peirce, 1885)

"I call a sign which stands for something merely because it resembles it, an icon. Icons are so completely substituted for their objects as hardly to be distinguished from them. Such are the diagrams of geometry. A diagram, indeed, so far as it has a general signification, is not a pure icon; but in the middle part of our reasonings we forget that abstractness in great measure, and the diagram is for us the very thing. So in contemplating a painting, there is a moment when we lose the consciousness that it is not the thing, the distinction of the real and the copy disappears, and it is for the moment a pure dream, - not any particular existence, and yet not general. At that moment we are contemplating an icon." (Charles S Peirce, "On The Algebra of Logic : A Contribution to the Philosophy of Notation" in The American Journal of Mathematics 7, 1885)

"Observations and statistics agree in being quantities grouped about a Mean; they differ, in that the Mean of observations is real, of statistics is fictitious. The mean of observations is a cause, as it were the source from which diverging errors emanate. The mean of statistics is a description, a representative quantity put for a whole group, the best representative of the group, that quantity which, if we must in practice put one quantity for many, minimizes the error unavoidably attending such practice. Thus measurements by the reduction of which we ascertain a real time, number, distance are observations. Returns of prices, exports and imports, legitimate and illegitimate marriages or births and so forth, the averages of which constitute the premises of practical reasoning, are statistics. In short, observations are different copies of one original; statistics are different originals affording one ‘generic portrait’. Different measurements of the same man are observations; but measurements of different men, grouped round l’homme moyen, are prima facie at least statistics." (Francis Y Edgeworth, 1885)

"There is no more remarkable feature in the mathematical theory of probability than the manner in which it has been found to harmonize with, and justify, the conclusions to which mankind have been led, not by reasoning, but by instinct and experience, both of the individual and of the race. At the same time it has corrected, extended, and invested them with a definiteness and precision of which these crude, though sound, appreciations of common sense were till then devoid." (Morgan W Crofton, "Probability", Encyclopaedia Britannica 9th Ed,, 1885)

 "The theory most prevalent among teachers is that mathematics affords the best training for the reasoning powers; […] The modem, and to my mind true, theory is that mathematics is the abstract form of the natural sciences; and that it is valuable as a training of the reasoning powers, not because it is abstract, but because it is a representation of actual things." (Truman H Safford, "Mathematical Teaching and Its Modern Methods", 1886)

"There are three aspects of thinking as more or less complete stages of it. These are, conception, judgment, and reasoning. They are not to be considered three distinct acts; not even three successive stages. No one of them could occur without each of the others." (John Dewey, "Psychology", 1887) 

🪷On Mind: On Reasoning (1870-1879)

 "Ideas are substitutions which require a secondary process when what is symbolized by them is translated into the images and experiences it replaces; and this secondary process is frequently not performed at all, generally only performed to a very small extent. Let anyone closely examine what has passed in his mind when he has constructed a chain of reasoning, and he will be surprised at the fewness and faintness of the images which have accompanied the ideas." (George H Lewes "Problems of Life and Mind", 1873)

“Nor do I know any study which can compete with mathematics in general in furnishing matter for severe and continued thought. Metaphysical problems may be even more difficult; but then they are far less definite, and, as they rarely lead to any precise conclusion, we miss the power of checking our own operations, and of discovering whether we are thinking and reasoning or merely fancying and dreaming." (Isaac Todhunter,"Conflict of Studies and Other Essays", 1873)

"With Algebra we enter a new sphere, that of symbolical quantities; here letters are symbols of any values we please; all we deal with in them is the relations of equality which the letters symbolise. Although the values are changeable, jet, once assigned, they must remain fixed throughout the operation. Illogical reasoning, in philosophic as in ordinary minds, is not due to any irregularity in the normal operation, but to a departure &om the values assigned." (George H Lewes "Problems of Life and Mind", 1873)

"By deductive reasoning and calculation, we must endeavor to anticipate such new phenomena, especially those of a singular and exceptional nature, as would necessarily happen if the hypothesis be true." (William S Jevons, "The Principles of Science: A Treatise on Logic and Scientific Method", 1874) 

"Deduction is certain and infallible, in the sense that each step in deductive reasoning will lead us to some result, as certain as the law itself. But it does not follow that deduction will lead the reasoner to every result of a law or combination of laws." (William S Jevons, "The Principles of Science: A Treatise on Logic and Scientific Method", 1874)

"It must be the ground of all reasoning and inference that what is true of one thing will be true of its equivalent, and that under carefully ascertained conditions Nature repeats herself." (William S Jevons, "The Principles of Science: A Treatise on Logic and Scientific Method", 1874)

"Numerical facts, like other facts, are but the raw materials of knowledge, upon which our reasoning faculties must be exerted in order to draw forth the principles of nature. [...] Numerical precision is the soul of science [...]" (William S Jevons, "The Principles of Science: A Treatise on Logic and Scientific Method", 1874)

"There is nothing physical to be learned a priori. We have no right whatever to ascertain a single physical truth without seeking for it physically, unless it be a necessary consequence of other truths already acquired by experiment, in which case mathematical reasoning is alone requisite." (Peter G Tait, "Lectures on Some Recent Advances in Physical Science, With a Special, Lecture on Force", 1876)

"The very genius of the common geometry as a method of reasoning - a system of investigation - is, that it is but a series of observations. The figure being before the eye in actual representation, or before the mind in conception, is so closely scrutinized, that all its distinctive features are perceived; auxiliary lines are drawn" (the imagination leading in this), and a new series of inspections is made; and thus, by means of direct, simple observations, the investigation proceeds." (Edward Olney, "Mathematics", The Cyclopedia of Education, 1877