"Mere deductive logic, whether you clothe it in mathematical symbols and phraseology or whether you enlarge its scope into a more general symbolic technique, can never take the place of clear relevant initial concepts of the meaning of your symbols, and among symbols I include words. If you are dealing with nature, your meanings must directly relate to the immediate facts of observation. We have to analyse first the most general characteristics of things observed, and then the more casual contingent occurrences. There can be no true physical science which looks first to mathematics for the provision of a conceptual model. Such a procedure is to repeat the errors of the logicians of the middle-ages." (Alfred N Whitehead, "Principle of Relativity", 1922)
"The 'physical' does not mean any particular kind of reality, but a particular kind of denoting reality, namely a system of concepts in the natural sciences which is necessary for the cognition of reality. 'The physical' should not be interpreted wrongly as an attribute of one part of reality, but not of the other ; it is rather a word denoting a kind of conceptual construction, as, e.g., the markers 'geographical' or 'mathematical', which denote not any distinct properties of real things, but always merely a manner of presenting them by means of ideas." (Moritz Schlick, "Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre", 1925)
"The rule is derived inductively from experience, therefore does not have any inner necessity, is always valid only for special cases and can anytime be refuted by opposite facts. On the contrary, the law is a logical relation between conceptual constructions; it is therefore deductible from upper laws and enables the derivation of lower laws; it has as such a logical necessity in concordance with its upper premises; it is not a mere statement of probability, but has a compelling, apodictic logical value once its premises are accepted."(Ludwig von Bertalanffy, "Kritische Theorie der Formbildung", 1928)
"As perceivers we select from all the stimuli falling on our senses only those which interest us, and our interests are governed by a pattern-making tendency, sometimes called a schema." (Mary Douglas, "Purity and Danger", 1966)
"Whether or not a given conceptual model or representation of a physical system happens to be picturable, is irrelevant to the semantics of the theory to which it eventually becomes attached. Picturability is a fortunate psychological occurrence, not a scientific necessity. Few of the models that pass for visual representations are picturable anyhow. For one thing, the model may be and usually is constituted by imperceptible items such as unextended particles and invisible fields. True, a model can be given a graphic representation - but so can any idea as long as symbolic or conventional diagrams are allowed. Diagrams, whether representational or symbolic, are meaningless unless attached to some body of theory. On the other hand theories are in no need of diagrams save for psychological purposes. Let us then keep theoretical models apart from visual analogues." (Mario Bunge, "Philosophy of Physics", 1973)
"The understanding of a thing begins and ends with some conceptual model of it. The model is the better, the more accurate, and inclusive. But even rough models can be used to guide - or misguide - research." (Bunge A Mario, "Philosophy in Crisis: The Need for Reconstruction", 2001)
"A conceptual model is a mental image of a system, its components, its interactions. It lays the foundation for more elaborate models, such as physical or numerical models. A conceptual model provides a framework in which to think about the workings of a system or about problem solving in general. An ensuing operational model can be no better than its underlying conceptualization." (Henry N Pollack, "Uncertain Science … Uncertain World", 2005)
"[...] a single thing may elicit several appearances, various conceptual models of it, or several plans of action for it, depending on the subject’s abilities and interests." (Mario Bunge, "Chasing Reality: Strife over Realism", 2006)
"Although fiction is not fact, paradoxically we need some fictions, particularly mathematical ideas and highly idealized models, to describe, explain, and predict facts. This is not because the universe is mathematical, but because our brains invent or use refined and law-abiding fictions, not only for intellectual pleasure but also to construct conceptual models of reality." (Mario Bunge, "Chasing Reality: Strife over Realism", 2006)
"At all events, our world pictures may have components of all three kinds: perceptual, conceptual, and praxiological (action-theoretical). This is because there are three gates to the outer world: perception, conception, and action. However, ordinarily only one or two of them need be opened: combinations of all three, as in building a house according to a blueprint, are the exception. We may contemplate a landscape without forming either a conceptual model of it or a plan to act upon it. And we may build a theoretical model of an imperceptible thing, such as an invisible extrasolar planet, on which we cannot act." (Mario Bunge, "Chasing Reality: Strife over Realism", 2006)
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