On Symbols (1880-1889)

"Symbolical reasoning may be said to have pretty much the same relation to ordinary reasoning that machine-labour has to manual labour. In the case of machine labour we see some ingeniously contrived arrangement of wheels, levers, &c., producing with speed and facility results which the hands of man without such aid could only accomplish slowly and with difficulty, or which they would be utterly powerless to accomplish at all. In the case of symbolical reasoning we find in an analogous manner some regular system of rules and formulae, easy to retain in the memory from their general symmetry and interdependence, economizing or superseding the labour of the brain, and enabling any ordinary mind to obtain by simple mechanical processes results which would be beyond the reach of the strongest intellect if left entirely to its own resources." (Hugh MacColl, Symbolical reasoning. Mind 5 (17), 1880)

"We need a system of symbols from which every ambiguity is banned, which has a strict logical form from which the content cannot escape." (Gottlob Frege, "Über die wissenschaftliche berechtigung einer begriffsschrift", Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik 81, 1882)

"[...] without symbols we could scarcely lift ourselves to conceptual thinking. Thus, in applying the same symbol to different but similar things, we actually no longer symbolize the individual thing, but rather what [the similars] have in common: the concept. This concept is first gained by symbolizing it; for since it is, in itself, imperceptible, it requires a perceptible representative in order to appear to us." (Gottlob Frege, "Über die wissenschaftliche berechtigung einer begriffsschrift", Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik 81, 1882)

"While all that we have is a relation of phenomena, a mental image, as such, in juxtaposition with or soldered to a sensation, we can not as yet have assertion or denial, a truth or a falsehood. We have mere reality, which is, but does not stand for anything, and which exists, but by no possibility could be true. […] the image is not a symbol or idea. It is itself a fact, or else the facts eject it. The real, as it appears to us in perception, connects the ideal suggestion with itself, or simply expels it from the world of reality. […] you possess explicit symbols all of which are universal and on the other side you have a mind which consists of mere individual impressions and images, grouped by the laws of a mechanical attraction." (Francis H Bradley, "Principles of Logic", 1883)

"The steps to scientific as well as other knowledge consist in a series of logical fictions which are as legitimate as they are indispensable in the operations of thought, but whose relations to the phenomena whereof they are the partial and not unfrequently merely symbolical representations must never be lost sight of." (John Stallo, "The Concepts and Theories of Modern Physics", 1884)

"Pure mathematics proves itself a royal science both through its content and form, which contains within itself the cause of its being and its methods of proof. For in complete independence mathematics creates for itself the object of which it treats, its magnitudes and laws, its formulas and symbols." (Eduard Dillmann, "Die Mathematik die Fackelträgerin einer neuen Zeit", 1889)