"In general, one might define a complex of semantic components connected by logical constants as a concept. The dictionary of a language is then a system of concepts in which a phonological form and certain syntactic and morphological characteristics are assigned to each concept. This system of concepts is structured by several types of relations. It is supplemented, furthermore, by redundancy or implicational rules […] representing general properties of the whole system of concepts. […] At least a relevant part of these general rules is not bound to particular languages, but represents presumably universal structures of natural languages. They are not learned, but are rather a part of the human ability to acquire an arbitrary natural language." (Manfred Bierwisch, "Semantics", 1970)
"Mental models are fuzzy, incomplete, and imprecisely stated. Furthermore, within a single individual, mental models change with time, even during the flow of a single conversation. The human mind assembles a few relationships to fit the context of a discussion. As debate shifts, so do the mental models. Even when only a single topic is being discussed, each participant in a conversation employs a different mental model to interpret the subject. Fundamental assumptions differ but are never brought into the open. […] A mental model may be correct in structure and assumptions but, even so, the human mind - either individually or as a group consensus - is apt to draw the wrong implications for the future." (Jay W Forrester, "Counterintuitive Behaviour of Social Systems", Technology Review, 1971)
"The essential functions of the mind consist in understanding and in inventing, in other words, in building up structures by structuring reality." (Jean Piaget, 1971)
"A person is changed by the contingencies of reinforcement under which he behaves; he does not store the contingencies. In particular, he does not store copies of the stimuli which have played a part in the contingencies. There are no 'iconic representations' in his mind; there are no 'data structures stored in his memory'; he has no 'cognitive map' of the world in which he has lived. He has simply been changed in such a way that stimuli now control particular kinds of perceptual behavior." (Burrhus F Skinner, "About behaviorism", 1974)
"Models are not intended to either reflect or construct a single objective reality. Rather, their purpose is to simulate some aspect of a possible reality. In NLP, for instance, it is not important whether or not a model is 'true' , but rather that it is 'useful' . In fact, all models can be perceived as symbolic or metaphoric, as opposed to reflective of reality. Whether the description being used is metaphorical or literal, the usefulness of a model depends on the degree to which it allows us to move effectively to the next step in the sequence of transformations connecting deeper structures and surface structures. Instead of 'constructing' reality, models establish a set of functions that serve as a tool or a bridge between deep structures and surface structures. It is this bridge that forms our 'understanding' of reality and allows us to generate new experiences and expressions of reality." (Richard Bandler & John Grinder, "The Structure of Magic", 1975)
"The conception of the mental construction which is the fully analysed proof as being an infinite structure must, of course, be interpreted in the light of the intuitionist view that all infinity is potential infinity: the mental construction consists of a grasp of general principles according to which any finite segment of the proof could be explicitly constructed." (Michael Dummett, "The philosophical basis of intuitionistic logic", 1975)
"A cognitive map is a specific way of representing a person's assertions about some limited domain, such as a policy problem. It is designed to capture the structure of the person's causal assertions and to generate the consequences that follow front this structure. […] a person might use his cognitive map to derive explanations of the past, make predictions for the future, and choose policies in the present." (Robert M Axelrod, "Structure of Decision: The cognitive maps of political elites", 1976)
"Owing to his lack of knowledge, the ordinary man cannot attempt to resolve conflicting theories of conflicting advice into a single organized structure. He is likely to assume the information available to him is on the order of what we might think of as a few pieces of an enormous jigsaw puzzle. If a given piece fails to fit, it is not because it is fraudulent; more likely the contradictions and inconsistencies within his information are due to his lack of understanding and to the fact that he possesses only a few pieces of the puzzle. Differing statements about the nature of things […] are to be collected eagerly and be made a part of the individual's collection of puzzle pieces. Ultimately, after many lifetimes, the pieces will fit together and the individual will attain clear and certain knowledge." (Alan R Beals, "Strategies of Resort to Curers in South India" [contributed in Charles M. Leslie (ed.), "Asian Medical Systems: A Comparative Study", 1976])
"The cognitive map is not a picture or image which 'looks like' what it represents; rather, it is an information structure from which map-like images can be reconstructed and from which behaviour dependent upon place information can be generated." (John O'Keefe & Lynn Nadel, "The Hippocampus as a Cognitive Map", 1978)
"The evolutionary vision is agnostic in regard to systems in the universe of greater complexity than those of which human beings have clear knowledge. It recognizes aesthetic, moral, and religious ideas and experiences as a species, in this case of mental structures or of images, which clearly interacts with other species in the world's great' ecosystem." (Kenneth Boulding," Ecodynamics: A New Theory of Societal Evolution", 1978)
"The use of metaphor is one of many devices available to the scientific community to accomplish the task of accommodation of language to the causal structure of the world." (Richard Boyd, "Metaphor and theory change: what is ‘metaphor’ a metaphor for?", 1979)
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