"Especially when we investigate the general laws of Nature, induction has very great power; & there is scarcely any other method beside it for the discovery of these laws. By its assistance, even the ancient philosophers attributed to all bodies extension, figurability, mobility, & impenetrability; & to these properties, by the use of the same method of reasoning, most of the later philosophers add inertia & universal gravitation. Now, induction should take account of every single case that can possibly happen, before it can have the force of demonstration; such induction as this has no place in establishing the laws of Nature. But use is made of an induction of a less rigorous type ; in order that this kind of induction may be employed, it must be of such a nature that in all those cases particularly, which can be examined in a manner that is bound to lead to a definite conclusion as to whether or no the law in question is followed, in all of them the same result is arrived at; & that these cases are not merely a few. Moreover, in the other cases, if those which at first sight appeared to be contradictory, on further & more accurate investigation, can all of them be made to agree with the law; although, whether they can be made to agree in this way better than in any Other whatever, it is impossible to know directly anyhow. If such conditions obtain, then it must be considered that the induction is adapted to establishing the law." (Roger J Boscovich, "De Lege Continuitatis" ["On the law of continuity"], 1754)
"We think only through the medium of words. Languages are true analytical methods. Algebra, which is adapted to its purpose in every species of expression, in the most simple, most exact, and best manner possible, is at the same time a language and an analytical method. The art of reasoning is nothing more than a language well arranged." (Abbé de Condillac, "System of Logic", cca. 1781)
"The mathematician pays not the least regard either to testimony or conjecture, but deduces everything by demonstrative reasoning, from his definitions and axioms. Indeed, whatever is built upon conjecture, is improperly called science; for conjecture may beget opinion, but cannot produce knowledge." (Thomas Reid, "Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man", 1785)
"In every chain of reasoning, the evidence of the last conclusion can be no greater than that of the weakest link of the chain, whatever may be the strength of the rest." (Thomas Reid, "Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man", 1785)
"In mathematics it [sophistry] had no place from the beginning: Mathematicians having had the wisdom to define accurately the terms they use, and to lay down, as axioms, the first principles on which their reasoning is grounded. Accordingly we find no parties among mathematicians, and hardly any disputes." (Thomas Reid, "Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man", 1785)
"In metaphysical reasoning, the process is always short. The conclusion is but a step or two, seldom more, from the first principles or axioms on which it is grounded, and the different conclusions depend not one upon another.
"It is otherwise in mathematical reasoning. Here the field has no limits. One proposition leads on to another, that to a third, and so on without end. If it should be asked, why demonstrative reasoning has so wide a field in mathematics, while, in other abstract subjects, it is confined within very narrow limits, I conceive this is chiefly owing to the nature of quantity, […] mathematical quantities being made up of parts without number, can touch in innumerable points, and be compared in innumerable different ways." (Thomas Reid, "Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man", 1785)
"The mathematician pays not the least regard either to testimony or conjecture, but deduces everything by demonstrative reasoning, from his definitions and axioms. Indeed, whatever is built upon conjecture, is improperly called science; for conjecture may beget opinion, but cannot produce knowledge." (Thomas Reid, "Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man", 1785)
"The reader will find no figures in this work. The methods which I set forth do not require either constructions or geometrical or mechanical reasonings: but only algebraic operations, subject to a regular and uniform rule of procedure." (Joseph-Louis de Lagrange, "Mechanique Analytique", 1788)
"The only method of preventing such errors from taking place, and of correcting them when formed, is to restrain and simplify our reasoning as much as possible. This depends entirely upon ourselves, and the neglect of it is the only source of our mistakes." " (Antoine-Laurent de Lavoisier, "Elements of Chemistry in a New Systematic Order", 1790)
"We think only through the medium of words. Languages are true analytical methods. Algebra, which is adapted to its purpose in every species of expression, in the most simple, most exact, and best manner possible, is at the same time a language and an analytical method. The art of reasoning is nothing more than a language well arranged." (Antoine-Laurent Lavoisier,"Elements of Chemistry", 1790)
"We must trust to nothing but facts: These are presented to us by Nature, and cannot deceive. We ought, in every instance, to submit our reasoning to the test of experiment, and never to search for truth but by the natural road of experiment and observation." (Antoin-Laurent de Lavoisiere, "Elements of Chemistry", 1790)
[...] mathematicians obtain the solution of a problem by the mere arrangement of data, and by reducing their reasoning to such simple steps, to conclusions so very obvious, as never to lose sight of the evidence which guides them." (Antoine-Laurent Lavoisier, "Elements of Chemistry In a New Systematic Order", 1790)
We must trust to nothing but facts: These are presented to us by Nature, and cannot deceive. We ought, in every instance, to submit our reasoning to the test of experiment, and never to search for truth but by the natural road of experiment and observation." (Antoine Lavoisier, "Elements of Chemistry", 1790)
We ought, in every instance, to submit our reasoning to the test of experiment, and never to search for truth but by the natural road of experiment and observation." (Antoine-Laurent Lavoisier, "Elements of Chemistry in a New Systematic Order", 1790)
In mathematics, such processes [of reasoning] are much longer than in any other science; and hence the study of it is peculiarly calculated to strengthen the power of steady and concatenated thinking, - a power which, in all the pursuits of life, whether speculative or active, is one of the most valuable endowments we can possess. This command of attention, however, it may be proper to add, is to be acquired, not by the practice of modern methods, but by the study of Greek geometry, more particularly, by accustoming ourselves to pursue long trains of demonstration, without availing ourselves of the aid of any sensible diagrams; the thoughts being directed solely by those ideal delineations which the powers of conception and of memory enable us to form." (Dugald Stewart, "Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind", 1792)
"Whoever limits his exertions to the gratification of others, whether by personal exhibition, as in the case of the actor and of the mimic, or by those kinds of literary composition which are calculated for no end but to please or to entertain, renders himself, in some measure, dependent on their caprices and humours. The diversity among men, in their judgments concerning the objects of taste, is incomparably greater than in their speculative conclusions; and accordingly, a mathematician will publish to the world a geometrical demonstration, or a philosopher, a process of abstract reasoning, with a confidence very different from what a poet would feel, in communicating one of his productions even to a friend." (Dugald Stewart, "Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind", 1792)
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