"It has been said, often enough and certainly with good reason, that teaching mathematics affords a unique opportunity to teach demonstrative reasoning. I wish to add that teaching mathematics also affords an excellent opportunity to teach plausible reasoning. A student of mathematics should learn, of course, demonstrative reasoning; it is his profession and the distinctive mark of his science. Yet he should also learn plausible reasoning; this is the kind of reasoning on which his creative work will mainly depend, The general student should get a taste of demonstrative reasoning; he may have little opportunity to use it directly, but he should acquire a standard with which he can compare alleged evidence of all sorts aimed at him in modern life. He needs, however, in all his endeavors plausible reasoning. At any rate, an ambitious teacher of mathematics should teach both kinds of reasoning to both kinds of students." (George P贸lya, "On Plausible Reasoning", Proceedings of the International Congress of Mathematics, 1950)
"The bridging of the chasm between the domains of the discrete and the continuous, or between arithmetic and geometry, is one of the most important - nay, the most important - problem of the foundations of mathematics. [...] Of course, the character of reasoning has changed, but, as always, the difficulties are due to the chasm between the discrete and the continuous - that permanent stumbling block which also plays an extremely important role in mathematics, philosophy, and even physics." (Abraham Fraenkel, "Foundations of Set Theory", 1953)
"Demonstrative reasoning is safe, beyond controversy, and final. Plausible reasoning is hazardous, controversial, and provisional. Demonstrative reasoning penetrates the sciences just as far as mathematics does, but it is in itself" (as mathematics is in itself) incapable of yielding essentially new knowledge about the world around us. Anything new that we learn about the world involves plausible reasoning, which is the only kind of reasoning, for which we care in everyday affairs. Demonstrative reasoning has rigid standards, codified and clarified by logic" (formal or demonstrative logic), which is the theory of demonstrative reasoning. The standards of plausible reasoning are fluid, and there is no theory of such reasoning that could be compared to demonstrative logic in clarity or would command comparable consensus." (George P贸lya, "Mathematics and Plausible Reasoning", 1954)
"Demonstrative reasoning penetrates the sciences just as far as mathematics does, but it is in itself" (as mathematics is in itself) incapable of yielding essentially new knowledge about the world around us. Anything new that we learn about the world involves plausible reasoning, which is the only kind of reasoning for which we care in everyday affairs." (George P贸lya, "Induction and Analogy in Mathematics", 1954)
"From the outset it was clear that the two kinds of reasoning have different tasks. From the outset. they appeared very different: demonstrative reasoning as definite, final, 'machinelike'; and plausible reasoning as vague, provisional, specifically 'human'. Now we may see the difference a little more distinctly. In opposition to demonstrative inference, plausible inference leaves indeterminate a highly relevant point: the 'strength' or the 'weight' of the conclusion. This weight may depend not only on clarified grounds such as those expressed in the premises, hut also on unclarified unexpressed grounds somewhere on the background of the person who draws the conclusion. A person has a background, a machine has not. Indeed, you can build a machine to draw demonstrative conclusions for you, but I think you can never build a machine that will draw plausible inferences." (George P贸lya, "Mathematics and Plausible Reasoning", 1954)
"If you have to prove a theorem, do not rush. First of all, understand fully what the theorem says, try to see clearly what it means. Then check the theorem; it could be false. Examine the consequences, verify as many particular instances as are needed to convince yourself of the truth. When you have satisfied yourself that the theorem is true, you can start proving it." (George P贸lya, "Mathematics and plausible reasoning" Vol. 1, 1954)
"In plausible reasoning the principal thing is to distinguish... a more reasonable guess from a less reasonable guess." (George P贸lya, "Mathematics and plausible reasoning" Vol. 1, 1954)
"The result of the mathematician's creative work is demonstrative reasoning, a proof; but the proof is discovered by plausible reasoning, by guessing. If the learning of mathematics reflects to any degree the invention of mathematics, it must have a place for guessing, for plausible inference." (George P贸lya, "Mathematics and plausible reasoning" Vol. 1, 1954)
"We secure our mathematical knowledge by demonstrative reasoning, but we support our conjectures by plausible reasoning. A mathematical proof is demonstrative reasoning, but the inductive evidence of the physicist, the circumstantial evidence of the lawyer, the documentary evidence of the historian, and the statistical evidence of the economist belong to plausible reasoning." (George P贸lya, "Mathematics and Plausible Reasoning", 1954)
"You have to guess the mathematical theorem before you prove it: you have to guess the idea of the proof before you carry through the details. You have to combine observations and follow analogies: you have to try and try again. The result of the mathematician’s creative work is demonstrative reasoning, a proof; but the proof is discovered by plausible reasoning, by guessing" (George P贸lya, "Mathematics and plausible reasoning" Vol. 1, 1954)
"Science cannot be based on dogma or authority of any kind, nor on any institution or revelation, unless indeed it be of the Book of Nature that lies open before our eyes. We need not dwell on the processes of acquiring knowledge by observation, experiment, and inductive and deductive reasoning. The study of scientific method both in theory and practice is of great importance. It is inherent in the philosophy that the record may be imperfect and the conceptions erroneous; the potential fallibility of our science is not only acknowledged but also insisted upon." (Sir Robert Robinson, "Science and the Scientist", Nature Vol. 176 (4479), 1955)
"Science is not a technique or a body of knowledge, though it uses both. It is rather an attitude of inquiry, or observation and reasoning, with respect to the world. It can be developed, not by memorizing facts or juggling formulas to get an answer, but only by actual practice of scientific observation and reasoning." (Karl T Compton, [in "A Scientist Speaks: Excerpts from Addresses by Karl Taylor Compton", 1955])
"The following are some aspects of the artificial intelligence problem: […] If a machine can do a job, then an automatic calculator can be programmed to simulate the machine. […] It may be speculated that a large part of human thought consists of manipulating words according to rules of reasoning and rules of conjecture. From this point of view, forming a generalization consists of admitting a new word and some rules whereby sentences containing it imply and are implied by others. This idea has never been very precisely formulated nor have examples been worked out. […] How can a set of" (hypothetical) neurons be arranged so as to form concepts. […] to get a measure of the efficiency of a calculation it is necessary to have on hand a method of measuring the complexity of calculating devices which in turn can be done. […] Probably a truly intelligent machine will carry out activities which may best be described as self-improvement. […] A number of types of 'abstraction' can be distinctly defined and several others less distinctly. […] the difference between creative thinking and unimaginative competent thinking lies in the injection of a some randomness. The randomness must be guided by intuition to be efficient." (John McCarthy et al, "A Proposal for the Dartmouth Summer Research Project on Artificial Intelligence", 1955)
“Because intuition turned out to be deceptive in so many instances, and because propositions that had been accounted true by intuition were repeatedly proved false by logic, mathematicians became more and more skeptical of intuition. [….] Thus, a demand arose for the expulsion of intuitive reasoning and for the complete formalization of mathematics." (Hans Hahn,"The crisis in intuition", 1956)
"Nevertheless, there are three distinct types of paradoxes which do arise in mathematics. There are contradictory and absurd propositions, which arise from fallacious reasoning. There are theorems which seem strange and incredible, but which, because they are logically unassailable, must be accepted even though they transcend intuition and imagination. The third and most important class consists of those logical paradoxes which arise in connection with the theory of aggregates, and which have resulted in a re-examination of the foundations of mathematics." (James R Newman, "The World of Mathematics" Vol. III, 1956)
"The predictions of physical theories for the most part concern situations where initial conditions can be precisely specified. If such initial conditions are not found in nature, they can be arranged. Such arrangements are considerably easier to realize with inanimate than with animate matter, because the properties of animate matter are much more sensitive to being tampered with than inanimate matter. In particular, living tissue in vitro may behave quite differently than in situ. Controlled biological experiments are, of course, possible, but they are more difficult and their scope is more limited than that of physical experiments. For this reason, biology has had to depend to a greater extent than physics on theories of larger speculative scope, in which reasoning by imaginative analogy plays a more important role." (Anatol Rapoport, "The Search for Simplicity", 1956)
"Understanding mathematical logic, or the theory of relativity, is not an indispensable attribute of the cultured mind. But if one wishes to learn anything about these subjects, one must learn something. It is necessary to master the rudiments of the language, to practice a technique, to follow step by step a characteristic sequence of reasoning and to see a problem through from beginning to end." (James R Newman, "The World of Mathematics" Vol. I, 1956)
"Nature seems to take advantage of the simple mathematical representations of the symmetry laws. When one pauses to consider the elegance and the beautiful perfection of the mathematical reasoning involved and contrast it with the complex and far-reaching physical consequences, a deep sense of respect for the power of the symmetry laws never fails to develop." (Chen Ning Yang, [Nobel lecture] 1967)
"The function of mathematical logic is to reveal and codify the logical processes employed in mathematical reasoning and to clarify the concepts of mathematics; it is itself a branch of mathematics, employing mathematical symbolism and technique, a branch which has developed in its entirety during the past hundred years and which in its vigor and fecundity and the power and importance of its discoveries may well claim to be in the forefront of modern mathematics." (Reuben L Goodstein, "Mathematical Logic", 1957)
"A logic machine is a device, electrical or mechanical, designed specifically for solving problems in formal logic. A logic diagram is a geometrical method for doing the same thing. […] A logic diagram is a two-dimensional geometric figure with spatial relations that are isomorphic with the structure of a logical statement. These spatial relations are usually of a topological character, which is not surprising in view of the fact that logic relations are the primitive relations underlying all deductive reasoning and topological properties are, in a sense, the most fundamental properties of spatial structures. Logic diagrams stand in the same relation to logical algebras as the graphs of curves stand in relation to their algebraic formulas; they are simply other ways of symbolizing the same basic structure." (Martin Gardner, "Logic Machines and Diagrams", 1958)
"Mathematics is a model of exact reasoning, an absorbing challenge to the mind, an esthetic experience for creators and some students, a nightmarish experience to other students, and an outlet for the egotistic display of mental power." (Morris Kline,"Mathematics and the Physical World", 1959)
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