"The reasoning of mathematicians is founded on certain and infallible principles. Every word they use conveys a determinate idea, and by accurate definitions they excite the same ideas in the mind of the reader that were in the mind of the writer. When they have defined the terms they intend to make use of, they premise a few axioms, or self-evident principles, that every one must assent to as soon as proposed. They then take for granted certain postulates, that no one can deny them, such as, that a right line may be drawn from any given point to another, and from these plain, simple principles they have raised most astonishing speculations, and proved the extent of the human mind to be more spacious and capacious than any other science." (John Adams,"Diary", 1850)
"The discovery of truth is prevented more effectively, not by the false appearance things present and which mislead into error, not directly by weakness of the reasoning powers, but by preconceived opinion, by prejudice." (Arthur Schopenhauer, "Parerga and Paralipomena", 1851)
"Reasoning from analogy is often most plausible and most deceptive." (Charles Simmons, "A Laconic Manual and Brief Remarker", 1852)
"To deduce the laws of the symbols of Logic from a consideration of those operations of the mind which are implied in the strict use of language as an instrument of reasoning." (George Boole, "An Investigation of the Laws of Thought", 1854)
"A physical theory, like an abstract science, consists of definitions and axioms as first principles, and of propositions, their consequences; but with these differences:—first, That in an abstract science, a definition assigns a name to a class of notions derived originally from observation, but not necessarily corresponding to any existing objects of real phenomena, and an axiom states a mutual relation amongst such notions, or the names denoting them; while in a physical science, a definition states properties common to a class of existing objects, or real phenomena, and a physical axiom states a general law as to the relations of phenomena; and, secondly,—That in an abstract science, the propositions first discovered are the most simple; whilst in a physical theory, the propositions first discovered are in general numerous and complex, being formal laws, the immediate results of observation and experiment, from which the definitions and axioms are subsequently arrived at by a process of reasoning differing from that whereby one proposition is deduced from another in an abstract science, partly in being more complex and difficult, and partly in being to a certain extent tentative, that is to say, involving the trial of conjectural principles, and their acceptance or rejection according as their consequences are found to agree or disagree with the formal laws deduced immediately from observation and experiment." (William J M Rankine, "Outlines of the Science of Energetics", Proceedings of the Philosophical Society of Glasgow, 1855)
"It has long been a complaint against mathematicians that they are hard to convince: but it is a far greater disqualification both for philosophy, and for the affairs of life, to be too easily convinced; to have too low a standard of proof. The only sound intellects are those which, in the first instance, set their standards of proof high. Practice in concrete affairs soon teaches them to make the necessary abatement: but they retain the consciousness, without which there is no sound practical reasoning, that in accepting inferior evidence because there is no better to be had, they do not by that acceptance raise it to completeness." (John S Mill, "An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy", 1865)
"[...] observation is the mind's support in reasoning [...]" (Claude Bernard, "An Introduction to the Study of Experimental Medicine", 1865)
"An anticipative idea or an hypothesis is, then, the necessary starting point for all experimental reasoning. Without it, we could not make any investigation at all nor learn anything; we could only pile up sterile observations. If we experiment without a preconceived idea, we should move at random […]" (Claude Bernard, "An Introduction to the Study of Experimental Medicine", 1865)
"Considered by itself, the experimental method is nothing but reasoning by whose help we methodically submit our ideas to experience, - the experience of facts." (Claude Bernard, "An Introduction to the Study of Experimental Medicine", 1865)
"Every process of what has been called Universal Geometry - the great creation of Descartes and his successors, in which a single train of reasoning solves whole classes of problems at once, and others common to large groups of them - is a practical lesson in the management of wide generalizations, and abstraction of the points of agreement from those of difference among objects of great and confusing diversity, to which the purely inductive sciences cannot furnish many superior. Even so elementary an operation as that of abstracting from the particular configuration of the triangles or other figures, and the relative situation of the particular lines or points, in the diagram which aids the apprehension of a common geometrical demonstration, is a very useful, and far from being always an easy, exercise of the faculty of generalization so strangely imagined to have no place or part in the processes of mathematics." (John S Mill, "An Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy", 1865)
"If the facts used as a basis of reasoning are ill-established or erroneous, everything will crumble or be falsified; and it is thus that errors in scientific theories most often originate in errors of fact." (Claude Bernard, "An Introduction to the Study of Experimental Medicine", 1865)
"It has long been a complaint against mathematicians that they are hard to convince: but it is a far greater disqualification both for philosophy, and for the affairs of life, to be too easily convinced; to have too low a standard of proof. The only sound intellects are those which, in the first instance, set their standards of proof high. Practice in concrete affairs soon teaches them to make the necessary abatement: but they retain the consciousness, without which there is no sound practical reasoning, that in accepting inferior evidence because there is no better to be had, they do not by that acceptance raise it to completeness." (John S Mill, "An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy", 1865)
"Speaking concretely, when we say ‘making experiments or making observations’, we mean that we devote ourselves to investigation and to research, that we make attempts and trials in order to gain facts from which the mind, through reasoning, may draw knowledge or instruction. Speaking in the abstract, when we say, ‘relying on observation and gaining experience’, we mean that observation is the mind’s support in reasoning, and experience the mind’s support in deciding, or still better, the fruit of exact reasoning applied to the interpretation of facts. Observation, then, is what shows facts; experiment is what teaches about facts and gives experience in relation to anything." (Claude Bernard, "An Introduction to the Study of Experimental Medicine", 1865)
"The degree in which each mind habitually substitutes signs for images will be, CETERIS PARIBUS [with other conditions remaining the same], the degree in which it is liable to error. This is not contradicted by the fact that mathematical, astronomical, and physical reasonings may, when complex, be carried on more successfully by the employment of signs; because in these cases the signs themselves accurately represent the abstractness of the relations. Such sciences deal only with relations, and not with objects; hence greater simplification ensures greater accuracy. But no sooner do we quit this sphere of abstractions to enter that of concrete things, than the use of symbols becomes a source of weakness. Vigorous and effective minds habitually deal with concrete images." (George H Lewes, "The Principles of Success in Literature", 1865)
"It has long been a complaint against mathematicians that they are hard to convince: but it is a far greater disqualification both for philosophy, and for the affairs of life, to be too easily convinced; to have too low a standard of proof. The only sound intellects are those which, in the first instance, set their standards of proof high. Practice in concrete affairs soon teaches them to make the necessary abatement: but they retain the consciousness, without which there is no sound practical reasoning, that in accepting inferior evidence because there is no better to be had, they do not by that acceptance raise it to completeness." (John S Mill, "An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy", 1865)
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