On Observation (1825-1849)

 "[…] in order to observe, our mind has need of some theory or other. If in contemplating phenomena we did not immediately connect them with principles, not only would it be impossible for us to combine these isolated observations, and therefore to derive profit from them, but we should even be entirely incapable of remembering facts, which would for the most remain unnoted by us." (Auguste Comte, "Course of Positive Philosophy", 1830)

"A maxim is a conclusion upon observation of matters of fact, and is merely speculative; a ‘principle’ carries knowledge within itself, and is prospective." (Samuel T Coleridge, "The Table Talk and Omniana of Samuel Taylor Coleridge", 1831)

"In many different fields, empirical phenomena appear to obey a certain general law, which can be called the Law of Large Numbers. This law states that the ratios of numbers derived from the observation of a very large number of similar events remain practically constant, provided that these events are governed partly by constant factors and partly by variable factors whose variations are irregular and do not cause a systematic change in a definite direction." (Siméon-Denis Poisson, "Règles générales des probabilités", 1837)

"[...] the rules for establishing the probability of an observed event given the probability of its cause, which are the basis of the theory under consideration, require taking into account all the presumptions prior to the observation, if only they are thought to exist, or if proven that they are not absent." (Siméon-Denis Poisson, "Researches into the Probabilities of Judgements in Criminal and Civil Cases", 1837)

"The calculus of probability is equally applicable to things of all kinds, moral and physical and, if only in each case observations provide the necessary numerical data, it does not at all depend on their nature." (Siméon-Denis Poisson, "Researches into the Probabilities of Judgements in Criminal and Civil Cases", 1837)

"[…] in order that the facts obtained by observation and experiment may be capable of being used in furtherance of our exact and solid knowledge, they must be apprehended and analysed according to some Conception which, applied for this purpose, gives distinct and definite results, such as can be steadily taken hold of and reasoned from […]" (William Whewell, "The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences Founded Upon their History" Vol. 2, 1840)

"But a thousand unconnected observations have no more value, as a demonstrative proof, than a single one. If we do not succeed in discovering causes by our researches, we have no right to create them by the imagination; we must not allow mere fancy to proceed beyond the bounds of our knowledge."(Justus von Liebig, "The Lancet", 1844)

"The framing of hypotheses is, for the enquirer after truth, not the end, but the beginning of his work. Each of his systems is invented, not that he may admire it and follow it into all its consistent consequences, but that he may make it the occasion of a course of active experiment and observation. And if the results of this process contradict his fundamental assumptions, however ingenious, however symmetrical, however elegant his system may be, he rejects it without hesitation. He allows no natural yearning for the offspring of his own mind to draw him aside from the higher duty of loyalty to his sovereign, Truth, to her he not only gives his affections and his wishes, but strenuous labour and scrupulous minuteness of attention." (William Whewell, "Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences" Vol. 2, 1847)