On Prediction VII (Nature)

"But the most powerful proof of the reality of phenomena (a proof which is, indeed, sufficient by itself) is success in predicting future phenomena from those which are past and present, whether the prediction be founded upon the success, so far, of a reason or hypothesis, or upon custom so far observed." (Gottfried W Leibniz, "De Modo Distinguendi phenomena realia ab imaginariis" ["On the Method of Distinguishing Real from Imaginary Phenomena"], cca. 1684)

"An exceedingly small cause which escapes our notice determines a considerable effect that we cannot fail to see, and then we say the effect is due to chance. If we knew exactly the laws of nature and the situation of the universe at the initial moment, we could predict exactly the situation of that same universe at a succeeding moment. But even if it were the case that the natural laws had no longer any secret for us, we could still only know the initial situation 'approximately'. If that enabled us to predict the succeeding situation with 'the same approximation', that is all we require, and we should say that the phenomenon had been predicted, that it is governed by laws. But it is not always so; it may happen that small differences in the initial conditions produce very great ones in the final phenomena. A small error in the former will produce an enormous error in the latter. Prediction becomes impossible, and we have the fortuitous phenomenon. (Jules H Poincaré, "Science and Method", 1908)

"The world is not made up of empirical facts with the addition of the laws of nature: what we call the laws of nature are conceptual devices by which we organize our empirical knowledge and predict the future." (Richard B Braithwaite, "Scientific Explanation", 1953)

"The predictions of physical theories for the most part concern situations where initial conditions can be precisely specified. If such initial conditions are not found in nature, they can be arranged. Such arrangements are considerably easier to realize with inanimate than with animate matter, because the properties of animate matter are much more sensitive to being tampered with than inanimate matter. In particular, living tissue in vitro may behave quite differently than in situ. Controlled biological experiments are, of course, possible, but they are more difficult and their scope is more limited than that of physical experiments. For this reason, biology has had to depend to a greater extent than physics on theories of larger speculative scope, in which reasoning by imaginative analogy plays a more important role." (Anatol Rapoport, "The Search for Simplicity", 1956)

"How can it be that writing down a few simple and elegant formulae, like short poems governed by strict rules such as those of the sonnet or the waka, can predict universal regularities of Nature? Perhaps we see equations as simple because they are easily expressed in terms of mathematical notation already invented at an earlier stage of development of the science, and thus what appears to us as elegance of description really reflects the interconnectedness of Nature’s laws at different levels." (Murray Gell-Mann, 1969)

"The basis of this theory is that in nature there is an inherent uncertainty or unpredictability that manifests itself only on an atomic scale. For example, the position of a subatomic particle such as an electron may not be a well-defined concept at all; it should be envisaged as jiggling around in a random sort of a way. Energy, too, becomes a slightly nebulous concept, subject to capricious and unpredictable changes." (Paul C W Davies, "The Edge of Infinity: Where the Universe Came from and How It Will End", 1981)

"Today’s quarks and leptons can be viewed as metaphors of the underlying reality of nature, though metaphors that are objectively and rationally defied and are components of theories that have great predictive power. And that’s the difference between the metaphors of science and those of myth: scientific metaphors work." (Victor J Stenger, "Physics and Psychics: The Search for a World Beyond the Senses", 1990)

"Pedantry and sectarianism aside, the aim of theoretical physics is to construct mathematical models such as to enable us, from the use of knowledge gathered in a few observations, to predict by logical processes the outcomes in many other circumstances. Any logically sound theory satisfying this condition is a good theory, whether or not it be derived from ‘ultimate’ or ‘fundamental’ truth." (Clifford Truesdell and Walter Noll, "The Non-Linear Field Theories of Mechanics" 2nd Ed., 1992)

"I seek […] to show that - other things being equal - the simplest hypothesis proposed as an explanation of phenomena is more likely to be the true one than is any other available hypothesis, that its predictions are more likely to be true than those of any other available hypothesis, and that it is an ultimate a priori epistemic principle that simplicity is evidence for truth." (Richard Swinburne, "Simplicity as Evidence for Truth", 1997)

"[…] the simplest hypothesis proposed as an explanation of phenomena is more likely to be the true one than is any other available hypothesis, that its predictions are more likely to be true than those of any other available hypothesis, and that it is an ultimate a priori epistemic principle that simplicity is evidence for truth." (Richard Swinburne, "Simplicity as Evidence for Truth", 1997)

"Historically, science has pursued a premise that Nature can be understood fully, its future predicted precisely, and its behavior controlled at will. However, emerging knowledge indicates that the nature of Earth and biological systems transcends the limits of science, questioning the premise of knowing, prediction, and control. This knowledge has led to the recognition that, for civilized human survival, technological society has to adapt to the constraints of these systems." (Nari Narasimhan, "Limitations of Science and Adapting to Nature", Environmental Research Letters, 2007)