On Diagrams (-1899)

"It hath been an old remark, that Geometry is an excellent Logic. And it must be owned that when the definitions are clear; when the postulata cannot be refused, nor the axioms denied; when from the distinct contemplation and comparison of figures, their properties are derived, by a perpetual well-connected chain of consequences, the objects being still kept in view, and the attention ever fixed upon them; there is acquired a habit of reasoning, close and exact and methodical; which habit strengthens and sharpens the mind, and being transferred to other subjects is of general use in the inquiry after truth." (George Berkeley, "The Analyst; Or, A Discourse Addressed to an Infidel Mathematician", 1734)

"In mathematics, such processes [of reasoning] are much longer than in any other science; and hence the study of it is peculiarly calculated to strengthen the power of steady and concatenated thinking, - a power which, in all the pursuits of life, whether speculative or active, is one of the most valuable endowments we can possess. This command of attention, however, it may be proper to add, is to be acquired, not by the practice of modern methods, but by the study of Greek geometry, more particularly, by accustoming ourselves to pursue long trains of demonstration, without availing ourselves of the aid of any sensible diagrams; the thoughts being directed solely by those ideal delineations which the powers of conception and of memory enable us to form." (Dugald Stewart, "Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind", 1792)

 "[…] the speculative propositions of mathematics do not relate to facts; […] all that we are convinced of by any demonstration in the science, is of a necessary connection subsisting between certain suppositions and certain conclusions. When we find these suppositions actually take place in a particular instance, the demonstration forces us to apply the conclusion. Thus, if I could form a triangle, the three sides of which were accurately mathematical lines, I might affirm of this individual figure, that its three angles are equal to two right angles; but as the imperfection of my senses puts it out of my power to be, in any case, certain of the exact correspondence of the diagram which I delineate, with the definitions given in the elements of geometry, I never can apply with confidence to a particular figure, a mathematical theorem." (Dugald Stewart, "Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind", 1792)

"There are, undoubtedly, the most ample reasons for stating both the principles and theorems [of geometry] in their general form […] But, that an unpractised learner, even in making use of one theorem to demonstrate another, reasons rather from particular to particular than from the general proposition, is manifest from the difficulty he finds in applying a theorem to a case in which the configuration of the diagram is extremely unlike that of the diagram by which the original theorem was demonstrated. A difficulty which, except in cases of unusual mental powers, long practice can alone remove, and removes chiefly by rendering us familiar with all the configurations consistent with the general conditions of the theorem." (John S Mill, "A System of Logic", 1843)

"Diagrams are of great utility for illustrating certain questions of vital statistics by conveying ideas on the subject through the eye, which cannot be so readily grasped when contained in figures." (Florence Nightingale, "Mortality of the British Army", 1857)

"Whenever I am infuriated, I revenge myself with a new Diagram." (Florence Nightingale, [letter to Sidney Herbert] 1857)

"They [diagrams] are designed not so much to allow of reference to particular numbers, which can be better had from printed tables of figures, as to exhibit to the eye the general results of large masses of figures which it is hopeless to attack in any other way than by graphical representation." (William S Jevons, [letter to Richard Hutton] 1863)

"Every process of what has been called Universal Geometry - the great creation of Descartes and his successors, in which a single train of reasoning solves whole classes of problems at once, and others common to large groups of them - is a practical lesson in the management of wide generalizations, and abstraction of the points of agreement from those of difference among objects of great and confusing diversity, to which the purely inductive sciences cannot furnish many superior. Even so elementary an operation as that of abstracting from the particular configuration of the triangles or other figures, and the relative situation of the particular lines or points, in the diagram which aids the apprehension of a common geometrical demonstration, is a very useful, and far from being always an easy, exercise of the faculty of generalization so strangely imagined to have no place or part in the processes of mathematics." (John S Mill, "An Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy", 1865)

"[…] it must be noticed that these diagrams do not naturally harmonize with the propositions of ordinary life or ordinary logic. […] The great bulk of the propositions which we commonly meet with are founded, and rightly founded, on an imperfect knowledge of the actual mutual relations of the implied classes to one another. […] one very marked characteristic about these circular diagrams is that they forbid the natural expression of such uncertainty, and are therefore only directly applicable to a very small number of such propositions as we commonly meet with." (John Venn, "On the Diagrammatic and Mechanical Representation of Propositions and Reasonings", 1880)

"I call a sign which stands for something merely because it resembles it, an icon. Icons are so completely substituted for their objects as hardly to be distinguished from them. Such are the diagrams of geometry. A diagram, indeed, so far as it has a general signification, is not a pure icon; but in the middle part of our reasonings we forget that abstractness in great measure, and the diagram is for us the very thing. So in contemplating a painting, there is a moment when we lose the consciousness that it is not the thing, the distinction of the real and the copy disappears, and it is for the moment a pure dream, - not any particular existence, and yet not general. At that moment we are contemplating an icon." (Charles S Peirce, "On The Algebra of Logic : A Contribution to the Philosophy of Notation" in The American Journal of Mathematics 7, 1885)

"At the basis of our Symbolic Logic, however represented, whether by words by letters or by diagrams, we shall always find the same state of things. What we ultimately have to do is to break up the entire field before us into a definite number of classes or compartments which are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive." (John Venn, "Symbolic Logic" 2nd Ed., 1894)

"The best way of introducing this question will be to enquire a little more strictly whether it is really classes that we thus represent, or merely compartments into which classes may be put? […] The most accurate answer is that our diagrammatic subdivisions, or for that matter our symbols generally, stand for compartments and not for classes. We may doubtless regard them as representing the latter, but if we do so we should never fail to keep in mind the proviso, 'if there be such things in existence'. And when this condition is insisted upon, it seems as if we expressed our meaning best by saying that what our symbols stand for are compartments which may or may not happen to be occupied." (John Venn, "Symbolic Logic" 2nd Ed., 1894)

"Deduction is that mode of reasoning which examines the state of things asserted in the premises, forms a diagram of that state of things, perceives in the parts of the diagram relations not explicitly mentioned in the premises, satisfies itself by mental experiments upon the diagram that these relations would always subsist, or at least would do so in a certain proportion of cases, and concludes their necessary, or probable, truth." (Charles S Peirce, "Kinds of Reasoning", cca. 1896)