"In fact, it is empirically ascertainable that every event is actually produced by a number of factors, or is at least accompanied by numerous other events that are somehow connected with it, so that the singling out involved in the picture of the causal chain is an extreme abstraction. Just as ideal objects cannot be isolated from their proper context, material existents exhibit multiple interconnections; therefore the universe is not a heap of things but a system of interacting systems." (Mario Bunge, "Causality: The place of the casual principles in modern science", 1959)
"Statistical laws are indisputably noncausal, even though some of them may be shown to be partly derivable from laws having a causal component." (Mario Bunge, Causality: The place of the casual principles in modern science, 1959)
"The word 'causality' has, unfortunately enough, no fewer than three principal meanings - a clear symptom of the long and twisted history of the causal problem. The single word 'causality' is in fact used to designate: {a) a category (corresponding to the causal bond); (b) a principle (the general law of causation), and (c) a doctrine, namely, that which holds the universal validity of the causal principle, to the exclusion of other principles of determination." (Mario Bunge, "Causality: The place of the casual principles in modern science", 1959)
"Intuition is the collection of odds and ends where we place all the intellectual mechanisms which we do not know how to analyze or even name with precision, or which we are not interested in analyzing or naming." (Mario Bunge, "Intuition and Science", 1962)
"A theory has a physical meaning iff it contains interpretation assumptions that assign physical correlates to its basic concepts. These correlates (referents) need not be and in general are not perceptible. But they must be scrutable, i.e. they must show up as observable effects even if remotely, i. e. at the end of a long chain accounted for by other theories."(Mario Bunge, "Foundations of Physics", 1967)
"And the best modern physicist is the one who acknowledges that neither classical nor quantum physics are cut and dried, both being full of holes and in need of a vigorous overhauling not only to better cover their own domains but also to join smoothly so as to produce a coherent picture of the various levels of physical reality." (Mario Bunge, "Foundations of Physics", 1967)
"The higher we climb the ladder of epistemic abstraction the less we ourselves appear in our picture of the world and the better we are at explaining our own experiences. On the other hand, by remaining close to the senses we will not transcend superficial, anthropocentric world views. In short, although experience is a test of our theories it is not the stuff our theories are made of or even the referent of physical theories: human experience proper is the subject of nonphysical sciences like psychology. These platitudes had to be stated on account of the widespread belief that in physics only observational predicates matter - a belief inherited from philosophies at variance with science." (Mario Bunge, "Foundations of Physics", 1967)
"A physical theory is assigned a literal and objective interpretation by assigning every one of its referential primitive symbols a physical object - entity, property, relation, or event - rather than a mental picture or a human operation." (Mario Bunge, "Philosophy of Physics", 1973)
"A physical theory must accept some actual data as inputs and must be able to generate from them another set of possible data (the output) in such a way that both input and output match the assumptions of the theory - laws, constraints, etc. This concept of matching involves relevance: thus boundary conditions are relevant only to field-like theories such as hydrodynamics and quantum mechanics. But matching is more than relevance: it is also logical compatibility." (Mario Bunge, "Philosophy of Physics", 1973)
"If 'model' is taken to mean visual representation or analogy with familiar experience, then clearly not every theory involves a model. Thus field theories, whether classical or quantal, are hardly visualisable. And if 'model' is taken to mean mechanism - either in a narrow mechanical sense or in a wide sense including nonmechanical mechanisms such as the meson field mechanism of nuclear forces - then some theories do contain models of this kind while others do not. [...] On the other hand in a third sense every physical theory is a model, namely of the underlying mathematical formalism. Moreover a physical theory is twice a model in the model-theoretic sense: once because every one of its basic signs has a particular interpretation within mathematics, another time because the same sign may have a physical interpretation as well - as is the case with all the referential primitives." (Mario Bunge, "Philosophy of Physics", 1973)
"Whether or not a given conceptual model or representation of a physical system happens to be picturable, is irrelevant to the semantics of the theory to which it eventually becomes attached. Picturability is a fortunate psychological occurrence, not a scientific necessity. Few of the models that pass for visual representations are picturable anyhow. For one thing, the model may be and usually is constituted by imperceptible items such as unextended particles and invisible fields. True, a model can be given a graphic representation - but so can any idea as long as symbolic or conventional diagrams are allowed. Diagrams, whether representational or symbolic, are meaningless unless attached to some body of theory. On the other hand theories are in no need of diagrams save for psychological purposes. Let us then keep theoretical models apart from visual analogues." (Mario Bunge, "Philosophy of Physics", 1973)
"This distinction is familiar in natural science, where one is not expected to mistake, say, the cardiovascular system for the circulation of the blood or the brain with mental processes. But it is unusual in social studies. [...] Mechanism is to system as motion is to body, combination (or dissociation) to chemical compound, and thinking to brain. [In the systemic view], agency is both constrained and motivated by structure, and in turn the latter is maintained or altered by individual action. In other words, social mechanisms reside neither in persons nor in their environment – they are part of the processes that unfold in or among social systems. […] All mechanisms are system-specific: there is no such thing as a universal or substrate-neutral mechanism." (Mario Bunge, "The Sociology-philosophy Connection", 1999)
"The understanding of a thing begins and ends with some conceptual model of it. The model is the better, the more accurate, and inclusive. But even rough models can be used to guide - or misguide - research." (Bunge A Mario, "Philosophy in Crisis: The Need for Reconstruction", 2001)
"We all would like to know more and, at the same time, to receive less information. In fact, the problem of a worker in today's knowledge industry is not the scarcity of information but its excess. The same holds for professionals: just think of a physician or an executive, constantly bombarded by information that is at best irrelevant. In order to learn anything we need time. And to make time we must use information filters allowing us to ignore most of the information aimed at us. We must ignore much to learn a little." (Mario Bunge, "Philosophy in Crisis: The Need for Reconstruction", 2001)
"Notice that I use the expression 'systemic approach', not 'systems theory', There are two reasons for this. One is that there are nearly as many systems theories as systems theorists. The other is that the 'systems theory' that became popular in the 1970s (e.g., Laszlo, 1972) was another name for old holism and got discredited because it stressed stasis at the expense of change and claimed to solve all particular problems without empirical research or serious theorizing." (Mario Bunge, "How does it work?: The search for explanatory mechanisms", Philosophy of the Social Sciences Vol.34 (2), 2004)
"The twin concepts of system and mechanism are so central in modern science, whether natural, social, or biosocial, that their use has spawned a whole ontology, which I have called systemism. According to this view, everything in the universe is, was, or will be a system or a component of one." (Mario Bunge, "How does it work?: The search for explanatory mechanisms", Philosophy of the Social Sciences Vol. 34 (2), 2004)
"[...] a single thing may elicit several appearances, various conceptual models of it, or several plans of action for it, depending on the subject’s abilities and interests." (Mario Bunge, "Chasing Reality: Strife over Realism", 2006)
"Although fiction is not fact, paradoxically we need some fictions, particularly mathematical ideas and highly idealized models, to describe, explain, and predict facts. This is not because the universe is mathematical, but because our brains invent or use refined and law-abiding fictions, not only for intellectual pleasure but also to construct conceptual models of reality." (Mario Bunge, "Chasing Reality: Strife over Realism", 2006)
"At all events, our world pictures may have components of all three kinds: perceptual, conceptual, and praxiological (action-theoretical). This is because there are three gates to the outer world: perception, conception, and action. However, ordinarily only one or two of them need be opened: combinations of all three, as in building a house according to a blueprint, are the exception. We may contemplate a landscape without forming either a conceptual model of it or a plan to act upon it. And we may build a theoretical model of an imperceptible thing, such as an invisible extrasolar planet, on which we cannot act." (Mario Bunge, "Chasing Reality: Strife over Realism", 2006)
"Chance is just as real as causation; both are modes of becoming. The way to model a random process is to enrich the mathematical theory of probability with a model of a random mechanism. In the sciences, probabilities are never made up or “elicited” by observing the choices people make, or the bets they are willing to place. The reason is that, in science and technology, interpreted probability exactifies objective chance, not gut feeling or intuition. No randomness, no probability." (Mario Bunge, "Chasing Reality: Strife over Realism", 2006)
"[...] the scientific models of concrete things are symbolic rather than iconic: they are systems of propositions, not pictures. Besides, such models are seldom if ever completely accurate, if only because they involve more or less brutal simplifications, such as pretending that a metallic surface is smooth, a crystal has no impurities, a biopopulation has a single predator, or a market is in equilibrium. These are all fictions. However, they are stylizations rather than wild fantasies. Hence, introducing and using them to account for real existents does not commit us to fictionism, just as defending the role of experience need not make us empiricists, nor is admitting the role of intuition enough to qualify as intuitionist." (Mario Bunge, "Chasing Reality: Strife over Realism", 2006)
"When in the sciences or techniques one states that a certain problem is unsolvable, a rigorous demonstration of such unsolvability is required. And when a scientist submits an article to publication, the least that its referees demand is that it be intelligible. Why? Because rational beings long for understanding and because only clear statements are susceptible to be put to examination to verify whether they are true or false. In the Humanities it is the same, or it should be, but it is not always so." (Mario Bunge, "Xenius, Platón y Manolito", La Nación, 2008)
"A computer program specifies a sequence of machine states. It is said to be a piece of software because it can be replaced with another program, and inserted into the same piece of hardware, to produce a different information-processing unit. Still, the hardware/software nomenclature is misleading, because software is just as 'hard' or material as hardware. True, unlike an ordinary piece of matter, a piece of software has a semantic content – or rather it elicits one. More precisely, a piece of software, when inserted into a computer, evokes meanings in its user’s brain. Hence, the' content' of a piece of software is very different from the content of a bottle: it can only be poured into a trained brain – and only metaphorically at that. That is, software belongs in the semiotic level of reality, along with bank bills, sentences, and diagrams, neither of which fulfils its function without a brain able to understand its meaning." (Mario Bunge, "Xenius, Platón y Manolito", La Nación, 2008)
"A worldview is a comprehensive conception of all there is, whereas a philosophy is a scholarly discipline divided into special fields, every one of which is usually cultivated independently of the others. [...] Every worldview includes views on values, action, the right, and politics." (Mario Bunge, "Matter and Mind: A Philosophical Inquiry", 2010)
"[...] according to the quantum theory, randomness is a basic trait of reality, whereas in classical physics it is a derivative property, though an equally objective one. Note, however, that this conclusion follows only under the realist interpretation of probability as the measure of possibility. If, by contrast, one adopts the subjectivist or Bayesian conception of probability as the measure of subjective uncertainty, then randomness is only in the eye of the beholder." (Mario Bunge, "Matter and Mind: A Philosophical Inquiry", 2010)
"Change can be defined as either event or process –in some concrete thing, of course. And a thing having a certain property, or being in a given state, or undergoing a certain change, is called a fact." (Mario Bunge, "Matter and Mind: A Philosophical Inquiry", 2010)
"Cognition is the acquisition of knowledge, or knowledge in the making. This sounds obvious as long as we do not ask what cognition and knowledge are, for we should admit that we don’t know much about either." (Mario Bunge, "Matter and Mind: A Philosophical Inquiry", 2010)
"Entanglement (non-separability) has been interpreted in several non-physical ways, including recourse to telekinesis; it has also been claimed that it refutes realism and confirms holism. In my view, all entanglement does is to confirm the thesis Once a system, always a system. However, this is not an independent postulate, but a consequence of conservation laws." (Mario Bunge, "Matter and Mind: A Philosophical Inquiry", 2010)
"From a historical viewpoint, computationalism is a sophisticated version of behaviorism, for it only interpolates the computer program between stimulus and response, and does not regard novel programs as brain creations. [...] The root of computationalism is of course the actual similarity between brains and computers, and correspondingly between natural and artificial intelligence. The two are indeed similar because the artifacts in question have been designed to perform analogs of certain brain functions. And the computationalist program is an example of the strategy of treating similars as identicals." (Mario Bunge, "Matter and Mind: A Philosophical Inquiry", 2010)
"[...] information is just as material as energy, though far less ubiquitous because it involves coding, and codes are conventional as well as artificial. [...] In sum, the concept of information is derivative, nor primary; in particular, it depends upon that of matter. Indeed, all information is transmitted by some physical process, just as every bit of energy is the energy of some material entity, and every energy transfer is a physical process that connects two or more physical entities." (Mario Bunge, "Matter and Mind: A Philosophical Inquiry", 2010)
"Language is a tool of social intercourse to such an extent that it is newly reinvented every time it is absent." (Mario Bunge, "Matter and Mind: A Philosophical Inquiry", 2010)
"Metaphysics, or ontology, is the study of the most basic and general problems about the universe and the mind." (Mario Bunge, "Matter and Mind: A Philosophical Inquiry", 2010)
"It is hard to navigate across one’s environment without having some ideas, however coarse, about it. Indeed, to face any situation we must know whether it is real or imaginary, profane or sacred, sensitive or insensitive to our actions, and so on. This is why even lowly organisms develop, if not worldviews, at least rough sensory maps of their immediate environment – as noted by ethologists from the start. But it is generally assumed that only humans can build conceptual models of their environments. And, except for some philosophers, humans distinguish maps from the territories they represent." (Mario Bunge, "Matter and Mind: A Philosophical Inquiry", 2010)
"The traditional worldviews were spiritualist, in that they revolved around imaginary beings: They attempted to understand facts in terms of fictions, and the reputedly lower in terms of the allegedly higher. [...] By contrast, scientific thinking takes the real existence of the external world for granted: it is realist or objectivist. And the sociologies of science, technology and religion attempt to explain in social terms the emergence and fortunes of their subjects. Moreover, the science-oriented worldviews are free from disembodied souls, world spirits, and other fictions: they are also tacitly naturalist or materialist in some sense –without however necessarily denying the existence and power of the mental." (Mario Bunge, "Matter and Mind: A Philosophical Inquiry", 2010)
"[...] we also distinguish knowledge from information, because some pieces of information, such as questions, orders, and absurdities do not constitute knowledge. And also because computers process information but, since they lack minds, they cannot be said to know anything." (Mario Bunge, "Matter and Mind: A Philosophical Inquiry", 2010)
No comments:
Post a Comment