Mental Models LVIII

"We form in the imagination some sort of diagrammatic, that is, iconic, representation of the facts, as skeletonized as possible. The impression of the present writer is that with ordinary persons this is always a visual image, or mixed visual and muscular; but this is an opinion not founded on any systematic examination." (Charles S Peirce, "Notes on Ampliative Reasoning", 1901)

"A mental model is conceived here as a knowledge structure possessing slots that can be filled not only with empirically gained information but also with 'default assumptions' resulting from prior experience. These default assumptions can be substituted by updated information so that inferences based on the model can be corrected without abandoning the model as a whole. Information is assimilated to the slots of a mental model in the form of 'frames' which are understood here as 'chunks' of knowledge with a well-defined meaning anchored in a given body of shared knowledge." (Jürgen Renn, "Before the Riemann Tensor: The Emergence of Einstein’s Double Strategy", [in "The Universe of General Relativity"] 2000)

"In the language of mental models, such past experience provided the default assumptions necessary to fill the gaps in the emerging and necessarily incomplete framework of a relativistic theory of gravitation. It was precisely the nature of these default assumptions that allowed them to be discarded again in the light of novel information - provided, for instance, by the further elaboration of the mathematical formalism - without, however, having to abandon the underlying mental models which could thus continue to function as heuristic orientations." (Jürgen Renn, "Before the Riemann Tensor: The Emergence of Einstein’s Double Strategy", [in "The Universe of General Relativity"] 2000)

"A mental model represents a possibility, or, to be precise, the structure and content of the model capture what is common to the different ways in which the possibility could occur [...]" (Philip N Johnson-Laird, Mental Models, Sentential Reasoning, and Illusory Inferences, [in "Mental Models and the Mind"], 2006)

"According to mental model theory, human reasoning relies on the construction of integrated mental representations of the information that is given in the reasoning problem's premises. These integrated representations are the mental models. A mental model is a mental representation that captures what is common to all the different ways in which the premises can be interpreted. It represents in "small scale" how "reality" could be— according to what is stated in the premises of a reasoning problem. Mental models, though, must not be confused with images. A mental model often forms the basis of one or more visual images, but some of them represent situations that cannot be visualized. Instead, mental models are often likened to diagrams since, as with diagrams, their structure is analogous to the structure of the states of affairs they represent." (Carsten Held et al, "Mental Models and the Mind", 2006)

"Mental models are mental representations of a certain type. The main problem in the philosophy of mental representation is to characterize the relation between a mental representation and the represented object. Naively speaking, a mental representation is an entity that 'stands for' another—the represented object - , but here 'stands for' is just a metaphoric place-holder for 'represents', thus requires further explanation." (Carsten Held et al, "Mental Models and the Mind", 2006)

"Prom the processing view, the model theory distinguishes between three different operations. In the construction phase, reasoners construct the mental model that reflects the information from the premises. In the inspection phase, this model is inspected to find new information that is not explicitly given in the premises. In most variants of the model theory, the inspection process is conceptualized as a spatial focus that scans the model to find new information not given in the premises.. In the variation phase, reasoners try to construct alternative models from the premises that refute the putative conclusion. If no such model is found, the putative conclusion is considered true." (Carsten Held et al, "Mental Models and the Mind", 2006)

"The model theory postulates that mental models are parsimonious. They represent what is possible, but not what is impossible, according to assertions. This principle of parsimony minimizes the load on working memory, and so it applies unless something exceptional occurs to overrule it." (Philip N Johnson-Laird, Mental Models, Sentential Reasoning, and Illusory Inferences, [in "Mental Models and the Mind"], 2006)

"Just as physicists have created models of the atom based on observed data and intuitive synthesis of the patterns in their data, so must designers create models of users based on observed behaviors and intuitive synthesis of the patterns in the data. Only after we formalize such patterns can we hope to systematically construct patterns of interaction that smoothly match the behavior patterns, mental models, and goals of users. Personas provide this formalization." (Alan Cooper et al, "About Face 3: The Essentials of Interaction Design", 2007)

"We tend to form mental models that are simpler than reality; so if we create represented models that are simpler than the actual implementation model, we help the user achieve a better understanding. […] Understanding how software actually works always helps someone to use it, but this understanding usually comes at a significant cost. One of the most significant ways in which computers can assist human beings is by putting a simple face on complex processes and situations. As a result, user interfaces that are consistent with users’ mental models are vastly superior to those that are merely reflections of the implementation model." (Alan Cooper et al,  "About Face 3: The Essentials of Interaction Design", 2007)