08 February 2021

On Imagination (BC)

"We invoke the imagination and the intervals that it furnishes, since the form itself is without motion or genesis, indivisible and free of all underlying matter, though the elements latent in the form are produced distinctly and individually on the screen of imagination. What projects the images is the understanding; the source of what is projected is the form in the understanding; and what they are projected in is this 'passive nous' that unfolds in revolution about the partlessness of genuine Nous." (Proclus Lycaeus, "A Commentary on the First Book of Euclid’s Elements", cca 5th century)

"But since we have, in our work on the soul, treated of imagination, and the faculty of imagination is identical with that of sense-perception, though the being of a faculty of imagination is different from that of a faculty of sense-perception; and since imagination is the movement set up by a sensory faculty when actually discharging its function, while a dream appears to be an image (for which occurs in sleep - whether simply or in some particular way - is what we call a dream): it manifestly follows that dreaming is an activity of the faculty of sense-perception, but belongs to this faculty qua imaginative." (Aristotle, "On Dreams", 4th century BC)

"It is obvious then, that memory belongs to that part of the soul to which imagination belongs. […] Just as the picture painted on the panel is at once a picture and a portrait, and though one and the same, is both, yet the essence of the two is not the same, and it is possible to think of it both as a picture and as a portrait, so in the same way we must regard the mental picture within us both as an object of contemplation in itself and as a mental picture of something else […]. Insofar as we consider it in relation to something else, e.g. as a likeness, it is also an aid to memory." (Aristotle, "De Memoria et Reminiscentia" [On Memory and Recollection], 4th century BC)

"For imagination is different from either perceiving or discursive thinking, though it is not found without sensation, or judgement without it. That this activity is not the same kind of thinking as judgement is obvious. For imagining lies within our own power whenever we wish (e.g. we can call up a picture, as in the practice of mnemonics by the use of mental images), but in forming opinions we are not free: we cannot escape the alternative of falsehood or truth." (Aristotle, "De Anima", cca. 350 BC)

"[Imagination is] that in virtue of which we say that an image occurs to us and not as we speak of it metaphorically."  (Aristotle, "De Anima" III, cca. 350 BC)

"Since it seems that there is nothing outside and separate in existence from sensible spatial magnitudes, the objects of thought are in the sensible forms, viz. both the abstract objects and all the states and affections of sensible things. Hence no one can learn or understand anything in the absence of sense, and when the mind is actively aware of anything it is necessarily aware of it along with an image; for images are like sensuous contents except in that they contain no matter. Imagination is different from assertion and denial; for what is true or false involves a synthesis of thoughts. In what will the primary thoughts differ from images? Must we not say that neither these nor even our other thoughts are images, though they necessarily involve them?" (Aristotle, "De Anima", cca. 350 BC)

"Thinking is different from perceiving and is held to be in part imagination, in part judgement: we must therefore first mark off the sphere of imagination and then speak of judgement. If then imagination is that in virtue of which an image arises for us, excluding metaphorical uses of the term, is it a single faculty or disposition relative to images, in virtue of which we discriminate and are either in error or not? The faculties in virtue of which we do this are sense, opinion, knowledge, thought." (Aristotle, "De Anima", cca. 350 BC)

"Imagination (VIKALPA) is a thought based on a mental image describable by words but not based on an object directly observable." (Patanjali, "Yoga Sutra" cca. 500 BC - 400 AD)

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