"As for me (and probably I am not alone in this opinion), I believe that a single universally valid principle summarizing an abundance of established experimental facts according to the rules of induction, is more reliable than a theory which by its nature can never be directly verified; so I prefer to give up the theory rather than the principle, if the two are incompatible." (Ernst Zermelo, "Über mechanische Erklärungen irreversibler Vorgänge. Eine Antwort auf Hrn. Boltzmann’s ‘Entgegnung’" Annalen der Physik und Chemie 59, 1896)
"It is not admissible to accept this property simply as a fact for the initial states that we can observe at present, for it is not a certain unique variable we have to deal with (as, for example, the eccentricity of the earth’s orbit which is just decreasing for a still very long time) but the entropy of any arbitrary system free of external influences. How does it happen, then, that in such a system there always occurs only an increase of entropy and equalization of temperature and concentration differences, but never the reverse? And to what extent are we justified in expecting that this behaviour will continue, at least for the immediate future? A satisfactory answer to these questions must be given in order to be allowed to speak of a truly mechanical analogue of the Second Law." (Ernst Zermelo, "Über mechanische Erklärungen irreversibler Vorgänge. Eine Antwort auf Hrn. Boltzmann’s ‘Entgegnung’" Annalen der Physik und Chemie 59, 1896)
"[...] the spirit of the mechanical view of nature itself which will always force us to assume that all imaginable mechanical initial states are physically possible, at least within certain boundaries." (Ernst Zermelo, "Über einen Satz der Dynamik und die mechanische Wärmetheorie", Annalen der Physik und Chemie 57, 1896)
"Banishing fundamental facts or problems from science merely because they cannot be dealt with by means of certain prescribed principles would be like forbidding the further extension of the theory of parallels in geometry because the axiom upon which this theory rests has been shown to be unprovable. Actually, principles must be judged from the point of view of science, and not science from the point of view of principles fixed once and for all." (Ernst Zermelo, "Neuer Beweis für die Möglichkeit einer Wohlordnung", Mathematische Annalen 65, 1908)
"Generally speaking, mathematical theorems are no analytic judgements yet, but we can reduce them to analytic ones through the hypothetical addition of synthetic premises. The logically reduced mathematical theorems emerging in this way are analytically hypothetical judgements which constitute the logical skeleton of a mathematical theory." (Ernst Zermelo, "Mathematische Logik. Vorlesungen gehalten von Prof. Dr. E. Zermelo zu Göttingen im S.S.", 1908)
"If one intends to base arithmetic on the theory of natural numbers as finite cardinals, one has to deal mainly with the definition of finite set; for the cardinal is, according to its nature, a property of a set, and any proposition about finite cardinals can always be expressed as a proposition about finite sets. In the following I will try to deduce the most important property of natural numbers, namely the principle of complete induction, from a definition of finite set which is as simple as possible, at the same time showing that the different definitions [of finite set] given so far are equivalent to the one given here." (Ernst Zermelo, "Ueber die Grundlagen der Arithmetik", Atti del IV Congresso Internazionale dei Matematici, 1908)
"It has been argued that mathematics is not or, at least, not exclusively an end in itself; after all it should also be applied to reality. But how can this be done if mathematics consisted of definitions and analytic theorems deduced from them and we did not know whether these are valid in reality or not. One can argue here that of course one first has to convince oneself whether the axioms of a theory are valid in the area of reality to which the theory should be applied. In any case, such a statement requires a procedure which is outside logic.” (Ernst Zermelo, "Mathematische Logik - Vorlesungen gehalten von Prof. Dr. E. Zermelo zu Göttingen im S. S", 1908)
"Now even in mathematics unprovability, as is well known, is in no way equivalent to nonvalidity, since, after all, not everything can be proved, but every proof in turn presupposes unproved principles. Thus, in order to reject such a fundamental principle, one would have to ascertain that in some particular case it did not hold or to derive contradictory consequences from it; but none of my opponents has made any attempt to do this." (Ernst Zermelo, "Neuer Beweis für die Möglichkeit einer Wohlordnung", Mathematische Annalen 65, 1908)
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