"It is of course easier to supply the proof when we have previously acquired some knowledge of the questions by the method, than it is to find it without any previous knowledge." (Archimedes, cca. 3rd century BC)
"It is not possible to find in all geometry more difficult and more intricate questions or more simple and lucid explanations [than those given by Archimedes]. Some ascribe this to his natural genius; while others think that incredible effort and toil produced these, to all appearance, easy and unlaboured results. No amount of investigation of yours would succeed in attaining the proof, and yet, once seen, you immediately believe you would have discovered it; by so smooth and so rapid a path he leads you to the conclusion required." (Plutarch, cca. 1st century)
"The calculation of probabilities is of the utmost value, […] but in statistical inquiries there is need not so much of mathematical subtlety as of a precise statement of all the circumstances. The possible contingencies are too numerous to be covered by a finite number of experiments, and exact calculation is, therefore, out of the question. Although nature has her habits, due to the recurrence of causes, they are general, not invariable. Yet empirical calculation, although it is inexact, may be adequate in affairs of practice." (Gottfried W Leibniz [letter to Bernoulli], 1703)
"[…] for the saving the long progression of the thoughts to remote and first principles in every case, the mind should provide itself several stages; that is to say, intermediate principles, which it might have recourse to in the examining those positions that come in its way. These, though they are not self-evident principles, yet, if they have been made out from them by a wary and unquestionable deduction, may be depended on as certain and infallible truths, and serve as unquestionable truths to prove other points depending upon them, by a nearer and shorter view than remote and general maxims. […] And thus mathematicians do, who do not in every new problem run it back to the first axioms through all the whole train of intermediate propositions. Certain theorems that they have settled to themselves upon sure demonstration, serve to resolve to them multitudes of propositions which depend on them, and are as firmly made out from thence as if the mind went afresh over every link of the whole chain that tie them to first self-evident principles." (John Locke, "The Conduct of the Understanding", 1706)
"As arithmetic and algebra are sciences of great clearness, certainty, and extent, which are immediately conversant about signs, upon the skillful use whereof they entirely depend, so a little attention to them may possibly help us to judge of the progress of the mind in other sciences, which, though differing in nature, design, and object, may yet agree in the general methods of proof and inquiry." (George Berkeley, "Alciphorn: or, the Minute Philosopher", 1732)
"It hath been an old remark, that Geometry is an excellent Logic. And it must be owned that when the definitions are clear; when the postulata cannot be refused, nor the axioms denied; when from the distinct contemplation and comparison of figures, their properties are derived, by a perpetual well-connected chain of consequences, the objects being still kept in view, and the attention ever fixed upon them; there is acquired a habit of reasoning, close and exact and methodical; which habit strengthens and sharpens the mind, and being transferred to other subjects is of general use in the inquiry after truth." (George Berkeley, "The Analyst", 1734)
"Pure mathematics can never deal with the possibility, that is to say, with the possibility of an intuition answering to the conceptions of the things. Hence it cannot touch the question of cause and effect, and consequently, all the finality there observed must always be regarded simply as formal, and never as a physical end." (Immanuel Kant, "The Critique of Judgement", 1790)
"The most important questions of life are, for the most part, really only problems of probability. Strictly speaking one may even say that nearly all our knowledge is problematical; and in the small number of things which we are able to know with certainty, even in the mathematical sciences themselves, induction and analogy, the principal means for discovering truth, are based on probabilities, so that the entire system of human knowledge is connected with this theory." (Pierre-Simon Laplace, "Theorie Analytique des Probabilités", 1812)
"The theory of which we have just given an overview may be considered from a point of view apt to set aside the obscure in what it presents, and which seems to be the primary aim, namely: to establish new notions on imaginary quantities. Indeed, putting to one side the question of whether these notions are true or false, we may restrict ourselves to viewing this theory as a means of research, to adopt the lines in direction only as signs of the real or imaginary quantities, and to see, in the usage to which we have put them, only the simple employment of a particular notation. For that, it suffices to start by demonstrating, through the first theorems of trigonometry, the rules of multiplication and addition given above; the applications will follow, and all that will remain is to examine the question of didactics. And if the employment of this notation were to be advantageous? And if it were to open up shorter and easier paths to demonstrate certain truths? That is what fact alone can decide." (Jean-Robert Argand, "Essai sur une manière de représenter les quantités imaginaires, dans les constructions géométriques", Annales Tome IV, 1813)
"Algebra is a way to bring us to certainty in mathematics; but must it be presently condemned as an ill way, because there are some questions in mathematics, which a man cannot come to certainty in by the way of Algebra?" (John Locke, "John Locke, A Letter to the Right Rev. Edward Lord Bishop of Worcester", 1823)
"Geometry, then, is the application of strict logic to those properties of space and figure which are self-evident, and which therefore cannot be disputed. But the rigor of this science is carried one step further; for no property, however evident it may be, is allowed to pass without demonstration, if that can be given. The question is therefore to demonstrate all geometrical truths with the smallest possible number of assumptions." (Augustus de Morgan, "On the Study and Difficulties of Mathematics", 1830)
"It is not of the essence of mathematics to be conversant with the ideas of number and quantity. Whether as a general habit of mind it would be desirable to apply symbolic processes to moral argument, is another question." (George Boole, "An Investigation of the Laws of Thought", 1854)
"In
mathematics the art of asking questions is more valuable than solving
problems." (Georg Cantor, [thesis’ title] 1867)
"So intimate is the union between Mathematics and Physics that probably by far the larger part of the accessions to our mathematical knowledge have been obtained by the efforts of mathematicians to solve the problems set to them by experiment, and to create for each successive class phenomena a new calculus or a new geometry, as the case might be, which might prove not wholly inadequate to the subtlety of nature. Sometimes the mathematician has been before the physicist, and it has happened that when some great and new question has occurred to the experimentalist or the observer, he has found in the armory of the mathematician the weapons which he needed ready made to his hand. But much oftener, the questions proposed by the physicist have transcended the utmost powers of the mathematics of the time, and a fresh mathematical creation has been needed to supply the logical instrument requisite to interpret the new enigma." (Henry J S Smith, Nature, Volume 8, 1873)
"When we consider that the whole of geometry rests ultimately on axioms which derive their validity from the nature of our intuitive faculty, we seem well justified in questioning the sense of imaginary forms, since we attribute to them properties which not infrequently contradict all our intuitions." (Gottlob Frege, "On a Geometrical Representation of Imaginary forms in the Plane", 1873)
"For an understanding of Nature, questions about the infinitely large are idle questions. It is different, however, with questions about the infinitely small. Our knowledge of their causal relations depends essentially on the precision with which we succeed in tracing phenomena on the infinitesimal level." (Bernhard Riemann, "Gesammelte Mathematische Werke", 1876)
No comments:
Post a Comment