"It is very difficult to write mathematics books today. If one does not take pains with the fine points of theorems, explanations, proofs and corollaries, then it won’t be a mathematics book; but if one does these things, then the reading of it will be extremely boring." (Johannes Kepler, "Astronomia Nova", 1609)
"For, Mathematical Demonstrations being built upon the impregnable Foundations of Geometry and Arithmetick, are the only Truths, that can sink into the Mind of Man, void of all Uncertainty; and all other Discourses participate more or less of Truth, according as their Subjects are more or less capable of Mathematical Demonstration." (Christopher Wren, [lecture at Gresham College] 1657)
"There is scarcely any one who states purely arithmetical questions, scarcely any who understands them. Is this not because arithmetic has been treated up to this time geometrically rather than arithmetically? This certainly is indicated by many works ancient and modern. Diophantus himself also indicates this. But he has freed himself from geometry a little more than others have, in that he limits his analysis to rational numbers only; nevertheless the Zetcica of Vieta, in which the methods of Diophantus are extended to continuous magnitude and therefore to geometry, witness the insufficient separation of arithmetic from geometry. Now arithmetic has a special domain of its own, the theory of numbers. This was touched upon but only to a slight degree by Euclid in his Elements, and by those who followed him it has not been sufficiently extended, unless perchance it lies hid in those books of Diophantus which the ravages of time have destroyed. Arithmeticians have now to develop or restore it. To these, that I may lead the way, I propose this theorem to be proved or problem to be solved. If they succeed in discovering the proof or solution, they will acknowledge that questions of this kind are not inferior to the more celebrated ones from geometry either for depth or difficulty or method of proof: Given any number which is not a square, there also exists an infinite number of squares such that when multiplied into the given number and unity is added to the product, the result is a square." (Pierre de Fermat, [Letter to Frénicle] 1657)
"I am not content with algebra, in that it yields neither the shortest proofs nor the most beautiful constructions of geometry. Consequently, in view of this, I consider that we need yet another kind of analysis, geometric or linear, which deals directly with position, as algebra deals with magnitude." (Gottfried Leibniz, [letter to Christiaan Huygens] 1670)
"Algebra is nothing but the characteristic of undetermined numbers or magnitudes. But it does not directly express the place, angles and motions, from which it follows that it is often difficult to reduce, in a computation, what is in a figure, and that it is even more difficult to find geometrical proofs and constructions which are enough practical even when the Algebraic calculus is all done." (Gottfried W Leibniz, [letter to Christiaan Huygens] 1679)
"I found the elements of a new characteristic, completely different from Algebra and which will have great advantages for the exact and natural mental representation, although without figures, of everything that depends on the imagination. Algebra is nothing but the characteristic of undetermined numbers or magnitudes. But it does not directly express the place, angles and motions, from which it follows that it is often difficult to reduce, in a computation, what is in a figure, and that it is even more difficult to find geometrical proofs and constructions which are enough practical even when the Algebraic calculus is all done." (Gottfried W Leibniz, [letter to Christiaan Huygens] 1679)
"But the most powerful proof of the reality of phenomena (a proof which is, indeed, sufficient by itself) is success in predicting future phenomena from those which are past and present, whether the prediction be founded upon the success, so far, of a reason or hypothesis, or upon custom so far observed.” (Gottfried W Leibniz, "De Modo Distinguendi phenomena realia ab imaginariis" ["On the Method of Distinguishing Real from Imaginary Phenomena”], cca. 1684)
"Mathematics in gross, it is plain, are a grievance in natural philosophy, and with reason: for mathematical proofs, like diamonds, are hard as well as clear, and will be touched with nothing but strict reasoning. Mathematical proofs are out of the reach of topical arguments; and are not to be attacked by the equivocal use of words or declaration, that make so great a part of other discourses, - nay, even of controversies." (John Locke, 1690)
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