On Proofs (1900-1919)

"[…] it is an error to believe that rigor in the proof is the enemy of simplicity." (David Hilbert, Paris International Congress, 1900)

“Besides it is an error to believe that rigour is the enemy of simplicity. On the contrary we find it confirmed by numerous examples that the rigorous method is at the same time the simpler and the more easily comprehended. The very effort for rigor forces us to find out simpler methods of proof.” (David Hilbert, “Mathematical Problems”, Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society, 1902)

"It is one of the chief merits of proofs that they instill a certain skepticism as to the result proved." (Bertrand Russell, "The Principles of Mathematics", 1903)

"Today it is no longer questioned that the principles of the analysts are the more far-reaching. Indeed, the synthesists lack two things in order to engage in a general theory of algebraic configurations: these are on the one hand a definition of imaginary elements, on the other an interpretation of general algebraic concepts. Both of these have subsequently been developed in synthetic form, but to do this the essential principle of synthetic geometry had to be set aside. This principle which manifests itself so brilliantly in the theory of linear forms and the forms of the second degree, is the possibility of immediate proof by means of visualized constructions." (Felix Klein, "Riemannsche Flächen", 1906)

"Banishing fundamental facts or problems from science merely because they cannot be dealt with by means of certain prescribed principles would be like forbidding the further extension of the theory of parallels in geometry because the axiom upon which this theory rests has been shown to be unprovable. Actually, principles must be judged from the point of view of science, and not science from the point of view of principles fixed once and for all." (Ernst Zermelo, "Neuer Beweis für die Möglichkeit einer Wohlordnung", Mathematische Annalen 65, 1908)

"It is by logic that we prove, but by intuition that we discover. [...] Every definition implies an axiom, since it asserts the existence of the object defined. The definition then will not be justified, from the purely logical point of view, until we have proved that it involves no contradiction either in its terms or with the truths previously admitted." (Henri Poincaré, "Science and Method", 1908)

"Now even in mathematics unprovability, as is well known, is in no way equivalent to nonvalidity, since, after all, not everything can be proved, but every proof in turn presupposes unproved principles. Thus, in order to reject such a fundamental principle, one would have to ascertain that in some particular case it did not hold or to derive contradictory consequences from it; but none of my opponents has made any attempt to do this." (Ernst Zermelo, "Neuer Beweis für die Möglichkeit einer Wohlordnung", Mathematische Annalen 65, 1908)

"The proof of the transcendency of π will hardly diminish the number of circle-squarers, however; for this class of people has always shown an absolute distrust of mathematicians and a contempt for mathematics that cannot be overcome by any amount of demonstration." (Felix Klein, "Lectures on Mathematics", 1911)

"The proof that π is a transcendental number will forever mark an epoch in mathematical science. It gives the final answer to the problem of squaring the circle and settles this vexed question once for all. This problem requires to derive the number π by a finite number of elementary geometrical processes, i.e. with the use of the ruler and compasses alone. As a straight line and a circle, or two circles, have only two intersections, these processes, or any finite combination of them, can be expressed algebraically in a comparatively simple form, so that a solution of the problem of squaring the circle would mean that π can be expressed as the root of an algebraic equation of a comparatively simple kind, viz. one that is solvable by square roots." (Felix Klein, "Lectures on Mathematics", 1911)

"It is well to notice in this connection [the mutual relations between the results of counting and measuring] that a natural law, in the statement of which measurable magnitudes occur, can only be understood to hold in nature with a certain degree of approximation; indeed natural laws as a rule are not proof against sufficient refinement of the measuring tools." (Luitzen E J Brouwer, "Intuitionism and Formalism", Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society, Vol. 20, 1913)

"At difficult times like this, the only salvation is an enthusiasm for science and elevated thinking, and from all sciences, mathematics, through its precise problems, through its rigorous proofs, gives the most important and immediate rewarding and serves then as a solid foundation for any other theoretical or applied profession." (Gheorghe Ţiţeica, "Gazeta Matematica", ["Mathematical Gazette"] XXXVI, 1916)