On Certainty (1600-1699)

"[…] if a man will begin with certainties he shall end in doubts, but if he will be content to begin with doubts, he shall end in certainties." (Sir Francis Bacon, "The Advancement of Learning", 1605)

"Thus, joining the rigor of demonstrations in mathematics with the uncertainty of chance, and conciliating these apparently contradictory matters, it can, taking its name from both of them, with justice arrogate the stupefying name: The Mathematics of Chance." (Blaise Pascal, [Address to the Academie Parisienne de Mathematiques] 1654)

"Probability, however, is not something absolute, [it is] drawn from certain information which, although it does not suffice to resolve the problem, nevertheless ensures that we judge correctly which of the two opposites is the easiest (facilius) given the conditions known to us." (Gottfried W Leibniz, "Forethoughts for an encyclopaedia or universal science", cca. 1679)

"Yet I shall not deny that the number of phenomena which are happily explained by a given hypothesis may be so great that it may be taken as morally certain." (Gottfried W Leibniz, "On the Elements of Natural Science", cca. 1682–84)

"Consider however (imitating Mathematicians) certainty or truth to be like the whole; and probabilities [to be like] parts, such that probabilities would be to truths what an acute angle [is] to a right [angle]." (Gottfried W Leibniz, [ to Vincent Placcius] 1687)

"And thus many are ignorant of mathematical truths, not out of any imperfection of their faculties, or uncertainty in the things themselves, but for want of application in acquiring, examining, and by due ways comparing those ideas." (John Locke, "An Essay Concerning Human Understanding", 1689)

"Knowledge being to be had only of visible and certain truth, error is not a fault of our knowledge, but a mistake of our judgment, giving assent to that which is not true." (John Locke, "An Essay Concerning Human Understanding", 1689)

"Probability is likeliness to be true, the very notation of the word signifying such a proposition, for which there be arguments or proofs to make it pass, or be received for true. […] The grounds of probability are two: conformity with our own experience, or the testimony of others' experience. Probability then, being to supply the defect of our knowledge and to guide us where that fails, is always conversant about propositions whereof we have no certainty, but only some inducements to receive them for true."  (John Locke, "An Essay Concerning Human Understanding", 1689)

"Sometimes the mind perceives the agreement or disagreement of two ideas immediately by themselves, without the intervention of any other; and this, I think, we may call intuitive knowledge. [...] Intuitive knowledge needs no probation, nor can have any, this being the highest of all human certainty." (John Locke, "An Essay Concerning Human Understanding", 1689)

"[…] the highest probability amounts not to certainty, without which there can be no true knowledge." (John Locke, "An Essay Concerning Human Understanding", 1689)

"They that are ignorant of Algebra cannot imagine the wonders in this kind are to be done by it: and what further improvements and helps advantageous to other parts of knowledge the sagacious mind of man may yet find out, it is not easy to determine. This at least I believe, that the ideas of quantity are not those alone that are capable of demonstration and knowledge; and that other, and perhaps more useful, parts of contemplation, would afford us certainty, if vices, passions, and domineering interest did not oppose and menace such endeavors." (John Locke, "An Essay Concerning Human Understanding", 1689)

"Though moral certainty be sometimes taken for a high degree of probability, which can only produce a doubtful assent, yet it is also frequently used for a firm assent to a thing upon such grounds as fully satisfy a prudent man." (John Tillotson, "The Works of the Most Reverend Dr. John Tillotson", 1696)