On Induction (1900-1949)

"Induction applied to the physical sciences is always uncertain, because it rests on the belief in a general order of the universe, an order outside of us." (Henri Poincaré, "Science and Hypothesis", 1901)

"I may as well say at once that I do not distinguish between inference and deduction. What is called induction appears to me to be either disguised deduction or a mere method of making plausible guesses." (Bertrand Russell, "Principles of Mathematics", 1903)

"If one intends to base arithmetic on the theory of natural numbers as finite cardinals, one has to deal mainly with the definition of finite set; for the cardinal is, according to its nature, a property of a set, and any proposition about finite cardinals can always be expressed as a proposition about finite sets. In the following I will try to deduce the most important property of natural numbers, namely the principle of complete induction, from a definition of finite set which is as simple as possible, at the same time showing that the different definitions [of finite set] given so far are equivalent to the one given here." (Ernst Zermelo, "Ueber die Grundlagen der Arithmetik", Atti del IV Congresso Internazionale dei Matematici, 1908)

"We shall call this universal organizational science the 'Tektology'. The literal translation of this word from the Greek is 'the theory of construction'. 'Construction' is the most generaI and suitable synonym for the modern concept of 'organization'. [...] The aim of tektology is to systematize organizational experience; this science is clearly empirical and should draw its conclusions by way of induction." (Alexander Bogdanov, "Tektology: The Universal Organizational Science" Vol. I, 1913)

"The great difference between induction and hypothesis is that the former infers the existence of phenomena such as we have observed in cases which are similar, while hypothesis supposes something of a different kind from what we have directly observed, and frequently something which it would be impossible for us to observe directly." (Charles S Peirce, "Chance, Love and Logic: Philosophical Essays, Deduction, Induction, Hypothesis", 1914)

"We know that the probability of well-established induction is great, but, when we are asked to name its degree we cannot. Common sense tells us that some inductive arguments are stronger than others, and that some are very strong. But how much stronger or how strong we cannot express." (John M Keynes, "A Treatise on Probability", 1921)

"The process of induction is the process of assuming the simplest law that can be made to harmonize with our experience. This process, however, has no logical foundation but only a psychological one. It is clear that there are no grounds for believing that the  simplest course of events will really happen." (Ludwig Wittgenstein, "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus", 1922)

"The so-called law of induction cannot possibly be a law of logic, since it is obviously a proposition with a sense. - Nor, therefore, can it be an a priori law." (Ludwig Wittgenstein, "Tractatus Logico Philosophicus", 1922)

"There is a tradition of opposition between adherents of induction and of deduction. In my view it would be just as sensible for the two ends of a worm to quarrel. (Alfred N Whitehead, "The Aims of Education & Other Essays", 1929)

"When an induction, based on observations, is made, it is not intended that it shall be accepted as a universal truth, but it is advanced as a hypothesis for further study. Additional observations are then made and the results compared with the results expected from the hypothesis. If there is more deviation between the experimental results and the computed results than can be expected from the inaccuracies of observation and measurement, the scientist discards the' hypothesis and tries to formulate another." (Mayme I Logsdon, "A Mathematician Explains", 1935)

"It is time, therefore, to abandon the superstition that natural science cannot be regarded as logically respectable until philosophers have solved the problem of induction. The problem of induction is, roughly speaking, the problem of finding a way to prove that certain empirical generalizations which are derived from past experience will hold good also in the future." (Alfred J Ayer, "Language, Truth and Logic", 1936)

"Given any domain of thought in which the fundamental objective is a knowledge that transcends mere induction or mere empiricism, it seems quite inevitable that its processes should be made to conform closely to the pattern of a system free of ambiguous terms, symbols, operations, deductions; a system whose implications and assumptions are unique and consistent; a system whose logic confounds not the necessary with the sufficient where these are distinct; a system whose materials are abstract elements interpretable as reality or unreality in any forms whatsoever provided only that these forms mirror a thought that is pure. To such a system is universally given the name Mathematics." (Samuel T. Sanders, "Mathematics", National Mathematics Magazine, 1937)

"It is essential to the possibility of induction that we shall be prepared for occasional wrong decisions." (Harold Jeffreys, "Theory of Probability", 1939)

"The question of the origin of the hypothesis belongs to a domain in which no very general rules can be given; experiment, analogy and constructive intuition play their part here. But once the correct hypothesis is formulated, the principle of mathematical induction is often sufficient to provide the proof." (Richard Courant & Herbert Robbins, "What Is Mathematics?: An Elementary Approach to Ideas and Methods" , 1941)

"In mathematics as in the physical sciences we may use observation and induction to discover general laws. But there is a difference. In the physical sciences, there is no higher authority than observation and induction but In mathematics there is such an authority: rigorous proof." (George Pólya, "How to solve it", 1945)

"Induction is the process of discovering general laws by the observation and combination of particular instances. […] Induction tries to find regularity and coherence behind the observations. Its most conspicuous instruments are generalization, specialization, analogy. Tentative generalization starts from an effort to understand the observed facts; it is based on analogy, and tested by further special cases." (George Pólya, "How to solve it", 1945)