On Impossibility (1750-1799)

"Especially when we investigate the general laws of Nature, induction has very great power; & there is scarcely any other method beside it for the discovery of these laws. By its assistance, even the ancient philosophers attributed to all bodies extension, figurability, mobility, & impenetrability; & to these properties, by the use of the same method of reasoning, most of the later philosophers add inertia & universal gravitation. Now, induction should take account of every single case that can possibly happen, before it can have the force of demonstration; such induction as this has no place in establishing the laws of Nature. But use is made of an induction of a less rigorous type ; in order that this kind of induction may be employed, it must be of such a nature that in all those cases particularly, which can be examined in a manner that is bound to lead to a definite conclusion as to whether or no the law in question is followed, in all of them the same result is arrived at; & that these cases are not merely a few. Moreover, in the other cases, if those which at first sight appeared to be contradictory, on further & more accurate investigation, can all of them be made to agree with the law; although, whether they can be made to agree in this way better than in any Other whatever, it is impossible to know directly anyhow. If such conditions obtain, then it must be considered that the induction is adapted to establishing the law." (Roger J Boscovich, "De Lege Continuitatis" ["On the law of continuity"], 1754)

"As a general rule - never substitute the symbol for the thing signified, unless it is impossible to show the thing itself; for the child's attention is so taken up with the symbol that he will forget what it signifies." (Jean Jacques Rousseau, "Emile, or On Education", 1762)

"One of the most intimate of all associations in the human mind is that of cause and effect. They suggest one another with the utmost readiness upon all occasions; so that it is almost impossible to contemplate the one, without having some idea of, or forming some conjecture about the other." (Joseph Priestley, "The History and Present State of Electricity", 1767)

"Because all conceivable numbers are either greater than zero or less than 0 or equal to 0, then it is clear that the square roots of negative numbers cannot be included among the possible numbers [real numbers]. Consequently we must say that these are impossible numbers. And this circumstance leads us to the concept of such numbers, which by their nature are impossible, and ordinarily are called imaginary or fancied numbers, because they exist only in the imagination." (Leonhard Euler, "Vollständige Anleitung zur Algebra", 1768-69)

"All such expressions as √-1, √-2, etc., are consequently impossible or imaginary numbers, since they represent roots of negative quantities; and of such numbers we may truly assert that they are neither nothing, nor greater than nothing, nor less than nothing, which necessarily constitutes them imaginary or impossible." (Euler, Algebra, 1770)

"But ignorance of the different causes involved in the production of events, as well as their complexity, taken together with the imperfection of analysis, prevents our reaching the same certainty about the vast majority of phenomena. Thus there are things that are uncertain for us, things more or less probable, and we seek to compensate for the impossibility of knowing them by determining their different degrees of likelihood. So it was that we owe to the weakness of the human mind one of the most delicate and ingenious of mathematical theories, the science of chance or probability." (Pierre-Simon Laplace, "Recherches, 1º, sur l'Intégration des Équations Différentielles aux Différences Finies, et sur leur Usage dans la Théorie des Hasards", 1773)

"That metaphysics has hitherto remained in so vacillating a state of uncertainty and contradiction, is only to be attributed to the fact, that this great problem, and perhaps even the difference between analytical and synthetical judgements, did not sooner suggest itself to philosophers. Upon the solution of this problem, or upon sufficient proof of the impossibility of synthetical knowledge a priori, depends the existence or downfall of metaphysics. (Immanuel Kant, "Critique of Pure Reason" , 1781)

"Mathematicians have, in many cases, proved some things to be possible and others to be impossible, which, without demonstration, would not have been believed […] Mathematics afford many instances of impossibilities in the nature of things, which no man would have believed, if they had not been strictly demonstrated. Perhaps, if we were able to reason demonstratively in other subjects, to as great extent as in mathematics, we might find many things to be impossible, which we conclude, without hesitation, to be possible." (Thomas Reid, "Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man", 1785)

"We must therefore establish a form of decision-making in which voters need only ever pronounce on simple propositions, expressing their opinions only with a yes or a no. […] Clearly, if anyone’s vote was self-contradictory (intransitive), it would have to be discounted, and we should therefore establish a form of voting which makes such absurdities impossible." (Nicolas de Condorcet, "On the form of decisions made by plurality vote", 1788)

"It is impossible to disassociate language from science or science from language, because every natural science always involves three things: the sequence of phenomena on which the science is based; the abstract concepts which call these phenomena to mind; and the words in which the concepts are expressed. To call forth a concept a word is needed; to portray a phenomenon a concept is needed. All three mirror one and the same reality." (Antoine-Laurent Lavoisier, "Traite Elementaire de Chimie", 1789)

"The impossibility of separating the nomenclature of a science from the science itself is owing to this, that every branch of physical science must consist of three things: the series of facts which are the objects of the science, the ideas which represent these facts, and the words by which these ideas are expressed. Like three impressions of the same seal, the word ought to produce the idea, and the idea to be a picture of the fact." (Antoine-Laurent de Lavoisier, "Elements of Chemistry in a New Systematic Order", 1790)

"Yet this is attempted by algebraists, who talk of a number less than nothing, of multiplying a negative number into a negative number and thus producing a positive number, of a number being imaginary. Hence they talk of two roots to every equation of the second order, and the learner is to try which will succeed in a given equation: they talk of solving an equation which requires two impossible roots to make it solvable: they can find out some impossible numbers, which, being multiplied together, produce unity. This is all jargon, at which common sense recoils; but, from its having been once adopted, like many other figments, it finds the most strenuous supporters among those who love to take things upon trust, and hate the labour of a serious thought." (William Frend, "The Principles of Algebra", 1796)

"Certain authors who seem to have perceived the weakness of this method assume virtually as an axiom that an equation has indeed roots, if not possible ones, then impossible roots. What they want to be understood under possible and impossible quantities, does not seem to be set forth sufficiently clearly at all. If possible quantities are to denote the same as real quantities, impossible ones the same as imaginaries: then that axiom can on no account be admitted but needs a proof necessarily." (Carl F Gauss, "New proof of the theorem that every algebraic rational integral function in one variable can be resolved into real factors of the first or the second degree", 1799)