"Of the figures, the first is especially scientific. The mathematical sciences carry out their demonstrations through it – e.g. arithmetic and geometry and optics – and so do almost all those sciences which inquire into the reason why. For deductions giving the reason why are carried out, either in general or for the most part and in most cases, through this figure. For this reason, then, it is especially scientific; for study of the reason why has most importance for knowledge." (Aristotle, "Posterior Analytics", cca. 350 BC)
"The method of demonstration is therefore generally feeble and ineffective with regard to facts of nature (I refer to corporeal and changeable things). But it quickly recovers its strength when applied to the field of mathematics. For whatever it concludes in regard to such things as numbers, proportions and figures is indubitably true, and cannot be otherwise. One who wishes to become a master of the science of demonstration should first obtain a good grasp of probabilities. Whereas the principles of demonstrative logic are necessary; those of dialectic are probable." (John of Salisbury, "Metalogicon", 1159)
"Philosophy is written in this grand book, the universe, which stands continually open to our gaze. But the book cannot be understood unless one first learns to comprehend the language and read the letters in which it is composed. It is written in the language of mathematics, and its characters are triangles, circles, and other geometric figures without which it is humanly impossible to understand a single word of it; without these, one wanders about in a dark labyrinth." (Galileo Galilei, “The Assayer”, 1623)
"It hath been an old remark, that Geometry is an excellent Logic. And it must be owned that when the definitions are clear; when the postulata cannot be refused, nor the axioms denied; when from the distinct contemplation and comparison of figures, their properties are derived, by a perpetual well-connected chain of consequences, the objects being still kept in view, and the attention ever fixed upon them; there is acquired a habit of reasoning, close and exact and methodical; which habit strengthens and sharpens the mind, and being transferred to other subjects is of general use in the inquiry after truth." (George Berkeley, "The Analyst; Or, A Discourse Addressed to an Infidel Mathematician", 1734)
"The reader will find no figures in this work. The methods which I set forth do not require either constructions or geometrical or mechanical reasonings: but only algebraic operations, subject to a regular and uniform rule of procedure." (Joseph-Louis de Lagrange, "Mechanique Analytique", 1788)
"[…] the speculative propositions of mathematics do not relate to facts; […] all that we are convinced of by any demonstration in the science, is of a necessary connection subsisting between certain suppositions and certain conclusions. When we find these suppositions actually take place in a particular instance, the demonstration forces us to apply the conclusion. Thus, if I could form a triangle, the three sides of which were accurately mathematical lines, I might affirm of this individual figure, that its three angles are equal to two right angles; but as the imperfection of my senses puts it out of my power to be, in any case, certain of the exact correspondence of the diagram which I delineate, with the definitions given in the elements of geometry, I never can apply with confidence to a particular figure, a mathematical theorem. On the other hand, it appears from the daily testimony of our senses that the speculative truths of geometry may be applied to material objects with a degree of accuracy sufficient for the purposes of life; and from such applications of them, advantages of the most important kind have been gained to society." (Dugald Stewart, "Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind", 1792)
"The analytical equations, unknown to the ancients, which Descartes first introduced into the study of curves and surfaces, are not restricted to the properties of figures, and to those properties which are the object of rational mechanics; they apply to all phenomena in general. There cannot be a language more universal and more simple, more free from errors and obscurities, that is to say, better adapted to express the invariable relations of nature." (Jean-Baptiste-Joseph Fourier, "The Analytical Theory of Heat", 1822)
"Algebra is but written geometry and geometry is but figured algebra." (Sophie Germain, "Mémoire sur les Surfaces Élastiques", 1880)
"Certainly it is permitted to anyone to put forward whatever hypotheses he wishes, and to develop the logical consequences contained in those hypotheses. But in order that this work merit the name of Geometry, it is necessary that these hypotheses or postulates express the result of the more simple and elementary observations of physical figures." (Giuseppe Peano, "Sui fondamenti della geometria", 1894)
"[…] geometry is the art of reasoning well from badly drawn figures; however, these figures, if they are not to deceive us, must satisfy certain conditions; the proportions may be grossly altered, but the relative positions of the different parts must not be upset." (Henri Poincaré, 1895)
"Geometry, then, is the application of strict logic to those properties of space and figure which are self-evident, and which therefore cannot be disputed. But the rigor of this science is carried one step further; for no property, however evident it may be, is allowed to pass without demonstration, if that can be given. The question is therefore to demonstrate all geometrical truths with the smallest possible number of assumptions." (Augustus de Morgan, "On the Study and Difficulties of Mathematics", 1898)
"Many theorems are obvious upon looking at a moderately-sized figure; but the reasoning must be such as to convince the mind of their truth when, from excessive increase or diminution of the scale, the figures themselves have past the boundary even of imagination." (Augustus de Morgan, "On the Study and Difficulties of Mathematics", 1898)
"A sign is a thing which is the representative, or deputy, of another thing for the purpose of affecting a mind. […] The utility of icons is evidenced by the diagrams of the mathematician, whether they involve continuity, like geometrical figures, or are arrays of discrete objects like a body of algebraical formulae, all of which are icons. Icons have to be used in all thinking." (Charles S Peirce, [manuscript] 1903)
"We may be thinking out a chain of reasoning in abstract Geometry, but if we draw a figure, as we usually must do in order to fix our ideas and prevent our attention from wandering owing to the difficulty of keeping a long chain of syllogisms in our minds, it is excusable if we are apt to forget that we are not in reality reasoning about the objects in the figure, but about objects which ore their idealizations, and of which the objects in the figure are only an imperfect representation. Even if we only visualize, we see the images of more or less gross physical objects, in which various qualities irrelevant for our specific purpose are not entirely absent, and which are at best only approximate images of those objects about which we are reasoning." (Ernest W Hobson, "Squaring the Circle", 1913)
"Mathematical reasoning may be regarded rather schematically as the exercise of a combination of two facilities, which we may call intuition and ingenuity. The activity of the intuition consists in making spontaneous judgements which are not the result of conscious trains of reasoning. [...] The exercise of ingenuity in mathematics consists in aiding the intuition through suitable arrangements of propositions, and perhaps geometrical figures or drawings." (Alan M Turing, "Systems of Logic Based on Ordinals", Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society Vol 45 (2), 1939)
"Exact figures have, in principle, the same role in geometry as exact measurements in physics; but, in practice, exact figures are less important than exact measurements because the theorems of geometry are much more extensively verified than the laws of physics. The beginner, however, should construct many figures as exactly as he can in order to acquire a good experimental basis; and exact figures may suggest geometric theorems also to the more advanced. Yet, for the purpose of reasoning, carefully drawn free-hand figures are usually good enough, and they are much more quickly done."
"Two kinds of sets turn up in geometry. First of all, in geometry we ordinarily talk about the properties of some set of geometric figures. For example, the theorem stating that the diagonals of a parallelogram bisect each other relates to the set of all parallelograms. Secondly, the geometric figures are themselves sets composed of the points occurring within them. We can therefore speak of the set of all points contained within a given circle, of the set of all points within a given cone, etc."
"Every branch of geometry can be defined as the study of properties that are unaltered when a specified figure is given specified symmetry transformations. Euclidian plane geometry, for instance, concerns the study of properties that are 'invariant' when a figure is moved about on the plane, rotated, mirror reflected, or uniformly expanded and contracted. Affine geometry studies properties that are invariant when a figure is 'stretched' in a certain way. Projective geometry studies properties invariant under projection. Topology deals with properties that remain unchanged even when a figure is radically distorted in a manner similar to the deformation of a figure made of rubber." (Martin Gardner, "Aha! Insight", 1978)
“We become quite convinced that a theorem is correct if we prove it on the basis of reasonably sound statements about numbers or geometrical figures which are intuitively more acceptable than the one we prove.” (Morris Kline, “Mathematics: The loss of certainty”, 1980)
"Geometry is the study of form and shape. Our first encounter with it usually involves such figures as triangles, squares, and circles, or solids such as the cube, the cylinder, and the sphere. These objects all have finite dimensions of length, area, and volume - as do most of the objects around us. At first thought, then, the notion of infinity seems quite removed from ordinary geometry. That this is not so can already be seen from the simplest of all geometric figures - the straight line. A line stretches to infinity in both directions, and we may think of it as a means to go 'far out' in a one-dimensional world."
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