On Plausibility IV

"Devising the plan of the solution, we should not be too afraid of merely plausible, heuristic reasoning. Anything is right that leads to the right idea. But we have to change this standpoint when we start carrying out the plan and then we should accept only conclusive, strict arguments." (George Pólya, "How to solve it", 1945)

"Heuristic reasoning is reasoning not regarded as final and strict but as provisional and plausible only, whose purpose is to discover the solution of the present problem. We are often obliged to use heuristic reasoning. We shall attain complete certainty when we shall have obtained the complete solution, but before obtaining certainty we must often be satisfied with a more or less plausible guess. We may need the provisional before we attain the final. We need heuristic reasoning when we construct a strict proof as we need scaffolding when we erect a building." (George Pólya, "How to solve it", 1945)

"From the outset it was clear that the two kinds of reasoning have different tasks. From the outset. they appeared very different: demonstrative reasoning as definite, final, 'machinelike'; and plausible reasoning as vague, provisional, specifically 'human'. Now we may see the difference a little more distinctly. In opposition to demonstrative inference, plausible inference leaves indeterminate a highly relevant point: the 'strength' or the 'weight' of the conclusion. This weight may depend not only on clarified grounds such as those expressed in the premises, hut also on unclarified unexpressed grounds somewhere on the background of the person who draws the conclusion. A person has a background, a machine has not. Indeed, you can build a machine to draw demonstrative conclusions for you, but I think you can never build a machine that will draw plausible inferences." (George Pólya, "Mathematics and Plausible Reasoning", 1954)

"We secure our mathematical knowledge by demonstrative reasoning, but we support our conjectures by plausible reasoning. A mathematical proof is demonstrative reasoning, but the inductive evidence of the physicist, the circumstantial evidence of the lawyer, the documentary evidence of the historian, and the statistical evidence of the economist belong to plausible reasoning." (George Pólya, "Mathematics and Plausible Reasoning", 1954)

"On the other hand, the 'subjective' school of thought, regards probabilities as expressions of human ignorance; the probability of an event is merely a formal expression of our expectation that the event will or did occur, based on whatever information is available. To the subjectivist, the purpose of probability theory is to help us in forming plausible conclusions in cases where there is not enough information available to lead to certain conclusions; thus detailed verification is not expected. The test of a good subjective probability distribution is does it correctly represent our state of knowledge as to the value of x?" (Edwin T Jaynes, "Information Theory and Statistical Mechanics" I, 1956)

"It is widely recognized that the word 'probability' has two very different main senses. In its original meaning, which is still the popular meaning, the word is roughly synonymous with plausibility. It has reference to reasonableness of belief or expectation. If 'logic' is interpreted in a broad sense, then this kind of probability belongs to logic. In its other meaning, which is that usually attributed to it by statisticians, the word has reference to a type of physical phenomena, known as random or chance phenomena. If 'physics' is interpreted in a broad sense, then this kind of probability belongs to physics. Physical probabilities can be determined empirically by noting the proportion of successes in some trials. (The determination is inexact and unsure, like all other physical determinations.)" (Francis J Anscombe & Robert J Aumann, "A Definition of Subjective Probability", The Annals of Mathematical Statistics Vol. 34 (1), 1963)

"Probability theory, for us, is not so much a part of mathematics as a part of logic, inductive logic, really. It provides a consistent framework for reasoning about statements whose correctness or incorrectness cannot be deduced from the hypothesis. The information available is sufficient only to make the inferences 'plausible' to a greater or lesser extent." (Ralph Baierlein, "Atoms and Information Theory: An Introduction to Statistical Mechanics", 1971)

"By common consensus in the mathematical world, a good proof displays three essential characteristics: a good proof is (1) convincing, (2) surveyable, and (3) formalizable. The first requirement means simply that most mathematicians believe it when they see it. […] Most mathematicians and philosophers of mathematics demand more than mere plausibility, or even belief. A proof must be able to be understood, studied, communicated, and verified by rational analysis. In short, it must be surveyable. Finally, formalizability means we can always find a suitable formal system in which an informal proof can be embedded and fleshed out into a formal proof." (John L Casti, "Mathematical Mountaintops: The Five Most Famous Problems of All Time", 2001)

"Given any collection of infinite sets the Axiom of Choice tells us that there exists a set which has one element in common with each of the sets in the collection. Choice, which seems to be an intuitively sound principle, is equivalent to the much less plausible statement that every set has a well-ordering. Although many tried to prove Choice, they only seemed to be able to find equivalent statements which were just as difficult to prove." (Barnaby Sheppard, "The Logic of Infinity", 2014)

"Objections to the Axiom of Choice, either the strong or the weak version, are typically either philosophical, based on the intuitive temporal implausibility of making an infinite number of choices, or on the non-constructive nature of the axiom, or are based on a peculiar identification of continuum-based models of physics with the physical objects being modelled; properties of the model which are implied by the Axiom of Choice are deemed to be counterintuitive because the physical objects they model don’t have these properties. Motivated by these objections, or just for curiosity, several alternatives to Choice have been explored." (Barnaby Sheppard, "The Logic of Infinity", 2014)