"If we are not content with the dull accumulation of experimental facts, if we make any deductions or generalizations, if we seek for any theory to guide us, some degree of speculation cannot be avoided. Some will prefer to take the interpretation which seems to be most immediately indicated and at once adopted as an hypothesis; others will rather seek to explore and classify the widest possibilities which are not definitely inconsistent with the facts. Either choice has its dangers: the first may be too narrow a view and lead progress into a cul-de-sac; the second may be so broad that it is useless as a guide and diverge indefinitely from experimental knowledge." (Sir Arthur S Eddington, "The Internal Constitution of the Stars Observatory", Vol. 43, 1920)
"Active experimentation must force the apparent facts of nature into forms different to those in which they familiarly present themselves; and thus make them tell the truth about themselves, as torture may compel an unwilling witness to reveal what he has been concealing." (John Dewey, "Reconstruction in Philosophy", 1920)
"It is well to be explicit when a positive generalization is made from negative experimental evidence." (Arthur Eddington, "Space, Time and Gravitation: An Outline of the General Relativity", 1920)
"A hypothesis or theory is clear, decisive, and positive, but it is believed by no one but the man who created it. Experimental findings, on the other hand, are messy, inexact things, which are believed by everyone except the man who did the work." (Harlow Shapley, "Review of Scientific Instruments" Vol. 6, 1922)
"Experiment without imagination or imagination without recourse to experiment, can accomplish little, but for effective progress, a happy blend of these two powers is necessary." (Ernest Rutherford, "The Electrical Structure of Matter", Science Vol. 58 (1499), 1923)
"There is no more pressing need in connection with the examination of experimental results than to test whether a given body of data is or is not in agreement with any suggested hypothesis." (Sir Ronald A Fisher, "Statistical Methods for Research Workers", 1925)
"Intermediate between mathematics, statistics, and economics, we find a new discipline which, for lack of a better name, may be called econometrics. Econometrics has as its aim to subject abstract laws of theoretical political economy or 'pure' economics to experimental and numerical verification, and thus to turn pure economics, as far as possible, into a science in the strict sense of the word." (Ragnar Frisch, "On a Problem in Pure Economics", 1926)
"We are, finally, forced to think that each grain only follows the portion of liquid surrounding it, in the same way that an indicating buoy indicates and analyses the movement all the better if it is smaller: a float follows the movement of the sea more faithfully than a battleship. We obtain from this an essential property of what is called a liquid in equilibrium: its repose is only an illusion due to the imperfection of our senses, and what we call equilibrium is a certain well-defined permanent system of a perfectly irregular agitation. This is an experimental fact in which no hypothesis plays any part." ("Discontinuous Structure of Matter", [Nobel lecture] 1926)
"Physics has progressed because, in the first place, she accepted the uniformity of nature; because, in the next place, she early discovered the value of exact measurements; because, in the third place, she concentrated her attention on the regularities that underlie the complexities of phenomena as they appear to us; and lastly, and not the least significant, because she emphasized the importance of the experimental method of research. An ideal or crucial experiment is a study of an event, controlled so as to give a definite and measurable answer to a question - an answer in terms of specific theoretical ideas, or better still an answer in terms of better understood relations." (Thomas H Morgan, "The Relation of Biology to Physics", Science Vol. LXV (1679), 1927)
"When a man of science speaks of his 'data', he knows very well in practice what he means. Certain experiments have been conducted, and have yielded certain observed results, which have been recorded. But when we try to define a 'datum' theoretically, the task is not altogether easy. A datum, obviously, must be a fact known by perception. But it is very difficult to arrive at a fact in which there is no element of inference, and yet it would seem improper to call something a 'datum' if it involved inferences as well as observation. This constitutes a problem [...]" (Bertrand Russell, The Analysis of Matter", 1927)
"Euclidean geometry can be easily visualized; this is the argument adduced for the unique position of Euclidean geometry in mathematics. It has been argued that mathematics is not only a science of implications but that it has to establish preference for one particular axiomatic system. Whereas physics bases this choice on observation and experimentation, i. e., on applicability to reality, mathematics bases it on visualization, the analogue to perception in a theoretical science. Accordingly, mathematicians may work with the non-Euclidean geometries, but in contrast to Euclidean geometry, which is said to be intuitively understood," these systems consist of nothing but 'logical relations' or 'artificial manifolds'. They belong to the field of analytic geometry, the study of manifolds and equations between variables, but not to geometry in the real sense which has a visual significance." (Hans Reichenbach, "The Philosophy of Space and Time", 1928)
"For establishing the laws of nature one resorts (not deliberately but involuntarily) to the simplest formulas that seem to describe the phenomena with reasonable accuracy. […] Even those laws of nature that are the most general and important for the world view have always been proved experimentally only in a confined ambit and with limited accuracy. […] The exact formulation of the laws of nature by simple formulas is based on the desire to master external phenomena with the simplest tools possible." (Felix Klein, "Elementary Mathematics from a Higher Standpoint" Vol III: "Precision Mathematics and Approximation Mathematics", 1928)
"[Philosophy] has tried to combine acceptance of the conclusions of scientific inquiry as to the natural world with the acceptance of doctrines about the nature of mind and knowledge which originated before there was such a thing as systematic experimental inquiry. Between the two there is an inherent incompatibility." (John Dewey, "Quest for Certainty: A Study of the Relation of Knowledge and Action", 1929)
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