Mental Models XLV

"Our knowledge springs from two fundamental sources of the mind; the first is the capacity of receiving representations (receptivity for impressions), the second is the power of knowing an object through these representations (spontaneity [in the production] of concepts)." (Immanuel Kant, "Critique of Pure Reason", 1781)

The traditional psychology talks like one who should say a river consists of nothing but pailsful, spoonsful, quartpotsful, barrelsful, and other moulded forms of water. Even were the pails and the pots all actually standing in the stream, still between them the free water would continue to flow. It is just this free water of consciousness that psychologists resolutely overlook. Every definite image in the mind is steeped and dyed in the free water that flows round it. With it goes the sense of its relations, near and remote, the dying echo of whence it came to us, the dawning sense of whither it is to lead." (William James, "On Some Omissions of Introspective Psychology", Mind, 1884) 

"The great basic thought that the world is not to be comprehended as a complex of ready-made things, but as a complex of processes, in which the things apparently stable no less than their mind-images in our heads, the concepts, go through an uninterrupted change of coming into being and passing away, in which, in spite of all seeming accidents and of all temporary retrogression, a progressive development asserts itself in the end - this great fundamental thought has, especially since the time of Hegel, so thoroughly permeated ordinary consciousness that in this generality it is scarcely ever contradicted." (Friedrich Engels," Ludwig Feuerbach and the Outcome of Classical German Philosophy", 1886)

"For a long time it has been known that the first systems of representations with which men have pictured to themselves the world and themselves were of religious origin. There is no religion that is not a cosmology at the same time that it is a speculation upon divine things. If philosophy and the sciences were born of religion, it is because religion began by taking the place of the sciences and philosophy." (Emile Durkheim, "The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life", 1912)

"If a fact is to be a picture, it must have something in common with what it depicts. […] What a picture must have in common with reality, in order to be able to depict it correctly or incorrectly - in the way it does, is its pictorial form. […] What any picture, of whatever form, must have in common with reality, in order to be able to depict it - correctly or incorrectly in any way at all, is logical form, i.e., the form of reality. […] Logical pictures can depict the world." (Ludwig Wittgenstein, "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus", 1922)

"A conceptual scheme is never discarded merely because of a few stubborn facts with which it cannot be reconciled; a conceptual scheme is either modified or replaced by a better one, never abandoned with nothing left to take its place."(James B Conant, "Science and Common Sense", 1951)

"As an empiricist I continue to think of the conceptual scheme of science as a tool, ultimately, for predicting future experience in the light of past experience. Physical objects are conceptually imported into the situation as convenient intermediaries - not by definition in terms of experience, but simply as irreducible posits comparable, epistemologically, to the gods of Homer." (Willard v O Quine, "From a Logical Point of View", 1953) 

"The ultimate origin of the difficulty lies in the fact (or philosophical principle) that we are compelled to use the words of common language when we wish to describe a phenomenon, not by logical or mathematical analysis, but by a picture appealing to the imagination. Common language has grown by everyday experience and can never surpass these limits. Classical physics has restricted itself to the use of concepts of this kind; by analysing visible motions it has developed two ways of representing them by elementary processes; moving particles and waves. There is no other way of giving a pictorial description of motions - we have to apply it even in the region of atomic processes, where classical physics breaks down." (Max Born, "Atomic Physics", 1957)

"The reason why new concepts in any branch of science are hard to grasp is always the same; contemporary scientists try to picture the new concept in terms of ideas which existed before." (Freeman J Dyson, "Innovation in Physics" , Scientific American, 1958)