"Engineers, as a rule are not and do not pretend to be philosophers in the sense of building up consistent systems of thought following logically from certain premises. If anything, they pride themselves on being hard-headed practical men concerned only with facts, disdaining mere speculation or opinion. In practice, however, engineers do make many assumptions about the nature of the universe, of man, and of society." (Edwin T Layton Jr., "The Revolt of the Engineers", 1971)
"Early scientific thinking was holistic, but speculative - the modern scientific temper reacted by being empirical, but atomistic. Neither is free from error, the former because it replaces factual inquiry with faith and insight, and the latter because it sacrifices coherence at the altar of facticity. We witness today another shift in ways of thinking: the shift toward rigorous but holistic theories. This means thinking in terms of facts and events in the context of wholes, forming integrated sets with their own properties and relationships."(Ervin László, "Introduction to Systems Philosophy", 1972)
"There are two subcategories of holist called irredundant holists and redundant holists. Students of both types image an entire system of facts or principles. Though an irredundant holist's image is rightly interconnected, it contains only relevant and essential constitents. In contrast, redundant holists entertain images that contain logically irrelevant or overspecific material, commonly derived from data used to 'enrich' the curriculum, and these students embed the salient facts and principles in a network of redundant items. Though logically irrelevant, the items in question are of great psychological importance to a 'redundant holist', since he uses them to access, retain and manipulate whatever he was originally required to learn." (Gordon Pask, "Learning Strategies and Individual Competence", 1972)
"This parallel, between cybernetic explanation and the tactics of logical or mathematical proof, is of more than trivial interest. Outside of cybernetics, we look for explanation, but not for anything which would simulate logical proof. This simulation of proof is something new. We can say, however, with hindsight wisdom, that explanation by simulation of logical or mathematical proof was expectable. After all, the subject matter of cybernetics is not events and objects but the information 'carried' by events and objects. We consider the objects or events only as proposing facts, propositions, messages, percepts, and the like. The subject matter being propositional, it is expectable that explanation would simulate the logical." (Gregory Bateson, "Steps to an Ecology of Mind", 1972)
"To do science is to search for repeated patterns, not simply to accumulate facts, and to do the science of geographical ecology is to search for patterns of plants and animal life that can be put on a map." (Robert H. MacArthur, "Geographical Ecology", 1972)
"Models are not assigned per se uniquely to their originals. They perform their replacement function: a) for definite – cognitive and/or handling, model-using – subjects, b) within definite time intervals, c) under restrictions of definite operations of thought or fact. […] Models are not only models of something. They are also models for somebody, a human or an artificial model user. They perform thereby their functions in time, within a time interval. And finally, they are models for a definite purpose." (Herbert Stachowiak, "Allgemeine Modelltheorie", 1973)
"Is evolution a theory, a system or a hypothesis? It is much more: it is a general condition to which all theories, all hypotheses, all systems must bow and which they must satisfy henceforth if they are to be thinkable and true. Evolution is a light illuminating all facts, a curve that all lines must follow." (Pierre T de Chardin, "The Phenomenon of Man", 1975)
"No theory ever agrees with all the facts in its domain, yet it is not always the theory that is to blame. Facts are constituted by older ideologies, and a clash between facts and theories may be proof of progress. It is also a first step in our attempt to find the principles implicit in familiar observational notions." (Paul K Feyerabend, "Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge", 1975)
"[…] semantic nets [are defined] as graphical analogues of data structures representing 'facts' in a computer system for understanding natural language." (Lenhart K Schubert," "Extending the Expressive Power of Semantic Networks", Artificial Intelligence 7, 1976)
"In comparison with Predicate Calculus encoding is of factual knowledge, semantic nets seem more natural and understandable. This is due to the one-to-one correspondence between nodes and the concepts they denote, to the clustering about a particular node of propositions about a particular thing, and to the visual immediacy of 'interrelationships' between concepts, i.e., their connections via sequences of propositional links." (Lenhart K Schubert, "Extending the Expressive Power of Semantic Networks", Artificial Intelligence 7, 1976)
"The chief difficulty of modern theoretical physics resides not in the fact that it expresses itself almost exclusively in mathematical symbols, but in the psychological difficulty of supposing that complete nonsense can be seriously promulgated and transmitted by persons who have sufficient intelligence of some kind to perform operations in differential and integral calculus […]" (Celia Green, "The Decline and Fall of Science", 1976)
"Facts do not ‘speak for themselves’; they are read in the light of theory. Creative thought, in science as much as in the arts, is the motor of changing opinion. Science is a quintessentially human activity, not a mechanized, robot-like accumulation of objective information, leading by laws of logic to inescapable interpretation." (Stephen J Gould, "Ever Since Darwin", 1977)
"The branch of modern science called cybernetics gives us concepts that describe the evolutionary process at both the level of intracellular structures and the level of social phenomena. The fundamental unity of the evolutionary process at all levels of organization is transformed from a philosophical view to a scientifically substantiated fact." (Valentin F Turchin, "The Phenomenon of Science: A cybernetic approach to human evolution", 1977)
"There are two facts about the distribution of prime numbers of which I hope to convince you so overwhelmingly that they will be permanently engraved in your hearts. The first is that, despite their simple definition and role as the building blocks of the natural numbers, the prime numbers belong to the most arbitrary and ornery objects studied by mathematicians: they grow like weeds among the natural numbers, seeming to obey no other law than that of chance, and nobody can predict where the next one will sprout. The second fact is even more astonishing, for it states just the opposite: that the prime numbers exhibit stunning regularity, that there are laws governing their behaviour, and that they obey these laws with almost military precision." (Don Zagier, "The First 50 Million Prime Numbers", The Mathematical Intelligencer Vol. 0, 1977)
"A good theorem will almost always have a wide-ranging influence on later mathematics, simply by virtue of the fact that it is true. Since it is true, it must be true for some reason; and if that reason lies deep, then the uncovering of it will usually require a deeper understanding of neighboring facts and principles." (Ian Richards, "Number theory", 1978)
"No theory ever agrees with all the facts in its domain, yet it is not always the theory that is to blame. Facts are constituted by older ideologies, and a clash between facts and theories may be proof of progress." (Paul K Feyerabend, "Against Method", 1978)
"Science has so accustomed us to devising and accepting theories to account for the facts we observe, however fantastic, that our minds must begin their manufacture before we are aware of it." (Gene Wolfe, "Seven American Nights", 1978)
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