"[…] for the saving the long progression of the thoughts to remote and first principles in every case, the mind should provide itself several stages; that is to say, intermediate principles, which it might have recourse to in the examining those positions that come in its way. These, though they are not self-evident principles, yet, if they have been made out from them by a wary and unquestionable deduction, may be depended on as certain and infallible truths, and serve as unquestionable truths to prove other points depending upon them, by a nearer and shorter view than remote and general maxims. […] And thus mathematicians do, who do not in every new problem run it back to the first axioms through all the whole train of intermediate propositions. Certain theorems that they have settled to themselves upon sure demonstration, serve to resolve to them multitudes of propositions which depend on them, and are as firmly made out from thence as if the mind went afresh over every link of the whole chain that tie them to first self-evident principles." (John Locke, "The Conduct of the Understanding", 1706)
"It hath been an old remark, that Geometry is an excellent Logic. And it must be owned that when the definitions are clear; when the postulata cannot be refused, nor the axioms denied; when from the distinct contemplation and comparison of figures, their properties are derived, by a perpetual well-connected chain of consequences, the objects being still kept in view, and the attention ever fixed upon them; there is acquired a habit of reasoning, close and exact and methodical; which habit strengthens and sharpens the mind, and being transferred to other subjects is of general use in the inquiry after truth." (George Berkeley, "The Analyst", 1734)
"In mathematics it [sophistry] had no place from the beginning: Mathematicians having had the wisdom to define accurately the terms they use, and to lay down, as axioms, the first principles on which their reasoning is grounded. Accordingly we find no parties among mathematicians, and hardly any disputes." (Thomas Reid, "Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man", 1785)
"The mathematician pays not the least regard either to testimony or conjecture, but deduces everything by demonstrative reasoning, from his definitions and axioms. Indeed, whatever is built upon conjecture, is improperly called science; for conjecture may beget opinion, but cannot produce knowledge." (Thomas Reid, "Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man", 1785)
"The science [mathematics], once fairly established on the foundation of a few axioms and definitions, as upon a rock, has grown from age to age, so as to become the most solid fabric that human reason can boast." (Thomas Reid, "Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man", 1785)
"Certain authors who seem to have perceived the weakness of this method assume virtually as an axiom that an equation has indeed roots, if not possible ones, then impossible roots. What they want to be understood under possible and impossible quantities, does not seem to be set forth sufficiently clearly at all. If possible quantities are to denote the same as real quantities, impossible ones the same as imaginaries: then that axiom can on no account be admitted but needs a proof necessarily." (Carl F Gauss, "New proof of the theorem that every algebraic rational integral function in one variable can be resolved into real factors of the first or the second degree", 1799)
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