"Some definite interpretation of a linear algebra would, at first sight, appear indispensable to its successful application. But on the contrary, it is a singular fact, and one quite consonant with the principles of sound logic, that its first and general use is mostly to be expected from its want of significance. The interpretation is a trammel to the use. Symbols are essential to comprehensive argument." (Benjamin Peirce, "On the Uses and Transformations of Linear Algebra", 1875)
"The most striking characteristic of the written language of algebra and of the higher forms of the calculus is the sharpness of definition, by which we are enabled to reason upon the symbols by the mere laws of verbal logic, discharging our minds entirely of the meaning of the symbols, until we have reached a stage of the process where we desire to interpret our results. The ability to attend to the symbols, and to perform the verbal, visible changes in the position of them permitted by the logical rules of the science, without allowing the mind to be perplexed with the meaning of the symbols until the result is reached which you wish to interpret, is a fundamental part of what is called analytical power. Many students find themselves perplexed by a perpetual attempt to interpret not only the result, but each step of the process. They thus lose much of the benefit of the labor-saving machinery of the calculus and are, indeed, frequently incapacitated for using it." (Thomas Hill, "Uses of Mathesis", Bibliotheca Sacra Vol. 32 (127), 1875)
"I say that a manifold (a collection, a set) of elements that belong to any conceptual sphere is well-defined, when on the basis of its definition and as a consequence of the logical principle of excluded middle it must be regarded as internally determined, both whether an object pertaining to the same conceptual sphere belongs or not as an element to the manifold, and whether two objects belonging to the set are equal to each other or not, despite formal differences in the ways of determination." (Georg Cantor, "Ober unendliche, lineare Punktmannichfaltigkeiten", 1879)
"[…] it must be noticed that these diagrams do not naturally harmonize with the propositions of ordinary life or ordinary logic. […] The great bulk of the propositions which we commonly meet with are founded, and rightly founded, on an imperfect knowledge of the actual mutual relations of the implied classes to one another. […] one very marked characteristic about these circular diagrams is that they forbid the natural expression of such uncertainty, and are therefore only directly applicable to a very small number of such propositions as we commonly meet with." (John Venn, "On the Diagrammatic and Mechanical Representation of Propositions and Reasonings", 1880)
"We need a system of symbols from which every ambiguity is banned, which has a strict logical form from which the content cannot escape." (Gottlob Frege, "Über die wissenschaftliche berechtigung einer begriffsschrift", Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik 81, 1882)
"Logic works, metaphysics contemplates." (Joseph Joubert, "The Notebooks of Joseph Joubert", 1883)
"The steps to scientific as well as other knowledge consist in a series of logical fictions which are as legitimate as they are indispensable in the operations of thought, but whose relations to the phenomena whereof they are the partial and not unfrequently merely symbolical representations must never be lost sight of." (John Stallo, "The Concepts and Theories of Modern Physics", 1884)
"The unimaginability of the content of a word is no reason, then, to deny it any meaning or to exclude it from usage. That we are nevertheless inclined to do so is probably owing to the fact that we consider words individually and ask about their meaning [in isolation], for which we then adopt a mental picture. Thus a word for which we are lacking a corresponding inner picture will seem to have no content. However, we must always consider a complete sentence. Only in [the context of] the latter do the words really have a meaning. The inner pictures which somehow sway before us (in reading the sentence) need not correspond to the logical components of the judgment. It is enough if the sentence as a whole has a sense; by means of this its parts also receive their content." (Gottlob Frege, "The Foundations of Arithmetic" , 1884)
"In calling arithmetic (algebra, analysis) just a part of logic, I declare already that I take the number-concept to be completely independent of the ideas or intuitions of space and time, that I see it as an immediate product of the pure laws of thought." (Richard Dedekind, "Was sind und was sollen die Zahlen?", 1888)
"In science nothing capable of proof ought to be accepted without proof. Though this demand seems so reasonable yet I cannot regard it as having been met even in […] that part of logic which deals with the theory of numbers. In speaking of arithmetic (algebra, analysis) as a part of logic I mean to imply that I consider the number concept entirely independent of the notions of intuition of space and time, that I consider it an immediate result from the laws of thought." (Richard Dedekind, "Was sind und was sollen die Zahlen?", 1888)
"There is probably no other science which presents such different appearances to one who cultivates it and one who does not, as mathematics. To [the noncultivator] it is ancient, venerable, and complete; a body of dry, irrefutable, unambiguous reasoning. To the mathematician, on the other hand, his science is yet in the purple bloom of vigorous youth, everywhere stretching out after the 'attainable but unattained', and full of the excitement of nascent thoughts; its logic is beset with ambiguities, and its analytic processes, like Bunyan's road, have a quagmire on one side and a deep ditch on the other, and branch off into innumerable by-paths that end in a wilderness." (Charles H Chapman, Bulletin of the New York Mathematical Society 2, 1892)
" […] the naive intuition is not exact, while the refined intuition is not properly intuition at all, but arises through the logical development from axioms considered as perfectly exact." (Felix Klein, [lectures] 1893)
"At the basis of our Symbolic Logic, however represented, whether by words by letters or by diagrams, we shall always find the same state of things. What we ultimately have to do is to break up the entire field before us into a definite number of classes or compartments which are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive." (John Venn, "Symbolic Logic" 2nd Ed., 1894)
"It is not easy to anatomize the constitution and the operations of a mind which makes such an advance in knowledge. Yet we may observe that there must exist in it, in an eminent degree, the elements which compose the mathematical talent. It must possess distinctness of intuition, tenacity and facility in tracing logical connection, fertility of invention, and a strong tendency to generalization." (William Whewell, "History of the Inductive Sciences" Vol. 1, 1894)
"The images which we may form of things are not determined without ambiguity by the requirement that the consequents of the images must be the images of the consequents. Various images of the same objects are possible, and these images may differ in various respects. We should at once denote as inadmissible all images which implicitly contradict the laws of our thought. Hence we postulate in the first place that all our images shall be logically permissible or, briefly, that they shall be permissible. We shall denote as incorrect any permissible images, if their essential relations contradict the relations of external things, i.e. if they do not satisfy our first fundamental requirement. Hence we postulate in the second place that our images shall be correct." (Heinrich Hertz, "The Principles of Mechanics Presented in a New Form", 1894)
"Even one well-made observation will be enough in many cases, just as one well-constructed experiment often suffices for the establishment of a law." (Émile Durkheim, "The Rules of Sociological Method", "The Rules of Sociological Method", 1895)
"It is they who hold the secret of the mysterious property of the mind by which error ministers to truth, and truth slowly but irrevocably prevails. Theirs is the logic of discovery, the demonstration of the advance of knowledge and the development of ideas, which as the earthly wants and passions of men remain almost unchanged, are the charter of progress, and the vital spark in history." (Lord John Acton, "The Study of History", [lecture delivered at Cambridge] 1895)
"[In mathematics] we behold the conscious logical activity of the human mind in its purest and most perfect form. Here we learn to realize the laborious nature of the process, the great care with which it must proceed, the accuracy which is necessary to determine the exact extent of the general propositions arrived at, the difficulty of forming and comprehending abstract concepts; but here we learn also to place confidence in the certainty, scope and fruitfulness of such intellectual activity." (Hermann Helmholtz, "Vorträge und Reden", 1896)
"In mathematics we see the conscious logical activity of our mind in its purest and most perfect form; here is made manifest to us all the labor and the great care with which it progresses, the precision which is necessary to determine exactly the source of the established general theorems, and the difficulty with which we form and comprehend abstract conceptions; but we also learn here to have confidence in the certainty, breadth, and fruitfulness of such intellectual labor." (Hermann von Helmholtz, "Vorträge und Reden", 1896)
"Incidentally, naive intuition, which is in large part an inherited talent, emerges unconsciously from the in-depth study of this or that field of science. The word ‘Anschauung’ has not perhaps been suitably chosen. I would like to include here the motoric sensation with which an engineer assesses the distribution of forces in something he is designing, and even that vague feeling possessed by the experienced number cruncher about the convergence of infinite processes with which he is confronted. I am saying that, in its fields of application, mathematical intuition understood in this way rushes ahead of logical thinking and in each moment has a wider scope than the latter " (Felix Klein, "Über Arithmetisierung der Mathematik", Zeitschrift für mathematischen und naturwissen-schaftlichen Unterricht 27, 1896)
"The ordinary logic has a great deal to say about genera and species, or in our nineteenth century dialect, about classes. Now a class is a set of objects compromising all that stand to one another in a special relation of similarity. But where ordinary logic talks of classes the logic of relatives talks of systems. A system is a set of objects compromising all that stands to one another in a group of connected relations. Induction according to ordinary logic rises from the contemplation of a sample of a class to that of a whole class; but according to the logic of relatives it rises from the contemplation of a fragment of a system to the envisagement of the complete system." (Charles S Peirce, "Cambridge Lectures on Reasoning and the Logic of Things: Detached Ideas on Vitally Important Topics", 1898)
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