"The man of science deals with questions which commonly lie outside of the range of ordinary experience, which often have no immediately discernible relation to the affairs of everyday life, and which concentrate the mind upon apparent abstractions to an extraordinary degree." (Frank W Clarke, "The Man of Science in Practical Affairs", Appletons' Popular Science Monthly Vol. XLV, 1900)
"Brightness and freshness take possession of the mind when it is crossed by the light of principles, shewing the facts of Nature to be organically connected." (John Tyndall, "Six Lectures on Light Delivered in America in 1872-1873" 3rd Ed., 1901)
"New ideas emerge dimly into intuition, come into consciousness from nobody knows where, and become the material on which the mind operates, forging them gradually into consistent doctrine, which can be welded on to existing domains of knowledge. But this process is never complete: a crude connection can always be pointed to by a logician as an indication of the imperfection of human constructions." (Henri Poincaré, "Science and Hypothesis", 1902)
"[,,,] the mind has the faculty of creating symbols, and it is thus that it has constructed the mathematical continuum, which is only a particular system of symbols. The only limit to its power is the necessity of avoiding all contradiction; but the mind only makes use of it when experiment gives a reason for it." (Henri Poincaré, "Science and Hypothesis", 1902)
"We imagine cases, place mental diagrams before our mind's eye, and multiply these cases, until a habit is formed of expecting that always to turn out the case, which has been seen to be the result in all the diagrams. To appeal to such a habit is a very different thing from appealing to any immediate instinct of rationality. That the process of forming a habit of reasoning by the use of diagrams is often performed there is no room for doubt. It is perfectly open to consciousness." (Charles S Peirce, "Fallibility of Reasoning and the Feeling of Rationality", cca. 1902)
"An icon is a representamen of what it represents and for the mind that interprets it as such, by virtue of its being an immediate image, that is to say by virtue of characters which belong to it in itself as a sensible object, and which it would possess just the same were there no object in nature that it resembled, and though it never were interpreted as a sign. It is of the nature of an appearance, and as such, strictly speaking, exists only in consciousness, although for convenience in ordinary parlance and when extreme precision is not called for, we extend the term icon to the outward objects which excite in consciousness the image itself." (Charles S Peirce, "On Existential Graphs, Euler's Diagrams, and Logical", 1903)
"The introduction into geometrical work of conceptions such as the infinite, the imaginary, and the relations of hyperspace, none of which can be directly imagined, has a psychological significance well worthy of examination. It gives a deep insight into the resources and working of the human mind. We arrive at the borderland of mathematics and psychology." (John Theodore Merz, "History of European Thought in the Nineteenth Century", 1903)
"[…] we can only study Nature through our senses - that is […] we can only study the model of Nature that our senses enable our minds to construct; we cannot decide whether that model, consistent though it be, represents truly the real structure of Nature; whether, indeed, there be any Nature as an ultimate reality behind its phenomena." (William C Dampier, "The Recent Development of Physical Science", 1904)
"Confronted with the mystery of the Universe, we are driven to ask if the model our minds have framed at all corresponds with the reality; if, indeed, there be any reality behind the image." (Sir William C Dampier, "The Recent Development of Physical Science", 1904)
"From that time, the universe has steadily become more complex and less reducible to a central control. With as much obstinacy as though it were human, it has insisted on expanding its parts; with as much elusiveness as though it were feminine, it has evaded the attempt to impose on it a single will. Modern science, like modern art, tends, in practice, to drop the dogma of organic unity. Some of the mediaeval habit of mind survives, but even that is said to be yielding before the daily evidence of increasing and extending complexity. The fault, then, was not in man, if he no longer looked at science or art as an organic whole or as the expression of unity. Unity turned itself into complexity, multiplicity, variety, and even contradiction." (Henry Adams, "Mont Saint Michel and Chartres", 1904)
"Mathematical knowledge, therefore, appears to us of value not only in so far as it serves as means to other ends, but for its own sake as well, and we behold, both in its systematic external and internal development, the most complete and purest logical mind-activity, the embodiment of the highest intellect-esthetics." (Alfred Pringsheim, "Ueber Wert und angeblichen Unwert der Mathe- matik", Jahresbencht der Deutschen Mathematiker Vereinigung, Bd 13, 1904)
"The mathematical formula is the point through which all the light gained by science passes in order to be of use to practice; it is also the point in which all knowledge gained by practice, experiment, and observation must be concentrated before it can be scientifically grasped. The more distant and marked the point, the more concentrated will be the light coming from it, the more unmistakable the insight conveyed. All scientific thought, from the simple gravitation formula of Newton, through the more complicated formulae of physics and chemistry, the vaguer so called laws of organic and animated nature, down to the uncertain statements of psychology and the data of our social and historical knowledge, alike partakes of this characteristic, that it is an attempt to gather up the scattered rays of light, the different parts of knowledge, in a focus, from whence it can be again spread out and analyzed, according to the abstract processes of the thinking mind. But only when this can be done with a mathematical precision and accuracy is the image sharp and well-defined, and the deductions clear and unmistakable. As we descend from the mechanical, through the physical, chemical, and biological, to the mental, moral, and social sciences, the process of focalization becomes less and less perfect, - the sharp point, the focus, is replaced by a larger or smaller circle, the contours of the image become less and less distinct, and with the possible light which we gain there is mingled much darkness, the sources of many mistakes and errors. But the tendency of all scientific thought is toward clearer and clearer definition; it lies in the direction of a more and more extended use of mathematical measurements, of mathematical formulae." (John T Merz, "History of European Thought in the 19th Century" Vol. 1, 1904)
"The mind of man, learning consciously and unconsciously lessons of experience, gradually constructs a mental image of its surroundings - as the mariner draws a chart of strange coasts to guide him in future voyages, and to enable those that follow after him to sail the same seas with ease and safety." (William C Dampier, "The Recent Development of Physical Science" , 1904)
"The most ordinary things are to philosophy a source of insoluble puzzles. In order to explain our perceptions it constructs the concept of matter and then finds matter quite useless either for itself having or for causing perceptions in a mind. With infinite ingenuity it constructs a concept of space or time and then finds it absolutely impossible that there be objects in this space or that processes occur during this time [...] The source of this kind of logic lies in excessive confidence in the so-called laws of thought." (Ludwig E Boltzmann, "On Statistical Mechanics", 1904)
"We can only study Nature through our senses – that is […] we can only study the model of Nature that our senses enable our minds to construct; we cannot decide whether that model, consistent though it be, represents truly the real structure of Nature; whether, indeed, there be any Nature as an ultimate reality behind its phenomena." (Sir William C Dampier, "The Recent Development of Physical Science", 1904)
"It is a matter of primary importance in the cultivation of those sciences in which truth is discoverable by the human intellect that the investigator should be free, independent, unshackled in his movement; that he should be allowed and enabled to fix his mind intently, nay, exclusively, on his special object, without the risk of being distracted every other minute in the process and progress of his inquiry by charges of temerariousness, or by warnings against extravagance or scandal." (John H Newman, "The Idea of a University Defined and Illustrated", 1905)
"So is not mathematical analysis then not just a vain game of the mind? To the physicist it can only give a convenient language; but isn't that a mediocre service, which after all we could have done without; and, it is not even to be feared that this artificial language be a veil, interposed between reality and the physicist's eye? Far from that, without this language most of the initimate analogies of things would forever have remained unknown to us; and we would never have had knowledge of the internal harmony of the world, which is, as we shall see, the only true objective reality." (Henri Poincaré, "The Value of Science", 1905)
"The chief end of mathematical instruction is to develop certain powers of the mind, and among these the intuition is not the least precious. By it the mathematical world comes in contact with the real world, and even if pure mathematics could do without it, it would always be necessary to turn to it to bridge the gulf between symbol and reality. The practician will always need it, and for one mathematician there are a hundred practicians. However, for the mathematician himself the power is necessary, for while we demonstrate by logic, we create by intuition; and we have more to do than to criticize others’ theorems, we must invent new ones, this art, intuition teaches us." (Henri Poincaré, "The Value of Science", 1905)
"The forceps of our minds are clumsy forceps, and crush the truth a little in taking hold of it." (Herbert G Wells, "Scepticism of the Instrument: A Modern Utopia", 1905)
"This making or imagining of models (not necessarily or usually a material model, but a conceptual model) is a recognised way of arriving at an understanding of recondite and ultra-sensual occurring say in the ether or elsewhere." (Hugh MacColl, Mind: a quarterly review of psychology and philosophy Vol. 14, 1905)
"Mathematics makes constant demands upon the imagination, calls for picturing in space (of one, two, three dimensions), and no considerable success can be attained without a growing ability to imagine all the various possibilities of a given case, and to make them defile before the mind's eye." (Jacob W A Young, "The Teaching of Mathematics", 1907)
"Materialism is the recognition of 'objects in themselves' , or outside the mind; ideas and sensations are copies of images of those objects." (Vladimir Lenin, "Materialism and Empirio-Criticism", 1908)
"What are the mathematical entities to which we attribute this character of beauty and elegance, which are capable of developing in us a kind of aesthetic emotion? Those whose elements are harmoniously arranged so that the mind can, without effort, take in the whole without neglecting the details. This harmony is at once a satisfaction to out esthetic requirements, and an assistance to the mind which supports and guides." (Henri Poincaré, 1908)
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