"There are two famous labyrinths where our reason very often goes astray. One concerns the great question of the free and the necessary, above all in the production and the origin of Evil. The other consists in the discussion of continuity, and of the indivisibles which appear to be the elements thereof, and where the consideration of the infinite must enter in." (Gottfried W Leibniz, "Theodicy: Essays on the Goodness of God and Freedom of Man and the Origin of Evil", 1710)
"Every quantity which, keeping the same expression, increases or diminishes continually (non per saltum), is called a variable, and that which, with the same expression, keeps the same value, is called fixed or constant." (Pierre Varignon, "Eclaircissemens sur l'Analyse des Infinimens Petits", 1725)
"In fact, a similar principle of hardness cannot exist; it is a chimera which offends that general law which nature constantly observes in all its operations; I speak of that immutable and perpetual order, established since the creation of the Universe, that can be called the LAW OF CONTINUITY, by virtue of which everything that takes place, takes place by infinitely small degrees. It seems that common sense dictates that no change can take place at a jump; natura non operatur per saltion; nothing can pass from one extreme to the other without passing through all the degrees in between." (Johann Bernoulli, "Discours sur les Loix de la Communication du Mouvement", 1727)
"In the same way, this should also happen with regard to time, namely, that between a preceding continuous time & the next following there should be a single instant, which is the indivisible boundary of either. There cannot be two instants, as we intimated above, contiguous to one another; but between one instant & another there must always intervene some interval of continuous time divisible indefinitely. In the same way, in any quantity which lasts for a continuous interval of time, there must be obtained a series of magnitudes of such a kind that to each instant of time there is its corresponding magnitude; & this magnitude connects the one that precedes with the one that follows it, & differs from the former by some definite magnitude. Nay even in that class of quantities, in which we cannot have two magnitudes at the same time, this very point can be deduced far more clearly, namely, that there cannot be any sudden change from one to another. For at that instant, when the sudden change should take place, & the series be broken by some momentary definite addition, two -magnitudes would necessarily be obtained, namely, the last of the first series & the first of the next. Now this very point is still more clearly seen in those states of things, in which on the one hand there must be at any instant some state so that at no time can the thing be without some state of the kind, whilst on the other hand it can never have two states of the kind simultaneously." (Roger J Boscovich, "Philosophiae Naturalis Theoria Redacta Ad Unicam Legera Virium in Natura Existentium, 1758)
"The Law of Continuity, as we here deal with it, consists in the idea that [...] any quantity, in passing from one magnitude to another, must pass through all intermediate magnitudes of the same class. The same notion is also commonly expressed by saying that the passage is made by intermediate stages or steps; [...] the idea should be interpreted as follows: single states correspond to single instants of time, but increments or decrements only to small areas of continuous time." (Roger J Boscovich, "Philosophiae Naturalis Theoria Redacta Ad Unicam Legera Virium in Natura Existentium", 1758)
"There really must be, in the commencement of contact, in that indivisible instant of time which is an indivisible limit between the continuous time that preceded the contact & that subsequent to it (just in the same way as a point in geometry is an indivisible limit between two segments of a continuous line), a change of velocity taking place suddenly, without any passage through intermediate stages; & this violates the Law of Continuity, which absolutely denies the possibility of a passage from one magnitude to another without passing through intermediate stages." (Roger J Boscovich, "Philosophiae Naturalis Theoria Redacta Ad Unicam Legera Virium in Natura Existentium, 1758)
"Any change involves at least two conditions, one preceding and one following, which are distinct from one another in such a way that the difference between the former and the latter can be established. Now the law of continuity prohibits the thing which is being changed to transcend abruptly from the former to the latter. It must pass through an intermediate condition which is as little distinct from the previous as from the subsequent one. And because the difference between this intermediate condition and the previous condition can be established still, there must be an intermediate condition between these two as well, and this must continue in the same way, until the difference between the previous condition and the one immediately succeeding it vanishes. As long as the set of these intermediate conditions can be established, every difference between one and the next can be established as well: hence their set must become larger than any given set if these differences shall vanish, and thus we imagine infinitely many conditions where one differs from the next to an infinitely small degree." (Abraham G Kästner, "Anfangsgründe der Analysis des Unendlichen" [Beginnings of the Analysis of the Infinite"], 1766)
"It is held because of this law in particular, that no change may occur suddenly, but rather that every change always passes by infinitely small stages, of which the trajectory of a point in a curved line provides a first example." (Abraham G Kästner, "Anfangsgründe der Analysis des Unendlichen" ["Beginnings of the Analysis of the Infinite"], 1766)
"Whoever wishes to extend this law [of continuity] to the real must justify his inferences by a law other than that, the suspicion remaining that he took images for things." (Abraham G Kästner, "Anfangsgründe der Analysis des Unendlichen" ["Beginnings of the Analysis of the Infinite"], 1766)
"[continuity] could be only appearance, and in this case Euler’s entire argument against the atoms would disappear; for one would be justified to apply the law of continuity only where experience shows that it agrees with the phenomena. [...]. The law of continuity thus belongs to the clothes of things which we must need rely on wherever reality seems impenetrably cloaked with it, but which we do not consider to be reality itself, and which we may still less cloak with things which do not serve us to see them." (Johann S T Gehler, "Physikalisches Wörterbuch" Bd. 4, 1798)
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