"[...] reality is blocked by form and image." (Jalaluddin Rumi, "Masnavi-ye Ma'navi" Vol. I ["Spritual Verses"], 1262-1264)
"Nor is it enough to say that the intelligible notions formed by the active intellect subsist somehow in the phantasmata" (mental image), which are certainly intrinsic to us; for as we have already observed in treating the passive intellect, objects only become actually intelligible when abstracted from phantasmata; so that merely by way of the phantasmata, we cannot attribute the work of the active intellect to ourselves" (St. Thomas Aquinas, "De Anima" III, cca. 1268) [On Aristotle's phantasmata]
"[…] one ought to say that one may perceive the image of a thing in two ways. In one way, as the object of cognition. In this way it is true that one perceiving only the thing's image does not cognize the thing; for example, someone seeing the image of Hercules painted on a wall does not thereby either see or cognize Hercules. In another way, as the basis [ratio] of cognizing, and in this way the claim is not true. For through only a species perceived of a thing the thing is truly cognized - as a stone is truly seen through its sensible species alone, received in the eye, and is truly intellectively cognized through its intelligible species alone, received in intellect." (Thomas Aquinas, "Summa Theologiae", cca. 1266-1273)
"One who doesn't perceive the essence and quiddity of a thing, but only its image, can't know the thing. For one who has seen only a picture of Hercules doesn't know Hercules. A human being, however, perceives nothing of a thing, except only its image, that is, a species received through the senses, which is an image of the thing and not the thing itself. For not the stone but a species of the stone is in the soul." (Thomas Aquinas, "Summa Theologiae", cca. 1266-1273)
"Nor is it enough to say that the intelligible notions formed by the active intellect subsist somehow in the phantasmata" (mental image), which are certainly intrinsic to us; for as we have already observed in treating the passive intellect, objects only become actually intelligible when abstracted from phantasmata; so that merely by way of the phantasmata, we cannot attribute the work of the active intellect to ourselves" (St. Thomas Aquinas, "De Anima" III, cca. 1268) [On Aristotle's phantasmata]
"The attention will tend toward the species either in such a way that it would not pass beyond so as to attend to the object, or in such a way that it would pass beyond. If in the first way, then the thing will not be seen in itself but only its image will be seen as if it were the thing itself." (Peter J Olivi, "Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum", cca. 1280- 1282)
"Such an image or fictum was postulated for no other reason than to supposit for a thing in such a way that both a proposition might be composed out of it and it might be common to things. For these are denied of things." (William Ockham, "Expositio in librum Perihermenias", cca, 1321-1324)
"When the Soul wants to experience something she throws out an image in front of her and then steps into it." (Eckhart von Hochheim [aka Meister Eckhart] cca. 14th century)
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