14 April 2022

On Reasoning: Demonstrative vs Plausible Reasoning

"In metaphysical reasoning, the process is always short. The conclusion is but a step or two, seldom more, from the first principles or axioms on which it is grounded, and the different conclusions depend not one upon another.
It is otherwise in mathematical reasoning. Here the field has no limits. One proposition leads on to another, that to a third, and so on without end. If it should be asked, why demonstrative reasoning has so wide a field in mathematics, while, in other abstract subjects, it is confined within very narrow limits, I conceive this is chiefly owing to the nature of quantity, […] mathematical quantities being made up of parts without number, can touch in innumerable points, and be compared in innumerable different ways." (Thomas Reid, "Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man", 1785)

"Mathematicians have, in many cases, proved some things to be possible and others to be impossible, which, without demonstration, would not have been believed […] Mathematics afford many instances of impossibilities in the nature of things, which no man would have believed, if they had not been strictly demonstrated. Perhaps, if we were able to reason demonstratively in other subjects, to as great extent as in mathematics, we might find many things to be impossible, which we conclude, without hesitation, to be possible." (Thomas Reid, "Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man", 1785)

"The mathematician pays not the least regard either to testimony or conjecture, but deduces everything by demonstrative reasoning, from his definitions and axioms. Indeed, whatever is built upon conjecture, is improperly called science; for conjecture may beget opinion, but cannot produce knowledge." (Thomas Reid, "Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man", 1785)

"It has been said, often enough and certainly with good reason, that teaching mathematics affords a unique opportunity to teach demonstrative reasoning. I wish to add that teaching mathematics also affords an excellent opportunity to teach plausible reasoning. A student of mathematics should learn, of course, demonstrative reasoning; it is his profession and the distinctive mark of his science. Yet he should also learn plausible reasoning; this is the kind of reasoning on which his creative work will mainly depend, The general student should get a taste of demonstrative reasoning; he may have little opportunity to use it directly, but he should acquire a standard with which he can compare alleged evidence of all sorts aimed at him in modern life. He needs, however, in all his endeavors plausible reasoning. At any rate, an ambitious teacher of mathematics should teach both kinds of reasoning to both kinds of students." (George Pólya, "On Plausible Reasoning", Proceedings of the International Congress of Mathematics, 1950)

"Demonstrative reasoning is safe, beyond controversy, and final. Plausible reasoning is hazardous, controversial, and provisional. Demonstrative reasoning penetrates the sciences just as far as mathematics does, but it is in itself (as mathematics is in itself) incapable of yielding essentially new knowledge about the world around us. Anything new that we learn about the world involves plausible reasoning, which is the only kind of reasoning, for which we care in everyday affairs. Demonstrative reasoning has rigid standards, codified and clarified by logic (formal or demonstrative logic), which is the theory of demonstrative reasoning. The standards of plausible reasoning are fluid, and there is no theory of such reasoning that could be compared to demonstrative logic in clarity or would command comparable consensus." (George Pólya, "Mathematics and Plausible Reasoning", 1954)

"Demonstrative reasoning penetrates the sciences just as far as mathematics does, but it is in itself (as mathematics is in itself) incapable of yielding essentially new knowledge about the world around us. Anything new that we learn about the world involves plausible reasoning, which is the only kind of reasoning for which we care in everyday affairs." (George Pólya, "Induction and Analogy in Mathematics", 1954)

"From the outset it was clear that the two kinds of reasoning have different tasks. From the outset. they appeared very different: demonstrative reasoning as definite, final, 'machinelike'; and plausible reasoning as vague, provisional, specifically 'human'. Now we may see the difference a little more distinctly. In opposition to demonstrative inference, plausible inference leaves indeterminate a highly relevant point: the 'strength' or the 'weight' of the conclusion. This weight may depend not only on clarified grounds such as those expressed in the premises, hut also on unclarified unexpressed grounds somewhere on the background of the person who draws the conclusion. A person has a background, a machine has not. Indeed, you can build a machine to draw demonstrative conclusions for you, but I think you can never build a machine that will draw plausible inferences." (George Pólya, "Mathematics and Plausible Reasoning", 1954)

"Demonstrative reasoning differs from plausible reasoning just as the fact differs from the supposition, just as actual existence differs from the possibility of existence. Demonstrative reasoning is reliable, incontrovertible and final. Plausible reasoning is conditional, arguable and oft-times risky." (Yakov Khurgin, "Did You Say Mathematics?", 1974)

"In mathematics the problem of the essence of proof has been thoroughly worked out and every mathematician must master the methods of demonstrative reasoning. Appropriate rules have been established for this purpose. These rules and the concepts of rigour and exactitude of reasoning vary from century to century, and at the present time every mathematician knows the level of rigour of modern mathematics." (Yakov Khurgin, "Did You Say Mathematics?", 1974)

"Mathematical knowledge is fixed securely by means of demonstrative reasoning, but the approaches to such knowledge are strewn with plausible modes of reasoning." (Yakov Khurgin, "Did You Say Mathematics?", 1974)

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